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Integrated conservation and development projects have been widely promoted across Africa. These often 
involve public-private partnerships targeting tourism. Despite this encouragement, there are conflicting 
views regarding their impact. Conservancies have emerged bordering the Maasai Mara National Reserve 
in Kenya. These conservancies are the latest in a series of attempts by residents to capture benefits and 
developmental assistance from the safari industry. Drawing upon 19-months of fieldwork, the thesis 
examines the contentious relationship between conservancies and development through a case study of 
Olare Motorogi and Naboisho Conservancies. The thesis analyses diverging interpretations of 
development between and within stakeholder groups active in the study site. Three key development 
indicators are identified: basic needs, economic implications and livelihood security. These indicators are 
used to assess how the conservancies are perceived to be impacting upon development, what motivating 
factors for involvement are, and whether this affects society evenly. 
Findings suggest that conservancies and their affiliated organisations are now widely seen as the main 
development actors within the study site. This is largely through the creation of community projects, 
income-earning opportunities and grazing schemes. The involvement of conservancy-based tourism 
businesses in these development initiatives suggests that inclusive business models are being adopted. 
There is still a degree of discontent regarding conservancies, especially within neighbouring communities. 
Successful project outputs do not always result in successful outcomes. Without steps to ensure that these 
outcomes are realised, community projects may be more beneficial for tourism marketing than they are for 
neighbouring residents. Significant disparities also remain in income distribution, although economic 
benefits accruing from the conservancies are now distributed more evenly than they were in previous 
community-based tourism attempts in the Mara. The most emotive issue amongst local residents is access 
to essential resources for the dominant livelihood, pastoralism. During the research period, more 
comprehensive grazing schemes were introduced which simulate communal grazing systems. These 
practices would otherwise have been lost following land subdivision. Some pastoralists maintain that fines 
for grazing illegally continue to outweigh other benefits, although others assess that they are beginning to 
see that conservancies can have a positive impact on their livelihood. 
Conservancy businesses adopting more inclusive strategies constitute a more conscious form of 
capitalism. Motivations for this centre around the importance of place, and incorporate an 
Africonsciousness. As such, the conservancies exemplify Africapitalism, a new concept within the 
broader inclusive business arena. To date, the effectiveness of inclusive capitalism as a development agent 
has been inconclusive due to insufficient data. This thesis begins to address this broad literature gap, and 
also expands research on Africapitalism to a new industry. Although a positive relationship with 
development is widely perceived within the study site, the sustainability of the conservancies is 
questioned in the face of multiple prevailing threats. These challenges can be recognised and mitigated 
against, but the future of the Maasai Mara Conservancies – and their ability to continue being 
development actors – remains uncertain. 
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1 Introduction       
The Maasai Mara is the heart of Kenya’s safari tourism industry. Here the “big five” 
roam free, living as they have done for centuries together with Maasai pastoralists. 
The Maasai Mara National Reserve (MMNR) is a huge draw for tourists but as a 
result it is under great stress – a very different image to those portrayed in wildlife 
documentaries. Wildlife is harassed, the environment is being persistently degraded 
and local Maasai people, who bear the brunt of conservation efforts, often do not see 
any of the profit. As one Maasai elder in focus group 22 in Mpuaai village explained: 
We live with the wildlife and put up with the problems that they bring when 
they attack our cows. We have always lived with the wildlife but we are 
getting tired. The white people come to see the lions and pay a lot of money 
but what have we been given? Nothing. And the lions come on the land that 
we own. For us to continue accepting this we need to get some of the benefits 
that these white people bring; we need to start eating [getting some of the 
money]. We want this for us to continue and for development. If that doesn’t 
happen, we do not want this conservation thing, we do not want the predators, 
we do not want the tourists driving over our land; we will not want any of it. 
We will see what these conservancies bring us and then we will decide what 
to do. 
The community land bordering the MMNR is essential for wildlife dispersal (Reid et 
al., 2003). When it was subdivided as part of the national plan to individualise all 
land in Kenya, an opportunity arose to develop conservation areas through public-
private partnerships between Maasai landowners and tour operators. The resultant 
conservancies - which aim to combine conservation, tourism and development goals 
- have increased in popularity over the last ten years and now cover 61% of the 
former Koiyaki Group Ranch (Bedelian, 2014). On a larger scale, there are now over 
140 conservancies in Kenya (I 104).1 Despite this proliferation, there is a lack of in-
depth empirical assessments of such interventions, either for conservation or 
development outcomes (Hughes and Flintan, 2001; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; 
Wilkie et al., 2006; Barrett et al., 2011; Ferraro, 2011). 
This thesis examines perceptions of the relationship between conservancies and 
development in the Maasai Mara. To begin, this chapter will briefly introduce the 
topic and study site, detail the methodologies used. The following chapter will then 
detail the creation story of the conservancies in the Mara as well as their structure. 
                                                
1 This refers to interview number 104. The coding system will be explained in the methods section. 
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This chapter will then develop a literature framework for the thesis by examining the 
different components that make up the conservancy concept in this case study.   
1.1 Introducing the Topic 
The topic for this thesis was inspired by Duffy’s (2002) book A Trip Too Far. I 
disagreed with her conclusion that tourism could not contribute to sustainable 
development because tourism is a capitalist industry. Simultaneously, calls for 
understanding development impacts from the grassroots level are increasing (Telfer, 
2002, Le et al., 2012). In the context of the Maasai Mara, Duffy’s simplistic and 
theoretical conclusion made me want to ask people directly affected by 
conservancies what their opinions are.  
The focus of this thesis is to examine grassroots perceptions of development in order 
to explore what development means to the various stakeholders2 active within the 
study site. This is essential to then assess the impact that conservancies are perceived 
to be having. The thoughts of multiple stakeholders were sought so that a broad base 
of opinions could be gauged. This includes tourism partners,3 camp managers, 
conservancy mangers, community members (including community leaders, men, 
women and youth), NGOs and researchers. 
Stakeholder theory illustrates that all stakeholders have intrinsic value and that the 
rights of one stakeholder must not be overwhelmed by the rights of others (Fennell 
and Weaver, 2005: 386). Whilst theoretically sound, this theory was not used for this 
research because of the sheer number of different stakeholders involved who all have 
vastly different objectives and values to their counterparts (as discussed by Robson 
and Robson, 1996). The use of stakeholder theory, which demands the inclusion of 
all, would have resulted in extensive networks that would have been unmanageable 
and thus it would have been more of a constraint than a catalyst (Fennell and 
Weaver, 2005: 386-7). Despite this, as noted above, multiple stakeholder groupings 
                                                
2 A stakeholder is defined as “any group or individual who can affect or who is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 25). 
3 Tourism partners are the operators who are members of the conservancies and run camps within the 
conservancies. When referring to people, this term is used for camp owners or the country directors of 
companies that own these camps. 
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were engaged in this research. Theories that have influenced this research include 
political ecology and anthropology of development.  
I chose to focus my study on conservancies because they are rapidly increasing in 
popularity across Kenya, but despite their widely advertised community-based 
approach and development role, these claims are to-date unsubstantiated. The Mara 
in particular was selected because it is a world-famous tourism destination. East 
African safaris draw in tourists through marketing permeated with a sense of 
encountering  “nature in the raw”, particularly through emotive pictures of animals in 
their natural habitats (Norton, 1996; Bryman, 2004: 46-7). The Mara in particular has 
been the focus of the West’s fascination since the early part of the 20th Century, 
reinforced by Hollywood feature films like Out of Africa, nature documentaries such 
as BBC’s Big Cat Diaries and Disney films (ibid). Whilst such media can result in 
the disneyfication of African wildlife (see Beardsworth and Bryman, 2001; Rogers, 
2012), it is undeniably a big pull for tourists.  
Despite its economic importance nationally, tourism in the Mara ecosystem has 
received extensive criticism regarding its environmental impact and inequitable 
benefit distribution to local communities4 (Roe et al., 1997; Honey, 2008). Through a 
combination of local demands for direct benefits from tourism, operators’ desire to 
develop a different product in the area and conservationists5 vying to “save” part of 
the famous Mara-Serengeti ecosystem, conservancies have emerged. Conservancies 
in Kenya adopt various forms and structures, as will be discussed in chapter two. In 
the Maasai Mara the conservancies are formed through public-private partnerships 
whereby Maasai landowners collectively lease their land to tourism partners. This 
partnership has multiple aims. These include increasing and improving conservation, 
developing a higher quality tourism product and ensuring that benefits are returned 
directly to Maasai communities. Despite these admiral goals, the extent to which 
                                                
4 The heterogeneity and complexity of “communities” is acknowledged, as well as difficulties in 
defining “local” (as discussed by Naguran, 1999). These issues will be discussed further in chapter 
three.  
5Here the term “conservationists” refers to the collective whose focus is on conservation. Whilst this 
may include some tourism professionals, not all gain economic benefits from conservation. The 
conservationists affiliated with the Mara are predominantly white Kenyans and expatriate males either 
in late twenties-early thirties or over sixty, but this is not exclusive.  
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Figure 1.1. Location of the Maasai Mara within Maasailand (red 
shading) 
 
conservancies influence development, in the opinion of those directly affected, is yet 
to be determined. 
The conservancies represent a capitalist industry, but they are an example of 
businesses trying to undertake a more conscious and sustainable approach. As 
chapter 8 will discuss, the term Africapitalism is now being used for such attempts. 
Africapitalism is a concept coined by Tony Elumelu and it emanates from the 
banking sector in Nigeria. It differs from other conscious or sustainable capitalism 
ideals by bringing back the importance of place, in this case Africa, into responsible 
business practices. Whilst this thesis specifically examines grassroots perceptions of 
development, and the impact of conservancies upon this, it is simultaneously 
assessing the broader topic of grassroots perceptions of sustainable Africapitalism – 
hence the title of this thesis. 
1.2 The Study Site   
The conservancies and 
communities that make up the 
case study for this thesis are 
located within Maasailand. This 
area covers south-western 
Kenya and northern Tanzania 
and is where the Maasai people 
largely reside (see figure 1.1).6 
More specifically, the study site 
is within the Maasai Mara 
ecosystem, Narok-West 
County, Kenya. Counties 
replaced districts following the 
devolution set out in Kenya’s 
2010 constitution. 
 
From the 1970s until the 2000s, 
                                                
6 Unless otherwise stated, all maps are made from Google Earth or ArcGIS by the author. 
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Narok District was subdivided into group ranches. Figure 1.2 shows the location of 
these group ranches (black borders) in the south-west of Narok District. The 
conservancies that form the study site for this research are within the former Koiyaki 
Group Ranch, which borders the Maasai Mara National Reserve (MMNR). 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Conservancies within Former group ranches in the south-west of Narok District 
In 2011-2013, when the research was undertaken, there were eight conservancies 
functioning in the former Olchorro Oirouwa, Lemek, Olkinyei and Koiyaki Group 
Ranches (see figure 1.3). Together these conservancies comprise over 90,000ha, 
which is over 60% of the area within the Maasai Mara National Reserve. During this 




Figure 1.3 Location of the conservancies within the former group ranches 
More specifically, the study site (shaded yellow in figure 1.4) comprises Olare Orok, 
Motorogi and Naboisho Conservancies and their surrounding homesteads. This totals 
542km2. For the research period I lived in Olesere village. My house and nearby 
larger settlements are also located on figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4 Location of the study site (yellow shading), large settlements and my house (red house symbol) 
within the former Koiyaki Group Ranch. 
The area around the north eastern tip of Naboisho Conservancy, to the east of my 
house in Olesere, was not included within the study site. This is for topographical 
reasons as it is the location of the Pardamat Hills, where access is very difficult and 
7 
 
few people live. The border of the study site skims the western lower slopes of these 
hills. To the east of the Pardamat Hills there are more villages, including Enchorro 
Sidan and Ilkarkar, but these were deemed to be beyond the desired study area. Aside 
from this range of hills, the remainder of the study site is relatively flat savannah 
made up of a mosaic of grasslands spotted with acacia trees and bushes, especially 
along river courses. The area to the north of Motorogi Conservancy was also not 
included within the study site because residents in this area are mainly affiliated with 
Mara North Conservancy (MNC). Initially it was hoped that the research could cover 
the whole of Koiyaki Group Ranch. However, early into the research period it was 
decided to exclude Mara North Conservancy and its neighbouring communities so as 
to concentrate on a deeper, more thorough analysis around Olare Orok, Motorogi and 
Naboisho Conservancies. 
1.2.1 Population Dynamics 
The population dynamics of the study site have changed rapidly and significantly 
over time. Lamprey and Reid (2004: 1009-10) mapped out this change in and around 
Koiyaki Group Ranch. Their maps from 1967 (figure 1.5), 1974 (figure 1.6), 1983 
(figure 1.7), and 1999 (figure 1.8) show this growth. The black dots represent 
homesteads and white dots temporary livestock camps. 
Figure 1.5. Population dynamic of Koiyaki in 1967 Figure 1.6. Population dynamic of Koiyaki in 1974 
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Figure 1.7. Population dynamics of Koiyaki in 1983 Figure 1.8. Population dynamics of Koiyaki in 1999 
From 1999 the population has continued to boom, with an estimated annual growth 
rate of 4.4% (Lamprey and Reid, 2004). The quantity of homesteads is increasing at 
a rate even higher than population growth due to the splitting up of settlements 
following land individualisation and in-migration. Bedelian (2014: 212) reports a 
37.9% increase in homesteads in Koiyaki in the five years between 2006 and 2011. 
Figure 1.9 shows the 228 homesteads mapped as part of the homestead census 
undertaken as part of this thesis7 in 2013. The continued proliferation of homesteads 













Figure 1.9 Homesteads within the study site portion of Koiyaki in 2013  
                                                
7 This will be detailed further shortly in the methods section. 
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The location of homesteads has also changed. Comparing figure 1.8 with 1.9 shows 
that some villages have relocated following the creation of the conservancies, 
especially those that were previously located inside Olare Orok. Habitation is 
restricted within conservancy regulations. 
Residents within the study site are predominantly Maasai. Few ethnic groups have 
attracted as much attention as the Maasai. Yet although anthropologists have written 
volumes about the Maasai, they have failed to puncture the image created by more 
romantically inclined observers (Adams and McShane, 1992: 41). In his book 
“Through Masai8 Land” published in 1885, Thomson described his first encounter:  
We soon set our eyes upon the dreaded warriors that had so long been the 
subject of my waking dreams, and I could not but involuntarily exclaim, 
‘what splendid fellows!’ as I surveyed a band of the most peculiar race of 
men to be found in Africa (Thomson, 1885: 160). 
The Maasai are a pastoral people and as such, livestock form the basis of their 
economic livelihood as well as being a critical element in ethnic self-definition 
(Mwangi, 2006: 159). Over time, under trying times such as drought or disease, some 
Maasai periodically fell out of the pastoral enterprise (Waller, 2000). However, as 
soon as possible these individuals rebuilt their herds and switched back to the 
pastoral mode (ibid). Over the last few decades the Maasai have increasingly become 
confronted with formal markets, state intervention, immigrants, land pressures, and 
an engagement in agriculture, trade and formal employment (Mwangi, 2006: 159). In 
the face of these pressures, the Maasai appear to be adapting and diversifying as far 
and as fast as the economic, ecological and political environment will allow 
(Western, 2009: viii). Despite this, “being people of cattle” is still core to their self-
identification (Mwangi, 2006: 159). As will be examined in chapters two and six, 
there are conflicting and contrasting interpretations of the environmental and 
economic implications of pastoralism. 9 
                                                
8 Some write Maasai with just a single a, especially when referring to the national reserve. 
Grammatically, it should have double “aa”.   
9 Pastoralism refers to the “extensive production of herbivorous livestock using pasture or browse in 
which herd mobility is a central management strategy” (Notenbaert et al., 2012) but many definitions 
are broader. This will be discussed more at the beginning of chapter six. In this thesis, the livestock 
keeping practices by residents within the study site are referred to as pastoralism. 
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In terms of structure, the Maasai are divided into 12 sections or sub-tribes (see figure 
1.10). The Maa term for these sections is iloshon in plural or olosho in singular. Each 
section occupies a specified territory (ibid). The study site is part of the “Olosho loo 
lpurko”, or the “Purko Maasai area”. The structure of Maasai society is based on 
these sections as each has its own autonomous political structure based on an age-
grade system (ibid). Traditionally, power and influence were acquired through 
membership in age sets (ibid: 162), but wealth and education are increasingly 
becoming determining factors. 
 
1.3 Methodology       
A case study research design is multi-faceted and can comprise a wide variety of 
approaches (Cavaye, 1996). I did not want to enter the research with set pre-
determined underpinnings, my priority was to see what was important on the ground 
and work from there. In this instance, an interpretivist approach was taken. This 
involves researchers reading the culture and interpreting the multiplicities of 
meaning expressed or hidden in the society (Geertz, 1994). Interpretivism is based on 
principles of social constructivism but does not involve as close an analysis as 
abductive approaches (Blaikie, 2000). These were deemed to be beyond my ability as 
Figure 1.10. Maasai Iloshon (Bendell, 2013) with the study site located by a yellow star 
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an ‘outsider’10 within the time constraints of the research. In essence, several 
different methodological approaches were used to attempt to see the world from the 
multiple stand-points held by stakeholders within the study site who became  
research participants. This included community members and leaders, NGO 
employees, conservancy personnel, researchers, tourism partners and camp 
employees. 
Research methods are determined by the type of data needed to answer the research 
questions (Blaikie, 2000: 22). The research questions for this thesis largely required 
primary data but secondary and tertiary data was also used to a minor extent. 
Secondary data was used to analyse how livestock numbers within the study site 
have changed over time, and tertiary to develop the literature framework for the 
study in chapter two. A major strength of conducting primary research is that the 
researcher has control over the collection process and thus is able to ensure the 
quality and appropriateness of the data (ibid). A variety of primary methods were 
used throughout the 19-month research period from September 2011 to March 2013, 
the majority of which were qualitative. To support this, quantitative surveys were 
used to establish rudimentary baseline data across the study site and to collect 
household and financial information. Qualitative techniques were favoured because 
of their in-depth nature (Bryman, 2004). The broad approach to this research was 
ethnographic, but within this, multiple data collection methods were utilised. For all 
methods used, access was gained to as wide a range of individuals who were relevant 
to the research as possible (as discussed by Bryman, 2004: 414). This enabled many 
different perspectives to be incorporated. 
1.3.1 Participant Observation 
Within participant observation there are multiple classifications. As I built a Maasai 
house, lived within a homestead and actively participated within communities in the 
study site, I would advocate that I fell into Gold’s (1958) participant-as-observer 
category. I chose to undertake participant observation in this way so that I could be 
immersed within a community under investigation, rather than just visiting during 
the day. By doing this I was able to witness aspects of daily life that would otherwise 
                                                
10 The insider-outsider positionality continuum will be discussed further shortly. 
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have been missed, and I could take advantage of unexpected interview opportunities 
that availed themselves in my home-life. In addition to living in a homestead (which 
was home to one man, his three wives and their 18 children), the house building 
process was a useful way to integrate myself into the community. A dozen ladies 
helped by collecting wood and water, and by smearing the walls. One of these ladies, 
Kijoolu Soit, continued to help around the house throughout the research period, 
washing clothes and re-smearing the house when necessary (see figure 1.11). Her 
friendship provided a vital route through which the roles, responsibilities and 
challenges facing Maasai women could be discussed. Further, her companionship 
opened the door for interesting in-depth informal conversations with her friends and 
family.  
 
Nine months of language training in Swahili and Maa were undertaken prior to the 
research period. This was essential for participant observation and informal 
discussions. Two female research assistants were used during the fieldwork period: 
Resian Letuluo from March 2012 to June 2012 and Lorna Serseri from October 2012 
to February 2013. Whilst Resian and Lorna assisted with formal data collection 
undertaken in Maa, the language training enabled a much deeper societal integration. 
Many vital snippets of information were gathered from informal conversations whilst 
giving people lifts, shopping or just sitting having a cup of tea. A grasp of the 
language also meant that I could understand interesting little comments made during 
Figure 1.11 Kijoolu Soit (right) and two other ladies smearing my house.  
Photo: C. Courtney 
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focus groups. One such instance was when women whispered to each other that I 
know them too well and so they need to be careful what they say to me. This will be 
discussed in section 4.7.  
Participant observations were not restricted to community settings. During the 
research period I also participated in several meetings, presentations and conferences 
of varying scales where observations were also made. Focus groups, semi-structured 
interviews, visual ethnography and three quantitative surveys were also undertaken. 
1.3.2 Focus Groups 
The focus group method is a beneficial way to gather a substantial amount of data 
about an area of interest (Cameron, 2005). Sometimes the power of the focus group 
comes with the interactions between participants who talk to each other, build 
consensus, or debate views because this adds richness to the data (ibid). Another 
reason why focus groups were chosen as one of the key methods for this study is that 
it worked well in Koiyaki during my previous research (Courtney, 2009).  
In total 29 focus groups were held with community members in and around 11 
villages in the study site (located on figure 2.12). Focus group respondents were not 
selected, convenience sampling was used (Bryman, 2004). Other than gender 
differentiation, the invitation was open and word was spread widely. Although a 
group of 10-15 was optimal, no-one was ever turned away from these sessions and 
FG 19 had 40 attendees. These sessions were used to discuss issues regarding 
development, the conservancies, and more specifically the role of the conservancies 
in development. Throughout the thesis references to specific focus groups are cited 
as FG followed by the session number(s). Details for each focus group can be found 
in appendix 1. In the majority of instances, the names of those focus group 
participants who made statements were not known. The group is referenced 




Figure 1.12. Villages where focus groups were held 
My Masters experience had taught me that sessions should be gender specific as I 
found that women were less likely to speak openly in front of the men. Two or three 
days prior to each session I visited homesteads in the area, informing them of the 
meeting arrangements, the topic of discussion, and asked for the word to be spread. 
Sessions were carefully timed to encourage high turnouts. Men favoured weekends 
when there were no market days and children were able to look after the livestock. 
Women preferred weekday afternoon sessions once the daily chores were complete 
and the younger children were home from school and could look after the shoats11 
and calves. In two cases (FG 19, 21) women requested meetings to follow-on after 
church.  
In the majority of instances, when approaching a new village, sessions with men 
were held first. This was done so that they would be comfortable with the topic of 
discussions and would not then disrupt the women’s sessions. However, in a few 
cases this arrangement was not possible. If men did come over to focus groups with 
                                                
11 A collective term for sheep and goats 
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women, discussions automatically ceased until they were sent on their way by the 
women. In total, 301 adults attended one of 29 outdoor focus group sessions, such as 
that in figure 1.13. Details for each session can be found in appendix 1. With 
permission gained from the participants, all focus group discussions were recorded 
via dictaphone and later transcribed in English. Key points and interesting 
phraseology were also noted in the original language, Maa.  
 
Figure 1.13. Resian Letolou with FG 10 in Enooronkon. Photo: C. Courtney 
1.3.3 Semi-structured Interviews and Informal Discussions 
Interviews and informal discussions were used to engage in more specific and 
(usually) individual conversations with key informants. This enabled a depth of 
inquiry unattainable through observational methods (Russel and Harshbarger, 2003). 
Semi-structured interviews allow open and closed-lines of questioning, where 
discussions can diverge from specific inquiries and new questions can be added 
(Creswell, 2009). Individuals selected for interview were those who were 
knowledgeable in the specific area under investigation, for example head teachers, 
camp managers, community leaders. Snowball sampling was used to identify more 
interviewees throughout the research process. In comparison, informal discussions 
were often unplanned opportunities with individuals who mentioned something 
noteworthy for my research. Whilst formal permissions to quote comments were not 
made during these informal discussions, largely due to their informal nature as they 
may have taken place in passing, all participants were fully aware of that I was a 
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researcher, and what I was studying. If comments made were at all private or 
controversial, they have been made anonymous. 
In total 105 interviews or discussions were held, ranging from brief conversations to 
five-hour marathons. Each semi-structured interview had its own unique pre-
determined discussion points, although relevant tangents were welcomed. These 
sessions were normally recorded with a dictaphone and then transcribed in English 
word for word. Each interviewee was asked whether they were happy or not for the 
interview to be recorded, in the vast majority of instances this was approved. For 
informal discussions, interesting comments were noted by hand, either at the time or 
immediately after the discussion and typed up as soon as possible. 
Interview/discussion sessions are coded using the letter ‘I’ followed by a number, for 
example (I 54). Within this thesis some interviewees are cited often, whilst others 
may not be mentioned at all. This reflects their varying degrees of relevance and 
expertise rather than ingrained bias. As names can be given for interviewees, but 
focus groups with Maasai residents are cited collectively, this may give the erroneous 
impression that the research favours these voices – many of which are white. Details 
for each interview/discussion can be found in appendix 2. 
1.3.4 Visual Ethnography 
Two innovative forms of visual ethnography were also trialled in this research. The 
first involved volunteers receiving brief training on using a basic digital camera 
(figure 1.14). These 23 individuals then took photographs relating to development, 
the conservancies, and how these issues affect their daily life. After 4-6 weeks I 
returned to collect the cameras and selected 20-25 of their images to discuss with 
them. Information or images from camera participants is coded CP followed by their 





Figure 1.14. Resian Letoluo teaching a camera participant how to use a camera. Photo: C. Courtney 
This method was chosen so as to deconstruct educational barriers and draw in shy 
participants. It succeeded in these aspects and also proved to be a great ice-breaker 
and enabled more detailed, private one-on-one discussions. In particular, female 
camera participants became much more confident and comfortable by participating 
in this project, which enabled a deeper probing into more delicate areas not discussed 
in focus groups. This included household finances, relationships, domestic violence, 
female circumcision, female health issues and contraception. Images resulting from 
this project are also used to visually demonstrate points made within this thesis. 
Participants in this camera project were volunteers from focus groups. Priority was 
given to those volunteers who were less vocal during the group sessions. 
Visual ethnography can be used in a variety of settings for a variety of purposes 
(Pink, 2013). Uses to date include documenting the experiences of children living in 
Kenyan orphanages (Johnson, 2011), exploring perceptions of women’s health in 
Canada (Wang, 1999) and the conditions, struggles and strengths of homeless people 
in Michigan (Wang et al., 2000). This method, which is also sometimes called 
photovoice, has previously been used to analyse interpretations of terms and 
concepts, such as mental illness (Fleming et al., 2009). However, it is not known to 
have been used to explore how development is interpreted, prior to this research.  
18 
 
The second visual ethnographic method was the creation and analysis of drawings by 
school children. In addition to interviewing the head or deputy head teacher at all 
nine schools within and bordering the study site (see figure 1.15), discussions were 
held with children at some of these schools.  
 
These group sessions were usually made up of a boy and girl from each year at the 
school, selected by their class teachers. During the first trial discussion session, 
answers were hard to draw out because participants were too shy to speak openly, 
even in Maa. Subsequently, a participatory approach was taken. The children were 
asked to produce two drawings. The first was anything relating to the conservancies 
and the second was an image of what they would like their life to be like when they 
are older, detailing their house, job, family and possessions. Once the pictures were 
drawn (see figure 1.16.), I then discussed these with each person in the group. These 
discussions were a lot more forthcoming than the initial more formal attempts. Some 
of these images are used to support the discussion in chapters four and six.  





Figure 1.16. Sitting with teachers and school children drawing their pictures in Mbitin. Photo: L. Serseri 
1.3.5 Qualitative Analysis 
For the analysis of the qualitative data, findings were translated (if necessary) and 
transcribed. Coding helped to reveal patterns and themes in the qualitative data 
(Creswell, 2009) which then formed the thesis and chapter structures. This coding 
emerged from key points within the research questions. As Wolcott (1990: 35 cited 
in Silverman, 2006: 88) notes: “The critical task in qualitative research is not to 
accumulate all the data you can but to ‘can’ [get rid of] most of the data you 
accumulate”. It was essential to focus the extensive quantity of notes collected during 
this research project as they exceeded one million words. Coding software was 
considered but I decided to code the information manually as reading through all of 
my notes helped me to organise my thesis in my head and remind myself of the key 
information to include. 
1.3.6 Quantitative Surveys 
Three quantitative surveys were undertaken to support the qualitative findings. 
Having recognised that there was a lack of up-to-date rudimentary information on 
households within the study site, a census-like survey was arranged. This survey 
mapped 228 households within the study site (see figure 1.9) and asked basic 
information at each regarding inhabitants, livestock, type of structures and land 
ownership. The survey was undertaken by Dominic Sakat, assistant to the Mara-
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Naboisho Lion Project (MNLP) and was funded jointly by MNLP, Dig Deep UK, 
Olare Orok and Motorogi Trust (OOMT) and myself.  
The second survey was a financial questionnaire sent to all parties who have put 
money into the study site as a result of the conservancies’ presence. The purpose of 
this was to provide data to enable the calculation of more comprehensive economic 
land use values for comparison (see chapter seven). This survey was distributed to all 
camps, conservancy managers and NGOs active in the area. Contributors were asked 
specific questions regarding money entering the area including: land rental 
payments; wages; tips and donations; funding for community projects resulting from 
the conservancies, camps or conservancy tourists; locally sourced produce; and 
village visits by tourists. Information from this financial questionnaire is referenced 
by FQ followed by the name of the company/organisation. 
Thirdly, during a short period of consultancy work for Basecamp Foundation Kenya 
(BCFK) in August-September 2012, a baseline survey of their community-managed 
microfinance (CMMF) project was undertaken. Raphael Kereto and Dominic Sakat 
collected the data which I analysed and presented in a report (Courtney, 2012). 79 
women were included in this study, which assessed the characteristics of group 
members, current living standards, household finances, access to financial services, 
the role of women in society and development aspirations. Although the point of a 
baseline survey is to have a foundation from which to assess the impact of the project 
in the future, this survey provided informative data on living standards amongst 
women. Further, since women in both newly formed groups and groups that were 
over six months old were included in the survey, comparative analysis was possible 
to assess early indications of project impact. 
The data from these three quantitative studies was analysed in excel where totals 
were calculated, differences were compared and interesting findings were identified. 
The analyses from these studies are presented and referred to throughout the thesis. 
1.3.7 Mixed Method Approach 
Multiple approaches were used to collect a vast amount of information for the 
purposes of this thesis. The rich complementary data generated facilitates a more 
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complete analysis as employing different data collection tools allows for thorough 
triangulation to identify consistent themes. For example, overlapping results between 
focus groups and interviews grant further validity to the findings (Bernard, 2006). It 
also greatly increased participation in this research.  
The participatory techniques were devised to be inclusive and particular attention 
was paid to ensure the representation of the less vocal (as discussed by Simpson, 
2009: 203). It was considered especially important to include women, youth, the old, 
the young and the illiterate as perceptions from these strata of society are often not 
included, especially in shorter studies where researchers just rush between the most 
vocal male community leaders. As the study is focused on gathering grassroots 
perceptions, this must represent multiple stakeholders within the study site. The 
length of the fieldwork assisted in ensuring that the reach of this research extended 
beyond the dominant community elite. In other words, the combination of the 
methods used were highly effective in engaging the community members which 
helped me to embrace the complexity, recognise the multiple realities, and identify 
the main concerns and priorities within the communities. As with any period of 
research, there were aspects that worked out better than expected as well as 
challenges. 
1.3.8 Challenges and Limitations of Methods Used 
Often one of the most difficult components of qualitative, especially ethnographic, 
research can be gaining access to the relevant social setting (Bryman, 2004). 
Although the study site conforms to what Hammersey and Atkinson (1995) would 
label a closed or non-public setting, this was not an issue within this research. 
Having undertaken research in the area twice before, both gatekeepers and 
community members were very welcoming and happy to participate. I believe this 
was cemented by living with a well-respected family. 
In line with Staddon (2014), from previous experience I was aware that there would 
be a certain amount of expectation that members would be directly rewarded for their 
participation in the research, like attending focus groups. At the beginning of each 
meeting I explained that I am a student carrying out research and I would like to 
listen to their thoughts. When questioned about what impact this could have, it was 
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made clear that this cannot be assured, but that the research will be disseminated to 
all conservancy personnel and county officials. Following this introduction, no one 
ever left through dissatisfaction with a lack of compensation for participation. 
Women especially were very happy to be included in the research. Nasuju Naurori 
(CP 12) and Faith Kereto (CP 9) specifically said that they were very pleased that 
women were being given a voice. Faith explained at the end of FG 9: “researchers 
who have come before have only listened to the men.”  
One minor issue encountered during discussions of development was in translation as 
there is no word for “development” in Maa. This challenge that was encountered, and 
how it was overcome, is elaborated upon in section 3.1 where the term is discussed in 
more detail. 
The main methodological challenges were brought by the quantitative surveys rather 
than the qualitative research that formed the backbone of the data collection. Other 
people undertook the homestead census and CMMF baseline surveys. I suffered an 
accident, and I had to return to the UK for an operation, which meant that I was 
unable to conduct the CMMF survey personally. The homestead census survey 
would have been too time-consuming to undertake myself. This meant that I could 
not personally validate the data and I felt as though I missed some of the nuances that 
I would have picked up by conducting these surveys first-hand. While I thought that 
it would be relatively simple, the finance questionnaire also turned out to be a real 
challenge. Some participants responded immediately with their figures whereas for 
others it took 16 months of frustrating follow up communication to secure this 
information from their offices. 
1.3.9 Ethical Considerations 
As with all research there are ethical considerations, but these are eased by an overt 
or open approach (Bryman, 2004). I did not hide the fact that I was a researcher. It 
was acknowledged that research participants have the inherent right to privacy, 
respect, and self-determination (as discussed by Murphy and Dingwall, 2001). One 
of the main ethical issues in ethnography occurs when the research is printed. Once 
the information is in the public domain researchers have limited control over its use 
(ibid). Throughout this research the privacy of participants was protected at all times 
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and participants were asked whether they would like to remain anonymous within the 
write-up. If this was requested, or if it was anticipated that any quote might have 
repercussions for the participant, their reference was made anonymous and written as 
(anon). The number after this, for example (anon 2), is used to differentiate between 
different anonymous sources. 
Consideration is needed for the ethical dimensions of a researcher claiming to speak 
for others, particularly if they are from the global south (Kapoor, 2004). I have 
always been very conscious of this, and I have tried to present opinions in the same 
context in which they were expressed, however it is recognised that accounts from 
any other person will only ever be partial. My research assistants greatly helped in 
ensuring that quotes were given as accurately as possible. Reflexivity and 
interpretation in cross-cultural research is essential (Twyman et al., 1999). 
Reflexivity requires that anthropologists set themselves apart from fellow citizens 
and create a discontinuity between their accounts of the citizens and accounts of 
themselves (Gomm, 2008). One way in which ethnographic researchers must be 
reflexive is to continually reassess their positionality. This refers to the researcher’s 
relation to the research subjects. Griffith (1998: 361) explains: 
Where the researcher enters the research site as an Insider – someone whose 
biography (gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and so on) gives her a lived 
familiarity with the group being researched – that tacit knowledge informs 
her research producing a different knowledge to that available to the Outsider 
– a researcher who does not have an intimate knowledge of the group being 
researched prior to their entry into the group. 
Issues of positionality are not limited to myself, they also apply to the research 
assistants. Whilst the two women who were chosen to assist with this research 
project are Maasai, they do not originate from within the study site. This was an 
intentional decision so that they would not be as affected by local politics, or 
especially drawn to – or influenced by – local leaders. It is acknowledged, however, 
that each assistant has her own specific positionality that will have unavoidably 
influenced the data that was collected as well as how this was interpreted and 
analysed.  
Insider-outsider positions are not clearly delineated; it is more common to 
conceptualise these terms as two endpoints on a continuum of power, knowledge and 
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self-understanding that shifts over time (Olson, 1977; Merriam et al., 2001; Rabe, 
2003). It is especially common for researchers who conduct participant observation 
for a long period of time to move from an outsider towards more of an insider 
position (Rabe, 2003). Further, Labaree (2002) and Groves (2003) suggest that a 
researcher can be simultaneously both an insider and an outsider, depending upon the 
context.  
Within this research project I continually reassessed my status in each context. While 
my initial positionality was undoubtedly that of an outsider, these lines blurred 
throughout the research period and differed between stakeholders. Different aspects 
of my biography enabled me to relate to different people. Being female and working 
with female research assistants enabled me to relate to women in the focus groups, 
camera project and the community more generally through participant observation. 
As Faith Kereto said in FG 9: 
We find it a lot easier talking to other women about these things, it means 
that we can speak freely and be honest. We appreciate that it is a woman 
coming to ask women about these things. 
Similarly, being educated facilitated discussions with school children, young people 
and others who believe in the importance of education. For example, the homestead 
that I lived in was that of a friend I had made during my Masters’ research who is 
pursuing a university education. Her father’s pioneering commitment to educating 
his daughters meant that he was very happy to assist my research in any way that he 
could. Despite having no experience in the tourism industry, I achieved the greatest 
insider status with conservancy and camp employees. This was largely due to our 
having similar backgrounds and interests, the majority being educated, white and 
originating from Europe, Kenya or South Africa. Meanwhile, at the other end of the 
spectrum, my positionality was much more of an outsider with male community 
members, especially elders.  
As discussed by Russell (1995), I found that the group under study decided the 
knowledge that was made available to me, depending on the insider-outsider status. 
For example, camp and conservancy employees would often mention interesting 
things to me in passing, blurring the line between friend and researcher. My latter 
role was often forgotten, despite the overt approach. In other instances, access was 
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also granted because of my outsider status. Given that the communities I was 
working with had limited opportunities to sit down and talk to white people, 
especially women, it often felt as though I was being studied at the same time as I 
was asking questions. Merriam et al. (2001: 410) had a similar experience whereby 
she was a curiosity for those whom she was studying, which facilitated access. This 
outsiderness also allowed me to hide behind a cloak of ignorance regarding 
appropriate norms (as discussed by Spiegel and Mehlwana, 1997) and probe issues 
that an insider might have been too afraid to broach.  
All positionings have “distinct assets and liabilities” (Merton, 1972: 33). No position 
is privileged to see the ‘real’ truth as “social experience and its perception are 
continuously ‘created’ by the social actors” (Cerroni-Long, 1994: 135). My 
positionality throughout this research was continually shifting depending upon 
context and time, and spanned much of the spectrum from insider to outsider. Instead 
of focusing on the difficulties of this, I tried to assess and exploit the benefits of my 


















2 The Maasai Mara Conservancies  
This chapter introduces the conservancy concept and details the creation and 
structures of the conservancies under investigation. To deepen this contextualisation, 
literature and empirical evidence from those who were involved in the creation of the 
conservancies are combined. In order to create a framework for this thesis, this 
chapter will then go on to examine literature pertaining to the key components within 
the conservancy concept in the Mara. This includes: neoliberal conservation, 
community involvement, livelihoods, linking conservation and development, and the 
tourism business. The potential association between conservancies and 
Africapitalism will also be introduced. Following this, the research questions, 
structure and contribution to knowledge for this thesis will be outlined. 
2.1 Creation of Mara Conservancies 
Following the successes of conservancies in Namibia and other Southern African 
countries, Kenya has adopted and adapted this conservation model. A conservancy 
can be defined as a “common property resource institution” (Hoole and Berkes, 
2010), whereby individual landowners or communal members pool properties to 
create a singular trust where benefits from wildlife and tourism development are 
shared by participants (Sorlie, 2008). Conservancies in Kenya have a variety of 
participant structures. The conservancies in the Mara are examples of individual 
landowners with freehold tenure leasing their land collectively. Naibunga and West 
Gate Community Conservancies within the Northern Rangelands Trust exemplify 
conservancies on communal land. In addition, some Kenyan conservancies, such as 
Ol Pejeta and Laikipia, are on large swathes of private land owned by one or few 
(often white) individuals.  
As previously noted, in the Maasai Mara, the emergence of conservancies was the 
result of the combination of local demands for direct benefits from conservation and 
tourism, operators’ desire to develop a high-quality tourism product and 
conservationists vying to “save” part of the famous Mara-Serengeti ecosystem. They 
are the latest attempt at a community-based conservation and tourism enterprise in 
the Koiyaki region. During group ranch land tenure wildlife trusts were formed, 
however, they lacked the capacity and structures for equitable benefit sharing which 
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hampered their success and ultimately resulted in their demise (Thompson and 
Homewood, 2002; Kaelo, 2009; Thompson et al., 2009). In terms of land tenure, it is 
now widely accepted that group ranches failed to meet their objectives (Mwangi, 
2006). After much optimism, funds were withdrawn in the late 1970s and in the early 
1980s calls were heard for their subdivision (Rutten, 1992: 79). Unlike previous 
changes in land tenure, the pressure to subdivide the group ranches largely emerged 
from within the Maasai communities themselves (Rutten, 1992; Mwangi, 2007). In 
the study site subdivision did not begin until after the new millennium and was 
completed in 2009.  
The principle of subdivision was that all members should get an equal share of land 
close to where they live (Mwangi, 2007; Kaigil, 2009). Contrary to members’ 
expectations, subdivision did not result in equal parcels (ibid). Corruption in the 
subdivision process favoured local elites, and enabled the wealthy to buy large areas 
cheaply (Rutten, 1992). Many prominent individuals, or those financially able, 
manipulated the process by allocating to themselves extra-large or multiple parcels, 
or by having their wives or children under 18 allocated plots and/or secured favoured 
locations (Galaty, 1999; Thompson and Homewood, 2002; Lamprey and Reid, 2004; 
Mwangi, 2007; Honey, 2008; Bedelian, 2012). Data from livestock surveys reveal 
that there was a reduction in mean livestock holdings per household between 1998-
2000 and 2004 (Thompson et al., 2009: 96-7). This would correspond with a reported 
spate of livestock sales prior to land privatisation in order to buy influence over the 
land allocation process or to pre-negotiate land redistribution between households – a 
process said to be dominated by the wealthier households (ibid). 
Similarly, at an inter-ethic scale, Western (2009: vii) suggests: “Kenya’s solution of 
granting individual land titles to customary owners militates against pastoral 
communities in a free market economy where wealthier ethnic groups can secure 
loans to buy land from poorer ones”.  The introduction of a cash society and 
individual title deeds was a new notion for the Maasai, many of whom did not fully 
understand some concepts. Despite many issues within the land subdivision process, 
the elite may have benefited proportionally more, by continuing to financially drain 
the communal group ranch system if the land tenure had not changed. Further, these 
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transitional problems should not negate any benefits made possible by land 
individualisation.  
The rapid transformation of land tenure into small parcels, each with an individual 
title deed, has been a major and fundamental change throughout the Mara area and is 
having major impacts on both land use and land values (Thompson et al., 2002; 
Thompson, 2002; Thompson and Homewood, 2002; Homewood et al., 2004; 
Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008). All wildlife in Kenya is owned by the state (Norton-
Griffiths, 1996). Land is one of the few assets owned by local communities that can 
be used to negotiate favourable partnerships with tourism operators. This is why the 
nature of land tenure is so critical for this study. The structure of the conservancies 
within the study site is only possible because of the individualisation of land.  
Those who had previously benefited from the wildlife associations, including the 
Koiyaki Lemek Wildlife Trust (KLWT), initiated the process of conservancy 
development in the Mara (I 48). They were looking for an alternative way to benefit 
from conservation and tourism once they became landowners (ibid). To Norton-
Griffiths et al. (2008: 411), conservancies offer an opportunity to strengthen the 
commercial relationship between the suppliers of wildlife on the one hand, and the 
suppliers of clients to view wildlife on the other. More specifically, conservancies 
have multiple objectives. According to Sorlie (2008), Thompson et al. (2009), and 
Hoole and Berkes (2010) these include:  
• increasing conservation by protecting wildlife habitat and biodiversity outside 
of the MMNR; 
• improving the quality of tourism experiences by securing exclusive high-
quality habitat for top-end camps; 
• securing land from onward sales to elite or non-Maasai; 
• bringing Maasai landowners into partnership agreements, and; 
• giving benefits of tourism directly back to the individual landowners and 
communities so as to diversify livelihoods and reduce poverty  
Jake Grieves-Cook first introduced the conservancy concept into Kenya in 1997 (I 
48). He began the first conservancy that brought together multiple indigenous 
landholders in Eselekei which borders Amboseli National Park (ibid). Grieves-Cook 
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explained that the aim was to put aside an area, which would be protected for 
wildlife and would recognise the landowners (I 74). This is in contrast to the status 
quo whereby tour operators pay for a few acres and use the surrounding area for 
game viewing free of charge (ibid). He believed that an area-wide approach would be 
more beneficial for conservation (ibid). Grieves-Cook also developed the first 
conservancy in the Mara, Olkinyei, which was formed in 2005. The following year 
he was also involved when OOC pioneered the way in Koiyaki (ibid).  
Four individuals were crucial in the instigation of OOC in the former block two of 
Koiyaki Group Ranch. A former chief, Kipeen ole Sayialel, who owns a large parcel 
of land in the area, saw a need for landowners to directly benefit from tourism. He 
came together with Ron Beaton12 and Dickson ole Kaelo13 to discuss ideas. Together 
with Jake Grieves-Cook,14 these four individuals developed the model for OOC 
(Sorlie, 2008; Bedelian, 2012; I 74). They sought to create a self-sustaining business 
model that would financially protect the local communities from fluctuations in the 
industry (I 48). The result was an agreement whereby the tourism partners would 
lease land from the landowners and guarantee a fixed income, regardless of tourist 
numbers (Sorlie, 2008; Kaelo, 2009; Bedelian, 2012). This idea came from farming 
whereby the amount paid to rent farmland is fixed and not reliant upon crop yields (I 
48). Following initial discussions, Chief Sayialel took it upon himself to visit every 
homestead in the area, convincing other landowners of the benefits of the 
conservancy model (Sorlie, 2008; Sayialel, 2009).  
Proposals for OOC received little objection from the wider tourism industry and its 
key beneficiaries because it was not seen as a threat; and because much of the area 
was not suitable for cattle grazing due to tsetse fly15 it was easier for landowners to 
lease it out (I 21; Bedelian, 2012). Landowners who agreed to sign the lease 
                                                
12 Ron is a white-Kenyan who had recently bought a 300 acres plot in the area for his retirement after 
30 years in the farming and tourism industries. Ron also spear-headed the creation of Koiyaki Guiding 
School. 
13 Dickson worked for the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and had worked with 
KLWT. Following his work creating OOC as a consultant he was later employed by BCFK as 
program manager to develop Naboisho Conservancy. In 2013 he became CEO of the newly formed 
Kenya Conservancies Wildlife Association (KWCA). 
14 Jake is a white Kenyan who has been involved in Kenya's tourism industry for over 40 years, 
starting in the Maasai Mara in the early 1970s. He is managing director of Porini Camps. 
15 Tsetse flies are vectors for trypanosomes which cause human sleeping sickness and animal 
trypanosomiasis.   
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agreement received a fixed monthly payment, determined by the size of their plot. In 
return there are restrictions in land use, including living and grazing on the land, and 
onward sales (Bedelian, 2012). Julius Kaleko in FG 26 explained some of the 
motivations behind landowners’ agreeing to sign the conservancy’s agreement: 
The local people saw that the tourists usually come because of wild animals 
and these wild animals are staying on our land. So the community have 
sacrificed the land for the wild animals to stay there and they are accepting 
the disturbances that the wild animals have on the livestock. But for this we 
need to get something small… Before when we had associations the people 
didn’t get money as now because the directors ‘looked after’ that money but 
it is good now that you just give out your bank details and then they put it 
direct in your bank.  
OOC’s initial contract was signed in May 2006 for 18 months at the rate of $20 per 
hectare per year (Bedelian, 2012). The first payment was in cash, as an incentive for 
signing up on the day;16 following this were direct bank transfers (ibid). Despite the 
presence of tsetse, 450 pastoralists within 25 independent settlements were resident 
in the area and were assisted with transport to move for the creation of the 
conservancy (ibid: 9). Many of those who moved did not own land there (ibid) and 
so in all likelihood would have had to move anyway following land individualisation. 
Some of these families moved to their own allocated plots and others moved over the 
Talek-Aitong road to blocks three and four that, at that stage, had not yet been 
subdivided (ibid). Few people displaced by conservancies left the area altogether 
(Bedelian, 2014: 234). The cost of having to move settlements was a major negative 
noted in 2009/10 in Bedelian’s (ibid: 139) study but it was not raised during this 
research project, perhaps as it was no longer an on-going issue. 
Many OOC landowners were initially sceptical about the intentions of the new 
conservancy and did not sign up from the outset (ibid). Over time the number of 
landowners grew, but the conservancy intentionally remained relatively small to ease 
the management of any disagreements and local politics within the communities 
(ibid, I 81). Following this trial period, a five-year lease was signed and then in 2010 
the tourism partners introduced a 15-year lease contract so that they could guarantee 
a longer-term investment (ibid). FG 13 discussed how their opinions of the 
conservancies changed over this period:  
                                                
16 Subsequent conservancies have replicated this method.  
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When it was first being made we weren’t sure of the idea of the conservancy 
because we thought that the white people were coming to take our land. But 
once it was set up we started to see the benefits and that we keep the land and 
so we have now agreed to increase the duration of the rent agreement. 
The new contract was backdated by a few months, again making a strong incentive 
for landowners to sign-up (ibid). However, not all did sign up to this longer lease and 
some remain on the previous lease at a lower rate (I 81).  
Amongst the landowners who have not signed up to the longer lease, there are a few 
who claimed that they were initially trapped into rental agreements. Men in 
Mbitin/Nkirgir (FG 14), as well some in Mpuaai (FG 22), alleged that they were not 
fully aware of the implications when they signed the conservancy agreement, 
particularly regarding the restrictions in grazing access. Initial reasons for joining 
conservancies included community pressure, coercion and a lack of alternatives if the 
allocated plot were located in the centre of a conservancy (Bedelian 2014: 103). 
Community meetings were held, in which leaders decided that land should be leased 
to the conservancies, and some landowners felt trapped by that decision (FG 14). The 
envelopes of cash given out on the sign-up day attracted others, but once the 
agreement had been signed they found that this amount was not as much as they had 
anticipated (ibid). These individuals, who are landowners in both OOC and 
Naboisho, said that if they remain dissatisfied when their current leases cease, they 
will not sign any more agreements and will return to their land (FG 14, 22). 
Following the opening of the long-awaited Mahali Mzuri Virgin camp in Motorogi 
Conservancy in 2013, ties with its sister conservancy, OOC, tightened and the 
combined area was named Olare Motorogi Conservancy (OMC). The two 
conservancies have their own separate land holding companies and committees but 
share management; and camps in either conservancy can cross over freely for game 
drives. In March 2014 there were 292 members of OMC,17 whose land parcels make 
up an area of 12,764ha. For 2013, OMC landowners received KES 49,141,400 (over 
$560,000)18 through rental payments.  
                                                
17 This number is regularly increasing, not by new land being added to the conservancy but by the 
subdivision of plots, especially between sons when their father dies. 




Having seen the success of the concept in Olare Orok, the former group ranch 
chairman, Konana ole Kereto, approached Basecamp who have a camp in Talek (I 
31, 48). He asked if they could help with the formation of a conservancy on block 
four of Koiyaki Group Ranch once land allocation was complete (ibid). This became 
Naboisho Conservancy. Having assisted with the setting up of Olare Orok, Motorogi 
and Mara North Conservancies, Basecamp Foundation invited Dickson Kaelo to 
become involved (I 48). The structure of Naboisho Conservancy largely replicates 
that introduced by OOC, with a few modifications, as will be discussed shortly in 
section 2.1.1. Although the creation process took a long time because of the delay in 
land subdivision, in some senses Naboisho was more straightforward to set up, as 
people were familiar with the concept (I 21; Bedelian, 2012: 8). Also, in the core 
area of Naboisho there were fewer settlements because the area had historically been 
heavily infested by tsetse fly19 (ibid). Following the completion of subdivision late in 
2009, Naboisho Conservancy began in March 2010 and introduced a 15-year lease 
contract from the outset (Bedelian, 2012: 8). The managing director of Basecamp 
Explorer (BCE) (I 56) explained that for Naboisho, they focused on a much longer 
lease agreement from the outset so that they could invest more in the land and 
communities. He sees the achievement of this as proof that “we are together in this, 
because you do not agree to a long-term lease if there is no trust” (ibid).  Following 
initial donor financing, the tourism partners took over the payments, ensuring its self-
sustainability, as with the other conservancies in the area. 
To date, eight conservancies have developed on the former Lemek, Olchorro 
Oirouwa, Koiyaki and Olkinyei Group Ranches collectively conserving over 
90,000ha. This growth of conservancies can also be seen nationwide. In 2006 they 
were estimated to hold 40% of the country’s wildlife (Western et al 2006; Norton 
Griffiths 2007) and given their expansion it is likely that this will have increased 
further to date. In May 2014 there were 140 conservancies in Kenya covering 10 
million acres (KWCA, 2014). At present, the only places where wildlife is holding 
its own or is actually increasing are those with the transparent payment of wildlife 
                                                
19 No-one is sure why tsetse fly have decreased within the conservancies in recent years but it has 
been suggested that it is due to the clearing of shrub land by elephants, the removal of a constant 
livestock presence in the area and the increased popularity of spraying livestock. 
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revenues to landholders rather than to central government (Western et al., 2009; 
Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010: 369). For these reasons, conservancies are seen by 
many as the solution to wildlife conservation in Kenya (Norton-Griffiths, 2007; 
Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008; Thompson et al., 2009; Western et al., 2009).  
2.1.1 Structure of Mara Conservancies 
Dickson Kaelo (I 48) sees the conservancies in Koiyaki as the next step in 
conservation in the Maasai Mara, following on from the wildlife associations. The 
leasing of land for the conservancies requires clear, strong land tenure. This is 
common in payments for ecosystem services (PES) more generally (Pagiola et al 
2005). The foundation of each conservancy within the study site is a public-private 
agreement between tourism partners and a land holding company. These non-profit 
land holding companies hold each landowner’s lease and are registered with the local 
land control board (Bedelian, 2012: 7). All land transactions must be approved 
within these companies (ibid) and each is presided over by between two and seven 
landowners who make up its shareholding board (I 81). This structure ensures that 
the ownership of land is retained within the landowners’ own company. One of the 
reasons for this was that Kenya’s Land Control Act does not permit any non-Kenyan 
citizens to own or lease agricultural land (NCLR 2010), which the Mara is classified 
as, and since the tourism investors are not all Kenyan citizens they are unable to hold 
the leases themselves (Bedelian, 2012: 7). This model gives the Maasai a strong 
position within the partnership. Lars Lindkvist (I 31), the executive chairman of 
Basecamp Foundation who were fundamental to the formation of Naboisho 
Conservancy, believes that it is empowering for the community to have a company 
that owns the land titles and thus become part of the business agreements (ibid).  
The landowners and tourism partners each have their own committees for 
stakeholder-specific discussions and decision-making. Representatives from these 
committees come together regularly in ManCO20 for Naboisho and OOC/Motorogi 
Management Committees in OMC. One issue is that the land committees are 
appointed without any election process and so are predominantly comprised of 
community elite (I 81; Bedelian, 2012: 7), who are often the same individuals as are 
                                                
20 ManCo is made up of three tourism partners, three representatives from LandCO and Lars Lindkvist 
of BCFK as chairman. 
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on the shareholding board. However, unlike the preceding wildlife associations, these 
committees are not involved in the distribution of land lease payments and only have 
one paid member, the community liaison officer. The only financial influence that 
landowners have is the distribution of the landowner community funds, comprised of 
agreed deductions from each landowner’s monthly rental payments. On a return trip 
to the study site in March 2014 one informant (anon 3) revealed that a land 
committee had decided to increase landowner payments for this fund without 
consulting all landowners. This breaks the contractual agreement and potentially 
provides landowners with a reason to withdraw from the conservancy contract. In 
OOC and Motorogi the land holding company shareholders have decision-making 
control of these funds (I 81). In Naboisho, spending proposals are suggested by the 
landowners committee (LandCO) but must receive approval from the joint 
Management committee (ManCO) (I 21). 
In OMC, the five tourism partners have their own non-profit management company, 
Olpurkel Ltd., which has a conservancy management contract from the land holding 
company. This company directly employs a conservancy manager, assistant manager 
and rangers. Olpurkel’s shareholders (the tourism partners) have underwritten the 
financial agreement to pay the leases to the landowners (Bedelian, 2012), financed 
by a monthly bed fee. These fees and payments will be detailed in chapter seven. 
There are five tourism partners who have camps in Naboisho Conservancy. In 
addition, Porini from neighbouring Ol Kinyei Conservancy pay for 10 beds in 
Naboisho so that they can conduct game drives there. These six tourism partners 
underwrite the lease payments and have contracted a management company, Seiya 
Ltd. Basecamp Foundation acts as the secretariat for Naboisho Conservancy and they 
process the payments, receiving the bed fees from the tourism partners and 
distributing this to Seiya Ltd and the landowners (with the deduction for the 
landowners community fund). The locations of camps owned by the tourism partners 
within the study site are shown on figure 2.1. There are six camps marked within 
Naboisho as both Dorobo and Eagle View Camps are owned by one tourism partner, 
Basecamp Explorer. Whilst Olkinyei Conservancy (far right) is outside the study site, 
its camps are included on this figure as Porini is a tourism partner in Naboisho 




Figure 2.1 Tourism partners' camps within the study site (shown by yellow shading). 
In Motorogi there are 15 plots not signed up, and in OOC there are six subdivided 
unsigned plots. Whilst some landowners do not want to sign up to the initiative, 
others hope to sell their plots or lease them directly to a camp. Following land 
individualisation, 14 land parcels (approximately 50 acres each) within OMC were 
sold to non-Maasai investors (Bedelian, 2012: 5). Consequently, several camps have 
been built within the conservancies and on their borders (see figure 2.2). Often the 
construction and design of the facilities are not in keeping with the conservancy 
concept. These camps are not members of the conservancy and are not allowed to 
conduct game drives within the area (I 81). They are only permitted access to and 
from their plot (ibid). This problem has now been eased by restrictions in the 
conservancy agreement regarding the onward sale of land, but it is still a fear that 




Figure 2.2 Official (marked with circles) and non-official camps (marked by triangles)  
Olare Orok and Motorogi Trust (OOMT) is a non-profit trust set up to channel donor 
funding to community development and conservation projects in the wider Mara 
area. Each tourism partner donates to OOMT $5 per client staying in OMC per night. 
Naboisho does not have an equivalent trust; but most tourism partners have trusts or 
foundations that they support more informally. Basecamp Foundation is the main 
conservancy-affiliated actor in the communities bordering Naboisho Conservancy. In 
Naboisho the tourism partners also have their own $100,000 annual project fund, 
40% of which is used to pay expenses to record leases and the remainder is used to 
cover AGM expenses, water projects and other initiatives. 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 diagrammatically represent the extreme complexities between the 
multiple actors in OMC and Naboisho respectively. These diagrams highlight the 
links between stakeholders (green grouping boxes), companies and individuals 
(orange boxes), committees (purple boxes) and community outputs (yellow boxes) 
through their interconnecting money transfers (red arrows), contractual agreements 
(light blue arrows) and decision-making power (dark blue arrows). These figures are 




Figure 2.3 Olare Motorogi Conservancy Structure 
 




2.2 Conservancies Literature Framework  
The following section will review literature on the key formative components of 
conservancies in the Mara, namely: neoliberal conservation, community 
involvement, livelihoods, linking conservation and development, tourism business 
and Africapitalism. This literature will form the framework for the thesis and will be 
referred back to, expanded upon and discussed in relation to empirical findings in 
subsequent chapters. 
2.2.1 Conservancies as Neoliberal Conservation  
Conservation in Africa has been seen in many different forms over the last century. 
In the first half of the 20th Century, British colonial conservationists alienated 
African land (Brockington and Homewood, 1996: 92; Adams and Hulme, 2001:10; 
Adams and Hutton, 2007).  They were motivated by romanticised Western social 
constructions of what “wild” Africa should look like and the belief that East Africa’s 
“natural” state is an unpopulated wilderness (ibid; Adams and McShane, 1992; 
Neumann, 1998). Following this, community-based conservation was encouraged – 
with differing degrees of success. As an example of a more recent approach, the 
conservancies within the study site comprise a public-private partnership between 
landowners and tourism partners with minimal state involvement – a form of 
neoliberal conservation.21 
The conservancies in the Mara were created at a time of crisis in terms of 
uncontrollable tourism, wildlife declines, unsustainable land use, lack of benefits for 
locals, and imminent uncontrollable subdividing or selling of land (Bedelian, 2014: 
240). According to the neoliberal view, in such times of ecological crisis, 
‘submission to capitalism’ is justified to try to save the area (ibid; Büscher et al., 
2012). The conservancies represent a hybrid approach combining aspects of fortress 
conservation (exclusion of people, resource use curtailed and herders caught and 
fined) and community conservation (community owned, partnership managed and 
                                                
21 The term ‘neoliberal conservation’ is derived from literature on the neoliberalisation of nature 




grazing schemes) with neoliberal conservation (McCarthy, 2005; Bedelian, 2014: 
240). They also contain elements of payment for ecosystem services (PES) (Osano et 
al., 2013). 
A close relationship between capitalism and conservation is nothing new, but there is 
something new going on (Brockington and Duffy, 2010: 470). Neoliberal 
conservation is the latest stage in the long relationship between capitalism and 
conservation (Neumann, 1998; Brockington et al., 2008). Deregulation, 
decentralisation and privatisation are increasingly being heralded as the key to 
conservation success (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 437). Those concerned with 
conservation have never before been so enthusiastic about the potential for capitalist 
solutions to conservation problems, to the extent that today it would be a challenge to 
find conservation strategies untouched by neoliberalism (Brockington and Duffy, 
2010). Arsel and Büscher (2012: 53) suggest that this is because new and innovative 
methods are necessary to respond to the many environmental problems the world is 
facing. Capitalist markets, they argue, are the ideal vehicle to supply these (ibid).   
Conservation has long had a history of fitting in with dominant trends in society as a 
way of achieving success (Holmes, 2012: 194). Given that neoliberal capitalism is 
the dominant force in today’s society, it is not surprising that conservation has 
adjusted its strategies in order to succeed (ibid). It is intended for it to be a mutually 
beneficial relationship. Privately owned and managed conservation is increasingly 
recognised as being able to make significant contributions to conservation worldwide 
(ibid; Global Environment Facility, 2011) whilst at the same time making money for 
its investors. This potential impact is compounded when one considers the quantity 
of biodiversity falling outside formally protected areas; in Kenya, this is 65% 
(Western et al., 2009). This speaks to both of the reasons behind the neoliberalisation 
of conservation: capitalism engaging with conservation to make more money, and 
conservation engaging with capitalism to facilitate more conservation (ibid: 194-
195). 
In 1999 advocates of community-based conservation saw the spread of markets and 
private enterprise as a key obstacle to their agenda (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). By 
2007, conservation-business partnerships were common and deemed increasingly 
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desirable (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 433). Holmes (2012: 187-188) draws 
together a number of generalisations about how conservation is neoliberalising: 
Conservation is increasingly turning to market mechanisms to find ways of 
preserving biodiversity, of “selling nature to save it”, such as payment for 
ecosystem services, bio-prospecting and ecotourism (Igoe and Brockington, 
2007)… [Also,] since the 1980s, but accelerating since 2000, leading 
conservation NGOs have developed closer relationships with corporations, 
working with them, copying their methods in areas such as marketing, taking 
their donations and generally developing more positive attitudes towards their 
activities. 
The conservancies under investigation exemplify these features. They are a private 
alternative to the state run national parks and reserves and they undertake ecotourism 
so that the conservation can pay for itself. They also have affiliated NGOs that work 
closely with the initiatives. While large conservation NGOs are not yet heavily 
involved within the study site, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), African Wildlife 
Foundation (AWF) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) are all beginning to 
show an interest. For a detailed discussion of neoliberal conservation policies, 
specifically regarding the conservancies within and around the study site, see 
Bedelian (2014). 
The use of public-private partnerships in conservation is not universally supported. 
There are pros and cons to both private and state involvement in conservation. The 
state is usually preferred as a wildlife manager because it is widely perceived as a 
publicly accountable institution that can devise management plans and has the 
capacity to implement them (Brockington et al., 2008: 182-183). On the other hand, 
private enterprises are able to pay for conservation when the state cannot or will not 
do so (ibid). This injects new resources into biodiversity conservation, especially in 
poorer parts of the world where states lack the resources and capacity to effectively 
protect biodiversity (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). More broadly, the introduction of 
new actors in environmental governance changes the consideration of who is 
responsible for conserving biodiversity, with less responsibility for the state and 
more for private individuals and civil society (Holmes, 2012: 192). This reflects what 
Mbembe (2001) refers to as ‘private indirect government’, or what Ferguson (2006) 
calls ‘the privatisation of sovereignty’. Both terms refer to an emerging system where 
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sovereignty has become highly decentralised and fragmented (Igoe and Brockington, 
2007: 439).  
In comparison to state-run ventures, the approaches of neoliberal conservation 
promise increased democracy and participation by dismantling restrictive state 
structures and practices (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 434; Brockington et al., 2008: 
182). In public-private partnerships the hope is that local people can be brought into 
the market as competent conservations (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 442). In 
Goldman's (2001) words, they must become 'eco-rational subjects'.22 Child (2000) 
clarifies requirements for local engagement in conservation-oriented business 
ventures. These include securing the necessary capital or collateral and having 
legally guaranteed property rights, which gives people both the authority and 
incentive to protect natural resources (ibid). In other words, land should first go 
through the neoliberal privatisation process before conservation itself can be 
neoliberalised. Payments can then be made for use of this land. 
Market forces, such as payments for ecosystem services (PES), have found their way 
into environmental policy and conservation to a degree that was unimaginable only 
two decades ago (Arsel and Büscher, 2012: 53-54). Emphasising the financial value 
of land and carefully calculating the putative losses from not harming the 
environment, easements such as land rental payments represent a clearly neoliberal 
conservation strategy of developing new ways of financially valuing nature and using 
market mechanisms to conserve it (Morris, 2008). From their study on community 
conservation in South Africa and the Phillippines, Büscher and Dressler (2012: 368) 
conclude that through neoliberal conservation the ‘emphasis is shifting from local 
constructions of nature by communities to what nature should mean for communities 
in terms of commodity resources and capitalist markets’.  
It is vital that this research engages with this issue and assesses the impact that the 
move towards neoliberal conservation has had upon how nature and wildlife are 
perceived by stakeholders within the study site. Recognising the growing importance 
of what nature should mean for communities emphasises the need to examine 
benefits captured through the presence of the conservancies, how these are perceived 
                                                
22 The 'eco' in this case refers to both economic and ecological 
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by the recipients, and what further implications they have. This can only be achieved 
by engaging directly with those directly affected by the presence of conservancies.  
Despite the current enthusiasm, the proliferation of private-sector involvement does 
not always translate into positive benefits for local communities, especially if they 
have no power within such initiatives. Neoliberal conservation approaches are 
creating new forms of governance and new relationships between communities and 
the private actors (Bedelian, 2014). For the conservancies in the study, land tenure 
reform was essential for their creation and is also critical in determining the degree 
of control and power to negotiate and receive direct benefits by communities (Ashley 
and Roe, 2002; Bedelian, 2014: 117). Subdivided land can result in power being 
shared more evenly between landowners, rather than it being captured solely by elite 
– as occurred during the wildlife association phase in Koiyaki.  
2.2.2 Conservancies and Community Involvement 
Criticisms of protectionist approaches combined with a rethinking about pastoralism 
resulted in an alternative approach to conservation in East Africa. Community-based 
conservation was developed in the 1980s with the aim of incorporating the needs of 
local residents. It postulates that resource users should be seen as potential 
conservation collaborators rather than obstacles to negotiate in pursuing conservation 
independently (Russel and Harshbarger, 2003; Balint and Mashinya, 2006; Igoe and 
Croucher, 2007; Nelson et al., 2009). 
From pre-colonial times to the present day, the Maasai have been dispossessed of 
land at every stage. This dispossession has been carried out by white settlers, other 
Kenyan communities and Maasai community leaders, as well as in the name of 
conservation (Tignor, 1976; Halderman, 1989; Knowles and Collet, 1989; 
Brockington and Homewood, 1996: 92; Adams and Hulme, 2001:10; Hughes, 2006; 
Mwangi, 2006; Adams and Hutton, 2007; Homewood et al., 2009). Even in recent 
times, conservation and tourism has had poor outcomes for the majority of Maasai 
people, with most benefits being captured by a few well-placed individuals 
(Homewood et al., 2009; Thompson et al., 2009). This is exemplified by the wildlife 
associations in the Mara during group ranch land tenure (Thompson, 2002; 
Thompson and Homewood, 2002). The increasing exclusivity of the wildlife 
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associations resulted in the omission of socially, politically and spatially less well-
placed members from wildlife conservation income leaving them with little incentive 
to conserve wildlife (ibid: 105). The wildlife associations lacked the capacity and 
structures for equitable benefit sharing which hampered their success and ultimately 
led to their breakdown (Thompson and Homewood, 2002; Kaelo, 2009; Thompson et 
al., 2009). The politics of wildlife revenue control in the Mara have always been 
intense and conflictual (Thompson and Homewood 2002; Thompson et al 2009; 
Bedelian, 2014: 127).  
Governance in neoliberal conservation is characterized by a reduction in the state’s 
control over conservation in favour of hybrid forms of governance (Igoe and 
Brockington 2007; Bedelian, 2014: 20).  An important effect of neoliberalism is the 
increase in private sector involvement in conservation through private ownership and 
management of protected areas (Langholz and Krug, 2004; Carter et al., 2008), as 
well as the growth of global ecotourism (Duffy, 2010). 
By linking landowners directly to the market, and bypassing community level 
institutions, new neoliberal conservation initiatives in the Mara have the potential 
(and promise) to provide better incomes to those participating in comparison to the 
former wildlife associations (Osano et al., 2013). One major change through land 
subdivision has been the marked shift from a situation where the group ranch 
committees exercised considerable control which enabled manipulation, to the 
current position whereby private land tenure has given individual landowners 
significant autonomy (Homewood et al., 2009: 11). However, there is still little 
understanding of who, within the heterogeneous Maasai community entity, gets to 
participate in such initiatives.  
In Cameroon researchers found local elites usurped leadership roles, creating 
institutional structures not recognized by the larger community, and failed to provide 
sustainable resource management (Brown and Lassoie, 2010). Similarly, despite the 
widely-reported success of Namibian conservancies, there are concerns of elite 
capture, power dynamics, and the lack of community empowerment threaten benefit 
distribution to local communities (Hoole, 2010). Within the Mara conservancies, 
there is community representation, but Jandreau (2012) rightly questions the extent 
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to which this is formalized and to what degree is this arrangement consultation or 
intensive participation. Also, in the Mara, the use of the same leaders, the ones 
having the greatest power, in conservancies as wildlife associations inevitably 
ensures the continuation of their political nature (Bedelian, 2014: 244).  
In addition to elite being the committee members and power brokers within 
conservation schemes, PES may disproportionately benefit the wealthier members of 
society. This creates or reinforces power asymmetries amongst those involved 
(Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013; Osano et al., 2013; 
Bedelian, 2014). As ecosystem services are commodified, they form the basis for 
new socio-economic hierarchies, and the reproduction of unequal power relations 
(Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013; Bedelian, 2014). One 
cause of this is that the poor may be limited to participate in PES due to institutional 
and technical barriers, insecure land tenure, high transaction costs or limited 
understanding (Wunder, 2008; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Bedelian, 2014). Despite 
these criticisms and allegations of inequitable benefit distribution, there is evidence 
of PES having a positive contribution to the poor (Wunder, 2008). However, effects 
on non-participants may be positive or negative (ibid).  
This review of literature on community involvement has highlighted several 
important issues that need to be addressed within this research project. This includes 
an analysis of who has power within the conservancy structures, who participates, 
and to what degree. It is also important to assess how this power is gained, for 
example through societal position or land ownership. Once the nature of those in 
power is established there is a need to examine the nature of the relationship between 
power and benefits accrued. This should examine the degree, if any, of elite capture, 
the differential impact of conservancies on members and non-members and any 
gender differentiation.  
2.2.3 Conservancies and Livelihoods 
Protectionist conservation is based upon romanticised images of wild Africa. In the 
Mara this was combined with a perception of the Maasai that resulted in fears that 
wildlife would progressively lose out to livestock (Brockington and Homewood, 
1996). Such pejorative attitudes and repressive policies towards pastoralists 
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emanated from the view that they do not fit into this construction of wilderness, 
cause desertification and bring about a tragedy of the commons (Leach and Mearns, 
1996: 19-20). Pastoralists, and especially the Maasai, were thought to be 
economically inefficient, having an irrational attachment to livestock numbers and 
unwillingness to sell animals resulting in them accumulating stock beyond their 
needs and the land’s carrying capacity (ibid, Talbot, 1973; Collett, 1987; 
Brockington and Homewood, 1996). The idea of carrying capacity in the context of 
rangeland management is the notion that there is a quantity of livestock and/or 
wildlife that can be sustained by the resources within a certain area and if these levels 
are exceeded it will lead to reduced productivity and degradation. Hardin’s (1968) 
“Tragedy of the Commons”, takes this notion a stage further. It postulates that when 
livestock are owned individually and the rangelands are held communally, the 
incentive for individual profit inevitably drives overstocking, resulting in 
environmental degradation at the expense of the group (ibid).  
As a consequence of these entrenched views held by some conservationists, the 
Maasai and their livestock were excluded from key wildlife areas through “fortress 
conservation”, in pursuit of “wilderness” and “pristine” habitat ideals (Brockington 
and Homewood, 1996: 94; Adams and Hulme, 2001:10; Adams and Hutton, 2007). 
This exclusion created, and continues to create, tension between pastoralism, 
tourism, wildlife and park management (Berger, 1996: 192), exemplified by the on-
going battles in MMNR between herders and rangers over grazing rights.  
Savannah ecosystems are man-made and not the natural wildernesses that these 
protectionist conservationists like to believe. Over the 5,000 years since pastoralism 
emerged as a land use system in sub-Saharan Africa, pastoral natural resource 
management and herding strategies have modified ecosystems (Notenbaert et al., 
2012: 5). This is to the extent that the removal of pastoralism can be detrimental to 
grazing ungulates and rangeland diversity (ibid). According to Homewood and 
Rogers (1991), the combined effects of fire, grazing, trampling, and nutrient cycling 
by pastoralism has created some of the most biologically diverse savannah 
ecosystems in the world. Exemplifying this, in the Mara ecosystem more wildlife can 
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often be found on the neighbouring group ranches than within the reserve itself (Reid 
et al., 2003).  
Since the 1990s it has increasingly been advocated that if nomadic movement can be 
assured, pastoralism could be an economically efficient use of resources as well as 
being a benefit to conservation and increasing biodiversity (Behnke et al., 1993; 
Scoones, 1995; Leach and Mearns, 1996: 28-29; Swift, 1996: 90; Homewood, 2008; 
Sinclair, 2008; Homewood et al., 2009; Notenbaert et al., 2012: 1; Reid, 2012). One 
reason for this change is the phenomenon of ecological flux/non equilibrium 
dynamics. This denotes that rangeland productivity is more constrained by factors 
such as climatic variability and external shocks, than by density-dependent factors 
such as stocking rates and grazing pressure (Behnke et al., 1993; Boyd et al., 1999). 
A key aspect of this argument for the utility of pastoralism is the need for large areas 
for mobility (Behnke et al., 1993; Notenbaert et al., 2012). This is essential for 
effective risk management, the harnessing of environmental variability, livestock 
production enhancement, and the production of positive environmental externalities 
such as biodiversity conservation and stimulated pasture growth (ibid). 
Consequently, changing land uses and tenure arrangements threaten the existence of 
both the pastoral way of life and the large wildlife herds and migrations (Homewood 
et al., 2009: 76; Reto-o-Reto, n.d.: 1). More specifically, Seno and Shaw (2002: 86) 
note that the change from communal to individual tenure may negatively affect 
livestock production by eliminating the resource sharing strategy that has ensured 
their survival. Recognition of this has resulted in calls for the maintenance of land 
models that permit livestock mobility and access to key resources such as communal 
tenure (Nyariki et al., 2009; Notenbaert et al., 2012: 11). However, in the face of 
rapid population growth and other factors, the continued viability of such open land 
tenure is questionable, especially in the Mara.  
Despite arguments in favour of pastoralism’s ecological efficacy and sustainability, 
most African governments continue to hold entrenched views about pastoralism and 
its impact upon the environment (Homewood, 2008: 252). When combined with the 
perceived failure of community-based approaches, the 1990s and 2000s saw a 
resurgence of the protectionist paradigm (Hanna et al., 2008:4). This was named the 
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“back to barriers” movement (Hutton et al., 2005). CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe is one 
such CBC initiative that has received a lot of criticism. Despite the theoretical 
community-based approach, this initiative did structural damage to rural security and 
land tenure, had doubtful economic benefits and enabled something close to a new 
enclosures movement (Alexander and McGregor, 2000; Balint and Mashinya, 2006; 
Hughes, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the resurgence of protectionist approaches, critiques remain. In his 
PhD thesis (1998) and later book (2002), Brockington  uses research from Mkomazi 
Game Reserve in Tanzania to challenge whether cattle destroy wilderness, and 
whether wilderness needs to be devoid of people in order to be “saved”. In line with 
the earlier discussion, he argues that the dominant fortress approach to wildlife 
conservation in Africa has more to do with western conceptions of nature and 
environment than what is appropriate for African people and their herds 
(Brockington, 2002). Such pointed critiques of protectionist approaches refuelled 
calls for more community-based approaches in conservation and ecotourism across 
Africa (Brockington and Homewood, 1996: 97; Adams and Hulme, 2001). This 
debate as to how best to undertake conservation in East Africa is still on going today, 
resulting in a polarisation of discourse on the role of livestock in conservation areas.  
In addition to the form of the conservation model applied, the broader systematic 
shifts in land tenure regimes and human influences have added to the uncertainty of a 
sustainable model for both livestock production and wildlife conservation (Reid, 
2012). In Narok District wildlife populations have declined by up to 75% in the last 
several decades (Ogutu et al., 2011). Human influences are primarily to blame for 
this drastic decline in wildlife. This includes the intensification of cultivation, in-
migration, sedentisation, settlement expansion, climatic changes and poaching 
(Thompson et al., 2002; Thompson, 2002; Reid et al., 2003; Waithaka, 2004; 
Homewood et al., 2006; Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008; Thompson et al., 2009; 
Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010; Ogutu et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2012; Osano et al., 
2013; Bedelian, 2014).  
Around the time of the subdivision of Koiyaki Group Ranch, many criticisms and 
fears regarding its impacts were expressed. For example Norton-Griffiths (2008: 
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396-405) notes that the immediate effects of subdivision in the Mara include rises in 
land values and rampant land sales; an expansion of cultivation and concentration of 
pastoral settlements and tourist facilities around the Mara Reserve; and the 
construction of permanent buildings, pens, water development and fencing. He 
blames subdivision for the 65% drop in migratory wildebeest population on the 
former group ranches since 1984 as the density and diversity of large wildlife decline 
with decreasing ranch size (ibid: 403). Similarly, Seno and Shaw (2002: 85), 
Waithaka (2004) and Thompson et al (2009: 77) all feared that subdivision would 
result in wildlife being confined to the reserve with insufficient forage, due to the 
encroachment of incompatible land uses such as cultivation constraining the formally 
free-ranging wildlife-livestock matrix. Allan Earnshaw (I 69), the chairman of Kenya 
Wildlife Trust, was so worried about the concept of fragmentation that he presented 
two papers to the Kenyan cabinet pleading with them to revoke their decision. 
However, once he saw that the conservancy concept could pull together hundreds of 
individuals to form community conservancies, he reversed his opinion of land 
individualisation (ibid). He now believes that it has been an even better success story 
than conservancies on trust lands that are still un-subdivided as the money can reach 
the right people directly (ibid). This addresses the prolonged status quo in the Mara, 
where the poor distribution of tourism-related incomes used to allow revenues to 
concentrate in the hands of a few (Homewood et al., 2009: 14-5). 
As previously noted, conservancies represent a combination of protectionist and 
community-based conservation approaches as livestock access is restricted but the 
community are heavily involved in both ownership and decision-making. Regardless 
of the descriptive term used for their approach, as conservancies invariably involve 
an adjustment in pastoral livelihoods, this can have important implications for access 
and use of the rangelands (Bedelian, 2014: 14). The fear is that through neoliberal 
conservation, local land uses and livelihood systems can be undermined or 
criminalised in favour of how conservation is interpreted by the global market (ibid: 
22). As such, the effectiveness of markets for conservation in developing countries to 
work for local communities is questioned (Levine and Wandesforde-Smith, 2004). In 
relation to cattle in the Maasai Mara, Butt (2012) describes how the rise of a 
commoditized form of nature tourism, coupled with idealized notions of ‘nature’ and 
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‘wilderness’, have altered the micro-geography of interaction between herders and 
protected area managers. Existing literature is critical with regard to the extent to 
which livestock is incorporated into the conservancy model, the lack of community 
participation in determining livestock access and the implications of this for 
pastoralism and the surrounding areas.  
Bedelian (2014: 114) reports that community members are concerned that 
conservancies have radically altered access to livestock grazing; it is the main source 
of conflict between communities and the conservancies. The 2010 OOC land lease 
agreement (Raffman Dhanji Elms Virdee Advocates 2011, cited in Osano et al., 
2013: 247) states that the landowner should not ‘use or permit the Premises or any 
part thereof to be used to graze livestock save in accordance with a grazing 
management plan set out by the Tenant’.  
All conservancies in the Mara have introduced controlled grazing plans, which set 
certain rules for grazing inside their boundaries (Osano et al., 2013: 244; Bedelian, 
2014: 136). These regulations restrict the number of livestock, the areas to be grazed, 
and periods of permitted access (Osano et al., 2013: 244). Conservancies usually 
allow more flexible grazing during the tourism low season (April/May and 
November) when there are very few tourists in the conservancy and some camps may 
be closed (ibid). Usually it is cattle herds neighbouring the conservancy are allowed 
access, on a rotational basis, as different parts of the conservancy are opened up at 
different times (ibid: 139). Grazing is only usually permitted during the day for ease 
of monitoring and to avoid conflict with predators (ibid). Despite the grazing rules 
there is a lot of illegal grazing in conservancies by both conservancy members and 
non-members (Bedelian, 2014: 137). Grazing rules are monitored and enforced by 
conservancy rangers, and herd owners are fined if herds are caught grazing in the 
conservancy at non-stipulated times and places (ibid). 
Bedelian (2014: 115) reports that there is little community participation in decisions 
determining livestock grazing, instead they are informed by the conservancy 
management or land committee of any decisions made regarding grazing. It is the 
land committee, conservancy management, and tourism investors who are perceived 
to have decision-making power regarding conservancy grazing (ibid). However, in 
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some conservancies, including Mara North, sub-committees have been created for 
grazing (ibid). Bedelian later adds, now that many conservancies have established 
conservancy management and controlled grazing plans, crafted by technical 
managers, there are fewer opportunities for input from the livestock owners 
themselves (ibid: 128). Furthermore, participation by landowners in formulating 
conservancy livestock grazing and management plans may lead to better compliance 
(Andrade and Rhodes, 2012; Bedelian, 2014: 129). 
In the case of the Mara conservancies, PES participants face having to make the 
trade-off of a reduction in the area available for livestock grazing, in order to 
conform to the Conservancy land use regulations (Osano et al., 2013: 252). The 
choice to lease land for wildlife tourism and exclude livestock in the OOC does not 
necessarily mean that the participating households have abandoned pastoralism 
altogether. Some household may relocate livestock grazing away from the 
conservancy to community areas but the resulting crowding therein could worsen the 
degradation of these areas due to overgrazing (ibid). This increased pressure adds 
grievances to landowners outside the conservancy, especially those who are not 
conservancy landowners and do not receive the monthly payments (Courtney, 2009). 
In some cases, livestock grazing is also transferred to the Mara Reserve (Butt, 2011; 
Osano et al., 2013: 253). Although cattle populations have not increased 
significantly, small stock have tripled, and illegal cattle grazing within the MMNR 
has risen, increasing competition between livestock and wildlife over forage (Butt 
2011; Bedelian, 2014: 65).  
Bedelian (2014: 137-138) concludes that grazing restrictions and the reduction of 
space for livestock grazing in conservancies has been a contentious issue within the 
community, creating much conflict. Livestock owners complained that conservancies 
had seriously reduced the grazing areas available to them, and prevented access to 
areas they once relied on (ibid). This is accentuated during dry conditions. 
Consequently, many viewed livestock grazing restrictions imposed by conservancies 
very negatively as they big cost on their livelihood, pastoralism. Such perceptions 
question whether community access and user rights are protected, or lost, under the 
Mara conservancy model (Butt, pers. comm. cited in Jandreau, 2012). Such 
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criticisms emphasised calls for increased access for cattle as a management tool 
within conservancies, because cattle are beneficial for wildlife at intermediate levels 
(Reid et al., 2003).  
In addition to their influence upon pastoralism, conservancies also generate other 
livelihood opportunities. Although employment in conservation and tourism can lead 
to a decline in other activities (e.g. hunting and farming) due to a shortage of time, 
new income sources can also enable greater market consumption and the expansion 
of production (Stronza, 2007; Bedelian, 2014: 25). As such, new livelihood 
opportunities tend to be additional rather than a substitute for established activities. 
This means that high earnings may be put back into activities that threaten 
biodiversity (Kiss, 2004) such as alternative economic opportunities leading to 
accelerated rates of deforestation resulting in ‘conservation backfires’ (Langholz, 
1999). For example, in Zimbabwe Murombedzi (1999) found that revenues to 
households from CAMPFIRE were reinvested in ways to improve agricultural 
productivity, which are incompatible with wildlife. In the Mara, Thompson and 
Homewood (2002) report that tourism earnings were reinvested in large-scale 
cultivation. Although Bedelian (2014) concluded that there was not a positive 
relationship between being a conservancy landowner and having more livestock, any 
influence may not yet have been visible at the time the data was collected for this 
study. 
As discussed, without clear links to conservation goals, increased incomes from a 
conservation project may counterproductively encourage more rapid resource 
extraction (Barrett et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014). Stem et al. (2003) report that even if 
income does cause positive changes in what people do, people’s beliefs or 
conservation perspectives may not have changed. This is concerning as it would 
mean that people are likely to revert back to previous ways if benefits reduce or 
cease (Pretty and Smith, 2004). 
This section has reviewed literature advocating that pastoralism can be a sustainable 
livelihood if it has sufficient mobility on communal land tenure. What is uncertain, 
however, is how pastoralism can and will evolve in the Mara when faced with land 
individualisation and high population growth rates. In terms of combining livestock 
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with conservation, we are perhaps reaching a point when the debate moves on from 
whether cattle should be incorporated, to how. Existing literature is critical of the 
extent to which conservancies in the Mara have been incorporating livestock, and the 
degree of participation given to pastoralists in determining access. This reduction in 
grazing area available was the biggest criticism that the conservancies faced in 
Bedelian’s (2014) study. This raises the question as to whether community access 
and user rights are secured or lost in the conservancy model. There have been calls to 
increase access for cattle in conservancies as a management tool. It is important for 
this research project, which is undertaken three years after Bedelian’s data was 
collected, to assess whether anything has changed with regard to the conservancies’ 
inevitable impact upon pastoralism. Findings to this will determine whether the 
neoliberal conservation aspect of the conservancies is undermining local needs and / 
or human rights in favour of creating a version of nature that is desired by global 
markets.  
Aside from pastoralism, it is important to investigate the impact of money earned 
through employment and lease payments resulting from conservancies, and whether 
there are any ‘conservation backfires’. Bedelian (2014) reported that evidence from 
2010 suggests there has not been an increase in cattle as a consequence of the 
conservancies, is this still true three years later? Finally, the literature reviewed here 
highlights the importance in exploring whether there are clear links between income 
earned and conservation goals. This involves investigating whether benefits accrued 
from conservancies change people’s actions, beliefs of perceptions, and if benefits 
were to stop, would people reverse to their previous ways? 
2.2.4 Conservancies linking Conservation and Development  
Community-based conservation involves linking conservation objectives to 
development needs (Adams and Hulme, 2001). PES is also popular because of the 
rhetoric of expected win-win outcomes in conservation and development (Muradian 
et al., 2010; Bedelian, 2014). In theory, conservancies have the potential to both 
expand habitats available for conservation and encourage development. However, 
development is a complex, multidimensional concept that seems to defy definition 
(Cowen and Shenton, 1996: 3; Telfer and Sharpley, 2008:6).  
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Development is socially constructed in nature, and means different things to different 
people (Wall, 1997:34). In its most basic form, development is a continuous and 
positive change in economic, social, political and cultural dimensions of the human 
condition, guided by the principle of freedom of choice and limited by the 
environment’s capacity to sustain such change (Telfer and Sharpley, 2008:6). It is 
contentious as to how this is to be done, and so the term now has strong political 
underpinnings (Wall, 1997:34). Early formulations of development focused primarily 
on economic aspects and measurements; however, definitions have broadened over 
time (Telfer and Sharpley, 2008:15). The term is also value laden, incorporating a 
mixture of material and moral ideas encompassing both present and future states; 
what currently exists and how it came to be, as well as what might be brought into 
the future (Wall, 1997:34). As a result of these complexities, Willis (2005: 2) asserts 
that any discussion on development needs to consider how development has been 
defined, by who and at what scale. 
Development has come to be used as a philosophy, a process, a plan and a product; 
but these perspectives are not distinct and overlap to a considerable degree (Wall, 
1997:34-35). There has also been a tendency for the discourse on development to 
swing from one grand narrative to another, reflecting the prevailing political 
economies that underpin the promotion of these ideas (Parnwell, 2002; Mowforth 
and Munt, 2009: 36). As a result, policy-orientated judgements sometimes obscure 
the success of projects (Mosse, 2005). Even if the desired project outcomes are 
achieved, these are only positively acknowledged if they still fit into the dominant 
policy model (ibid).  
In addition to these complexities in defining development, many commentators – 
especially post-developmentalists – emphasise that development has a built-in 
Western bias (Mowforth and Munt, 2009: 31-2). This is because the vast majority of 
development theories and policies are fashioned by the West – dominated global 
institutions, governments, agencies and academe (ibid). Enlightenment and is an 
unequivocal ‘modern project’. According to Escobar (1995), despite alterations in 
the theory and approach to development, Third World change is contingent on, and 
reflective of, the First World; this is in the nature of economic change and expansion 
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of capitalist relations of production and in the practice and theorisation of 
development. Telfer (2002: 339) challenges whether Western development concepts 
should be utilised in non-western settings. This will be the focus of chapter three. 
Despite the inconsistencies in definitions of development discussed, it remains a 
widely held belief that economic growth is fundamental to the wellbeing of the poor 
and the progress of development (Mowforth and Munt, 2009: 44-46). Both neoliberal 
conservation and community-based tourism are centred on economic benefits being 
returned to local communities. Many studies looking at the impact of tourism focus 
on economic aspects (including Croes and Vanegas, 2008; Schubert et al., 2011). 
This is largely because of the first Millennium Development Goal (Mitchell and 
Ashley, 2010) and tourism’s frequent adoption as a national poverty reduction 
strategy (Hawkins and Mann, 2007). For example, in Kenya, tourism is one of the 
key sectors outlined within the economic pillar of the country’s Vision 2030 
development programme (Government of Kenya, 2007). Evidence that tourism 
countries achieve higher economic growth rates compared to non-tourism countries 
(Lanza et al., 2005) is often used to justify this approach. 
For these reasons, global or national scale analyses of tourism’s economic impact are 
commonly undertaken. Tourism also has an economic impact in destination areas. 
Local economic development is particularly encouraged within alternative tourisms 
such as community-based ecotourism (Reid, 1999). Yunis (2009) describes seven 
ways in which ecotourism can provide economic opportunities for local 
communities. These are employment, earning concessions from tourism, the supply 
of goods and services to tourism enterprises, the direct sale of goods and services to 
visitors, running tourism enterprises such as village visits, voluntary giving by 
tourism enterprises and tourists, and finally investment in infrastructure stimulated 
by tourism (ibid). Mihalic (2002: 81) warns that in practice, local economic benefits 
are not always realised.  
As opposed to protectionist conservation which largely excludes neighbouring 
communities, in public-private partnerships the hope is that local people can be 
brought into the market as competent conservations (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 
442). This involves those with legally guaranteed property rights being given an 
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incentive to protect their natural resources (Child, 2000). These PES schemes 
emphasise the financial value of land and calculate the putative losses from not 
harming the environment (Morris, 2008). By doing this, easements such as land 
rental payments can be paid (ibid). As with community-based conservation, the 
theory of passing these benefits on to local communities are not always realised, 
especially if they have insufficient power within the initiative. Neoliberal 
conservation approaches also creating new forms of governance and new 
relationships between communities and the private actors (Bedelian, 2014). 
To date, in Kenya there is scant evidence of wildlife-based tourism significantly 
impacting on the local economy, particularly in pastoral areas (Manyara and Jones, 
2007). This is largely because revenues generated have been diverted from the 
producers of wildlife, the pastoral landowners, to the service side of the industry 
(Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010; Osano et al., 2013). At the extreme, Earnshaw and 
Emerton (2000) calculated that in 1987 only 8% of wildlife earnings were received 
either directly or indirectly by the local population: 5% to Narok county council, 2% 
to local employees and 0.6% to landowners. More recent estimates of predicted 
revenue to Narok and Trans-Mara county councils in the MMNR Management Plan 
(NCC and TMCC 2011, cited in Bedelian, 2014: 66) total more than $41 million, 
with $34 million to Narok county council alone.23 Despite this enormous revenue, 
neighbouring Maasai landowners have so far received little financial benefit (Norton-
Griffiths et al., 2008).  
The extent to which projects are able to achieve and combine conservation and 
development, which often have contradictory objectives is much debated. There is 
little credible empirical evidence, to date, that solutions to meet the joint goals of 
conservation and development have been met (Hulme and Murphree, 2001; Adams 
et al., 2004; Ferraro, 2011). Communicating projects as win-win does not 
acknowledge the multiple complexities of most conservation and development 
                                                
23 These are only predicted revenues as reported revenues are not available. These estimates are based 
on what the two county councils should potentially be earning from the MMNR (and Mara Triangle) 
based on existing visitor usage in a good year. Revenues only include the major revenue types, such as 
visitor entrance fees, bed night fees and balloon fees. They do not take into account any of the 
leakages in the revenue collection system that may be occurring (NCC and TMCC 2011: 43 cited in 
Bedelian, 2014: 66). 
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scenarios (McShane et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014: 16). Some projects would be better 
understood as involving trade-offs and hard decisions (ibid). 
An area neglected in the current literature is how attempts to achieve this win-win for 
both conservation and development influences the actors involved. Are traditional 
development actors as heavily involved in conservation areas? Or do conservation 
actors become development actors in these contexts? If so, to what extent do their 
duel-core motivations influence development outcomes? Do their conservation 
objectives influence the trade-offs made? 
There appears to be a mismatch between the theoretical win-win linkage between 
community-based conservation and development with empirical findings. Whilst this 
study will not assess the success of the conservation aspect of conservancies, the 
continued presence of high-end tourism operators is highly indicative of this. Instead, 
the focus of the study will be on perceptions of the relationship between 
conservancies and development, and who is undertaking this work. This will include 
assessments of the trade-offs and hard decisions made in name of conservation 
objectives.  
2.2.5 Conservancies as a Tourism Business 
Tourism is one means by which nature is neoliberalised (Duffy, 2013; Bedelian, 
2014: 23). Tourism, and especially ecotourism, creates economic value from species, 
landscapes and activities, and turns these into ‘commodities’ that clients pay to see or 
experience (ibid). It opens up nature to international markets and inscribes new 
values and uses for nature, species and landscapes (Brockington and Duffy, 2010). 
Nature is produced, reproduced and redesigned as a tourism attraction (Duffy, 2013).  
In the case of the conservancies under investigation, money earned through tourism 
funds the payment of the easements through PES. Unlike areas that rely upon donor 
involvement, this model makes the conservancies in the Mara self-sustainable. As 
previously discussed, the need for an alternative, higher-end tourism product was 
also one of the dominant influences behind the creation of the conservancies.  
Tourism is one of the largest and fastest growing industries in the world (Chambers, 
2000). Alongside tourism’s growing importance, as with community-based 
58 
 
conservation, great expectations have been generated with regard to its development 
potential – especially community-based tourism (Saarinen et al., 2011: 201). As 
developing countries are increasingly desired as holiday destinations, tourism has 
become “the world’s largest voluntary transfer of resources from rich people to poor 
people” (Mitchell and Ashley, 2010: 1). In many less developed countries of sub-
Saharan Africa, tourism is perceived to be one of the few feasible options for 
development (Briedenhann and Wickens, 2004: 71). However, Mowforth and Munt 
(2009: xii) caution that it is too easy to be seduced by the possibilities inferred from 
relatively few examples of positive change. 
In 2013, Kenya’s tourism sector contributed $5.4 billion to the economy (Kamau, 
2014). However, Kenya’s tourism industry is fragile, due in particular to the 
country’s political instability. In addition to ingrained memories of Kenya’s post-
election violence in 2007-2008 and the after effects of the terrorist attack on 
Westgate Mall in 2013, Foreign and Commonwealth Office warnings continue to 
undermine Kenya’s tourism sector (ibid, Business Monitor International, 2014). 
Despite these challenges, the tourism industry in Kenya remains the second highest 
national economic earner after agriculture (Akwiri, 2013). The Kenyan government 
recognised the development potential of this and named tourism one of the key 
sectors within its Vision 2030 development programme (Government of Kenya, 
2007). 
Although the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem is a mere dot on the African continent, it 
embodies the ideals of pristine wilderness which have long been central to wildlife 
conservation following colonial imaginations and policies (Adams and McShane, 
1992: 38). It is undeniably a big pull for tourists; almost half of all international 
tourists to Kenya visit the Maasai Mara (Honey, 2008; Sayagie, 2013). Despite its 
economic importance nationally, tourism in the Mara ecosystem has received 
extensive criticism regarding its environmental impact and inequitable benefit 
distribution to local communities24 (Roe et al., 1997; Honey, 2008). The emergence 
                                                
24 The heterogeneity and complexity of “communities” is acknowledged, as well as difficulties in 




of conservancies is an attempt to address these criticisms through the creation of an 
alternative model.  
As highlighted throughout this chapter, conservation approaches have evolved over 
time towards attempts to incorporate developmental needs of destination 
environments and communities; tourism has evolved likewise (Telfer and Sharpley, 
2008: 27). These new approaches, including ecotourism, sustainable tourism and 
community-based (eco)tourism, are collectively referred to by the World Travel and 
Tourism Council as “New Tourism” (WTTC, 2003). As with many of the key 
concepts within this study, there is no universally agreed definition of these niche 
tourisms. Although with varying foci, they are all widely perceived to be 
“responsible travel” to areas rich in wildlife that also helps to preserve the 
environment and promote the well-being of the local people through their inclusion 
in decision making and benefit distribution (Mbaria, 2007). Largely because of this 
lack of agreed definition, the terms are often misused and abused through “green-
washing” campaigns by tourism companies which threaten to make the term merely 
a marketing and promotional tool (Telfer, 2002: 348; Mowforth and Munt, 2009; 
Ngunyi, 2009; Yunis, 2009). My Masters dissertation (Courtney, 2009) concluded 
that although no tourism venture is likely to fit into more comprehensive definitions 
of ecotourism perfectly, Olare Orok Conservancy conforms to a large extent. This 
dissertation advocated that such conservancies warrant the label “ecotourism”; 
therefore, this thesis will not reassess the vast array of literature debating ecotourism 
definitions.  
Community-based tourism (CBT) is a broad term to encompass initiatives that 
genuinely work together with neighbouring communities (Mtapuri and Giampiccoli, 
2014). Due to the nature of land ownership combined with the conservancy 
framework in the study site, community members are involved in both decision-
making and benefit receipt. As a result, community-based ecotourism would be an 
accurate descriptor for the tourism undertaken in the conservancies within this case 
study. 
As already touched upon, tourism is widely seen by governments as a tool for 
national, regional and local economic growth, as well as employment creation 
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(Saarinen et al., 2011: 201). Its potential role has also been expanded to address 
global-scale developmental challenges (Ashley and Mitchell, 2005; Bolwell and 
Weinz, 2008). For example, the potential of tourism in the context of the Millennium 
Development Goals has been stressed (Ashley and Roe, 2002; UNWTO, 2006; 
Novelli and Hellwig, 2011; Saarinen et al., 2011: 201). Although they recognise that 
the tourism industry cannot address all these ambitious development targets, 
Saarinen et al. (2011: 201) advocate that tourism has the potential to be a tool, or can 
represent a partial solution.  
The global reach of the tourism industry cultivates hopes and expectations that it can 
challenge global problems. As 75% of the 2 billion people living on less than a dollar 
a day live in rural areas surrounded by natural or cultural attractions that can be given 
economic value through tourism (Yunis, 2009), this potential has immense scope. 
Aside from contributing to national economies, it is in the destination locale that 
many of the physical manifestations and impacts of the industry occur (Telfer, 2002: 
347), both positive and negative (Duffy, 2002; Honey, 2008). This is why the 
destination scale was selected for this research project. 
Echoing the conservation-development discussion above, the tourism industry, 
international agencies such as the UN and World Bank, bilateral organisations and 
some NGOs are all optimistic regarding tourism’s impact upon development (Honey, 
2008: 90). In particular, community-based tourism (CBT) is promoted as a means of 
both poverty reduction and community development in developing countries 
(Baktygulov and Raeva, 2010: 2-3; Mtapuri and Giampiccoli, 2014: 1). Duffy (2002; 
2006) suggests that this is encouraged because tourism fits into existing neoliberal 
structures. Again mirroring community-based conservation, the key word used in 
many assessments of the community-based tourism – development nexus is potential 
(see Telfer, 2002; Moscardo, 2008: 175; Mitchell and Ashley, 2010: 136; Sebele, 
2010; Saarinen et al., 2011: 202).  
This approach to development has been subject to criticism, and some scholars have 
pointed to a mismatch between theory and practice (Scheyvens, 2002: 72; Honey, 
2008: 90; Mitchell and Muckosy, 2008; Goodwin and Santilli, 2009). CBT offers 
both opportunities and challenges; if not properly facilitated, it can inflict profound 
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damage on communities instead of serving as a development tool (Suansri, 2003: 7; 
Khanal and Babar, 2007: 7; Mtapuri and Giampiccoli, 2014: 2).  
In its broad sense, tourism is criticised for environmental degradation, dependency 
on international corporations (Telfer and Sharpley, 2008: 28) and challenging the 
nation state by engaging in issues such as conservation and development (Mowforth 
and Munt, 2009). Tourism is a neoliberal, capitalist industry and these criticisms 
mirror those of capitalism in general – as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
eight.  
Analysis of literature and community-based tourism case studies, including other 
conservancies in Kenya, identified six factors commonly cited as limiting tourism’s 
ability to have a positive impact on development. These are: inconsistent definitions 
of development, motivation, insufficient or inadequate distribution of benefits, 
resource access restrictions, inadequate participation or control by communities, and 
unsustainability. Although community-based tourism is only one component of the 
conservancy concept, as this chapter has demonstrated, this body of literature is 
greatly relevant to this research. Some of these six factors have been touched upon 
already in this chapter and are reflected upon again, through the tourism lens. They 
will now each be examined, in turn, so as to deepen the contextualisation for this 
study.  
2.2.5.1 Inconsistent Definitions of Development 
Although many reports extol the benefits of using tourism as an agent of 
development, definitions of development can be very restrictive, with economic 
benefits often receiving the most attention (Telfer, 2002: 339). The contribution of 
tourism can be easily identified in economic-centric definitions, but it becomes more 
complex in holistic definitions that encompass social, cultural, political, 
environmental and economic targets (ibid).  
Further, Kontogeorgopoulos et al. (2013: 2) caution that the measurement of success 
is subjective, controversial and ‘depends largely on one’s perspective and 
expectations’. Current models are “overly reliant on Western ‘experts’ and 
development agencies and that far too little attention has been paid to local and non-
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Western perspectives and knowledge” (Le et al., 2012: 362). Snider (2012: 210) 
concluded his thesis, based in the Mara, by appealing for new innovative measures of 
non-economic benefits emanating from tourism, as defined by the host community. 
Consequently, it is vital that the concept of development, and how different people 
interpret it over time and space, is analysed within this study.  
2.2.5.2 Motivation 
Mbaria (2007) notes that there is debate whether the demand for ecotourism is driven 
by: 
the need to genuinely alter the socio-economic circumstances of communities 
or the desire of the global environmental movement – NGOs, UN bodies, 
environmental charities and private environmentalists – to halt the 
degeneration of key ecosystems in Kenya and elsewhere.  
These two approaches either prioritise development or conservation. As previously 
discussed in section 2.2.4, although theoretically community-based conservation is a 
win-win for these two objectives, empirical examples point more towards trade-offs 
and hard decisions based on these, often competing, objectives. Similarly, Burns 
(1999) identifies two differing approaches and labels them “Tourism First”, in which 
tourism is the focus, and “Development First”, referring to the idea that tourism is 
framed by development needs. Butcher (2011) believes that determining the 
motivation is important because this dictates whose needs are met. He suggests that 
tourism may actually better serve the needs of already industrialised countries that 
aim to save global biodiversity, than poverty alleviation and socio-economic 
development more generally (ibid).  
In Eselenkei Conservancy bordering Amboseli National Park, Rutten (2004: 28) 
notes that within the public-private partnership, theoretical voluntary and genuine 
commitment in collaboration, transparency and good communication do not match 
practice. He believes that the core problem that led to many of the troubles was that 
there was no genuine motivation by the tour operator to develop the sanctuary for the 
benefit of the local people (Rutten, 2002: 22-3).  
In addition to motivating factors for involvement in tourism, there are also different 
motivations for actors being involved in development initiatives. For some, such as 
the state, this stems from a sense of responsibility and for others, including religious 
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and tourism organisations, it is used as a way to gain acceptance and support. 
Tourists also have multifaceted reasons for wanting to become involved in 
development around tourism areas.  
2.2.5.3 Insufficient or Inequitable Distribution of Benefits 
Tourism activities need to benefit local communities as well as pass revenue onto the 
national government (Novelli and Scarth, 2007). Yet the way the revenue is allocated 
is fundamental, as development projects, for example, do not solve the problem of 
passive economic dependency or the antagonism rooted in the presence of problem 
animals (ibid: 70). Benefits for host communities must also outweigh perceived 
social costs (Whelan, 1991). From the case study of Liwonde National Park in 
Malawi, Novelli and Scarth (2007) argue that tourism should finance enterprise-
based community development and provide employment opportunities as well as 
tangible park benefits. In some instances, tourism revenues may always remain too 
low to bring personal wealth, such as Il Ngwesi Conservancy in Laikipia (Harrison, 
2001), but in prime areas like the Maasai Mara revenues are much higher. 
As previously discussed more broadly in relation to PES, it is important to determine 
who benefits from tourism, and whether local elite benefit disproportionately (Telfer, 
2002: 344). There is a close relationship between having power and control in a 
venture, and receiving direct benefits from it. Where adequate benefit capture and 
distribution are absent, Murphy (2013: 153) notes: “tourism development has 
frequently failed to live up to its promised expectations and many communities have 
begun to develop jaundiced attitudes to this panacea growth industry”. Power is 
closely linked to land tenure. In Eselenkei, where land is still a communal group 
ranch, Ogutu (2002) and Rutten (2004) concur that some elite individuals, including 
those on the group ranch committee, are accumulating huge returns while others 
receive very little in return for the loss of their resources.  
2.2.5.4 Resource Access Restrictions 
One of the main costs incurred by communities hosting tourism initiatives, especially 
wildlife or nature tourism, is restricted access to resources. In some cases, in an 
attempt to protect environments for ecotourism, traditional resource uses and users 
have been eliminated, thereby depriving local people of their livelihoods (Wall, 
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1997: 489; Roe and Urquhart, 2001; Mwangi, 2005: 61; Mowforth and Munt, 2009). 
This will be the focus of chapter six. In his case study in Ghana, Eshun (2010) finds 
that ecotourism development has continued practices of colonial wildlife 
conservation and forestry that fail to understand the problem of the marginalisation 
of local communities. As a result, ecotourism has brought hardships to the residents 
in surrounding communities (ibid). Osano et al. (2013) and Bedelian (2014) have 
already indicated that this is a major issue for the pastoralists living alongside the 
conservancies in the Mara.  
2.2.5.5 Inadequate Participation or Control by Communities 
Participation is essential to ensure that more benefits are captured by local 
communities (Mbaria, 2007). This is exemplified by multiple case studies including 
Khama Rhino Sanctuary Trust in Botswana (2010: 136) and Elmina in Ghana 
(Sonne, 2010). One of the most frequently cited concerns regarding the realisation of 
tourism’s potential for development is the power relations between actors in 
ventures, more specifically the degree of participation and control held by the local 
communities (Wall, 1997: 489; Wallace and Russell, 2004; Sebele, 2010: 136; 
Ferreira, 2011; Mbaiwa, 2011; Saarinen et al., 2011: 202).  
Matarrita-Cascante (2010) uses a case study from Costa Rica to advance “the critical 
relevance of open communication, widespread participation, tolerance, and 
communication between residents and different tourism-related stakeholders for the 
promotion of processes leading to tourism-led development”. If this does not happen, 
tourism ventures can lead to human rights infringements and a deterioration of the 
status quo (Goldman, 2011). Insufficient or ineffective participation can also result in 
unfair deals for communities, as reported by Ogutu (2002), Rutten (2002; 2004), 
Mwangi (2005) and Southgate (2006) regarding Eselenkei25 and Kimana 
Conservancies which border Amboseli National Park in Southern Kenya. 
Interestingly, although “New Tourism” demands an effective, long-term partnership 
between the public and private sectors, no explicit reference is made to community 
participation in its definition (Telfer and Sharpley, 2008: 27-8).  
                                                
25 This is also sometimes spelt Selenkei, Selenkey or Selengei. The initiative was originally called a 
“Conservation Area” but later changed to “Conservancy”.  
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It is particularly difficult for communities to maintain control and capture benefits in 
light of the dominant power of multinational hotel chains and holiday providers 
(Saarinen et al., 2011: 201). Telfer (2002: 344) questions whether those who have the 
power in the tourism industry will ever be willing to share this power with local 
communities in destinations, and whether the sharing of power will represent a 
meaningful partnership. Exemplifying this, the Ecotourism and Community Benefits 
Report analysed by Mbaria (2007) uses six partnership operations in Kenya to argue 
that communities have reaped minimal gain, instead ending up in “exploitative 
partnerships with various private investors”. If communities have secure rights over a 
resource critical to the tourism venture, such as land, they have more power to 
negotiate fairer agreements. 
Within the literature on local participation in tourism, little consideration is given 
either to the degree of participation or who within communities should participate 
(Gauthier, 1993; Scheyvens, 2002; Garrod, 2003; Honey, 2008). Given the 
heterogeneity of communities, this is a significant omission. In Kimana, broad 
participation proved elusive owing to the highly fragmented community (Southgate, 
2006). The political rifts between ethnic groups, clans and age sets resulted in the 
failure to capitalise on its immense ecotourism potential (ibid).  De Kadt (1990: 30) 
also warns that “calls for community participation gloss over the well-known 
tendency for local elites to ‘appropriate’ the organs of participation for their own 
benefit”.  
In the Eselenkei case, community members claim that they were merely informed of 
the ecotourism project rather than becoming involved in its development, as regular 
communication was only held with community leaders (Mwangi, 2005). The 
elections for these leaders were undemocratic and Mwangi (ibid) also suggests that 
they had been compromised by the tourism partner; thus the leaders were not 
accountable to the group ranch members (ibid). This enabled thriving corruption 
amongst the politically motivated leaders resulting in the lack of incentive for them 
to increase community involvement or to spread benefits more evenly (ibid: 63). 
Reviewers of this case study criticise KWS for failing to provide support during 
contract negotiations (Rutten, 2004) and the government for having no structures or 
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watchdogs in place to assist the community (Mwangi, 2005: 62). Expanding on this, 
Ngunyi (2009) argues that an inadequate policy framework by some governments to 
guide the process also prevents the development potential of tourism from being 
fully realised. For example, in Kenya there are no clear structures or guidelines 
outlining how the local area should benefit from tourism ventures (ibid). 
Although most tourism venture partnership agreements are drawn up by lawyers, and 
NGOs often take on a brokerage role, few have clear-cut criteria for sharing revenues 
between investors and local people (Mbaria, 2007). This ambiguity, and a lack of 
watchdogs, hinders the accruement of community benefits from projects and thus 
minimises any development impact (Mwangi, 2005: 62).  
2.2.5.6 Unsustainability 
The final key aspect identified from literature, which is a deterrent to positive 
tourism-development relationships, is unsustainability. Using the case of Tsiseb 
Conservancy in Namibia, Lapeyre (2010) shows that tourism income captured 
locally has improved rural households’ livelihoods, generated linkages in the local 
economy, empowered rural actors through training and unlocked socioeconomic 
opportunities for the future. However, he questions the sustainability of such 
community tourism ventures due to competitiveness in the tourism industry, high 
costs, weak local capacities and inadequate support by donors and NGOs (ibid). 
Similarly, the impact of conservancies upon development in the long term will only 
be complete once the sustainability of the conservancies is understood.  
In summary, when deciding whether to introduce tourism businesses, potential 
destinations in the developing world face a dilemma: tourism represents a potentially 
valuable development option, yet it is associated with a variety of costs or impacts 
(Telfer and Sharpley, 2008: 28). Many of these echo the costs and impacts associated 
with community-based conservation, neoliberal conservation and PES schemes. 
What emerges from existing literature on tourism is a “set of interesting results and 
notions, which both support and challenge the connections between tourism and 
development and the new role of tourism in global development” (Saarinen et al., 
2011: 202). It is essential not to accept at face value the tacit assumption that the new 
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forms of conservation or tourism are both designed for, and will result in, addressing 
problems such as poverty through development (Mowforth and Munt, 2009: 61).  
2.2.6 Conservancies as Africapitalism 
Conservation is not alone in adopting a neoliberal approach to try to achieve its 
needs through a mutually beneficial approach: development is following suit. 
Increasing attention is being paid to the idea of business as a solution (Blowfield, 
2008). Concepts such as conscious capitalism and inclusive business strategies26 are 
now widespread in the business arena (ibid). Organisations, including United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), are promoting business strategies for 
development. The Millennium Development Goals also refer to a “global partnership 
for development” (MDG 8) in which there is a role for companies.  
Africapitalism is a more specific branch within inclusive capitalism that brings back 
the importance of place within our globalised world. Tony Elumelu, the founder of 
the term, insists that Africapitalism is not capitalism with an African twist, but rather 
“an economic philosophy that embodies the private sector’s commitment to the 
economic transformation of Africa through investments that generate both economic 
prosperity and social wealth” (cited by Amaeshi, 2013). Capitalism encounters 
different circumstances around the world, and business practices in Africa differ 
from those in other locations (Elumelu, 2013: 12). There are new challenges or 
opportunities such as increasing populations, labour pools, spending power and 
accelerating reforms which create various demands (ibid). Partly as a result of 
striving to meet these challenges, Africa has been the location of some of the most 
advanced concepts guiding the development of global business today such as the 
‘double bottom line’27 and Porter and Kramer’s CSV (ibid). Africapitalism does not 
ask businesses to be philanthropists. As with other inclusive capitalism approaches, 
although the long-term investments should be beneficial for the locale by creating 
social wealth, they also stimulate profit for the investors. 
                                                
26 Inclusive business or inclusive capitalism are terms that have taken over from sustainable and 
responsible prefixes (Ashley 2009). They have less ethical connotations and a wider conceptual 
embrace (ibid). 
27 While all businesses have a conventional bottom line to measure their fiscal performance, 




There are a multitude of ways in which this potential development power could be 
realised through such alternative approaches to capitalism, but as with community-
based conservation and community-based ecotourism, despite this optimism, doubts 
and criticisms remain (Kolk and van Tulder, 2006; Karnani, 2009: 38). 
If the conservancies are found to have a positive relationship with development, this 
will exemplify these notions and demonstrate that neoliberalism can target 
development, as well as conservation, outcomes. This will be the focus of chapter 
eight. That chapter will also highlight similarities between the pros and cons of 
neoliberal approaches to both conservation and development, drawing upon findings 
presented throughout the thesis. In the broader sense, whilst this thesis examines 
grassroots perceptions of development, and the impact of conservancies upon this, it 
is simultaneously assessing grassroots perceptions of sustainable Africapitalism. 
2.2.7 Literature Framework Conclusion 
The literature framework identified in section 2.2 highlights fundamental existing 
literature and case studies that relate to the six core components of the conservancy 
concept in the Mara. These were: neoliberal conservation, community involvement, 
livelihoods, linking conservation and development, tourism businesses and 
Africapitalism. This literature framework will guide the direction of this thesis and, 
as highlighted, it has been particularly useful in identifying key issues and questions 
that should frame this research. During the subsequent chapters, this literature will be 
referred back to, expanded upon, and discussed in relation to the empirical findings 
of this study.  
2.3 Research Questions   
In order for this thesis to be undertaken efficiently, strictly defined research questions 
were used to limit the amount of data gathered and ensure that everything was 
appropriate to the research problem (Silverman, 2006). The research questions for 
this thesis emanate from the literature framework discussed throughout this chapter. 
They are: 




2. What is the perceived relationship between the conservancies and 
development? 
a. (How) are the conservancies impacting upon development?  
b. Why are they doing this?  
c. Does this affect society evenly 
3. How does this research relate to literature on sustainable forms of capitalism, 
including Africapitalism? 
2.4 Thesis Structure 
The thesis comprises an introduction (chapter one), this literature framework (chapter 
two), followed by seven thematic chapters and then a conclusion. The seven thematic 
chapters will all focus on a different area and will present empirical findings. In each 
chapter, these findings will be discussed in relation to the literature that forms the 
framework for this thesis. Table 2.1 below highlights some of the key aspects 
discussed within this literature framework. The structure of this thesis is based upon 
grouping these issues thematically. The table also highlights the chapter within 
which each point will be addressed.  
Key Features within the Literature Framework  Chapter 
Considered 
Inconsistent definition of development 3 
Little attention paid to the subjectivity and non-Western perspectives of 
impacts 
3 
Who are the actors who want to get involved in this area? Are traditional 
development actors as heavily involved in areas linked to conservation? 
4,5 
Motivation - is conservation or development prioritised? What are the 
motivations of the different actors involved? 
4,5 
Are there clear links between benefits and conservation goals? In actions, 
beliefs or perceptions? 
4,5,6,7,8 
What are the implications of nature becoming a commodity from which 
benefits are expected? Does this change how ‘nature’ is treated? 
4,5,6,7,8 
Quantity and distribution of benefits 5,6,7,9 
What are the trade-offs and hard decisions needed between conservation 
and development? 
5,6,7 
What are revenues from conservancies being used for? Have livestock 
numbers changed since the creation of the conservancies? Are there any 
‘conservation backfires’? 
5,6,7 
How do access restrictions affect traditional resource users? 6 
How can pastoralism survive on subdivided land with a rapidly increasing 
population? 
6 
Have conservancies heeded calls for greater incorporation of livestock and 6 
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Table 2.1 Literature Framework Summary 
Chapter three focuses on the first research question and examines the concept of 
“development”. In recognition of the subjectivity of the issue and the importance for 
non-Western interpretations, this includes an overview of how development is 
interpreted by each of the stakeholder groupings active within the study site. Through 
an analysis of these grassroots perceptions, three key development indicators are 
identified. The indicators are selected to represent notions of development that are 
raised most frequently across the stakeholder categories. These, in the following four 
chapters, are then used to systematically assess the impact of the conservancies upon 
development, from the perspective of those directly involved with and affected by 
the conservancies. This middle section of the thesis contains the majority of the 
primary data and analysis addressing the second research question: perceived 
impacts of the conservancies upon development.  
Chapter four examines the multiple actors involved in community development 
projects aimed at addressing basic needs such as education, health and clean water 
within the study site. It probes the relative involvement of each in this context and 
their motivations. Chapter five goes on to assess the success and limitations of some 
of these community development initiatives undertaken by conservancy-affiliated 
organisations. Chapter six looks more broadly at perceptions of how the 
conservancies affect the predominant livelihood, pastoralism. Chapter seven explores 
the economic implications of conservancies for individuals and households as well as 
issues pertaining to participation and power distribution.  
Chapter eight explores the bigger implications of this research in relation to 
alternative capitalism, addressing the third research question. This includes a 
changed their approach to pastoralism? How are their policies regarding 
grazing perceived by conservancy stakeholders? 
Do conservancies have a differential impact on the elite/non-elite, 
members/non-members and different genders? 
7 
Degree of participation or control by communities 7 
What are the power relations between stakeholders? Who are the power 
brokers and how did they attain these positions? Do they benefit 
disproportionately? Are societal inequalities increasing? 
7 
How do general criticisms of capitalism reflect upon this case study? 8 
Does this case study exemplify conscious capitalism and Africapitalism? If 
so, what can be learnt from this case study for these fields? 
8 
How sustainable are the conservancies in the Mara? 9 
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deliberation of the use of neoliberal approaches, such as inclusive business practices 
and the new concept of Africapitalism, to achieve conservation and development 
outcomes.  
Chapter nine highlights some of the key threats facing the sustainability of 
conservancies within the Mara, and thus any resultant development.  
The concluding chapter summarises the key findings in this thesis in relation to the 
research questions and literature framework. To end the thesis, the contribution to 
knowledge made for various audiences will be highlighted.  
Because of the nature of this research, emphasis is placed upon commentary, 
thoughts and opinions from primary research participants. Where appropriate, direct 
quotes have been used to allow voices from the ground speak directly to the reader. 
Amongst these empirical findings, literature is brought in where it informs 
discussions generated from the fieldwork.    
2.5 Anticipated Contribution to Knowledge 
It is anticipated that each of the three research questions of this thesis will contribute 
something new and unique, either by taking a different approach that resolves current 
issues with existing studies, or filling in a gap in the literature. With regard to 
interpreting “development”, Telfer (2002: 339) questions the applicability of using a 
western framework to measure tourism’s impact on development in developing 
countries. Is it appropriate? “Should Western development concepts be utilised in 
non-western settings?” (ibid: 345). Existing research assumes that there is a 
definitive answer to what is development. As “development” is understood 
differently by different people, any impact on this notion is also constructed both 
individually and socially. Existing case studies on this topic have not fully 
acknowledged this subjectivity. Using indicators determined from understandings of 
development by those directly involved within the study site, this thesis will address 
this literary gap and add a new dimension to current discussions.  
The strengths of this research are rooted in the emphasis on interpretive paradigm 
and qualitative methodology, in which voice is given to local people and 
stakeholders. This study aims to provide a broader view of stakeholders’ 
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understandings and perceptions of the conservancies’ role in development, as 
opposed to earlier works in the Mara. A key strength is enhancing the focus beyond 
the loudest voices to include those who are often excluded. Further, as discussed in 
chapter one, this thesis utilises visual ethnography methods in a new context. 
Telfer (2002: 348) states: “more research is needed not only on the goals of 
development but also on how tourism can be used to reach those goals effectively”. 
Although tourism is only one component of the conservancy concept, the second 
research question will provide a new case study that assesses the impact of 
conservancies upon context-specific development goals. As previously mentioned, 
given the importance of the context for potential impacts, linkages can only be 
pieced together through case studies. With the proliferation of conservancies in 
Kenya as well as Africa more generally, it has become increasingly important to 
measure the impact that they have upon their widely advertised community 
development objectives.  
Broader ramifications of the research are explored by linking findings to notions of 
conscious capitalism, inclusive business strategies and Africapitalism. This is a new 
approach for research on tourism. Making linkages between disciplines is not only 
beneficial to this thesis. As will be seen in chapter eight, this case study also 








3 Interpreting Development     
In order to assess perceptions of the relationship between the conservancies and 
development in the Maasai Mara, it is first essential to acknowledge the subjectivity 
of the term ‘development’, its Western bias, and discuss how the term is interpreted 
within the study site. The importance of this was stressed in chapter two, where the 
inconsistent definition of development was one of the six identified threats regarding 
tourism’s contribution to development. This chapter will address the first research 
question: how do stakeholders within the study site understand the term 
“development’?  
As noted in chapter two, this thesis concurs with Telfer (2002: 339) who challenges 
whether Western development concepts should be utilised in non-western settings. 
Moving away from Western-designed definitions of development, this research 
empirically examines how development is interpreted by different stakeholders 
active within the study site. Understandings of development differ between 
stakeholders, and stakeholder categories are not homogenous in their interpretations. 
Yet some shared perspectives can be identified within categories (which will be 
outlined in table 3.1).  
The aim of this thesis is to assess the impact that the conservancies are having upon 
development within the study site. It is not feasible to assess the extent to which 
conservancies influence every aspect within every interpretation of development 
noted by every stakeholder. Consequently, prominent themes will be identified from 
these multi-stakeholder definitions to form key development indicators. Assessing 
the impact of conservancies on Western notions of development may not resonate 
with those directly affected by the conservancies. Using development indicators 
generated from local interpretations makes the research more specific and relevant to 
the study site. This is especially important considering that the continuation and 
success of the conservancies depends upon the contentment of these stakeholders. 
Before stakeholders’ perceptions of development are analysed, some key terms 
require clarification.  
Throughout this thesis, the terms “grassroots”, “local”, “community”, “community 
leaders” and “stakeholders” are used. These terms are not easily defined; however, 
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the context in which they are used within this thesis can be outlined. “Grassroots” is 
a term often associated with aid and development to denote an initiative coming from 
the ground up, as opposed to top-down. In this thesis it is used more generally to 
indicate what is happening on the ground at a local level within the study site, as 
opposed to district, regional or national levels. For the purposes of this research, 
“local” is delineated as the study site and its immediate surroundings. In total, this is 
approximately 1000km2. “Community” refers to residents brought together by living 
in the same area or village. Villages are either formed by groups of homesteads,28 or 
multiple individuals living in close proximity in more urban environments. House 
styles range from those made of mud and cow dung surrounded by acacia thorn 
circular fences, to iron sheet constructions and, on occasion, cement or stone houses. 
Scattered around the study site are a few small shopping centres, usually clustered 
close to a school or health centre. These shops are often managed by people of 
Somali decent as well as those of other heritages within Kenya. Larger urban centres 
border the study site, including Nkoilale, Sekenani, Talek and Aitong. The term 
“community leaders” refers to both formal and informal leaders within a community. 
In many cases, these are respected elders. Yet increasingly educated young men, 
including those who have been through Koiyaki Guiding School (KGS), are included 
in this category. Leaders are given respect and power by the wider community which 
results in them having decision-making powers. It is very rare for women to be 
classified as community leaders, but female individuals are identified as group 
leaders or facilitators in the context of women’s groups.  
As noted in footnote two, a ‘stakeholder’ is defined as “any group or individual who 
can affect or who is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” 
(Freeman, 1984: 25). In this research, this refers to individuals within the study site 
who are actively involved in either communities or conservancies. Despite the 
difficulties of grouping people into categories in heterogeneous societies, this can be 
useful as a way to examine, discuss and compare common themes - in this instance, 
interpretations of development. The stakeholder categories used to analyse 
                                                
28 A homestead is a cluster of huts that use one communal livestock enclosure. This is usually 
comprised of one man, his wives, children and parents/parents-in-law, although sometimes there are 
multiple families within one homestead. 
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interpretations of development are outlined in table 3.1 below. 
 
 
3.1 Stakeholders’ Perceptions of Development  
Discussing development issues with Maasai participants is complicated by there 
being no word for “development” in Maa. Maasai people have adopted the Swahili 
word for development, “maendeleo”, and modified it slightly to “emaendeleo”. This 
term has inherent positive and appealing connotations. For example, it is used 
alongside “paradise”, “glory” and “joy” in both its Swahili and Maa forms as 
common names for shops and hotels in Narok town (figure 3.1).  
Category Source Details 
Male community 
members 
10 focus groups, 7 
camera participants 
Maasai men residing within the study site. 
Male community 
leaders 
36 interviews Male Maasai community leaders residing within the study site. This 





18 focus groups, 4 
interviews, 13 camera 
participants 
Maasai women residing within the study site. 
Relatively 
educated women 
9 interviews Maasai women residing within the study site who have, at 
minimum, completed secondary school. 
Conservancy 
managers 
5 interviews Two white Kenyan men. 
Tourism industry 28 interviews With the exception of two camp managers who are black Kenyans, 
all other camp managers and tourism partners are white. These are 
a combination of South African, European and Kenyan nationals. 
All tourism partners were men. 
NGO employees 
and researchers 
38 interviews Men and women who are white European, white Kenyan or black 
Kenyans. With one exception, those in the highest positions are 
white.   




The word for “change” in Maa, “ebelekeny”, was often used by research participants 
in conversation. When asked, some people (including FG 1, 12, 14, 15, 17) perceived 
a difference between development and change, and so the term “ebelekeny” was not 
used by myself or my research assistants. To break down the task of defining a 
complex abstract term such as development, research participants were encouraged 
to give examples of what they saw as development. This generated discussions. I 
asked open questions regarding what development means to them as individuals. 
Research participants were not given a set of options for the definition of 
development. If participants were still unsure how to respond, I asked: “If you were 
writing a dictionary definition of development, what would you write?” 
Interpretations of development presented by each stakeholder category will now be 
discussed.  
3.1.1 Male Community Members 
The individual definitions of development given by male community members 
contained common elements. These included meeting basic needs, especially 
education. Three focus groups with men (18, 22, 26) specified that they supported 
education in order to increase the power and control held by their families. They 
believed that their children, if educated, once grown could get jobs, for example in 
tourism. This means that their children could gain some control, become leaders, and 
then bring change back to their communities (ibid). These stakeholders also 
Figure 3.1 Use of Term "Maendeleo" in Narok 
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emphasised that development is the physical construction of classrooms and clinics, 
as well as improved access to grazing for their livestock. This could be expressed as 
increased livelihood security. FG 22 identified improvements in livestock breeds and 
enclosures as other examples of development. Land subdivision was discussed by 
many male focus groups, with some people seeing it as a positive change, and others 
as negative. In light of this, FG 1 noted that the conservancies are contributing to 
development by bringing the community back together following land 
individualisation. Male community members were one of the many stakeholder 
categories that stressed the importance of economic aspects of development: 
specifically direct financial payments such as, conservancy rents, employment and 
small scale businesses – including cultural villages.29  
3.1.2 Male Community Leaders 
In addition to the construction of new facilities such as schools and clinics, male 
Maasai community leaders noted the need for higher quality facilities. Unlike male 
community members, who did not mention any negative aspects, male leaders 
indicated that development is not always positive. They highlighted the social 
problems brought by the creation and expansion of trading centres, for example, the 
large number of bars (I 85) as well as land sales to ‘outsiders’ (I 87). Two trained 
safari guides who now focus on community work, Nelson Kirrokor (I 64) and 
Dominic Koya (I 84), included in their definitions of development attaining the 
knowledge needed to identify and utilise existing resources (including land and 
wildlife). More generally, male community leaders emphasised the role of 
conservancies in development; this is not surprising considering the favourable links 
between many community leaders and the conservancies. The chairman of Naboisho 
Conservancy’s LandCO, John Sengeny (I 86), suggested that development is an end 
point or target to be achieved. In his opinion, the area is currently not developed and 
the conservancies should address this. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) disagreed with the 
notion of development as a fixed target, and instead advocated that it is a continual 
process of meeting needs. He elaborated that, once these needs are met, you then get 
other needs and the more that you “develop”, the more needs you seem to get (ibid).  
                                                
29 These are villages visited by tourists, for a fee. They are discussed further in chapter seven.  
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3.1.3 Female Community Members 
Unlike their male counterparts, the vast majority of focus groups with female 
community members identified women’s groups and the microfinance project as 
examples of development. In addition, female community members discussed ways 
in which development is changing their culture, in both positive and negative ways. 
This was not mentioned by male community members. FG 9 suggested that negative 
cultural changes include the loss of respect and women wearing provocative 
clothing. FG 27 explained that women’s priorities have also changed. When their 
mothers were their age, the focus was looking after livestock, but now women want 
jobs and to ensure their children are educated (ibid). FG 3 noted that their 
interpretations of development – which focused on the importance of schools, 
hospitals, drilling for water and women’s groups – have evolved from what NGOs 
have told them. One woman said: “people come and ask… do you have xyz… and 
they told us this is what development is” (ibid). In addition to the construction of 
facilities, this category identified the need to move beyond just having the buildings, 
and rather concentrated on their outputs such as health care and education or 
knowledge (FG 12, 17). Looking to the future, the most commonly-cited 
developments desired by female community members were cultural villages where 
they can sell their beadwork, or alternative ways to sell their homemade wares to 
tourists (FG 4, 6, 13, 15, 17, 19, 25). 
3.1.4 Relatively Educated Maasai Women 
As with female focus groups with community members, educated Maasai women’s 
development definitions also highlighted the importance of working with women. 
They believe that there has been a gradual increase in empowerment and self-
sustainability; this is due to education, along with outreach projects, microfinance 
and the employment of women (I 13, 49, 62). Grace Naisenya (I 62) highlighted that 
one of the main changes that she has seen over her lifetime is the attitude towards 
education. Families are no longer reluctant to send children to school (ibid). Teriano 
Soit was one of the first girls in the study area to be formally educated and, as a law 
student at Nairobi University, is now a role model to other Maasai girls and their 
families (ibid). Despite this focus on formal education, in her own interview Teriano 
highlighted the importance of Maasai people also maintaining traditional knowledge 
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(I 13). She noted that the opening of clinics is a positive development, but she would 
like to see this combined with traditional medicines (ibid).  
Outreach worker Sarah Liaram compared the Naboisho area before the conservancy 
with the present day. She said that an example of development that she has seen is 
the coming of tourism activities (I 49). To her, tourism’s involvement in 
development has “empowered the people around” (ibid). This is because the 
subsequent assistance and incomes are enabling people to educate their own children 
(ibid). She concluded that the resultant development is increasing the self-sufficiency 
of families as “if the conservancy wasn’t there you would have to rely on donor 
funding” (ibid). 
3.1.5 Conservancy Managers 
Both conservancy managers (I 76, 81) indicated that education must be an important 
aspect of development, but urged that alongside this, traditional knowledge must be 
recognised. They both emphasised that development should not be defined by the 
‘West’, as the Maasai are inextricably linked to their environment and culture (ibid). 
Rob O’Meara noted the importance of pastoralism but stressed that development 
should be locally defined (I 81). He summarised: “I would define development as a 
long-term security of the Maasai culture and lifestyle, if that is what they want” 
(ibid). 
3.1.6 Tourism Industry 
Camp managers and tourism partners are grouped into the category “tourism 
industry”. Within this, three people (I 4, 72, 73) used the term “basic needs” in their 
definition of development. Similarly, another popular response was the construction 
and improvement of community facilities such as schools, clinics, water projects and 
churches (I 14, 16, 21, 70). These were perceived to be the developmental desires of 
the local communities (I 15, 82). Similarly, the outputs of these facilities in terms of 
education, training and healthcare were seen to be important (I 14, 16, 21, 73). 
Respondents gave several differing motivations for prioritising education. These 
included empowerment (I 74), the ability to expand options such as employment (I 
56), starting businesses (I 21), and learning better ways of doing things (I 73). Two 
tourism partners suggested that economic measures of development are not 
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appropriate in the Mara context (I 56, 70). Despite this, money-earning opportunities 
were widely cited as examples of development. These included direct rental 
payments, employment (I 56, 73, 88), businesses resulting from microfinance 
schemes and beading for the women (I 21). Three tourism partners - Svein 
Wilhelmsen (I 56), Greg Monsen (I 70) and Sean Anderson (I 72) - stressed that they 
do not believe that development should equate to westernisation. This is because 
traditions remain important (ibid), it cannot be assumed what is desired, and so 
people should decide development paths for themselves (I 70). Svein Wilhelmsen (I 
56) suggested that people living around the conservancies could be classed as richer 
than “we are” in terms of enjoying life. Greg Monsen concurred:  
We rush in and say everyone should be educated and developed but why are 
they worse off than a lot of other people? It is chilled out; you’ve got your 
cows and your family (I 70).  
Svein also highlighted that, although 70% of Maasai in the area live below the UN 
definition of poverty, this figure is an “over-exaggeration” as it does not adequately 
take into account livestock (I 56). Gerard Beaton said that, to him as a tourism 
partner, given the pastoralist nature of the communities, development should include 
“working with them to develop the true potential of that livestock” (I 21). A desire 
was expressed amongst tourism stakeholders that a long-term holistic approach to 
development needs to be taken (I 56). The aim of this approach is self-sustainability 
(I 21, 73), through a focus on the environment, resources, conservation and wildlife 
(I 15, 21, 72, 73, 74, 88). Such notions are in line with a sustainable development 
approach. This was most clearly expressed by tourism partner Garry Cullan who 
said: “development is improving conditions and issues for the benefit of as many 
people as possible without detracting from things that could damage the environment 
or living situations” (I 15). Two people in this category mentioned the development 
of towns and centres in the Mara, and both perceived it as a negative aspect of 
development (I 21, 88).  
3.1.7 NGOs and Researchers 
The final stakeholder group is that of NGO workers and researchers. This group is 
largely made up of white Kenyans and Europeans, plus a few non-Maasai Kenyans 
and Dickson Kaelo (who is also included in the male community leader category). 
Interpretations of development expressed by this category are most similar to those 
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of tourism industry stakeholders. They concur that environmental conservation 
should be an integral aspect of development, alongside the sustainable use of 
resources (I 44, 69, 80). Allan Earnshaw pointed out that combining this with human 
development can be a challenge, and difficult balances need to be found (I 69). These 
stakeholders agreed that centres such as Talek are examples of “bad” development (I 
75, 78, 80). Instead of directly changing cultures, it was suggested that development 
initiatives should concentrate on educating people (I 75); for example, by ensuring 
that girls attend school, and helping women learn about saving and investing money 
(I 78). With the exception of Dickson noting the importance of improving the 
accessibility of health care and education, the construction of facilities was not 
included in definitions or examples of development amongst NGO employees and 
researchers. This was surprising, considering the popularity amongst NGOs of 
infrastructure as community projects (as will be discussed in chapter five).  
As with the tourism industry category, there was a desire to move away from 
conventional definitions of development, particularly amongst researchers and high-
level individuals within conservancy-affiliated NGOs. Similarities with Sen’s (1999) 
capability as freedom approach were expressed. Researcher Niels Mogensen (I 80) 
stated: “we should stop comparing the lives of the Maasai to our own”. Terry 
Davidson (I 75) elaborated that development should move away from assessing 
poverty by material possessions, and instead look at the quality of life and ability to 
make choices. In line with this, Lars Lindkvist (I 31) and Nathanial Robinson (I 36) 
defined development as the freedom to make choices and live the life desired. 
Similarly, Ben Skelton defined poverty as the lack of this freedom (I 58). To Lars, 
poverty was a lack of alternatives, for example a reliance on a single livelihood (I 
31). In this stakeholder group, there was an agreement across the board that 
development is a process with no end goal.  
3.1.8 Discussion: Stakeholders’ Interpretations of Development 
Although categories were not homogenous in their understandings, it is clear that 
different stakeholder groups have differing interpretations of development. The main 
implication of definitions differing between stakeholders is that actions undertaken 
by one actor with the intention of being development may not be seen as such by 
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other stakeholders. Consequently, it is important to be aware of the different ways in 
which development is understood, and the nature of the development paths desired 
by the stakeholders being targeted. With the exception of the tourism industry and 
NGO categories, most research participants did not appear to have a detailed 
knowledge of global development theories and approaches. NGOs are required to be 
aware of dominant approaches as they are answerable to their funders, and thus need 
to emulate current notions. This echoes Mosse’s (2005) proposition that the success 
of development actions are determined by their reflection of the current dominant 
development approach.  
As will be discussed further in chapter four, conservancy-affiliated organisations 
(included in the NGO category) are widely seen to be the main development actor 
within the study site. These organisations have a particularly complex matrix of 
motivational considerations regarding development actions, as they have to satisfy 
multiple stakeholders. As with all NGOs, they must please their donors. But due to 
their involvement in the conservancies, they must also focus on the environment, 
conservation and livestock to satisfy the conservancy managers and the tourism 
industry. In addition to this, these organisations must appease the communities and 
meet their expectations. These competing objectives are not always harmonious and 
hard decisions and trade-offs are likely, as discussed by McShane et al. (2011). 
These multiple motivating factors may be one reason why conservancy-affiliated 
organisations continue to undertake infrastructure projects, such as the construction 
of schools and clinics, despite it differing from their own stated understandings of 
development. Tourism partner Garry Cullen (I 15) explained: “schools, dispensaries 
and water are issues of great interest to the community and we need to address that”. 
This is a cyclical process as the conservancy-affiliated organisations are undertaking 
initiatives that they expect will meet the desires of the local communities. 
Simultaneously, these community members are moulding their interpretations of 
development based on “good things that we have seen” (FG 1, 3, 11, 15). This issue 
will be considered again in chapter five. 
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3.2 Development Indicators 
So far, this chapter has explored the complexities involved in defining development 
through an analysis of interpretations by stakeholders active within the study. As 
explained at the beginning of this chapter, it is necessary to extract key indicators 
against which the conservancies can be assessed. These development indicators are 
needed in order to answer the second research question regarding the relationship 
between the conservancies and development. It is not feasible to evaluate every 
aspect identified by every stakeholder; the identification of three key common 
features within the stakeholders’ definitions enables the conservancies to be assessed 
against manageable indicators. Rather than ignoring the subjectivity of the issue and 
focusing on Western-based definitions, these indicators importantly reflect the 
perspectives of stakeholders within the study site. Telfer (2002) notes that definitions 
of development can be restrictive – with economic benefits receiving the most 
attention – but this approach ensures that the research assesses the impact of 
conservancies against how development is interpreted within the study site.  
In order to select three key development indicators from the stakeholder’ definitions 
of development, common themes were identified. These themes were those that were 
mentioned most frequently, and spanned multiple stakeholder categories.  
The first key component is that of meeting basic needs such as education, health care 
and clean water through community projects. This analysis will take place at the 
community scale. Chapter four will identify key actors involved in community 
development initiatives and discuss their motivations as well as highlighting the 
complexities brought by the multiplicity of actors within the study site. Possible 
causes for this actor matrix will be discussed. Chapter five will then assess the 
success of the outputs and outcomes of some projects undertaken by conservancy-
affiliated organisations. 
The second key indicator identified is that of livelihoods, specifically pastoralism 
and livestock. Male community members, in particular, defined development as 
access to grazing for livestock, and advancements in livestock keeping. More 
broadly, community members (including FG 18, 19, 20) emphasised that, although 
development is desired, this must not come at the expense of their traditional 
84 
 
livelihood. It is therefore important to assess the effect of the conservancies on 
pastoralism within the study site. Chapter six will concentrate on this. 
The third and final indicator is economic implications. Different stakeholder groups 
raised different economic aspects, but the vast majority included some form of 
money-earning activities as examples of development. This was often in the form of 
land rental payments, employment or – for the women – microfinance and selling 
beadwork. Chapter seven will be devoted to this economic implications indicator.  
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4 Community Development Actors  
As determined in chapter three, addressing basic needs through community projects 
is a key development indicator for the study site. Recent studies on the Mara 
Conservancies (see Bedelian, 2012; Snider, 2012; Osano et al., 2013) have largely 
ignored community initiatives. Instead, authors have concentrated on the 
environment, economy and livelihoods. The direction of this study was determined 
by stakeholders’ own interpretations of development and community projects were 
the most frequently cited example of development. This secured its inclusion as a 
key development indicator for this thesis.  
This chapter, and chapter five, will examine community development initiatives 
within the study site. Their aim is to meet basic needs through the provision of health 
care, water, capacity building and the advancement of education. Locally, the 
development of such facilities is commonly referred to simply as “projects”. The link 
between the term “development” and these projects was reinforced by answers in 
focus groups to the question “who has been involved in development in this area?” 
Responses to this question centred around who had undertaken community projects, 
as opposed to any other form of development.  
Many different actors are involved in development projects within the study site. 
This chapter will outline the perceived involvement of each actor noted by research 
participants. The literature framework for this thesis emphasised the importance of 
assessing which actors are involved where both conservation and development 
objectives are targeted. For example do traditional development actors have the same 
level of involvement as elsewhere in Kenya or are conservation organisations playing 
the main role in development? An examination of this may reflect implications of the 
commodification of nature through which benefits are expected from it. Perceptions 
regarding the degree of involvement by tourism-specific actors will then be 
discussed.  
Once the actors involved in development are identified it is also important to 
examine their motivations, whether these are primarily conservation or development 
based and how motivations differ between actors. These findings will then be 
analysed further, with a focus on the matrix of actors involved in community projects 
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in the Mara. Chapter five will then concentrate on examples of community initiatives 
undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations. This chapter contributes towards 
the second research question: “What is the perceived relationship between the 
conservancies and development?” It is only by examining the role of all actors active 
within the study site that the relative significance of the conservancies in 
development projects can be assessed.  
The state, religious organisations, communities and NGOs are commonly involved in 
development projects across Kenya. Within the study site, in addition to these actors, 
conservancy-affiliated organisations and tourists are heavily involved. The 
conservancies and their affiliates are widely perceived by research participants as the 
most significant development actors in the area at present. One prominent exception 
to this viewpoint was a local councillor, Ole Ketuyo (I 30), who claimed that the 
government and communities are responsible for community development projects in 
the area. He stated that conservancies were “only here for profit” (ibid).  
The head teacher of Aitong Primary School (I 86) suggested that the actors involved 
in community projects have evolved over time: “projects like schools began 
originally with the community and then the government helped us through CDF30 
and at the moment the Obel Foundation31 have done several things in Aitong”. 
Mechanica Lolkumum, a community leader and elder in Endoinyo e Rinka, agreed 
that previously councillors and occasionally the MP assisted with the schools in the 
area. He purports, however, that: “today it is OOC32 and Basecamp33 that are helping 
us the most” (CP 16). More detailed discussions of perceptions regarding the roles 
played by seven development actors within the study site will now be discussed, 
beginning with the state.  
4.1 The State  
Many study site residents are very frustrated by the lack of development assistance 
from their national government: “They [the government] have done nothing here; it 
                                                
30 Constituency Development Fund, started in 2003 by the national government to support grassroot 
development projects. 
31 The Obel Foundation donated $1million to Mara North Conservancy (MNC) to assist with 
community development projects. 
32 Referring to OOMT. 
33 Referring to BCFK. 
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is only the white people who are helping us” (FG 22). Criticisms encompass all 
levels of government, but the MP receives the most criticism. FG 3 noted: “We don’t 
think that the MP knows that this place exists”. The local councillor, Ole Ketuyo, did 
have a few supporters amongst local residents. One person in FG 3 suggested: “The 
key community person for development is the councillor”. Two other focus groups 
with women (17, 21) also praised Ole Ketuyo for his development work, especially 
at their schools.  
It is interesting to note that Mbitin and Olkuroto villages, where these two cited 
meetings were held, have the two poorest-quality schools34 in the area - despite them 
being amongst the oldest. These two schools have received minimal support from 
conservancy-affiliated organisations. OOMT did earmark a large amount of funding 
for Olkuroto School, but this was reallocated to Endoinyo e Rinka following 
disagreements with the head teacher (FG 21; I 3). There is a correlation between the 
perceptions of development actors and degree of support given. Therefore, minimal 
involvement by conservancy-affiliated organisations in a community, regardless of 
cause, results in anomalous perceptions that the state is the main development actor. 
In concurrence with observed correlation, women in Olkuroto explained the logic 
behind citing the councillor as the major development actor in their area: “our school 
has only been supported by Ole Ketuyo and ourselves over the last 10 years” (FG 
21). These two communities also expressed some of the most negative attitudes 
towards the conservancies and wildlife. This advocates that developmental assistance 
by conservancy-affiliated organisations may improve community members’ opinions 
of conservancies, and wildlife more generally. This backs-up the notion that benefits 
need to be distributed in order to gain support.  
Focus group participants only assessed the actors who have worked within their own 
villages. They did not acknowledge projects that the conservancies have done in 
neighbouring communities until specifically asked. Once this issue was raised, a 
sense of jealousy was expressed that the conservancies were involved in the schools 
in those areas and, as a result, they were able to reach a higher standard (FG 16). FG 
                                                
34 This is in my personal opinion and was assessed on the condition and size of the school in addition 
to the quality of teaching and grades achieved.  
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14 expanded: “we do not know why they [the conservancy-affiliated organisations] 
help the people in those villages but not our own. What have we done?”  
Research participants (including FG 17; CP 4, 14, 16) highlighted that one of the 
main roles undertaken by the government is the employment of teachers. Councillor 
Ole Ketuyo explained that this is one way in which he is bringing development to 
these communities. He was adamant that all teachers employed by the county council 
are fully qualified, adding: “They are trained teachers and nowadays we do not want 
the teachers who are not trained. If you are just from secondary school we cannot 
agree with that” (I 30). Contradicting this, one of the camera project participants 
(anon 4) told me that two of his children, who have only completed primary school, 
are employed by the county council as teachers within the study site. A teacher at 
another school (anon 5) explained:  
The county council can only employ local people who have not been to 
college, and normally we have only completed standard eight.35 No trained 
teachers will work for the 6,800 [KES ($80) per month] that they pay (ibid).  
In comparison, the central government employs trained teachers for KES 15,000 
($170) per month (ibid).  
Interviews with head teachers of all public schools within and bordering the study 
site revealed that on average only 42% of teachers are employed by the Teacher 
Service Commission (TSC) of the central government (i.e., are trained teachers) (I 
19, 38, 41, 51, 52, 54, 60, 61). A third of teachers are paid via the county council 
(some of whom have received some training).36 The remaining quarter are paid by 
parents, with few of these teachers having received any training (ibid). In some of the 
smaller schools, there is only one trained teacher in the entire institution. Primary 
education in Kenya is theoretically free.37 Yet the severe lack of teachers paid for by 
the state has resulted in the majority of schools within the study site demanding 
payments of approximately KES 300 ($3.50) per child per term from parents. Talek 
                                                
35 Standard eight is the final year of primary school at the end of which students sit the KCPE (Kenya 
Certificate of Primary Education) examination, which determines whether students can progress onto 
secondary school.  
36 Several head teachers stressed the unreliability of this income source. When payments are delayed 
or do not come at all, parents have to pay the remaining wages otherwise the teachers do not come 
into school. 
37 In 2003 President Kibaki re-introduced free primary education, and in Kenya’s new constitution of 
2010, primary education was declared free and compulsory (Article 53). 
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Primary, the only school that did not charge a fee at the time they were interviewed, 
indicated that they would start doing so the following year to pay for additional 
teachers (I 38). 
The overwhelming opinion within focus groups and key stakeholder interviews was 
that it was the state that should be responsible for bringing development projects to 
the area. FG 14 said: “This is all the work of the MP and the councillors but they are 
not doing the work that they are supposed to be”. John Sankok, the director of 
Christian Missionary Fellowship (CMF), pointed out: “There is not even a single 
government [health] facility in Koiyaki” (I 26). Community members claimed that 
they have asked the government for help, “so many times until we have become very 
tired” (I 14). FG 11 added: “The only way that we can get them to do something is to 
go and stand before them and keep reminding them”. There is a sense of betrayal as, 
“When they’re not looking for votes, they forget about us” (FG 3). Several 
participants (including FG 3, 14, 15, 22; I 37) noted that when campaigning, 
politicians come and make promises, but once they are elected they disappear. FG 22 
explained:  
At the moment the MPs are trying to do projects38 because the elections are 
coming up but as soon as they are elected they go and sleep for four years 
until they want re-electing.  
When I asked focus group participants how the role of the government in the Mara 
compares to elsewhere, their responses often expressed uncertainty. For example FG 
24 said: “We are not aware of other places as we have not been to the other side”. 
Most of the community members included in this study said that they have travelled 
as far as Narok town (three hours drive away), with the exception of some elderly 
women. The majority have not been any further than this, nor do they believe that 
they have spent sufficient time elsewhere to assess what the government has done 
there. Individual exceptions to this were able to make some interesting comparisons. 
Nairobi University student Teriano Soit believes that the government should be 
involved in local development projects because “the Mara is still part of Kenya. In 
fact the government and the county council should be doing more for us than anyone 
else [because of all of the money earned from the Mara]” (I 13). Teriano did not 
                                                
38 For example Naserian School, near Osilale, was expanded shortly before the election by Ole Tunai, 
who was campaigning for Governor (FG 24). 
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think that the government was living up to this responsibility because “the 
community itself is largely illiterate and so they don’t know their rights and what 
should be given to them and so they are reluctant” (ibid).  
Supporting Teriano’s thoughts, Gert Bomhof (I 24) – the founder of Stichting 
Nkoilale39 – noted that he has to constantly push his local partners to make demands 
on their leaders, as it is not something that they do of their own accord. Similarly, as 
part of the water project in Endoinyo e Rinka, it is Dig Deep who suggested that the 
community should apply for CDF funding, and then got the papers together for the 
application (I 58). Anna Banyard, who facilitated Endoinyo e Rinka’s water project, 
noted: 
I don’t think it’s a lack of knowledge as they are very aware of the CDF and 
that they can ask their MPs for money but there is lack of initiative and 
perhaps overreliance [on other people and institutions] that is stopping them 
doing this themselves (I 1).    
One of my research assistants, Lorna Serseri, explained that a large proportion of 
state funding is directed back to the home areas of politicians, and so many people 
feel as though an area can only develop if a politician comes from your locale (I 14). 
At the national scale, it is alleged that presidents direct assistance back to their home 
areas and favour their own ethnic group. Councillor Ole Ketuyo was optimistic that 
devolution,40  following the adoption of Kenya’s new constitution in 2010, will 
increase the state financial support for the Mara: 
Before all of the money had to go through the government and the president 
is someone who decides where the money goes, if he is a Kikuyu it goes to 
that area, if he is a Kalenjin it goes to that area but now the money is divided 
equally. And so now I think that this area will get a lot more (I 30). 
Conservancy manager Justin Heath was more uncertain about how devolution will 
change state involvement in development. He expected that it may “change a bit with 
this devolution, but now you are giving a lot of power to one governor… I think 
we’re just going to find the same problem of corruption” (I 76). Lorna agreed that, in 
                                                
39 Stichting Nkoilale is a Dutch NGO, started by a tourist, which is working with Nkoilale Community 
Development Organisation to promote development in Nkoilale. 
40 Kenya’s 2010 constitution called for devolution to county governments. These county assemblies 
are run by elected governors and senators (elected in March 2013) as well as appointed executive 
committees. According to Elias Wakhisi, a programme officer at The Institute for Social 
Accountability (TISA) (May, 2013), the aim of devolution is to “bring services, resources and power 
closer to the people. And this power means that citizens will be able to make decisions about aspects 
and issues affecting them directly”.  
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addition to the misappropriation of funds at the national level, it is also occurring at 
the regional level through MPs and councillors taking “their turn to eat” (I 14) (see 
Wrong, 2010). For example, in her hometown of Ololulunga, a new clinic was built 
by the county council because the current councillor is from that area “and so he had 
to build a clinic there” (ibid).  
More generally, community leaders (I 8, 23, 26, 48, 84) blame the minor 
involvement of the government in community projects in the Mara on its distance 
from Nairobi, and low population density. In addition, it was expressed that low 
education levels have resulted in poor leadership, representation and relatively few 
powerful Maasai politicians able to fight for the provision of resources (I 48, 69; FG 
14, 18, 26). In the state’s defence, teacher Mike Kahiga (I 44) pointed out that the 
nomadic nature of the Maasai, which continued up until land individualisation and 
sedentisation, made it difficult for the government to provide services such as 
education and health care.  
Councillor Ole Ketuyo (I 30) proposed that the communities bordering the Maasai 
Mara are more developed than interior areas of Narok District, and that the schools in 
the area have improved. He suggested that there are two reasons for this: direct 
support from tourists, and the wards neighbouring the reserve purposefully being 
given a higher share of the 19% funding.41 Although recognising state funding 
sources, a young community leader (anon 6) blames corruption within district (now 
county) finances for the state’s inadequate involvement in the Mara: 
I am sure we do get some money from CDF but we don’t know where it goes 
– you can see one or two classrooms but the rest disappears. There is no 
proper management of those funds, they are disappearing like the 19%. 
 Another source concurred, stating: 
The politicians pocket everything, the CDF money, the whole lot goes. They 
are the ones who are driving this poor Maasai image. They try to get donors 
to put money in so that they can then steal that too and blame the wazungu42 
for not putting it in (anon 3).  
                                                
41 As discussed in chapter two, 19% of the revenue from the Maasai Mara National Reserve is 
theoretically placed in a fund to be distributed to the surrounding communities through projects and 
scholarships. There are grave doubts regarding the percentage that actually reaches this fund, and how 
it is distributed. 
42 Swahili term for white people. 
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In summary, the majority of research participants assert that the state is playing a 
relatively minor role in the Mara. Maasai academic and conservationist Dickson 
Kaelo (I 48) concurred with FGs 3 and 18: they felt that, even if other organisations 
were not helping and they were forced to take their complaints to the politicians, they 
would still not get any help, just as before. On the other hand, some participants 
argued that the reason that the state is not heavily involved within the study site is 
because there are other organisations doing it for them. Lincoln Njiru (I 39) proposed 
that CDF are active at his hometown of Embu because they do not have many other 
organisations working there, unlike the Mara. Similarly, Niels Mogensen, who has 
undertaken research in the Mara for over eight years, stated that the government 
merely wait until they realise that no one else is going to intervene; it is only then 
when they might step up (I 80). 
Despite a poor general perception of the role of the state in development within the 
study site, Councillor Ole Ketuyo was keen to take full credit for projects that the 
government contributed to - in the form of CDF, 19% of county council funding. For 
example, he told me that the water project in Endoinyo e Rinka was funded by CDF 
(I 30), whereas this contribution only amounted to 10% of the total project costs (I 
1). This insistence by a government official that conservancies are not beneficial for 
development contradicts national policy. Similarly, from his research in Ghana, 
(Sonne, 2010: 240). concluded that the government tends to place emphasis on 
benefits of tourism at the national level, rather than at the local level. 
4.2 Religious Organisations   
Compared to other areas in Kenya, religious organisations (defined as NGOs or 
community groups with religious underpinnings) are also perceived to be playing a 
relatively minimal role in community development in the Mara. Aside from 
traditional Maasai beliefs, the predominant religion within the study site is 
Christianity. In the CMMF survey (Courtney, 2012) of women belonging to 
microfinance groups, one quarter indicated that they follow traditional beliefs, and 
three quarters classified themselves as Christian. These figures from the women’s 
groups, however, are not likely to be representative of the study site as a whole as 
more woman than men attend church (FG 4, 5, 17, 20, 21, 24). Mainstream Christian 
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denominations, such as Catholicism, Baptism and Methodism, are not active within 
Koiyaki. Outside of the study area, there are Christian missionaries based at 
Sekenani who occasionally assist with projects, for example by welding solar panels 
(FG 3). The closest Catholic Church is in Lemek. Within the study site, the only 
church buildings are at Nkoilale and Endoinyo e Rinka.43 In all other communities, 
church services are held in school classrooms with pastors travelling to villages for 
services (FG 1). FG 27 in Nkoilale noted: “The church is not doing anything for us 
here yet, we are the ones who are contributing to the construction of the church by 
selling our cows”. 
There is one religious organisation, Christian Missionary Fellowship (CMF), active 
in the area. The director of their health ministries (I 26) explained that, when funders 
build a clinic, CMF then provides the staff and ensures that it is sustainable and 
operational. When discussing the role of the church or religious organisations in 
development, no community members mentioned CMF. This suggests that either 
they are not visible, or that the Christian aspect of the organisation may not be 
widely understood. The most cited role of religion in development was in an 
educational capacity, teaching moral behaviour (FG 13, 19, 21, 26). This includes 
advising people “how to live a good life” (FG 1), and to prevent “evil things like 
alcohol” (I 33) and “men beating their wives” (FG 13). 
This minimal involvement contrasts with that of the church in development 
elsewhere in Kenya, especially Central Province. Teacher Mike Kahiga (I 44), who is 
from Nakuru, explained: 
At my home the church is very involved in development, especially in terms 
of education. We have a number of schools that are run by missionaries, both 
primary and secondary… and a number of clinics that have been constructed 
through the churches.  
Dickson Kaelo (I 48) believes that there are several key reasons for this geographical 
inequality within Kenya: 
Initially the colonial government made sure that outsiders were not permitted 
into the Maasai reserve so it is only after independence that the first 
missionaries started coming into Maasailand while in Central Kenya and 
other places in this county, the colonialists came with the missionaries and 
                                                
43 There was previously a small CMF missionary base in Endoinyo e Rinka (CP 16) 
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they started projects. So that was the main reason but also because there were 
low levels of education, poor infrastructure and so the church couldn’t 
penetrate into these areas a lot and it was a big sacrifice to start missions 
anywhere in Maasailand, just because there were no services. It might also be 
to a certain extent that the Maasai themselves had their own traditional beliefs 
and customs and they resisted any external influences including the church 
and so it took quite some time for people to be convinced that believing in the 
white God brought by the missionaries is superior to the Maasai God. 
In addition to Dickson’s reasons for the minimal involvement of the church in 
Maasailand, other Maasai areas have had different experiences. The relative absence 
of the church is not consistent across Kenya’s Maasailand. Lorna Serseri (I 63) told 
me: 
In Ololulunga [50km north-east of the study site] the Catholic Church is 
sponsoring more than 200 students through high school from poor families 
and orphans from the community, and these are not just those from the 
congregation. 
 Also, “in Mashuuru [Kajiado District] the [Catholic] church is very active in 
development projects like schools, but the church still isn’t doing much here in the 
Mara” (I 9). Paul Murero (ibid) is employed by the Catholic Church to run the 
Oltopesi Cultural Centre in Mashuuru, Kajiado, and he is from Lemek. Having been 
involved in an unsuccessful attempt to bring Catholicism to Koiyaki, he believed that 
tourism may partly be to blame for the Catholic Church’s relative absence in this 
area of Maasailand. More specifically, he thought that wealth from tourism has 
encouraged local residents to adopt a more selfish attitude:  
The [Catholic] church did come to Talek but then later left because the local 
community were getting a lot of money from tourism but they were only 
thinking of themselves… when the people got money they became more 
egoistic. That is now when the church started pulling out because, remember, 
the church becomes more involved with the people when the people show 
willingness and cooperation and therefore the church would also want to get 
income from the people. Even if a priest came to Talek, where the people are 
getting a lot of money, if he spent [KES] 500-1000 [$5.50-11] in fuel, he only 
gets [KES] 200 [$2.30] in the collection. Especially when he knows that 
people are getting a lot of money, he gives up (ibid). 
Paul Murero’s account of why the Catholic Church withdrew from the Mara suggests 
that living alongside tourism may encourage the local people to become spoilt, and 
reliant upon being given assistance rather than participating in it. This notion will be 
expanded upon in the next section on community involvement.  
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4.3 Communities  
FG 11 in Enooronkon suggested that, together with the state, the community was one 
of the few development actors in the area prior to the introduction of the 
conservancies: 
The school44 began by people selling sheep and those with children in school 
would contribute 2-3,000 shillings [$23-35]. By doing this we built 2 wooden 
classrooms, and then we went and asked for help from the leaders.45 That is 
what we have been doing before the conservancy was there to help.  
Although additional development actors are now involved, the community are still 
expected to contribute financially towards social projects. Lars Lindkvist, the 
executive chairman of Basecamp Foundation, said that this is because: 
There is no ownership, there is no sustainability without [local contributions]. 
Whether you are contributing in cash or in kind, it just needs to be something 
that is clearly valued. Now I think that the opportunity of contributing in cash 
is becoming rapidly more relevant… the most negative and dangerous type of 
aid and development is that which doesn’t ask for anything and doesn’t see it 
as an investment and it is a give-away and a charity (I 31).  
Exemplifying this, a community health worker at Koiyaki Community Clinic told me 
that sometimes the government hand out mosquito nets for free (I 55). Many of these 
are subsequently torn up and used as rope for building houses (ibid).  
Gert Bomhof stressed that in Nkoilale the community are contributing financially 
towards projects undertaken through Nkoilale Community Development 
Organisation (NCDO). He added: 
Always they can do more. They just support through a little money but… it is 
hard to understand why they don’t contribute more because they say that they 
don’t have the money but then if you look at all of the cows and goats, you 
can see that they have money (I 24).  
Dickson Kaelo (I 48), who previously worked as project manager for Basecamp 
Foundation, does not believe that the communities in the Mara have become donor 
dependant. He noted: “They are very willing to [contribute an amount] and they are 
very appreciative, they don’t see it as a right that they are being assisted” (ibid). In 
Endoinyo e Rinka, each household agreed to contribute the price of one sheep or goat 
to the water project. However, Dig Deep’s programme manager found ensuring that 
                                                
44 There is no school in Enooronkon. Participants were referring to Olesere School, which is the 
closest to them. 
45 By leaders, FG 11 is most likely referring to councillors and the MP. 
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this agreement was met was a long drawn-out process (I 1). Lincoln Njiru (I 39) 
suggested that, in comparison to Embu where he is from, people in the Mara do not 
understand or value the importance of matters such as education. He believes this, in 
turn, influences their willingness to make contributions (ibid). For example, in the 
Mara “if they need water in the village, for that to happen they rely on people from 
outside to come and do that” (ibid) or to say: “let’s do this together” (I 37). From her 
experience in Endoinyo e Rinka, Anna Banyard of Dig Deep noted that communities 
desire leaders:  
It is a lack of leadership that is preventing them [communities] from 
developing on their own; no one wants to take the leading role. They’re a lot 
more confident when there is someone to lead (I 1). 
Despite acknowledging its importance for community ownership in joint projects, 
donor organisations do not always follow their own advice. As Dig Deep found in 
Endoinyo e Rinka, it is very time consuming to collect community contributions. 
Despite stating that “of course” the community should contribute financially to 
community projects, the director of CMF (I 26) then conceded that, in the case of the 
extension to Endoinyo e Rinka clinic, the community did not contribute financially. 
When questioned about this, CMF director of health ministries, John Sankok, 
explained: “they [communities] are very poor in timeframes… here we have a donor 
[Better World Canada] who says I have some money I want to help you… we are so 
much quick because we wanted to make sure that it was done” (ibid). 
Although it is easy to criticise the minimal role of the community, Gert Bomhof 
questioned whether it is their responsibility to fund infrastructure and projects 
targeting basic needs:  
I would not blame them [the community] to not be behind the development of 
infrastructure, as that is the government’s job. Although they are participants, 
helping the development organisations by giving them a bit of an amount [of 
money] for projects such as water construction and schools, just as a way to 
empower them or to give them a responsibility, but the main and the basic 
responsibility should be the central government. 
When asking focus groups what responsibility the community has for their own 
development, responses often focused around showing appreciation for the initiatives 
undertaken by others. For example, FG 1 said: “If someone has brought 
developments to us, it is the responsibility of the community to appreciate any help 
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and they should give presents or beadwork”. Some groups (including FG 1, 2, 6, 14) 
noted that they should also contribute financially towards projects, possibly because 
in recent years this has increasingly become standard practice. The stated aim of this 
is self-sustainability so that in the future projects will be completely undertaken, 
managed and maintained by communities (I 2, 24, 25, 31, 36, 58). There are no real 
signs of this mind-set changing within the study site yet. 
Another highlighted responsibility for the community as a whole involves coming 
together and holding events – fundraisers46 – to finance secondary and tertiary 
education (FG 16, 24; CP 7). Such fundraisers are common across Kenya, but they 
are relatively rare within the study site. Mbitin, where FG 16 was held, is the only 
village where one is known to have taken place during the 19 month research period. 
Mike Kahiga (I 44), a teacher at Koiyaki Guiding School, believes that fundraisers 
are not popular in the Mara because of tourism. He elaborated: 
In my home [Nakuru], people would seek bursaries from the government but 
they are not enough for everyone so people are always doing small 
fundraisings… but here [in the Mara] there are a lot of donors. I have seen a 
number of cases where donors or tourists just visiting from outside are very 
willing to assist [with bursaries] (ibid).  
Grace Naisenya (I 62) works on a day-to-day basis at the schools in Koiyaki through 
her job as an outreach worker. She agreed: 
Fundraisers are not common here because they get scholarships from tourists 
and camps... People from this area don’t like education so they don’t 
fundraise for that, what is assisting education here are the camps.  
Local students attending KGS are only expected to pay 10% of the course fees. 40% 
of the fees are covered by bursaries from conservancy-affiliated organisations, camps 
and tourists (I 44). The remaining 50% comes from KGS’s affiliated camp, Eagle 
View, which is contracted out to be managed by BCE (ibid). In addition to support 
from the tourism industry, Dickson Kaelo (I 48) agrees with Grace that the lack of 
fundraisers within Koiyaki is also a result of how residents regard education: 
It is very likely that if you invited people [to a fundraiser] to come and help 
you because there is a sick person in Tenwek47 and the bill has gone to 
                                                
46 “Fundraisers are when you call your neighbours and maybe politicians to come to your home. You 
cook some food, then they come and contribute towards the school fees” (I 14).  




100,000 [KES, $1100] that there will be a higher turn-out than for schools. 
Education is not, to a large extent, regarded highly, especially by the most 
illiterate of the community.  
Lincoln Njiru (I 39) proposed that this general lack of support for education in the 
Mara, combined with bursaries through tourism, is resulting in an expectation 
amongst parents for external assistance. This, he believes, absolves them from their 
responsibility (ibid). Comments made by men in FG 14 supported Lincoln’s notion:  
There are so many children who finish primary and are unable to go to 
secondary school and so we’d appreciate well-wishers who are able to 
sponsor children through secondary school because most of them just come 
home after primary school and do herding if they don’t get sponsors (FG 14). 
The reason that children could not progress in education was frequently (including 
CP 4; I 50) cited as “mekiata enkidimata (a lack of ability)”, referring to inadequate 
finances. However, Dickson (I 48) suggested that this is often not the whole truth: 
You still see children are dropping out of school but the guy [father] still has 
200 sheep… they say yes I couldn’t afford to take my child to school, they 
use lack of ability to afford it [as an excuse] but in fact the lack of motivation 
of wanting to keep that child in school is because they want him to herd 
rather than lack of money.  
In comparing her home area of Ololulunga to the study site, Lorna Serseri noted: 
People here [in the Mara] are rich in terms of livestock but they don’t exploit 
that richness. You can wonder, someone may have 1000 cows and he cries 
that he can’t afford school fees and demands bursaries (I 14).  
Although they benefit many children by enabling them to further their education (I 
62), scholarships can also have a downside. From Lorna’s experience of schooling in 
Narok District, she believes that financial support influences the work ethic of 
students: 
In the schools in my place [Ololulunga] we have a lot of children from the 
Mara and they don’t work hard because they know that the donor is paying 
for it and so they don’t feel the pressure. If a parent has to sell the cows to get 
the school fees, the children work a lot harder. Maybe it would be good if the 
donors paid half and the parents paid half so that he feels some of the pain (I 
14).  
Gender disparity within education is still present in Koiyaki. Whilst some primary 
schools now have more girls than boys registered in the lower classes (CP 14), there 
are still high dropout rates for girls. This is especially when they reach 12-13, when 
girls often leave school to get married (I 12, 19). In addition, some men refuse to pay 
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Figure 4.1 Household dam in Olkuroto (CP  19). 
to educate their daughters (I 50). One woman (anon 7) explained that her husband 
pays the school fees for her four boys, but refuses for the four girls. Prior to giving 
birth to her last born, she was able to cover the school fees for the girls by doing odd 
jobs, but with the baby she is now unable to work. She has had to send the young 
girls to stay and work in other households, who pay their school fees when they can. 
She said: “This will be my last baby because I cannot support them. I want to educate 
all of my children but my husband is not supporting me enough and so I cannot have 
any more” (ibid). Wanting to educate all their children, both boys and girls, is 
becoming an increasingly common rationale for women desiring fewer children (CP 
3, 7, 14, 19). Whilst the community will not directly pressurise women to have many 
children (CP 19), Noormiseyieki Mpooya (CP 13) explained: “Maa men still want us 
to have as many children as possible.” This highlights the need for family planning 
education to be expanded beyond women’s groups; even if women desire fewer 
children, it would be very difficult without the consent of their husbands.  
There are also ways in which communities within the study site are involved in 
development at a household scale. Despite the generally relaxed attitude to 
education, there are some examples of sacrifices made by families to educate their 
children. While talking to Mechanica Lolkumum (CP 16) at his home in Endoinyo e 
Rinka, he explained that one of his wives has two houses, (one in which to sleep, and 
another in which to cook), but another of his wives has only one house. He said: “this 
is because her son has just finished secondary school and he wants to go to KGS and 
so she has spent a lot of 
money paying school fees” 
(ibid). Aside from 
education, there are other 
examples of families taking 
the initiative to assist 
themselves on a household 
scale, for example providing 
their own water by building 
small dams (see figure 4.1).  
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Although these reservoirs may run dry for a several months of the year, when one 
contains water it is used by the family that built it and their friends (CP 7, 9, 19). 
Dam building can also have undesired effects for the family. Noosokon Kaleku noted 
that there has been an increase in mosquitos since they built a dam on their land (CP 
7). During the rains, water is also often collected in large buckets or drums (see 
figure 4.2) directly from iron-sheet roofs (CP 8). Larger water tanks (such as that 
seen in figure 4.3) remain rare due to their expense (CP 19). Faith Kereto (CP 9), 
who has both a household dam and a large water tank said: “collecting water is 
something new. It is good because it means that I don’t need to walk far to collect 
water so often”.  









At a smaller scale still, there are certain individuals who are deemed to play a vital 
role in community involvement in development. In Olesere, one such person is Rusei 
Ole Soit. FG 10 explained that he took the initiative to “bring development to this 
place”. In his interview, Ole Soit told me that he wanted the children in his village to 
become educated, and so he gave his own house and used his own money to start a 
school (I 85). It was also suggested that, while in Eldoret the city is being developed 
by local long-distance runners, in the Mara it is safari guides who are building the 
local economy and developing shopping centres like Nkoilale and Talek (I 14).  
Community members are involved in development in terms of contributing 
financially to projects, paying school fees, moving towards water self-sufficiency 
and being leaders. As well as this, community members are also involved in project 
Figure 4.2 Oil drum positioned to collect rainwater (CP 9) Figure 4.3 Household Water Tank (CP 3) 
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decision-making, to greater or lesser extents. According to FG 1, donors do not bring 
predetermined projects to the communities, instead: 
There are two ways by which the white people help us, either we go to them 
and say these are the developments we want, can you bring them to us? Or 
the white people come and ask, what do you want us to do for you?  
Although projects do sometimes evolve in this way, including the school and water 
projects in Endoinyo e Rinka (CP 16), personal observation revealed that is not 
always the case.  If donors have set projects in mind, these were introduced 
regardless of the needs and desires stated by the community. For example, the 
computer classroom at Loigero School and the solar project at Olesere School did not 
address the most urgent needs at these specific schools, yet they were introduced 
regardless. This will be discussed further in chapter five.  
When communities gather to discuss the needs within their society, youth also attend 
the meetings. However, FG 3 described the involvement of young people using the 
verb “aaduakuki”, which translates most closely as “to witness”. This suggests that 
they may not participate as fully as other members of the community. Women also 
attend. Lorna Serseri explained: 
Traditionally, women were not allowed to speak at meetings. They were told 
that the mouth of a woman is just for eating, not for speaking. But nowadays, 
if there is a meeting there must be women representatives (I 14).  
A female focus group in Olesere purported that women are equal to men when it 
comes to making decisions on issues concerning the community because “if there is a 
contribution to be made, we as women contribute as well as men. Equality in 
decision-making has just come recently” (FG 3). In contrast to this, another group 
with women at a homestead on the outskirts of Olesere said:  
The men don’t talk to us about such things [community projects]. The men 
have refused to involve us in their developments. If meetings are called then 
it is only the men who go and women are told to herd the cattle (FG 5).  
One possible reason for these conflicting answers from the women of Olesere is that 
the loudest voices in FG 3 belonged to Nooloiretu and Noombarbali Soit who are 
wives of the community leader, Rusei Ole Soit. In addition, Noombarbali is the 
Olesere community based facilitator (CBF) for Basecamp Foundation’s microfinance 
project. Therefore, these co-wives may attend and voice their thoughts at community 
meetings more than other women within Olesere.  
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NGO employees said that they are continually trying to increase the involvement of 
women in meetings and decision-making processes, but face many challenges. Anna 
Banyard (I 2) noted that during the water project at Endoinyo e Rinka: 
Dig Deep encouraged women to share in any decision-making and positions 
of responsibility but despite this encouragement, women played a much more 
passive role in community meetings than men. It was only in around half of 
the meetings that a woman stood up to address everyone.  
Similarly, Gert explained that in Nkoilale they normally have a meeting with about 
50 men and 3 women (I 24). One of the challenges noted in meetings that I attended 
personally is the language barrier. In several instances, only Swahili and English 
were used in the meeting, excluding women and uneducated men, who only speak 
Maa. 
Women in Enooronkon (FG 9) believe that there is a shift taking place regarding 
who is listened to in community meetings. They explained that today, even if you are 
young or female, so long as you are knowledgeable you will be heard (ibid). But they 
stressed that men must have their voices heard first, and the priority is still given to 
the older men over the younger (ibid). Such accounts suggest that, even though 
women and youth may now attend more meetings, they may not yet be participating 
as fully as the older men who have traditionally held decision-making power. This 
shift in who participates, although not yet complete, is an example of Cleaver’s 
(2001) conclusion that a rethinking is needed in community participation regarding 
the differential role played by individuals due to historical and spatial social 
structures. As discussed in chapter two, little consideration is currently given either 
to the degree of participation or who within communities should participate in 
literature on local participation in tourism (Gauthier, 1993; Scheyvens, 2002; Garrod, 
2003; Honey, 2008).  
Despite this expansion of participation, community members made two criticisms. 
The first is that participation in some meetings is not evenly distributed spatially 
between communities. FG 14 in Mbitin suggested that one of the reasons that their 
neighbouring village of Olesere receives greater development assistance is that “most 
of the people in Olesere attend the [conservancy] committee meetings, and so that is 
why the help is directed there”. The other main criticism is that too much decision-
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making power for projects still lies with the donors and trusts (I 8). James Kaigil 
argued “the local people need to be more involved because they know where the 
problems are around here” (ibid). This will be discussed further in chapter five. 
4.4 Conservancy Landowners  
Following the creation of the conservancies, the landowners decided to use a 
proportion of their rental incomes each month to undertake their own development 
projects. A Naboisho Conservancy landowner explained: “Olare Orok began this, 
and then we in Naboisho followed up by also collecting money from each landowner 
each month” (I 85). The agreed amount is subtracted, and then the landowner bodies 
in each conservancy decide how this is spent. Olare Orok landowners agreed on a 
rate of 150 shillings per hectare per year. Motorogi landowners contribute 50 
shillings per hectare per year to their own fund,48 as do Naboisho landowners. In 
Naboisho, in addition to this contribution from the rental income, 30% of the $11 per 
client per night camp landowner bed night fee49 is added to the landowner 
community fund.50  
Motorogi Conservancy used this fund to contribute KES 1.5million ($17,000) 
towards a water project on its border, working together with Operation Universal 
Eyesight (I 87). Several participants raised a concern over the lack of transparency in 
this fund as, other than the water project, it is not known what the money raised from 
landowners has been used for (anon 3, 9, 11). On a return visit to the study site in 
summer 2014, I was told that it had been uncovered that two officials had 
systematically withdrawn at least KES 700,000 ($7,700) from this fund’s bank 
account (anon 3). Such discrepancies are fuelling the creation of a Motorogi 
Conservancy landowner association that is calling for democratically elected, rather 
than appointed, officials. This movement is now also spreading to other neighbouring 
conservancies. 
                                                
48 At the time of research there were discussions amongst Olare Orok and Motorogi land committee 
officials about increasing this to 150 shillings to match OOC. As previously mentioned, increasing the 
payment without the correct consultations breaks the contractual agreement between landowners and 
the conservancy (anon 3). 
49 For clarification, there are two bed night fees. $11 per client per night is divided with $8 going to 
the individual landowner(s) who own the land where the camp is located and in OMC the remaining 
$3 goes to the landowners committee and in Naboisho the $3 goes to the landowners’ community 
fund. This is different to the additional $5 bed night fee in OMC which goes to OOMT. 
50 See diagrams 2.6 and 2.7 to see how these payments flow between the stakeholders. 
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OOC landowners previously contributed money towards OOMT but during a 
political “bust up” in 2011 certain members of the land committee decided that they 
would no longer give this money to the trust (I 81). Now the money is put towards 
covering school fees for the children of landowners (I 64) and it is processed through 
the land holding company (I 81). A list FG 18 provided of award recipients of these 
bursaries for 2012 detailed 54 grants ranging from KES 8000 ($93) for a few primary 
school bursaries to KES 28,500 ($330) for university students. The modal average 
was KES 10,000 ($120). Theoretically, the provision of these scholarships is 
determined by considering the student’s performance, whether their father is a 
member of the conservancy and the capability/neediness of the family (I 64). 
Landowners say that this is significantly helping some families, enabling their 
children to continue their education and is the cited reason why some non-
conservancy members think that OOC is the best conservancy in the area (including I 
18, 79; CP 13, 15, 19). As one OOC landowner explained: “I would not be able to 
take the children to secondary school if I didn’t get the money from OOC because a 
drought came and my livestock died and so I only have few cows now” (CP 16). This 
money is benefiting some families, but there are widespread allegations of nepotism 
and political favouritism by the land committee regarding the allocation of this 
money (anon 3, 8, 9). It is alleged that individuals in the land holding company are 
using their decision-making power in this initiative to strengthen their political 
standing by favouring family, friends and allies (ibid). 
To date, Naboisho Conservancy has used its landowner fund to build six classrooms 
or nursery schools in surrounding communities (I 84, 86). They plan to now move on 
to focusing on water projects for the coming year (2014-15) (ibid). For the money to 
be released for projects, LandCO propose potential uses to ManCO and seeks 
approval (I 31). Likewise, for the $100,000 community fund provided by Naboisho’s 
tourism partners, they suggest uses for that money, but it must also be approved 
through ManCO. ManCO comprises an equal representation of conservancy 
landowners and tourism partners and is then chaired by Lars Lindkvist of BCFK 
(ibid). Initiatives by Naboisho Conservancy landowners have also been subject to 
allegations of corruption. In the run up to the 2013 election, a large portion of money 
earmarked for a classroom at Mbitin School allegedly disappeared (FG 14; anon 9, 
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10, 11). The cause of this was that the money was kept in a teachers’ SACCO51 
account instead of a bank account. Given that the chairman of Naboisho’s LandCO is 
a head teacher, he had too much influence over this SACCO (anon 11). This was 
recognised as a design flaw, the majority of the money was returned and alternative 
banking arrangements have been made (I 35). One Naboisho landowner suggested 
that to prevent this from happening again:  
We need greater transparency between the LandCO officials and the 
contractors so that no more money can go missing. There is still KES 100,000 
($1200) unaccounted for. ManCo should pay the contractors directly and miss 
out LandCO (anon 10).  
Another young Maasai man explained: 
Giving money to local people can be a problem because they use it for 
themselves and this leads to mistrust within the community. The Maasai trust 
you white people more than their own people to manage such things because 
you [white people] will not consume the money (anon 2).  
Whilst it is encouraging to see the landowners wanting to get involved in 
development projects, accusations of favouritism and corruption within the 
management and allocation of these resources is universal across conservancies. This 
phenomenon is not unique to this case study. In Ghana, Sonne (2010) also found that 
greater transparency is needed in the finances of community projects resulting from 
tourism.  The official motivation for this conservancy landowner initiative is to 
nurture the feeling of ownership over both the conservancy and development 
projects, and to encourage the belief that the community can do things for themselves 
(I 86). However, these on-going issues make it possible to argue that motivations 
may be more aligned with a desire to have greater control over finances that can be 
manipulated for personal and political gain by individuals on landowner committees. 
At present, these organisations lack the rigorous accountability and transparency in 
decision-making and accounting which more formal development actors must meet 
to satisfy donors. 
In 2013 the Kenya Wildlife Conservancies Association (KWCA) was established to 
act as an umbrella body for all wildlife conservancies across Kenya. Dickson Kaelo 
was appointed CEO. The aim of this landowner-led national association is to be a 
                                                
51 A SACCO is a Savings and Credit Cooperative Organization. This is an organisation that is owned, 
managed and run by its members who have a common bond, in this case teaching. 
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forum through which landowners can have a unified voice and share experiences 
(KWCA, 2014). Regional bodies feed up to this national entity, with the Maasai 
Mara Wildlife Conservancies Association (MMWCA) representing Narok District. 
This new association, which brings representatives of each conservancy’s landowner 
committee together at a regional level, is indicating that it would like to become 
involved in distributing benefits, such as the implementation of community projects. 
In light of the issues discussed in this section, some individuals (anon 3, 8, 9) are 
concerned that the representatives in this association are those who are currently 
managing the individual conservancy landowner funds. Without transparency and 
rigorous management, MMWCA may face the same problems as the individual 
conservancy landowner funds. 
4.5 Other NGOs  
Juma Sampuerrap, a CMF nurse, considers development projects to be the 
responsibility of the government, “but since they are not doing this, other people 
such as charity organisations need to step in” (I 23). The key motivation of these 
organisations is to “see people being served… They make sure that people get the 
services that other Kenyans are getting” (ibid). Anna Banyard from Dig Deep UK 
believes: 
It is not the responsibility of western aid organisations but it has become their 
responsibility due to a lack of funding and care from Kenya’s own. It seemed 
that when we met with the constituencies development fund (CDF), they 
were much more willing to fund projects that had a western aid donor than 
those without. I think that the community could have done this project 
without Dig Deep’s involvement but I don’t think they would have. They are 
very reliant. 
One problem associated with external NGOs is an inadequate presence within the 
communities with which they are working. For example, “[prior to the 
conservancies] World Concern also did a lot on development in this area, especially 
in education” (I 13). According to FG 14, “they came to Mbitin School and said they 
were going to assist us and so we [the community] dug the hole for the toilets, but 
then they never came back”. “This is very dangerous for the children and when it 
rains it [the hole] becomes full of water” (FG 16). One way to address this is for 
external NGOs to partner with field-based organisations. Following 
recommendations from the head of the district water authority, Dig Deep UK came 
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to the study site and decided to work together with OOMT because “they have a 
handle on what is happening on the ground” (I 1). Other conservation NGOs, 
including Tusk Trust and Kenya Wildlife Trust who both undertake community 
initiatives in wildlife areas, also use OOMT as their facilitator for the Mara.  
Some stakeholders believe that there are fewer NGOs in the study site than in other 
parts of Kenya. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) suggested that most people shy away from 
wanting to come and work in this area because local residents can have very strong 
political opinions. In addition to the political context, the director of Dig Deep (I 58) 
highlighted educational and organisational differences when working in Koiyaki. He 
explained: 
If I go to a meeting in Kericho there is a secretary, they have an agenda… 
This makes me both keener to work here [in Koiyaki] because this area has 
more need and less keen as it is more difficult (ibid).  
As a result of these difficulties, the majority of NGOs active in the study site are in 
the Mara for a specific reason. In some cases this is a conservation agenda, but the 
most common reason for the NGOs present to be working in this area is an affiliation 
with camps, conservancies, or tourism more generally. For example, Mama Zebra 
Memorial Fund, Better World Canada and Stichting Nkoilale all work in the Mara 
because of a need seen by individuals holidaying in the area.  
4.6 Tourists  
As noted earlier, Councillor Ole Ketuyo believes that donations from tourists are one 
reason why schools bordering tourism areas, such as Koiyaki, are better than those 
further away from tourism activities in areas (I 30). Dickson Kaelo concurs that a 
large proportion of the money for projects in communities bordering conservancies 
“is through travellers’ philanthropy, people who just come here and they feel that 
they want to do something” (I 48). Travellers’ philanthropy is a relatively new area 
of research for academia but it is increasingly being heralded as one way in which 
tourism can positively impact upon development (see Wiebe, 2011; Lacey et al., 
2012). As an example of this, in Ghana, Sonne (2010: 181) found that through 
travellers’ philanthropy tourists helped a marginalised sector of society known as the 
‘Castle Boys’ through scholarships and other capacity building opportunities.  
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In focus groups with community members, with regard to the responsibility of 
development actors, participants placed few expectations on tourists directly. Three 
sessions with men (FG 1, 18, 22) hoped that tourists may decide to help their 
children by donating to the local school or giving scholarships, whilst women wished 
that they would buy their beadwork (FG 5, 6, 10, 13, 17). Expectations on tourists 
were not as high as other actors, and there was a general attitude that “if they see it in 
their hearts to help us we would accept that” (FG 15). On the other hand, Juma 
Sampuerrap of CMF (I 23) had higher hopes: 
I think that there is a very big role that tourism should play… it is good to 
have a holiday, it is good to spend money on being happy and having fun but 
it is also good to spend money, just a little, maybe a dollar or two, to help 
somebody near you to change their life.  
Regardless of these varying expectations placed on them by Maasai residents, 
tourists are contributing towards development within the study site. There are several 
different ways in which this is being undertaken.  
There are a few examples of tourists starting their own NGOs to address problems 
witnessed first-hand.52 The Mama Zebra Memorial Fund was created in memory of 
two people, one Swedish and one Danish, who were killed in East Africa (Zetterlund, 
2013). The Swedish woman was holidaying and writing a book in Talek, and came to 
be called Mama Zebra by Maasai school children, prior to her death at Mount Kenya 
(ibid). In her memory, her husband, together with the widow of a Danish man killed 
in Tanzania, decided to start a foundation to give children in Talek a better life (ibid). 
Another example is the foundation Stichting Nkoilale which created the Nkoilale 
Community Development Organisation (NCDO). Gert Bomhof, who came to 
Nkoilale nine years ago as a tourist, founded Stichting Nkoilale. He told me that he 
“saw what was missing, how these people live, and especially how these kids have to 
struggle and so we started to help as a family and then we started a foundation” (I 
24). As a result of these organisations, FGs 26 and 27 in Nkoilale said that tourists 
are the main development actor in their area. 
The presence of tourism also assists community projects by encouraging existing 
NGOs to bring their donors to the area. Erik Ranja is the director of Better World 
                                                
52 These individuals may not have been tourists in the conservancies, but the organisations discussed 
here work within the study site 
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Canada, which funds schools and clinics within the study site. He explained how 
they became involved with projects in the Mara specifically: 
We had projects elsewhere in Kenya but I came to the Mara on holiday and I 
drove around and saw the need here. I then thought, I know, I’ll bring my 
friends here and they can see the animals and while they’re here they can 
invest in the people. Also, it is an easy place to bring the donors to see their 
work and they really like that (I 25). 
Despite their own involvement, Erik Ranja noted that – considering the number of 
tourists coming to the area – there is not much development work coming from them 
“as most people don’t even leave the lodge” (ibid). The conservancies are trying to 
break down this barrier between tourists and the communities by encouraging clients 
to visit genuine local villages to see their way of life as an additional experience (I 
21). This is in contrast to the commercial cultural villages that border the national 
reserve. There are not yet clear conservancy-wide agreements regarding village visit 
arrangements, and this prevents the full potential being realised. An OOC landowner 
and former employee of a camp in Naboisho pointed out: “Many of the camps in 
OOC take their clients to the ‘commercial villages’ near the reserve53 instead of 
‘genuine villages’ like Naboisho does” (I 64). Even within Naboisho Conservancy, 
camps have different arrangements with the homesteads that they visit, and this has 
caused tensions within communities (I 20). Despite these issues, village visits are 
widely interpreted as a form of development by the communities and are greatly 
desired (FG 13, 25; I 20; CP 2).  This is not surprising as they can be a significant 
source of income. For example, Naboisho Camp charges $25 per client:  $15 goes to 
the homestead visited, $5 to the local school54 and $5 to cover VAT and credit card 
expenses (I 16). In 2012, this one camp paid over $3000 to the village visited (FQ 
Asilia Naboisho Camp).55 
According to camp manager Helen Schutte (I 16):  
                                                
53 For a further discussion on the issues associated with these villages see Mitchell and Ashley (2010: 
59) and Honey (2008: 319). 
54 The camp keeps this $5 per client for the school and then once or twice a year they discuss with the 
school committee what is needed, buy the items and then deliver them to the school (I 21). For 
example, in March 2013 they donated 30 benches to Olesere School costing $1350 (P.C. Helen 
Schutte). 
55 Financial Questionnaire– This information is from the financial survey. The subsequent name 
identifies the organisation/company whose financial survey response is being referred to. 
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In addition to the payment for the trip, village visits make the problems that 
the Maasai people face visible and real to the tourists. For example, appalled 
at seeing children in old ripped clothing with no shoes on village visits, 
tourists have accused us as camp managers of not doing enough to support 
the local communities. Roelof [her husband] tried to explain that these 
families have many livestock and that if they wanted to dress their children in 
new clothes and shoes they are more than financially able to do so, but it is 
difficult for the tourists to understand this.  
Dickson Kaelo (I 48) agreed that outsiders see the Maasai as very poor because of 
how they dress. He explained that he knows some “very poorly dressed Maasai guys 
who have [KES] 800,000 [$9000] in their purse” (ibid). This is one example of 
tourists, from their Western backgrounds, thinking that Maasai people are poor by 
comparing them to their own ways of living (I 36, 58, 62). Yet as a result of this, 
many tourists are keen to donate to local initiatives (ibid). For example, a Belgian 
tourist from Kicheche Bush Camp in OOC donated $1000 to build a pit latrine at 
Loigero Primary School following a visit (I 3). In this instance, the money was 
processed through OOMT, following advice from the safari guide (ibid).  
Often tourists pass donations directly into the hands of head teachers or other 
community members. Although donations are given with the best intentions: “they 
[tourists] shouldn’t just give money directly to people because that is the most wrong 
way; it just goes in the pockets” (I 24). Exemplifying this, a tourist visiting a school 
near a conservancy donated $600 cash directly to the head teacher (anon 12). When 
the camp managers heard about this the next day, they went to the school to discuss 
how best to put this money to good use, but the head teacher denied all knowledge of 
the donation (ibid). It became increasingly apparent by visiting schools over a long 
period of time that in some instances, despite regular donations from tourists and 
camps alike,56 they do not look any better off. One returning volunteer to Naboisho 
picked up on this issue. She stated: 
When I was here last time we donated so many books and things to (anon) 
school and I know that many other people do as well. But when I go back 
there now, it looks poorer than ever (I 92).  
This raises questions as to where this money has gone and whether these head 
teachers are deliberately wanting their schools to appear “poor” and “needy” in order 
                                                
56 The ‘Pack for a Purpose’ scheme has increased the quantity of donated items even further as many 




to continue attracting donations from visiting tourists – as has been reported at some 
orphanages in Cambodia (see Birrell, 2010).  
Passing donations directly to local residents is the most unsustainable route as there 
are no organisations overseeing expenditure to ensure that it is used for its intended 
purpose. This is one of the tasks undertaken by the conservancy-affiliated 
organisations. Any donations linked to tourism are reliant upon the presence of 
tourism, and if this dwindles donations will simultaneously reduce, however, any 
donations are at risk of cessation.  
The administrator of OOMT noted that the ability to raise money to be used in 
development projects from tourists is immense, especially within the conservancies 
as the clients are often very wealthy57 (I 36). For example, the trust has received 
donations from tourists to construct toilet blocks at schools (ibid). It is also 
fashionable to give to the Maasai (I 76). Yet it needs to be coordinated, it has to be 
regulated somehow and channelled through accountable organisations (anon). This is 
because: 
There is a whole ton of money coming into the Mara from tourism that isn’t 
going where it should be going. A few people getting very rich from it (I 36). 
To a certain degree, some community members are sceptical about the motives of 
such donors and believe: “organisations like Mama Zebra must be benefiting from 
that [donating] because she would not be doing it if she wasn’t benefiting” (FG 24). 
Another focus group (22) thought that donors must get free entry to the national 
reserve, and that this is how they benefit from donating to the area. Although, FG 22 
stressed that they do not mind if the donors benefit in some way so long as they 
continue supporting the communities. Individuals involved in receiving donations 
from tourists broke down motives into three main categories. Firstly, being faced 
with “poverty” first-hand, leading to a guilt complex; secondly, wanting to reward 
communities who have leased their land for tourism and wildlife; and thirdly, a 
desire to get a “warm glow” feeling, having personally been involved in making a 
difference. 
                                                
57 This is not exclusive to development-focused initiatives, tourists also donate to conservation-based 
schemes, such as predator projects (I 80). Tourists’ philanthropic income generation for conservation 
is discussed further by Barnes and Eagles (2004). 
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Dickson Kaelo believes that one of the main motivations for tourists to donate is that 
they witness problems for themselves: 
They come here and they hear that community members have to go 25km to 
access the nearest clinic and they just feel that this is unfair, [and they say] if 
there is a way I can do it, I would be willing to help (I 48).  
Teriano Soit, a young educated Maasai lady, does not think that donations from 
tourists are linked to a sense of guilt because “they have not caused the poverty in 
this area and so do not have a reason to feel guilty” (I 13). However, Ron Beaton (I 
3), the founder of OOMT, is adamant that a guilt complex caused by seeing problems 
first-hand encourages donations. This is why guides are encouraged to take interested 
clients to KGS, to increase support for the school (ibid). The manager of NCDO (I 
64) agrees with the importance of this direct personal experience. He believes that 
tourists are assisting in Nkoilale’s development because “they feel like they want to 
improve the lives of the people they have seen. They meet people and see poverty for 
themselves” (ibid). 
Specifically for the conservancies, Dickson highlighted another possible motivation: 
It is also very likely that a few people are motivated by the fact that people 
have given up their land for me to come here to enjoy. So more recently I 
think there are people who come in and if they enjoy the conservancy they 
feel that I was on someone’s land and if there is anything that I can do to 
make his life better because my life was better because I came here and I had 
a great time and I enjoyed it (I 48). 
The schools’ outreach worker agreed that tourists enjoying the resources and wildlife 
sometimes results in them wanting to give back to the local communities, which has 
“helped a lot to bring development to this area” (I 62). 
Donors do not necessarily fall into just one of the aforementioned categories. When I 
asked Gert to explain the motivation behind his work at Nkoilale he replied: 
Just look in the eyes of the kids over there. You know what I told them? You 
have the same rights. You know what, we came from another world and we 
were just so happy with the wildlife and everything in Kenya and then I 
talked to our driver and I said please bring me to a primary school because I 
wanted to see the other side… and then I saw it and I said wow, just like a 
virus it struck me at that moment, it was 2003, the 3rd of July. 
Finally, tourists also often feel uplifted assisting communities, especially when they 
can return on holiday and see first-hand the impact that this is having. As one donor 
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explained: “You feel good helping other people. I always think of giving like 
shopping, you have to have some satisfaction in the money that you give” (I 25). The 
manager of Naboisho Camp believes that this feel-good sensation from supporting 
the local women is behind the success of the new beadwork project (PC58 Helen 
Schutte). She has found that the tourists are desperate to buy the produce, especially 
if the label includes some information about the lady who made it (ibid). 
Although, as has been discussed, many tourists choose to become directly involved 
in community development in the Mara, this does not mean that those who do not 
make this choice have no impact. Lars Lindkvist of Basecamp Foundation (I 31) 
argued that, while every traveller needs to think about how they can contribute, the 
very structure of sustainable tourism - in this instance conservancies - can do this on 
behalf of the tourists. He elaborated: 
If you design your tourism so that by default it supports development, for 
example, or supports communities one way or another, then choosing that 
business as your product to provide that is a deliberate step in that direction. 
[Then] you might not need to do anything else as a visitor, other than to make 
sure what they say, what they claim [is true] (ibid). 
4.7 Conservancy-Affiliated Organisations  
Conservancies and their affiliated organisations are widely perceived by informants 
as the main development actor within the study site at present. In addition to their 
role in livelihood security and creating income-earning opportunities, they are 
heavily involved in social development projects. As previously noted, OMC have 
their own trust, OOMT which is financed by a “$5 per person per night” fee (I 36). 
Despite this funding support, the trust is an independent entity and the conservancy 
does not influence its activities (I 36, 75). The majority of OOMT’s other funding 
comes from a few key previous tourists and prominent white Kenyans – especially 
those involved in the tourism industry – as well as organisations including Tusk 
Trust and African Digna (I 36). Olare Orok’s trust initially held communal 
machinery for use in the conservancy, but over the last few years they have come to 
concentrate more on outreach and projects in the communities that border the 
conservancies (ibid). Naboisho Conservancy does not have its own trust. The main 
actor for this conservancy is Basecamp Foundation Kenya (BCFK), one of the key 
                                                
58 Personal Communication 
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instigators and funders in the creation of the conservancy. Basecamp Foundation has 
evolved from its corporate sister, Basecamp Explorer, which has two camps within 
Naboisho Conservancy as well as one in Talek bordering the reserve. 
In addition to these two main organisations, Kicheche, who have camps in Olare 
Orok, Naboisho and Mara North Conservancies, have their own charitable arm called 
Kicheche Community Trust (KCT). KCT have largely been involved in projects in 
Aitong, which borders Mara North Conservancy and is just outside of the study site 
(I 71). Despite this, head teachers within the study site named KCT as a development 
actor as they have provided books, desks and tree saplings for their schools (I 19, 41, 
54). Naboisho Camp previously had its own organisation called Rekero Community 
Conservation Fund. In 2012 this was merged into Kenya Wildlife Trust (KWT). 
KCT and KWT both work through OOMT for any community-focused projects 
within the study site (I 69, 71). As well as these registered NGOs, individual camps 
sometimes informally assist neighbouring villages using either company money or 
donations from clients (I 12, 21). Conservancy managements also play a role in some 
development initiatives. For example, Naboisho’s contracted management company 
(Seiya Ltd) is sometimes asked by organisations such as BCFK to project manage the 
building of predator-proof livestock enclosures and classrooms (I 76).  
Naboisho Conservancy’s LandCO chairman claimed: “Almost all community 
projects [in this area] are connected to tourism” (I 86). Dickson Kaelo suggested that, 
more specifically, conservancies are a key factor in stimulating community 
development as: 
They [community projects] are not happening in Olkinyei, in Maji Moto, in 
Oldurkesi, in Naikarra, you go there and there is nothing, absolutely nothing 
happening and it is because they don’t have conservancies to a large extent (I 
48).  
As previously noted, Councillor Ole Ketuyo disagrees with such perspectives. He 
claimed: “they [conservancies] are not development conscious; they are only here for 
profit - that is the problem” (I 30).  
The vast majority of focus group participants disagreed with the councillor’s 
viewpoint. They concluded sessions by ranking conservancies and their affiliated 
organisations as the main development actors in the area. It is important to note, 
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however, that this was sometimes not the opinion at the beginning of sessions. On 
many occasions, participants responded to one of the initial questions, “have the 
conservancies been involved in development in this area?” by stating that they have 
done nothing (FG 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 22). More specific questions were 
then asked which broke down the issue. We asked the participants what is 
development, what are examples of development, and who is responsible for each of 
these initiatives. 
All female focus groups held in areas included in the scheme named, as examples of 
development, the women’s groups and the microfinance scheme run by outreach 
workers. They praised the impact that this scheme has had on their lives (FG 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 19). The outreach workers responsible – employed by OOMT and 
BCFK – were often named by focus groups as people involved in community 
development, although their employers and the link to conservancies was not always 
recognised. Bedelian (2014: 145) concurs as she also found that many people did not 
link projects to conservancies in Koiyaki. 
Regarding infrastructure-based community projects, several focus groups (including 
5, 9, 10, 13, 16, 22) described the actor responsible as “ilashumpa” which translates 
as “the white people”. Participants were often unable to specify further who exactly 
these people were, although FG 5 stressed: “there is no link with the conservancy”. 
In several focus groups some individuals knew the organisation responsible for a 
project, but their affiliation with a conservancy was not understood. The link 
between OOMT and OMC was more widely recognised than that between BCFK 
and Naboisho Conservancy, perhaps due to the organisation’s name. This disconnect 
was especially common amongst non-conservancy members. If some individuals in 
the focus group knew who was responsible, this then led to a group discussion. If no 
one in the group was aware who had undertaken the project under deliberation, I 
asked what they would think if these projects were connected to the conservancies. 
Participants replied that if this was the case: “we would then say that the conservancy 
is good” (FG 13). This supports the idea that there is a close relationship between 




Regarding the involvement of conservancies in projects, Dickson Kaelo (I 48) 
acknowledged that in some instances community members may not realise this link 
and provided an example: 
We had a guest who came to Naboisho and she was concerned that there were 
no health facilities around here and she went back and made contact with the 
Japanese embassy and they are going to do a clinic in Nkoilale. So the people 
in Nkoilale now know that there is a clinic coming but they may not know 
that the guest actually got interested because they had a visit to Naboisho. 
When I mentioned to Dickson that many people in Olesere claim not to know who is 
responsible for the projects there he responded:  
Specifically for Olesere, the person who was in the meetings and the opening 
ceremony et cetera was me and they know me and they know who I work for. 
So if someone says that they didn’t know it was Basecamp who did it I think 
that they are just being mischievous.  
In contrast, participants in FG 19 revealed that, although they know the names of 
some people involved in projects, they do not know for whom they work. Lars 
Lindkvist, the executive chairman of BCFK, believes that the issue may be more 
complex: 
Sometimes we get these indicators that they deliberately misunderstand it 
[who is responsible for projects]... There might be a situation when you feel 
that they haven’t understood it but they have understood it and they 
deliberately are misusing information for some other reasons (I 31). 
Another possibility is that there is complacency that “people do know who has done 
these projects as there has been a lot of branding” (I 87). This presumes that all 
members of the community are literate and that they read and understand the signs. 
Branding is controversial amongst development actors for a number of reasons: 
donors think that it is insufficient (I 31); some working with the communities think it 
is excessive (I 1, 87); critics think it takes away from the desired goal of community 
ownership (I 2, 36, 58); and the community seem to pay little attention to it (I 58). 
James Kaigil was also surprised that some community members claim not to be 
aware who is responsible for these projects because: 
At every launching they [the conservancies] shout we do this, we want you to 
see the importance of the conservancy, we want you to benefit, we need you 
to see the sweetness of wildlife, you should like the elephants the same way 
as you like your cows, and so they also preach like a gospel. 
Perhaps, therefore, at present the community are simply not interested in who is 
responsible and what their motivations are, so long as they receive their desired 
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outputs. If this is the case, Allan Earnshaw, the chairman of KWT, believed that 
funding projects is “wasted money” (I 47). Another consequence of the 
conservancies’ involvement not being fully understood by communities is that the 
government often gains credit for work undertaken. FG 5 explained: “We don’t know 
who has brought these developments but because they are here we presume that it is 
the government who has brought them.” 
The scale under consideration is an additional influencing factor for initial negative 
responses when asking the conservancies’ involvement in development. To begin 
with, participants only thought about the impact that the conservancies are having on 
themselves and whether they are benefiting directly. As more specific questions were 
asked, some respondents then revealed that they do benefit from the conservancies 
because they have family members who receive rental payments or wages, and that 
these individuals sometimes support them (FG 11, 15, 25). There was one instance 
when a lady in FG 6 was adamant that she did not know anyone employed by the 
conservancy. Knowing that her stepson is a guide in a camp, I questioned her further 
about this. She was surprised that I knew about her stepson and then conceded that 
he is the main financial supporter of the homestead. This woman then whispered to 
the other participants in the group saying: “she knows us too well, we need to think 
about what we say to her”. This suggests that some participants may have 
intentionally tried to play down the impact that the conservancies are having, perhaps 
in an attempt to attain more benefits. This is one example whereby the longevity of 
the fieldwork period proved vital. Without personal relationships with community 
members I would have accepted initial negative responses at face value, which would 
have painted a very different picture. 
Focus group participants were also asked whether they ever go into the 
conservancies to graze their livestock and if they ever use the community projects 
that had been discussed, even if these are located beyond their village. As a result of 
breaking down the benefits and asking more specific questions in this way, by the 
end of the sessions when I re-asked the initial question regarding perceptions of the 
role that the conservancies are having upon development, responses in 21 out of 29 
focus groups were positive. Opinions of groups held in Mbitin, Olkuroto and Osilale 
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remained mixed, and in five instances predominantly negative. Considering the 
relative lack of conservancy involvement in these villages, as previously discussed, 
their perceptions are perhaps not surprising.  
In addition to encouraging participants to look at the issue from a broader household 
and community scale, there are three factors that potentially influenced this change 
of opinion. Firstly, as exemplified, participants may have been initially trying to 
deliberately downplay benefits accruing from the conservancies. Secondly, some 
people may have been genuinely unaware of the conservancies’ involvement in 
community projects. Thirdly, community members may not have thought through 
and added up all of the benefits that are affecting them, both directly and indirectly, 
until specifically asked. James Kaigil (I 8) told me that he has had a similar 
experience at his home area of Mpuaai. Men wanted to block access to the 
conservancies because they said that they were not getting benefits:  
I told them, please don’t. You have to be patient and wait for some other 
benefit, and that it doesn’t necessarily have to be direct and may be indirect, 
and even now you may be benefiting but do not see. I tell them, your brother 
is employed in Mara Plains, your uncle is employed in Porini59 and tomorrow 
you’re also grazing during open grazing in the conservancy and so why do 
you try to create an enemy? (ibid) 
This change in response is critical because responses to more general questions 
regarding opinions of conservancies changed in sync. In other words, while 
participants felt that conservancies were not involved in development, they also 
expressed negative opinions of conservancies in general, saying that they are bad and 
not wanted. Yet as participants’ thoughts about the conservancies’ involvement in 
development changed, they also changed their broader opinion of the conservancies. 
This means that if conservancy stakeholders want to ensure that communities think 
positively about the concept, assisting with community development is one way to 
work on achieving this. However, this will only succeed if conservancies’ roles in 
such initiatives are clearly understood by the broader community.  
Although many community members may not currently be fully aware of the 
conservancies’ involvement, individuals on the various committees do see this link 
and are very positive and appreciative. Rusei Ole Soit explained that, in Olesere, “we 
                                                
59 Mara Plains and Porini Lion are two camps in OOC. 
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now have facilities like the school, water project and clinic – they wouldn’t be here if 
the conservancy wasn’t here” (I 85). FG 25 disagreed with this sentiment, noting that 
schools were present before the conservancies were created. Dickson admitted that 
there would be schools in the absence of conservancies, but stressed that “they would 
be struggling schools” (I 48). In addition to committee members, school children also 
seem to be more aware of who is responsible for assistance, especially within their 
own school environment. Discussions with students at Mbitin, Olesere and Endoinyo 
e Rinka schools suggested that they are also comparatively more positive about the 
conservancies and wildlife than their parents’ and grandparents’ generations. As part 
of these participatory sessions, students were asked to draw something that they 
associate with the conservancies. The majority of students drew wildlife and tourists 
(see figure 4.4) but some students drew projects that conservancy-affiliated 
organisations have been involved in (see figure 4.5). This highlights comprehension 











Figure 4.4. Selima Kumum. Class 7 student at Endoinyo e Rinka Primary School 




Tourism partner Gerard Beaton (I 21) noted that the conservancies’ involvement in 
projects is leading to “more of a planned approach” to development, although he 
recognised that this can still be improved upon. As another respondent described: “At 
present each conservancy has their own organisation and then the camps have their 
own pet projects too and they don’t talk to each other” (anon 13). One benefit of 
organisations closely linked to businesses, such as tourism camps being involved in 
development, is that they are long-term players – because the investment is also 
long-term (I 31). In contrast, more conventional NGOs and development 
organisations have short perspectives due to working on 2-4 year budgets and 
strategies (ibid). This has led to many coming and going in the Mara over the years 
(ibid).60 Alan Earnshaw, the chairman of KWT, explained that many NGOs are 
selecting to work through the conservancy-affiliated organisations because some 
other organisations have good websites and publicity but do not actually do anything 
                                                
60 This will be expanded upon in chapter eight. 
Figure 4.5. Sarah Fimer, Class 6 Student at Endoinyo e Rinka Primary School 




on the ground (I 47). In his opinion, OOMT can be trusted as they are a constant 
presence (ibid). Because of time constraints, camps within the conservancies are also 
keen to work with these organisations rather than trying to do it themselves (I 21). 
Sonne (2010) concluded that Elmina requires the accountability that such 
organisations bring in order to increase the potential development impact from 
tourism, including that from travellers’ philanthropy.  
Another outcome of the conservancy-affiliated organisations being permanently 
present, active and visible on the ground is that they are more approachable to 
communities. Nathalie Leen of KCT believes that one reason that conservancy-
affiliated organisations are so heavily involved in development is local demand (I 
71). Community members openly acknowledged: “when we have a problem, or we 
want help, we go and cry for help at a camp then they come here” (FG 5). 
Respondents indicated that these organisations specifically are approached because 
“white people” are perceived to do a better job as they are thought to be 
“trustworthy”, “efficient” and “clever” (FG 8, 9; anon 2, 10). In comparison, “before 
the conservancies we were relying on the local authorities” (I 87). Now “for us 
people who are near the conservancies we are benefiting because people in the other 
areas are still waiting for the government to come and help” (I 79). FG 8 added: “We 
have seen that the people in the camps and conservancies are now the people near us 
and so they are the people who we can approach to do these things for us”. 
In October 2012, BCFK and one of their major donors, Stromme Foundation, visited 
Olesere School to open a new teachers’ house that they had co-funded. In the 
preceding months, governmental support to buy food for student lunches ceased in 
the run up to the election. Instead of complaining to the government department who 
had suddenly stopped the payments, the head teacher used the official opening 
speech as an opportunity to ask BCFK for help. Similarly, at the opening of the new 
IT room at Loigero School, the head teacher used his thank you speech to appeal to 
OOMT as the school was in desperate need of water. Both of these cases show that 
once a donor becomes affiliated with an area, opportunities for future assistance are 
enhanced. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) explained that this, rather than a conscious decision, 
is the reason why BCFK’s projects are focused in Olesere village: 
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The first project was the water project and while we were doing [that]… they 
[the donors] would ask, what is the health situation? Where do people go to 
hospital? And that is how the fundraising happened. So it wasn’t a conscious 
decision to focus on this one area, much more than actually doing one project 
and that led to the others. 
Community members also place expectations on conservancies, especially regarding 
the provision of water sources for livestock. This is largely because sources used 
previously are now inside conservancies, restricting access (FG 1, 2; I 84, 85). In 
addition, as the work of conservancy-affiliated organisations is used in marketing the 
conservancies and their camps, tourists’ expectations are raised. This adds to the 
conservancies’ responsibility towards community development (I 36). 
As well as community and client demands and expectations, there are several other 
factors that motivate the conservancy stakeholders to exceed the degree of 
involvement in development usually associated with tourism ventures. One factor is 
the nature of the conservancy structure, which – because of the nature of land tenure 
– has a partnership between landowners and tourism partners at its core. Whilst it is 
only the conservancy landowners who sign agreements with the conservancies, the 
cooperation of local communities more broadly is essential for the conservancies’ 
success. FG 22 explained: 
The conservancy is using our land for a business and so that is why they are 
helping us. They cannot reward [pay] everyone and so they have to do 
something that can help the whole community through a project such as 
school, hospital or water project. 
OMC assistant manager James Kaigil (I 8) proposed that this is especially important 
considering human-wildlife conflicts. Discontent amongst neighbouring communities 
could easily cause the collapse of the conservancy concept (ibid). Put another way, 
“conservancies are not so much threatened and troubled by what is going on inside 
them, as what is going on outside” (I 31). In order to ensure the sustainability of the 
conservancies and their affiliated businesses, community satisfaction is essential.  
Gerard Beaton recognised that conservancy tourism partners have a responsibility 
and a financial obligation to assist with community development if the conservancies 
are to be sustainable (I 21). He elaborated: 
I just think that it is a responsibility if you go into an area like this, this is not a 
private conservancy, it is owned by 500 heads of family which probably leads to 
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probably 5000 people. They are all sitting on the edge of this conservancy so I think 
that there is a primary responsibility that we address their needs and we develop 
together. You can’t develop a world class conservancy and then on the edge have 
poverty and chaos. You have got to develop and be in harmony otherwise the 15 
years will be up and they will all pile in here and take over this place (ibid).  
At present Gerard thinks that tourism partners are focused on tourism needs and there 
is only a small focus on the community. Yet he noted “it has gone from 0 to 10% and 
it will keep increasing as more people realise the threat of not getting it right” (ibid).  
Two focus groups with men in Mbitin and Endoinyo e Rinka took a more critical 
view of the motivations of conservancy-affiliated organisations. FG 14 said that they 
believe some camps are philanthropic in an effort to get a good name for themselves 
and improve their businesses. FG 18 concurred and expanded this notion: 
The conservancy also does this [work on projects] so that they can advertise 
themselves to get more tourists, when they do a project here they take 
pictures that they take back to their country so that they can get more people 
to come. 
While projects are certainly used in advertising for the conservancies, as well as 
specific camps, community projects are also an attempt to distribute benefits back to 
local people. The aim of this is to assist with development whilst simultaneously 
improving perceptions of the conservancies and the wildlife on which they depend. 
The aim is to achieve statements like the following made by FG 1: 
One change in this area is the coming of the conservancies which we like 
very much because they have brought a lot of help which we have received 
and accepted like schools, water, and hospitals and so we support them a lot. 
As will be discussed at length in chapter eight, it is proposed that the actions of 
conservancies and their affiliated organisations go beyond that of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), especially with regard to community projects. Being involved 
in community development is an integral part of the business model as it is necessary 
to ensure the success and longevity of the business. Another difference is the power 
dynamics involved. In contrast to the one-sided nature of CSR, because of the 
structure and agreements in place, conservancy landowners and neighbouring 
communities have a degree of power and are thus able to make demands of the 
conservancies.  
An underlying question here is whether the motivation behind assistance in 
community development matters? Conservancy stakeholders may undertake 
124 
 
community projects because it is in their business interest in order to incentivise 
positive perceptions amongst communities or attract clients; yet it is suggested that 
this does not matter so long as the output is beneficial. The nature of outputs and 
outcomes resulting from conservancy-affiliated organisation’s projects will be the 
focus of the following chapter. As noted, development actors being linked to 
businesses can be beneficial in terms of active presence on the ground and long-term 
commitments to the area. Looking at the bigger picture, Lars Lindkvist proposed 
“there is no deed that is not selfish” (I 31). He elaborated: 
I don’t think that it [community assistance by BCFK and other actors] is 
selfless. I think that even altruism is not selfless... The Florence Nightingales 
of this world and so forth are all wonderful people but they just have a 
different set of drivers that we sometimes mistake for being selfless (ibid). 
4.8 Discussion - Koiyaki Development Actor Matrix  
The actors involved in community development within the study site are perceived to 
differ from those involved elsewhere in Maasailand and Kenya. Despite the majority 
of communities stating that the main responsibility of development should lie with 
the government and elected political leaders, they are not perceived to be living up to 
this. Religious organisations are also seen to be comparatively absent, and 
communities are taking a relatively passive role in development. This apparent 
‘absence’ of traditional development actors is extremely noteworthy. Within this 
context, alternative actors are currently involving themselves in developing Koiyaki, 
especially those affiliated with the conservancies. There is no simple explanation for 
the present development actor matrix in the Mara. Many factors, including those of a 
geographical, historical, political and cultural nature, are likely to be influential. The 
motivations behind development actor’s actions are also of critical importance to 
understand. Finally, it is suggested that the neoliberal model upon which the 
conservancies are based may be altering the dynamic of those who are involving 
themselves in development, as well as the power dynamic between actors.  
Informants suggested a myriad of reasons for low levels of engagement by the state, 
religious organisations and the community within the Mara. Regarding the state, 
reasons included the Mara being forgotten due to its distance from Nairobi, low 
population density and difficulties in working with nomadic communities. In the 
Mara, the presence of the church remains small. This is perhaps partly due to 
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residents being egoistic, as suggested by Paul Murero, and historically, missionaries 
did not enter Maasailand to the same extent as elsewhere in Kenya. This low 
engagement by the state and the church has contributed towards the continuation of 
low education levels. This in turn curtails effective leadership, representation and 
allocation of resources. Local residents have not been widely exposed to 
developments occurring elsewhere. This is combined with low levels of support for 
formal education and a perceived “lack of ability” is resulting in the relatively minor 
involvement of communities in development initiatives. The same issues may have 
influenced the low expectations that are placed on elected representatives and 
community leaders, which have allowed them to neglect the area and “reallocate” 
resources. Although it is encouraging to see conservancy landowner committees 
initiating their own development initiatives, these organisations currently have 
insufficient accountability and transparency to ensure that money is not 
misappropriated. In the Mara, there is also a degree of expectation that assistance is 
to be given by those involved in conservation or tourism fields as an exchange for 
access to natural resources and wildlife. These factors make the Maasai Mara a 
challenging place to work in development.  
The Maasai Mara is not an area of greatest need globally or nationally. The World 
Economic Outlook Database for 2011 (International Monetary Fund, 2011) ranks 
Kenya’s GDP as 11th out of 52 in Africa. Within Kenya, poverty rates in Narok 
District are amongst the lowest in the country, with the district ranked 63/69 poorest 
by the Kenyan Government’s open data resource (Government of Kenya, 2005-6). 
This relative lack of poverty, combined with aforementioned difficulties associated 
with working in development in the Mara, suggests that external actors have specific 
reasons for choosing to work in this region. This is vital to acknowledge because, as 
discussed in chapter two, motivation dictates whose needs are prioritised (Butcher, 
2011). Motivating factors are a desire to have a closer relationship with donations in 
the case of tourists, and conservation plus the sustainability of businesses for 
conservancy-affiliated organisations. These differing motivations and expectations 
produce a very complex set of power dynamics. They also influence which aspects of 
development are prioritised and which approaches are chosen. Although no 
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development actor is without their own stimulus, motivations behind the main 
development actors are vital to recognise and acknowledge.  
Although it is an area that is often neglected in studies of tourism’s developmental 
impact (Wiebe, 2011), philanthropic tourists are increasingly becoming major actors 
within the study site. Philanthropically-motivated individuals make emotional 
connections with people and places (discussed further by Lacey et al., 2012), and are 
drawn to donate in order to tackle issues seen first-hand. Surpassing tourists, the 
most prominent development actors at present are perceived to be conservancy-
affiliated organisations.61 As discussed in chapter two, conservancies have duel 
objectives in that they seek win-win outcomes for both conservation and 
development (Muradian et al., 2010; Bedelian, 2014). Yet this does not acknowledge 
the multiple complexities which results in projects having to make hard decisions 
and trade-offs (McShane et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014: 16), or the extent to which 
these trade-offs or approaches taken differ when undertaken by traditional 
development actors or those motivated by conservation – or business – objectives.  
Although community-based conservation involves linking conservation objectives to 
development needs (Adams and Hulme, 2001), there is little credible empirical 
evidence that solutions to meet the joint goals have been met (Hulme and Murphree, 
2001; Adams et al., 2004; Ferraro, 2011). Chapter five will examine this in more 
detail by assessing some of the community development projects undertaken by 
conservancy-affiliated organisations. Chapter eight will also continue this line of 
questioning by examining business motivations for involvement in development.  
The key difference between this case study of the Mara conservancies and 
conservation or tourism initiatives that are not perceived to assist development is the 
inherent need for conservancies to win and maintain community support. This is 
essential for their business product because of the privatised nature of land tenure 
and the resultant conservancy structure. Due to the neoliberalisation of nature 
emphasis has shifted towards what nature should mean for communities (Buscher 
and Dressler, 2012: 368), in other words what benefits they can get from it. One 
                                                
61 It is important to note that these organisations also get a significant amount of funding directly 
through tourists.  
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benefit stream initiated by the conservancies as a way of appeasing and working 
together with neighbouring Maasai people are community projects. This is the source 
of communities’ expectation for development assistance from conservation and 
tourism organisations. 
The neoliberal nature of the conservancies inevitably means that new actors will be 
introduced. With regard to conservation, Holmes (2012: 192) notes that the 
introduction of new actors in environmental governance changes the consideration of 
who is responsible for conserving biodiversity, with less responsibility for the state 
and more for private individuals and civil society. This ‘private indirect government’ 
(Mbembe, 2001) refers to the decentralisation and fragmentation of sovereignty (Igoe 
and Brockington, 2007: 439). Ferguson (1994) found that state involvement in 
development intervention in Lesotho expanded the extent and reach of “bureaucratic 
state power”. In contrast, the relatively minimal role of the state in development 
initiatives in the study site potentially represents a reduction in state power, 
sovereignty and legitimacy. This mirrors that seen within neoliberal conservation. As 
conservancy-affiliated organisations are now largely perceived to be the main 
development actors, the power brought by this involvement in development 
interventions – discussed by Ferguson – is ultimately being handed to private 
entities. This could be described as the privatisation of development and will be 
discussed further in chapter eight.  
Prior to the creation of the conservancies, communities were reliant on the state for 
assistance; to attain this, people felt they had to beg politicians (I 87). As a result, 
some political leaders now see conservancies as competition because “they can’t win 
people’s minds like they used to. Before they were the only people who could help 
but now others can and so they have lost some power” (ibid). Yet there are no signs 
that the state is reacting to this. Debra Kaigil (I 37) and Grace Naisenya (I 62) both 
suggested that, because of contributions made by these other actors, there is now less 
pressure on the state to assist these areas. FG 26 thought that this is why the 
government does not interfere with the conservancies. Sometimes government 
agencies even support initiatives undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations 
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as it lightens their load and enables them to concentrate on other issues and in other 
areas (I 24, 48).  
Saying that conservancy-affiliated actors have replaced the state, the church, and the 
community as the main development actors does not tell the full story. While tourism 
actors may have surpassed the previous levels of support given by these actors, 
making them look relatively smaller, levels of assistance from the state and the 
community may actually be higher now in real terms. This is because they are often 
pushed to match contributions made by conservancy-affiliated organisations.  
Community members do not seem concerned as to who brings development 
assistance. Whilst questioning focus group participants as to who they think should 
be responsible, a common answer was “anyone who is willing” (FG 9, 13, 27). There 
is a notion within communities that once an “outsider”62 has seen the problems, they 
then have a responsibility to act upon this. When FG 12 mentioned that they would 
really like a water project and school closer to them in Enooronkon, I asked whose 
responsibility this is. They replied that it was now the responsibility of my research 
assistant and myself because “now that you are the ones who have seen that we don’t 
have these things, you should be the ones to bring this to us” (ibid). Similarly, 
another group explained that the government was not meeting their responsibility 
regarding meeting the needs of the communities “because they do not know that 
there are people who have these problems here” (FG 24). While a lack of personal 
interaction is considered an excuse for the state’s minimal involvement, direct 
contact with those “in need” compels tourists and those linked to the conservancies 
to assist. As FG 17 explained, people working with the conservancies “are here in 
this area, come and see the state of the schools and so decide to help”.  
Once stakeholders are seen to be assisting communities, expectations quickly 
develop and increase. This can lead to an “addiction” (I 36), “over-reliance” or 
“degree of dependency” (I 31) by communities on tourism donors to be the support 
crutch for community development. The anticipation of tourists giving direct “hand-
outs” can also provoke begging and stir up rivalry and jealousy within communities, 
                                                




as discussed by Cravatte and Chabloz (2008) in relation to Burkina Faso. 
Dependence on tourism would also be problematic if the conservancies and their 
affiliates ever withdrew from the area. Also, if expectations increase with each 
initiative undertaken, these may soon spiral beyond available capabilities and 
resources leading to disappointment and discontent within communities. This would 
directly oppose the aims and motivations of involvement. Similarly, there are 
currently no agreements regarding what is within and beyond the responsibility of 
each development actor, both regarding the type of initiative and the geographical 
scope. 
To date, there is no integrated management plan for the Mara area and there is no 
unified approach to development (I 69), even between conservancy-affiliated 
organisations (I 21). Insufficient communication and collaboration between the 
multiple development actors can lead to the unnecessary duplication of projects, 
reduces their efficiency and effectiveness and enables communities to play 
organisations off against each other. When the pump at Olesere borehole stopped 
working, the community first approached BCFK, with whom they had jointly funded 
the project (anon 10). They were told the amount that they would have to contribute 
for the repairs; the community then turned to OOMT to see what deal they would 
offer (ibid). In addition, the lack of a comprehensive Mara-wide development 
organisation prevents large big international NGOs from putting money into the area, 
even though the willingness is there (I 69). It is hoped that the development of 
Maasai Mara Wildlife Conservancies Association (MMWCA) at the end of the 
research period may go some way to address this problem. The disjuncture between 
projects having successful outputs and outcomes will now be the focus of chapter 












5 Conservancy-Affiliated Organisations’ Projects  
This chapter will use examples of community projects undertaken by conservancy-
affiliated organisations within the study site to highlight that a successful output does 
not necessarily lead to a successful outcome. Chapter four found that communities 
currently perceive these organisations to be the main development actors within the 
study site. This short chapter will highlight that the effectiveness of their initiatives 
can be improved and will explore possible reasons for the current disconnect. This 
builds upon findings in chapter four; that actors within the study site differ from 
those traditionally involved in development work and as such they also have 
different motivations. Analysis in this chapter will address the question highlighted 
in the literature framework regarding the extent to which the shift towards alternative 
actors in development, especially those with simultaneous conservation objectives, 
influences development outcomes. It will also discuss the potential ‘conservation 
backfires’ (Langholz, 1999) that refer to income generated through conservation 
activities being used in a way that threatens biodiversity (Kiss, 2004). 
If positive outcomes are not achieved, community projects may be more beneficial as 
marketing for the tourism industry than for neighbouring Maasai communities. This 
chapter contributes towards the second research question: “What is the perceived 
relationship between the conservancies and development? Following on from chapter 
four, this chapter will focus in further on the three sub-points of this research 
question:  
a) (How) are the conservancies impacting upon development?  
b) Why are they doing this?  
c) Does this affect society evenly 
Conservancy-affiliated organisations have a higher active presence on the ground 
and a closer relationship with communities than other development actors which 
generally results in a higher success rate for projects. But the length of the research 
period enabled a deep analysis, breaking through surface appearances. Issues were 
uncovered with some of the initiatives undertaken by conservancy-affiliated 
organisations, finding that successful outputs did not necessarily leading to 
successful outcomes. Three ways in which projects appeared successful on the 
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surface by achieving their output but not meeting their potential outcome, will be 
analysed. These are: the use of income earned through conservancy schemes; focus 
on building infrastructure projects that do not necessary meet expectations and are 
rarely well maintained; and the greatest needs of communities not being met.  
5.1 Increasing Incomes   
Female research participants largely praised the role of women’s groups. This was 
both the creation of women’s groups by an outreach worker who is funded jointly by 
OOMT and BCFK, and the CMMF scheme undertaken in these groups that is 
supported by Stromme Foundation through BCFK. Consultancy work done for 
BCFK in August-September 2012 involved undertaking a baseline survey for this 
CMMF project and producing a report (Courtney, 2012). This found that income 
earned through this scheme is not being used in the ways anticipated. At the time of 
the survey, 24 CMMF groups had been formed with a total membership of 574 
women from seven villages within and immediately bordering the study site.  
A comparison between groups that had been established for over six months and 
those newly created suggested that the scheme has increased the income that women 
contribute to the household by an average of 55%. In real values this equates to KES 
2175 ($25) per month. Whilst it cannot be proven that this difference is the result of 
the CMMF project, it is very indicative. This growth in income is likely to increase 
further with time as the groups develop. For example, Mwirigi (2010) found that 
women involved in the microfinance scheme initiated by Lewa Conservancy in 
Northern Kenya multiplied their income by a factor of four. Surprisingly, further 
comparative analysis of the baseline study data in the Mara between the established 
and the newer groups suggested that this increased income was not increasing 
household expenditure.  
According to the founder of BCFK (I 56), the aim and hope of the CMMF scheme is 
that additional income earned by women will reduce poverty within their households, 
and improve the social and economic status of women. Yet the data from this survey 
indicates that this additional income was being used to reduce the deficit between 
expenditure and household cash income (principally from employment and 
conservancy lease payments). This household deficit was largely cancelled out 
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through livestock sales. With the introduction of this additional income provided by 
the women, fewer livestock needed to be sold to balance out the deficit. In other 
words, instead of increasing expenditure on food, school fees, or improving living 
conditions as hoped, income generated through the CMMF scheme reduces the 
number of livestock that need to be sold each month to meet the same household 
needs. This subsequently increases livestock numbers. Whilst this can be seen as 
increased financial security and household resources, it is not leading to the 
fulfilment of the aims of projects, or the needs and desires of the women involved, as 
will be discussed shortly. Increasing livestock numbers also has environmental 
implications within the constraints of the ecosystem. This will be examined in 
chapter six.  
Whilst in some cases women indicated that they are giving this money directly to 
their husbands, because this is what the church teaches them to do (FG 19), this was 
not always the case. In other instances, women were using their income to buy their 
usual items at the market each week without asking their husbands for money, as 
they would have done previously (FG 6). A possible reason for this is that one of the 
CMMF facilitators advocated that the aim of the project is to reach a point whereby 
“the Maasai lady can help herself, with or without the husband. She can be able to 
take care of the kids and pay school fees and clothe the kids” (I 37). 
Although this finding may seem disappointing, the hard work of setting up the 
groups and increasing their income (i.e. “the output”) has been successful. Many 
other studies of tourism impact (including Harrison, 2001; Rutten, 2004; Mbaria, 
2007; Saarinen et al., 2011; Osano et al., 2013) only assess the amount of money 
earned and do not go on to look at the impact that this money has upon the 
household. It is often presumed that increased income has the expected outcomes, 
without specifically investigating this – as I did in this baseline study. If this study 
had followed this trend, all income-generating schemes would have been labelled a 
success. It is through a deeper analysis that a disjuncture was found. If a successful 
outcome – reducing household poverty and increasing the social and economic status 
of women – is to be achieved, further education with the women is required. For 
example, a simultaneous education programme could highlight options for the 
134 
 
women with regard to how this money could be spent to improve their lives, and the 
lives of their children and families. In the study site, options for spending or 
investing money are currently very limited. 
Following the creation of a beadwork project in the summer of 2013 by OOMT, 
during a short return visit to the field site I talked to some women in Olesere about 
how they are spending this new-found income. The most popular answer was buying 
sheep, although the women recognised that, if they all bought sheep every time they 
earn some money, it will become increasingly problematic as “it is already difficult 
to find grass for these animals” (FG 29). I then asked them on what they would really 
like to spend their money. Responses included buying solar lanterns and solar phone 
chargers, water tanks and alternatives to firewood for cooking. The reason stated was 
that these items would make the work of women a lot easier (ibid). They explained 
that they are not spending their money on these items at present for two reasons. 
Firstly, they said that saving money is a foreign concept to the Maasai (many of these 
ladies are not in a CMMF group) and so it is difficult to buy expensive items as “we 
always spend whatever money we have in our pockets” (ibid). Secondly, these items 
are not widely available to buy in the Mara, and those that are available are very 
expensive (ibid). Living in Koiyaki I found prices to be significantly higher than in 
Nairobi or Narok, largely because of transport expenses. If the transport of such 
items could be subsidised and buyers permitted to pay in instalments, positive 
outputs (income generation) could become positive outcomes (socio-economic 
advancement). Giving women autonomy over their own money does not come 
without difficulties. It is not in line with Maasai culture whereby men have the sole 
ability to own such possessions and make financial decisions (I 95). As a result, 
“some men accuse her [the outreach worker who runs the women’s groups] of not 
being a good lady and teaching their wives bad ways” (I 85). 
The CMMF scheme and beadwork project are just two examples of income sources 
generated from conservancies. They are used here to represent the broader issue of 
how money earned through conservancy-affiliated schemes is utilised. Research 
participants indicated that in many instances all cash income sources, including 
rental income and employment, are used to reduce the number of livestock needing 
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to be sold, rather than increasing expenditure.63 This is an example of what Langholz 
(1999) termed ‘conservation backfires’. Just as Homewood (2002) reported that 
tourism earnings in the Mara were reinvested in large-scale cultivation, recipients of 
money earned as a result of the conservancies are using it to reduce the number of 
livestock they need to sell which increases herd sizes. This in turn threatens the 
biodiversity through which the money was earned (Kiss, 2004). This issue will be 
examined in more detail in chapter six. 
It could be argued that influencing spending is beyond the remit or responsibility of 
those creating income-earning opportunities, including the conservancies or their 
affiliated organisations. When questioned about this, Dickson Kaelo (I 48) responded 
that he believes these organisations should build capacity for the local people to 
manage the money themselves. Similarly, Lars Lindkvist suggested that, while it 
cannot be the entire responsibility of the organisation involved, “we can showcase 
some ways of doing it” (I 31). Regarding land lease payments he raised a concern 
that:  
If they [landowners] are just paid rent and left it could actually be quite 
disastrous in terms of the amount of cash that is actually introduced into these, 
not long ago, cashless communities (ibid). 
There is a wide array of literature on the geographic, gendered and social inequality 
of incomes earned through tourism enterprises (Lee and Seyoung, 1998; Tosun et al., 
2003; Thrane, 2008). As discussed, there is also a body of literature on money earned 
through conservation being used in ways that threatens biodiversity (Langholz, 1999; 
Murombedzi, 1999; Homewood, 2002; Kiss, 2004; Bedelian, 2014). Yet there is 
minimal literature discussing the process involved in ensuring that money earned 
through conservation or tourism initiatives has a positive impact upon standards of 
living, and whose responsibility this is. In light of this, the case study provided here 
raises some interesting questions to be considered regarding incomes earned through 
tourism initiatives.  
                                                
63 The economic impact of the conservancies upon development will be the focus of chapter seven. 
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5.2 Infrastructure and Maintenance      
The construction of buildings, such as school classrooms and clinics, is one of the 
main forms of development that communities request. As noted in chapter three, 
during discussions with male focus group participants regarding developments they 
would like to see in their communities in the coming five years, answers centred 
around physical changes in houses, infrastructure and the addition of new facilities 
(FG 1, 8, 14, 22). Although women agreed with their male counterparts about the 
need for these, some women also highlighted the importance of capacity building, 
such as the women’s groups (FG 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 17, 25). A focus on capacity 
building and training within the women’s groups may be partially responsible for this 
gender differentiation. Women also stressed the need for trained personnel within 
buildings constructed as they recognised that infrastructure alone is insufficient to be 
of benefit (ibid).  
Women in Mbitin referred to a local clinic as being “like a picture” because it is just 
something that you can see with your eyes rather than being of any help (FG 15). 
When my neighbour (Kijoolu Soit) began having difficulties, when nine months 
pregnant, I took her to a new clinic built with the financial assistance of tourists and a 
conservancy-affiliated organisation. There was only a community health worker 
present and due to a lack of midwifery training, this individual was unable to tell 
whether Kijoolu was in labour or not. She then had to endure an agonising 90 minute 
journey along very rough roads to Talek Clinic for a consultation with a nurse. I 
discussed this issue with her a few days later, following the birth of her healthy baby 
girl. She acknowledged that the new clinic is still growing, but expressed 
disappointment (I 50). She said that a building shell is of little use to the community 
if they do not have any trained staff or the necessary equipment (ibid). Kijoolu went 
on to suggest that, instead of spending money on building clinics, perhaps vehicles 
could be bought to transport patients to existing hospitals that have better resources 
and trained nurses (ibid). At present, to hire a car for a return trip to the clinic that 
she visited costs KES 8000 ($92) (ibid). She thought that people would be happy to 
pay towards the use of such a vehicle as it would be cheaper than hiring a private car, 
as they do now (ibid). 
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Improved transport linkages64 across the Mara could also reduce the need to build 
small, inefficient schools in each village. Whilst water sources and nursery schools 
are needed in all settled areas, the concentration of resources for schools in certain 
areas could enable the creation of some good quality facilities. With a thawing in 
general opinions of education, some community members are starting to prioritise 
the quality of schools over proximity. Women in FG 25 in Osilale explained that, 
even though a new school has been built very near to where they live, “once the 
children are old enough they walk past this school to Talek which can take up to two 
hours [5km] because it is a better school”. If transport either in the form of bicycles 
or vehicles was available, this would reduce the proliferation of poorer quality 
schools.  
Focus group participants always stated that they wanted schools, clinics and 
boreholes closer to their homes. However, breaking this down and discussing what 
they want more specifically, they agreed that they actually desired better access to 
education, health care and clean water. Communities explained that they state that 
they want these facilities because that is how they have seen these needs previously 
being met, but stressed that they are open to other delivery routes so long as their 
needs are met. 
Reasons for development organisations focusing on providing infrastructure are that 
it is easily quantifiable to donors, it is impressive in pictures, and it can be branded. 
The Kenyan government’s open data resource exemplifies this need for quantifiable 
results (Government of Kenya, 2005-6). This database assesses the level of health 
care provided in each district by counting the number of clinics, regardless of the 
condition of the clinic or services provided (ibid). The construction of infrastructure 
is another example whereby projects can look successful from the surface, but waver 
under closer examination. It was only because I was living in the communities and 
tried to access these facilities that the underlying problems beyond the actual 
building construction became apparent.  
                                                
64 In the form of community transport vehicles combined with infrastructure such as bridges over 
seasonal streams and placing marram (gravel) on tracks crossing black cotton soil. 
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Chapter three disclosed the interesting finding that those in the NGO sector did not 
include the construction of infrastructure projects in their definition of development, 
despite these organisations commonly undertaking such. As with all NGOs, they 
must please their donors but conservancy-affiliated organisations must also focus on 
the environment and livestock to satisfy the conservancy managers and the tourism 
industry. In addition, these organisations must appease the communities and meet 
their expectations. This complex set of motivations and expectations may point 
towards why conservancy-affiliated organisations continue to undertake 
infrastructure projects despite it differing from their own stated understandings of 
development. Tourism partner Garry Cullen (I 15) explained: “schools, dispensaries 
and water are issues of great interest to the community and we need to address that”. 
This is a cyclical process as the conservancy-affiliated organisations are undertaking 
initiatives that they expect will meet the desires of the local communities. 
Simultaneously, these community members are moulding their interpretations of 
development based on “good things that we have seen” (FG 1, 3, 11, 15). 
This situation raises an interesting question as to whether this pattern of providing 
communities with what they say they want (infrastructure) rather than what they 
mean (better health care, education etc.) is the result of conservation affiliated 
organisations not being ‘expert’ or ‘traditional’ development actors. One could argue 
that organisations or agencies that solely focus on development work and undertake 
this all day, everyday, would have come across this issue before and subsequently 
would prevent it from happening. The example of how the Kenyan government 
assesses the level of health care, based on the number of clinics, places doubt on this 
hypothesis, however, it is one that is worth raising. Another contributing factor is 
that conservancy-affiliated organisations will always consider the environmental 
implications of projects to a degree that other development actors may not. For 
example, when I suggested improving transport links across the Mara rather than 
providing inefficient resources in each centre one of the tourism partners (anon 17) 
countered that they did not want to see an increase in traffic around or across 
conservancies. While no participant stated that infrastructure projects were being 
developed to reduce transport in this way, it may – to some degree – be an 
unconscious thought for those actors who are simultaneously trying to achieve 
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conservation objectives through a more environmentally sustainable approach to 
community development. 
Another major problem in the study site with infrastructure projects, once completed, 
is a lack of maintenance. Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010: 16) suggest that this 
is widespread across the continent, with one third of Africa’s infrastructure assets in 
need of rehabilitation. In the Mara it seems to be especially problematic for water 
projects due to their need for frequent maintenance. For example, during my 
19months living in Olesere village the borehole there, constructed by BCFK, only 
worked for 3 weeks. Communities are told from day one that, once the project is up 
and running, day-to-day maintenance of the project will be their responsibility. But 
an expectation on other people to undertake maintenance remains. In Endoinyo e 
Rinka, Dig Deep worked closely with the community from the project’s conception 
to create a water committee and develop plans to ensure sustainability. To create a 
maintenance fund, the committee decided to collect monthly usage fees from 
families using the project. Despite this, once Dig Deep left, these payments were not 
made. When the turbine needed its annual maintenance, there was no money in the 
fund to pay for this (PC Anna Banyard). As donor organisations do not want failed 
projects on their books, they are often coerced into coming back to these 
communities to help. During the research period, this was seen with the water 
projects in Olesere, Endoinyo e Rinka and Olkuroto. If donors do not return, projects 
collapse, as with the Ilera cattle troughs in Olesere. Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 
(2010: 16) believe that funding for maintenance is often not forthcoming because 
recipients believe that if they wait donor funding could be obtained for 
reconstruction or repair. This is in line with the findings from the study site.  
Reasons for communities not taking care of projects once complete, suggested by 
research participants, included a lack of ownership due to community members not 
putting enough equity in (I 76). However, for the vast majority of projects examined 
throughout the research period, community contributions were relatively high. One 
underlying issue is that despite agreeing to these contributions, communities 
sometimes seek other funders to cover this, such as other NGOs or politicians (I 2). 
Organisations responsible for these projects were also criticised for not incorporating 
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running and maintenance costs into budgets (I 76). Yet in all projects that were 
overseen, this was given real consideration with plans being put in place to ensure 
financial sustainability. The main problem has been that, once supporting 
organisations leave, the communities have not kept to the plans that they participated 
in developing. This means that despite ownership theoretically having been passed to 
the relevant community, responsibility is not being taken for maintenance.  
Dickson Kaelo (I 48) believes that while this problem of maintenance is faced across 
the whole of Kenya, it is particularly problematic in the Mara because of Maasai 
culture. He explained that it is not in the nature of Maasai communities to repair 
community projects. This is because they are “communal in sharing their resources 
but individualistic in their own activities and so it [coming together to do or repair a 
project] is something that doesn’t work very well in their culture” (ibid). Another 
contributing factor with water projects in the Mara is that the conservancy-affiliated 
organisations have been trying to use modern renewable energy systems that increase 
costs because they require more maintenance (such as wind turbines) or are 
frequently stolen (like solar panels). Using generators instead is not practical due to 
the continual fuel expenses, as Mpuaai community have found (I 37). Going back to 
basics with hand pumps – which local people could be trained to maintain 
themselves – may be an option. This is another example of the trade-offs made as a 
result of trying to combine conservation and development objectives (McShane et al., 
2011; Bedelian, 2014: 16). Following the maintenance issues in Endoinyo e Rinka, 
Dig Deep are now looking into alternatives to boreholes to increase and improve 
water access in the Mara such as rain water catchment, shallow wells and dams (PC 
Anna Banyard and Ben Skelton). This concurs with a recommendation made by 
Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010: 16) that a lack of willingness to maintain 
infrastructure projects should be taken into account in the design of projects by 
choosing low-maintenance technologies. 
5.3 Satisfying Needs      
Although conservancy-affiliated organisations generally have a greater collaboration 
and participation with communities than other development organisations, there are 
still instances where projects do not address the greatest needs of the area. Examples 
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of this include: the distribution of solar panels amongst schools; the provision of IT 
equipment; and the spatial distribution of community outreach. 
Olesere School is a day school65 bordering Naboisho Conservancy. A client from Ol 
Seki Camp donated their first solar panel. When asked, the head teacher revealed that 
this was only used to charge the teachers’ phones and light one classroom for 
security at night-time (I 12). Then, as part of their Green Village Initiative, BCFK in 
February 2013 donated a 1000 watt solar system to the school. In an interview with 
the chairman of the school board shortly after receiving this system, he said that the 
school does not know what to do with all of this power. He explained: “It is so big 
and we don’t have boarding here… they just came and said we have it” (I 85). Given 
that this solar power is not deemed to be necessary, or wanted, he was unhappy that 
the community had to pay to build a battery room for the system (ibid). This 
chairman was re-interviewed six months later and the issue of the solar power was 
raised again to see if it had now found a use; for example by linking it up to the 
nearby clinic. He responded that in the intervening six months, BCFK had brought 
another solar system for the clinic, and that shortly after this the government 
delivered two more solar systems – one for the school and one for the clinic (I 94). 
In sharp contrast to the situation in Olesere, is Loigero School, near Olare Orok 
Conservancy. This school has 80 boarding students but no power (I 51). In February 
2012, OOMT donated a computer lab to the school, together with its own solar 
system to power the computers. Although it was appreciated and used, this computer 
lab did not satisfy the greatest needs of the school: water and power (ibid). In order 
to satisfy the latter, the school tapped the electricity from the computer lab to power 
lights in the boarding students’ dining room (anon 14). This meant that the children 
did not have to eat in the dark (ibid).  
BCFK and OOMT both concentrate their efforts on schools that border their 
affiliated conservancies. As one former BCFK employee said: “All the NGOs that 
are here are fighting over their patch and their right for influence and that doesn’t 
always best serve the communities around here” (anon 15). Whereas the greatest 
                                                




need for power was at Loigero School, this is not where solar power systems were 
donated. Conversely, a computer lab at Olesere School could have utilised their 
plentiful power supply. The need for conservation-affiliated benefits or development 
work to be located geographically close to the conservation initiative is a common 
trait amongst organisations in the Mara. This is so that the link with the source of the 
benefit can be emphasised. Despite this, it does not serve the best purpose of 
communities.   
As this thesis is submitted, there are on-going discussions between development 
actors and tourism partners within the study site regarding the creation of one trust to 
bring together all community development work within and around the Mara 
Conservancies. If all of these conservancy-affiliated organisations could join together 
as one trust and pool their resources, situations like that affecting Loigero and 
Olesere schools could be prevented. Although in some instances donations are made 
because specific items have been given to organisations to pass on, the greatest needs 
from the ground must be listened to and acted upon if successful outcomes are to be 
achieved. 
Unfortunately, it is not as easy as simply asking the local people what their greatest 
needs are. As previously discussed, communities often state that they want a specific 
project rather than highlighting a need to be addressed. In addition, some individuals 
within communities want to use donations for their own benefit, or that of their 
friends and family. For example, a camp manager told me about her attempt to assist 
a local school (anon 18). She asked the head teacher what the greatest need in the 
school was, and he replied that they were in need of more teachers. Knowing that 
there are few well trained teachers in the school, she was pleased by this response 
and said that they would happily employ a new teacher. She told the head teacher 
that she would like to be part of the interview process to ensure that the money was 
spent on employing a well-qualified individual, but he replied that this was not 
necessary as he already had CVs and knew whom he would like to employ. The 
camp manager asked to see the CV for this person and found that they did not have 
any teaching qualifications or experience but happened to be a friend of the head 
teacher. Disappointed and frustrated at the lack of desire to make the most of the 
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offer to fund a fully qualified teacher in favour of benefiting his friend, the camp 
manager retracted the offer. 
One final example of the greatest needs not being met is the spatial distribution of the 
conservancies’ outreach scheme. This focuses on women’s groups and school 
wildlife clubs. An analysis of areas covered by these initiatives highlighted that they 
focus upon bigger centres. This is understandable as it is easier to start women’s 
groups in places like Talek and Endoinyo e Rinka. In these areas, women are more 
organised, willing and aware of what the CMMF concept is trying to achieve. 
Similarly, it is easier to work in more formalised schools that are more welcoming of 
extra-curricular activities. It is also likely that these areas would produce the greatest 
quantifiable results when the schemes’ impacts are assessed.  
Mbitin, Nkirgir, Osilale and Olkuroto are the least developed in terms of community 
facilities and education levels are the lowest within the study site. Yet the outreach 
schemes do not include these villages. Focus group sessions also suggested that these 
same areas are the most negative about the conservancies and wildlife more 
generally, often due to human-wildlife conflicts. In November 2011, a lion killed a 
schoolboy from Mbitin School near his home. Teachers at the same school have been 
injured by buffalo and another lion. Consequently, the teachers and pupils have 
openly negative perceptions of wildlife, yet this is one of the few schools in which 
the outreach scheme does not run a wildlife club. It is not known if the negative 
perceptions are a cause or consequence of the lack of outreach work. Similarly, 
ladies from Nkirgir and Olkuroto revealed that an outreach worker came to their area 
to set up women’s groups but then left and did not return (FG 17, 21). In Nkirgir this 
was because a grandfather gave the outreach worker a hard time regarding the land 
that they were meeting on (FG 17; CP 13). Instead of finding somewhere else to 
meet she never returned (ibid). Now the women only see her driving past on her way 
to work with other communities (ibid). Such areas are undeniably more challenging 
to work in, but these villages have the greatest need and are where outreach work 
could have the greatest impacts. 
Although, as noted, the direction of causation is not known, if the negativity towards 
the conservancies and wildlife in these locations is a consequence of the lack of 
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engagement by conservancy-affiliated organisations it would strongly insinuate that 
their involvement in other communities have made them more positive. An 
important, unknown, issue is whether perceptions within these communtiies are 
likely to revert if incentives reduce or cease (Pretty and Smith, 2004). 
5.4 Implications: The Importance of Positive Outcomes  
Although successful outputs are being achieved, successful outcomes are being 
hindered by conservancy-affiliated organisations not: adequately carrying out 
capacity building alongside income generation schemes; looking beyond easily 
quantifiable projects such as infrastructure; or working together to apply practical 
sustainable solutions to address the greatest needs. These findings would not have 
been uncovered if it were not for the length of the research period, the ethnographic 
methods adopted or the fact that I chose to live within a community in the study site 
and experience day-to-day village life.  
The majority of other studies assessing conservancy impacts in the Mara (Osano et 
al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014) have only looked at the surface findings such as the 
amount of money generated, the number of infrastructure projects built and the 
provision of items such as solar panels and outreach support. This is the first study in 
the Mara to have probed development aspects further to investigate what this money 
is used for, how infrastructure projects are staffed and maintained, and whether 
current actions are meeting the greatest needs of communities. The findings within 
this chapter highlights that a closer examination is essential in order to probe how the 
communities perceive such development interventions as they are able to see beyond 
initial impressions given to researchers and donors who are just passing through. To 
ensure that development projects are truly appreciated by community members and 
the intended outcomes are satisfied, this level of analysis is essential.  
The first point highlighted in this chapter, that earnings emanating from the 
conservancies are being used to reduce the number of livestock being sold, and thus 
increasing herd sizes bordering the conservancies is a critical one. This is an example 
of a conservation backfire and it is especially problematic when conservancy-
affiliated organisations are involved given that they have both conservation and 
development objectives. Given this dualistic approach, such organisations inevitably 
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have to face difficult decisions and trade-offs with regard to development 
interventions. This was highlighted in the infrastructure projects section. As a result 
of this conflict it was questioned as to whether such organisations are suited to 
undertaking development interventions. Although conservancy-affiliated 
organisations are not solely devoted to development, and may not have as much 
experience as more traditional actors, for those in favour of sustainable development, 
one could argue that they are the best placed. Without due consideration for the 
environment, any development has the potential to hinder both current and future 
generations.  
One challenge with these organisations taking a lead in implementing development 
initiatives, however, is their limited geographical scope. As each conservancy-
affiliated organisation wants to benefit those living near it, largely so that they can 
associate the benefit with their conservancy, the greatest needs of the communities 
are not being met. What was highlighted in the final section of this third point, which 
assessed the spatial distribution of outreach schemes, is an indication that actions 
undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations do work in improving 
perceptions of the conservancies, conservation and wildlife. Whilst this is only 
inferred at this stage, and is not conclusive, it is an encouraging sign for these 
organisations.  
Regardless of cause, the result of the current disconnect between successful outputs 
and successful outcomes means that community projects may become more 
beneficial for the camps and conservancies, who use them for advertising and 
marketing, than the communities themselves. If conservancy-affiliated organisations 
are to support community development initiatives in an attempt to improve 
perceptions of the nature and wildlife upon which the businesses66 within the 
conservancies depend, it is vital that positive outputs lead to positive outcomes. If 
they do not, communities will get frustrated and attempts will back-fire, making 
people more negative about the conservancies and wildlife more generally. If the 
successful outputs can be transformed into successful outcomes then the appreciation 
of benefits received by community members will increase. This would address one of 
                                                
66 Businesses engaging in development work in response to various motivations will be explored 
further in chapter eight. 
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the greatest threats to initiatives such as conservancies, as discussed in chapter two. 
For this to be achieved, greater unity and collaboration between actors, as well as 
with all demographics within all communities, is essential. The current levels of 
community engagement and participation will be critically analysed in section 7.3. 
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6 Pastoralism        
The dominant livelihood of residents within the study site is pastoralism. Livestock 
keeping is deeply ingrained in these communities: 
As Maasai people, we cannot live without our livestock. If you come back in 
10 years, things may have changed, but we will still be here, on our land, with 
our livestock and the wild animals. Cattle and the Maasai are one (FG 20). 
At the most basic level, livestock provide food security for pastoralists such as the 
Maasai and are central to their social and cultural lives. In the Mara, livestock also 
form a living bank account and have an important role in development through the 
provision of capital for investment (Nyariki et al., 2009: 163). FG 22 unintentionally 
stressed this role of cattle in financial security by using the Maa word for cows, 
inkishu, to discuss money instead of the usual nouns, impesai or iropiani.  
Pastoralism refers to the “extensive production of herbivorous livestock using 
pasture or browse in which herd mobility is a central management strategy” 
(Notenbaert et al., 2012: 2). Homewood (2008: 1) notes that popular conceptions of 
pastoralism have focused on ‘pure’ pastoralists who live a nomadic or transhumant 
existence, subsisting entirely on the produce of their herds. She elaborates that it has 
become increasingly clear that such pastoralists are the exception rather than the rule 
(ibid). In a broader sense, Homewood (ibid: 250) states:  
African pastoralists emerge as constituting a loose, permeable, highly diverse 
category that embraces people from a wide spectrum of ethnic groups, 
ecologies and economies, engaged in an enormous range of livestock-related 
occupations.  
The nature of pastoralism is also changing temporally. The rapid transformation of 
land tenure into small parcels, each with an individual title deed, over the last 15 
years has been a major and fundamental change throughout the Mara area and is 
having major impacts on both land use and land values (Thompson et al., 2002; 
Thompson, 2002; Thompson and Homewood, 2002; Homewood et al., 2004; 
Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008). The majority of residents now live on their individual 
plots and nomadic movements are increasingly restricted. 
As discussed in chapter two, perceptions that pastoralists and their livestock are 
harmful to the environment and not compatible with conservation remain entrenched 
within African governments. Research over the last thirty years has repeatedly 
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pointed to the efficacy of pastoralism, as well as its benefits for rangeland ecology if 
mobility can be assured (Behnke et al., 1993; Notenbaert et al., 2012). As land in 
Koiyaki is subdivided and the population is rapidly increasing, how can pastoralism 
be incorporated into this system? Another question raised in the literature framework 
was whether access granted to traditional resource users, pastoralists and their 
livestock, within the conservancy system has changed since the research period of 
previous studies (including Snider, 2012; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014). This 
chapter will examine how and why changes in resource access are occurring, whether 
this is enjoyed evenly within society, and the impact that this has had upon 
community perceptions of the model. This boils down to the need for benefits to 
outweigh costs.  
As such, this chapter will systematically examine how the conservancies are thought 
to be affecting this livelihood. This incorporates perceived direct impacts such as 
access to resources and human-wildlife conflicts as well as more indirect changes to 
the composition of livestock holdings within the study site. This is another point 
raised in the literature framework. Bedelian (2014) found that conservancies had not 
increased livestock numbers amongst its members and beneficiaries, but the finding 
in chapter five regarding how revenues earned from conservancy initiatives are spent 
calls for this to be re-examined. This chapter contributes towards the second research 
question, which focuses on perceptions of how the conservancies are impacting on 
development, why they are doing so and whether it affects society evenly. To begin, 
this chapter will discuss the continued dominance of pastoralism as a livelihood 
within the study site. 
Despite the importance of tourism in the Maasai Mara, livestock keeping remains the 
dominant livelihood. According to the BCFK CMMF baseline survey, 97.5% of 
households within the study site participate in livestock keeping, contributing on 
average 57.6% of household income (Courtney, 2012). Income is gained by selling 
livestock at local weekly markets through middlemen. Traders, through multiple 
onward sales, then take the livestock to the outskirts of Nairobi where they are 
slaughtered and the meat sold. Men in Mpuaai (FG 22) explained that, on average, 
each household sells one shoat every market day, meaning four are sold per month. 
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The monthly income from this, for the pastoralist, is approximately KES 20,000 
($230) (ibid). This cash revenue is used to cover household expenses and so the 
number of shoats needing to be sold depends on the size and demands of the family 
(ibid). Cows are sold when additional money is required, for example when school 
fees are due (FG 21).  
As previously discussed in chapter two, carrying capacities are a concept supported 
by those who believe that there is a limit to the quantity of livestock that can be 
sustained within a set area. Although recognising the importance of other ecological 
flux aspects such as rainfall, Maasai pastoralists state that they are increasingly 
acknowledging limitations regarding the number of livestock that can be sustained 
throughout the year on their allocated land. This has come about since the 
sedentisation of people and cessation of mobility through nomadism. Discussions 
with conservationists and range management researchers may also have influenced 
these perceptions. Prior to the introduction of the conservancies and their grazing 
schemes, Berger (1996) and Nyariki, Mwang’ombe et al. (2009) suggested that 
livestock were beginning to cause degradation in the Mara. During my research 
period, focus groups estimated that one cow (0.7 LU)67 can be supported on one acre 
of land. Dividing the current number of livestock on the unprotected community land 
within the study site gives a current LU/acre of 0.68 (36,688 LU within 54,225 acres 
of non-conservancy land). As this area includes land that is unsuitable for grazing, 
such as the Pardamat Hills, it is likely that the current density on suitable land will 
exceed the 0.7 LU/acre predicted by the landowners.  
As well as pastoralism remaining the dominant livelihood and income source for the 
residents within the study site, it also continues to be immensely important socio-
culturally. In line with the earlier quote from FG 20, when I asked the men in FG 18 
“what would you like your lives be like in the future?” the three responses were: 
- We should stay together with our livestock.  
- The life of the Maasai is staying with the wild animals and our land and 
so we need to stay being the Maasai, together with our cows. 
- We want development, we want to improve, but we want to stay Maasai.  
                                                
67 1 livestock unit (LU) is 250kg live weight of any domestic herbivore. Therefore 1 cow = 0.7 LU 
and shoats = 0.1 LU. 
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As these research participants indicated, although they want to stay Maasai – which 
to them means remaining with their livestock, land and wildlife – they also desire 
development, improvements and changes. Similarly, in local schools I asked the 
students to draw a picture of how they would like their life to be when they are 
grown up. We then discussed their pictures. The students usually drew a permanent 
house, a smaller family than is currently the average for the Maasai68 and sometimes 
a car. One consistent feature in these drawings was the presence of livestock 
enclosures. All children said that regardless of whether they have a job, they will 
always want to keep livestock at their home (see figure 6.1). This suggests that rather 
than replacing, alternative income sources will diversify and financially support 
pastoralism in the Mara (as suggested by Kiss, 2004; Stonza, 2007; Bedelian, 2014: 
25). 
 
Figure 6.1 My Future Home by Sawmei Nawisais STD 1 Mbitin School  
                                                
68 A shift is occurring in Maasai culture regarding family size. Elders of today on average have 3-4 
wives, younger men in their 30s have 2-3 wives and the youth are saying they only want 1-2 wives. It 
is likely that this change is largely the result of recognising the expenses involved in having a large 
family in an increasingly cash-driven society. 
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Having discussed the continued importance of pastoralism within the study site, 
positive and negative direct effects of the conservancies on the livelihood will now 
be discussed.  
6.1 Direct Affects of Conservancies on Pastoralism 
Stakeholders unanimously believe that the greatest direct impacts of the 
conservancies on pastoralism are their influence on resource access and human-
wildlife conflicts. Grassroots perceptions of these two aspects will now be analysed. 
It is important to remember that the research used to form this discussion was 
undertaken over 19 months. During this time there were many changes, especially 
regarding resource access. Therefore, perceptions at the beginning of the research 
period may not be identical to those, even from the same participants, at a later date.  
6.1.1 Resource Access 
To date the Mara Conservancies have been heavily criticised regarding the extent to 
which people and livestock are integrated into the model, as discussed in chapter 
two. At an ILRI workshop, Katherine Homewood (2012) argued that conservancies 
are detrimental to pastoralism because they restrict nomadic movements and access 
to resources for livestock. She also states in her written work that, although private 
conservancies deliver financial returns and conservation outcomes, they may 
“replace rather than sustain local livelihoods” (Homewood et al., 2009: 395).  
Specifically regarding the Mara Conservancies, Bedelian (2012: 13) agrees that: 
“tourism is in direct competition against other livelihood activities such as livestock 
production.” This is in direct contrast to Maasai youth stating that they will always 
keep livestock, regardless of future employment, as discussed above.  
These statements by Homewood and Bedelian reflect the status quo prior to, and at 
the beginning of, my research period. The conservancy rental agreements signed by 
conservancy landowners state that no grazing is permitted within leased areas. When 
fieldwork began in August 2011, grazing within conservancies was very limited; 
livestock were generally only permitted to graze in the conservancies during 
droughts or when desired by conservancy management. Beyond this, herders grazed 
illegally at night, which increased the likelihood of predator attacks. At this time, the 
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conservancies were largely exclusionary and more in line with fortress conservation 
ideals. 
Towards the beginning of the research period, ladies in Nkirgir (FG 17) stated: “the 
only disadvantage of the conservancy is that our cows can’t graze there”. They 
expanded: 
Cows aren’t allowed to graze inside even when there is a lot of grass. It is 
your land and your cows are dying. They are only allowed to go in when it’s 
open for 4 weeks during the low season when the conservancy is closed.69 
The rest of the time when we’re not allowed in, we have to graze illegally at 
night. When it is open it helps and benefits the cows but when it’s closed, 
what benefit does it bring to them (ibid)? 
Men in Mbitin/Nkirgir (FG 14) suggested “it would be better if the conservancies 
weren’t there so that we could graze our cows freely like before”. A tourism partner 
acknowledged: 
Traditional ways are definitely being restricted; they [the herders] can’t just 
go and graze where they traditionally did. And I think to a certain extent this 
is the fault of the conservancy but also it’s also due to the whole change in 
land ownership (I 21). 
Bedelian (2014: 220) agrees that criticisms of conservancies restricting access and 
settlement is “closely integrated and mixed up” with land subdivision. I asked the 
men in Mbitin/Nkirgir (FG 14) to what extent they thought the changes in resource 
access were the result of the conservancies, or the change in land ownership more 
generally. They responded that without the conservancies, they would have ignored 
land subdivision with regard to grazing (ibid). This statement, however, presumes 
that all landowners are willing to continue grazing communally, which allows those 
with large herds to utilise the resources owned by the less wealthy. The rapid 
proliferation of fencing in the Mara contests this (see figure 6.2).  
                                                




Figure 6.2 Newly constructed fence around an individual’s plot in Olesere. Photo: N. Mogensen 
Several focus groups (including 3, 10, 14, 27) complained that in addition to the 
restrictions imposed on grazing, conservancies prevent access to natural salt licks 
and water points. Again, it is difficult to determine the extent to which this would 
have occurred anyway following land individualisation, independently of the 
conservancies’ presence, as these occurred simultaneously. The idea that resources 
now belong to individuals is proliferating rapidly. For example, when I was building 
my house, I collected water from a dirty spring for smearing the walls. This quickly 
resulted in debates within the community regarding whose land the spring was on 
and who was able to charge me for using this dirty water. Similarly there has been a 
recent spurt in blocking roads for tolls to charge vehicles for passing over private 
land. These examples highlight the realisation by some individuals that the resources 
on their land are not communal any more. Therefore, even without the presence of 
the conservancies, those who are ‘lucky’ enough to have springs and salt licks on 
their land may have restricted access.  
During the research period, a more comprehensive approach to livestock grazing was 
introduced by the conservancies within the study site. This decision was made by the 
conservancies in an attempt to prevent illegal night-grazing in favour of a more 
organised and manageable approach (I 5, 76, 81). There were also strong demands by 
local communities to make grazing access more comprehensive. As James Kaigil, 
assistant manager of OMC, said: “one way [for the conservancies] to acknowledge 
the importance of livestock to us Maasai, and to support us, is to have balanced and 
controlled grazing in subsections [of the conservancies]” (I 8). FG 14 argued that 
unless wildlife is contained within the conservancies, livestock grazing inside the 
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protected areas should be allowed. This is because wildlife comes and eats the grass 
on their land, especially at night (ibid). Tourism partners did not want cattle in 
conservancies, they had to be persuaded to allow some level of grazing (Bedelian, 
2014: 226). Dickson Kaelo believes that this change in practice is evidence that 
landowners have a say in the running of the conservancies. He expanded: 
If we allowed the decisions to be made 100% by one tourism operator it is 
very likely that they would come in and fence it and no cattle could come in. 
But because they go to meetings and they see the reaction of the community 
representatives when they say no grazing, perhaps it makes them say this 
can’t fly so let’s accept it in a way (I 48).  
As well as gradually recognising the importance of pastoralism for the surrounding 
communities, Dickson (ibid) believes that the tourism partners were more open to 
this change because of a growing awareness of the potential benefits of grazing for 
both the flora and fauna (Homewood and Rogers, 1991; Notenbaert et al. 2012), 
something that has long been recognised by the conservancy managers (Bedelian, 
2014: 226). He partially accredits this change to ILRI’s work in the area, in addition 
to reports that have now been read widely that suggest some level of grazing might 
be beneficial for the environment (I 48). Consequently, the change in grazing policy 
is a combination of the intrinsic need for the conservancy management and tourism 
partners to keep the local communities onside, and recognition that doing so could 
also be beneficial for the tourism product – if well managed. Finding this balance is 
not an easy task for conservancy managers. It involves constantly “walking a fine 
tightrope attempting to look after the interests of both tourism partners and 
landowners” (I 81). This balance of interests represents the trade-offs and hard 
decisions that need to be made when targeting both conservation and development 
objectives (McShane et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014: 16). 
Grazing in conservancies is widespread. In 2009/2010, Bedelian (2014: 226) found 
that 87% of households in Koiyaki graze in conservancies. Of this, 46% took their 
livestock to conservancies to graze regularly/daily, 47% in dry times and 7% 
occasionally/seasonally (ibid). Since this study, undertaken at the inception of 
conservancies in Koiyaki, the percentage of households using the conservancies, and 
the regularity of this use, is likely to have increased. The management of Olare Orok 
and Motorogi Conservancies falls under the same body (Ol Purkel Ltd) and so they 
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follow the same grazing scheme. This differs from Naboisho Conservancy whose 
management is contracted to Seiya Ltd.  
Rob O’Meara (I 81), the manager of OMC, explained the two ways in which grazing 
access is usually granted:  
If the management decide that the grass has become too long they will call in 
the cows, and if there is a drought, the communities come to request 
additional access.  
He added that grazing can also be used to dissuade elephants from approaching the 
borders of the conservancies where they are likely to conflict with the local people 
(ibid). This is because if cattle eat the grass in these areas before it becomes too long, 
it is less likely to attract elephants (ibid). During open grazing in OMC, the livestock 
from different communities are all pushed together in one small area (ibid). Rob 
estimated that in 2013, areas of the conservancy will be open for 10-11 months as 
opposed to 9 months in 2012 and 8-9 months in 2011. Access is increasing as the 
grass root base is now recovering from the overgrazing prior to the conservancy’s 
presence and so now some areas are being opened for the first time in three years 
(ibid, I 101). Also, increasing pressures for grazing in community areas have fuelled 
both night-grazing and demands for the conservancies to open larger areas for longer 
(I 101).  
Emma and Darren Geary (I77) believe that there is a general agreement amongst 
camp managers that the introduction of a more formal grazing plan in 2012 is 
increasing the extent of access permitted. On the whole, camp managers in OMC are 
very happy with the management of the controlled grazing, especially with regard to 
the regular emails that they receive clarifying the areas open for grazing so that the 
guides can be advised of locations to avoid (I 83). Two camp managers (I 77, 82) 
mentioned that there is still a problem with night-grazing as cow bells are sometimes 
heard from the camp during the night. One camp manager (I 82) was under the 
impression that day-grazing was only open to conservancy landowners and so night 
grazers are non-conservancy members ‘stealing’ the grass. The conservancy manager 
and assistant manager independently insisted that day-grazing access in OMC is not 
exclusively for conservancy landowners (I 8, 81). According to the Motorogi liaison 
officer (I 87): 
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We allow everyone to graze, [conservancy] landowners and non-
[conservancy] landowners. [Conservancy] landowners are guaranteed access 
and although the non-[conservancy] landowners are not guaranteed, so far we 
have not had to experience it [excluding them]. When the resource is 
available we’re happy to share. This reflects back to our [Maasai] culture.  
Bedelian’s study concurs with this as she found that conservancy members and non-
members equally reported grazing in a conservancy (2014: 227). This equal 
treatment is especially important considering that those whose whole plot is inside 
the conservancies are not able to live on it, and so they often reside and graze on land 
owned by non-conservancy members. It would therefore create a great deal of 
tension if they were to benefit exclusively from grazing rights inside the 
conservancies. 
Countering Rob’s description, some other stakeholders believe that the grazing 
periods in OMC are very short. One new camp manager said that he liked the grazing 
in OMC because it is open for a maximum of one week, a small area is grazed and 
then it is closed again (I 83). Similarly, men in neighbouring Mpuaai village (FG 22) 
claimed that the conservancy only opens for grazing for two weeks. In Olkuroto 
village, which is sandwiched between the three conservancies, there was a heated 
debate in FG 20 about how often grazing is permitted. This inconsistency in 
responses, even merely within Olkuroto, suggests that there is general confusion 
regarding the extent of grazing access currently permitted within OMC. Conservancy 
management originally tried to organise grazing through a central conservancy 
landowner committee but this became very political. Within the Mara, grazing access 
is a form of political currency. Committee members tried to manipulate and 
personally allocate grazing rights so as to expand their political power (I 101).  
Of OMC’s 292 landowners, the manager estimates that 75 % do not have livestock in 
the immediate area (I 81). This would suggest that the grazing is largely enjoyed by 
the neighbouring non-conservancy members. However, Rob went on to clarify that a 
few of the key influential landowners own the majority of the livestock brought in to 
graze (ibid). He estimates that four cattle barons70 own 75% of the cows that come 
into OMC, as they each own between 2500 and 4000. It is these barons who have 
                                                
70 This term is widely used by conservancy managers to describe those who own many cattle. They 
are often also politically well-connected.  
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been using their influence in the conservancy committees to ensure that the grazing 
schemes benefit themselves (ibid). If decisions did not go their way, this would 
create a political backlash (ibid).  
In an attempt to keep the conservancies as apolitical as possible, instead of making 
grazing decisions at a central point, grazing committees were set up in neighbouring 
villages. These committees now negotiate directly with the conservancy management 
for access on behalf of their area (ibid). In addition, if someone breaks conservancy 
regulations, for example grazes illegally or kills wildlife, it is then the responsibility 
of the community to reprimand the individual or they will risk losing their grazing 
access (ibid). This was an attempt to encourage responsibility at the village level 
(ibid). The chairman of OOMT (I 75) hopes that through such measures, peer 
pressure may introduce a more equal, fairer system that benefits the majority whilst 
marginalising the cattle barons. However, inclusion in these committees does not 
recognise the heterogeneity of society. Although the grazing committees were not 
intended to be formed exclusively of conservancy landowners, in reality the majority 
are (I 101).   
As the majority of landowners do not graze in the conservancy, Rob O’Meara 
predicts that in the future they may demand a grazing fee (I 81). This would be a fee 
per head for livestock to come and graze in the conservancy and would need to be 
hand-in-hand with livestock improvement programs (ibid). This is because people 
would be more willing to pay a fee to access a high-quality grass bank71 for fewer, 
high-quality cattle. Rob O’Meara and Dickson Kaelo were two of the first voices 
stressing the need for a broader, more holistic approach to land management in 
Koiyaki, extending beyond the conservancies. Bedelian (2014: 247) agrees that 
conservancies need better, well thought out, grazing plans and greater integration of 
livestock into conservancies and the wider landscape. She believes that such 
measures would increase landowners’ interests to continue participating in 
conservancies (ibid: 248). 
                                                
71 A grass bank is the high volume of long grass that develops when mass grazing has been restricted 
in an area for a period of time.  
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Communities that border OMC are closer to the national reserve where a blind eye is 
often turned to illegal grazing, especially during dry times. FG 22 explained that 
herders are able to go there for weeks without being fined, whereas in OMC, herders 
entering illegally are caught every time. Butt, Shortridge et al. (2009) and Butt 
(2011) suggest that the creation of the conservancies may have increased night-
grazing within the national reserve. Whilst, for those living close to the reserve, 
grazing there represents a less risky option when conservancy grazing is closed, 
when the conservancies are open for grazing they may actually take some pressure 
off the reserve. Grazing in the reserve is also not a viable option for the majority of 
villages bordering Naboisho because of the greater distances involved. In comparison 
to OMC, Naboisho has developed a more formal grazing scheme as part of the 
conservancy’s master plan. 
Initially when the conservancy was created, no cattle were allowed into Naboisho, 
but this created a very intense conflict with the surrounding communities (I 76). 
Rangers had to police the area in 24-hour shifts to prevent illegal night-grazing 
(ibid). Seeing that grass was exhausted on the community land, the conservancy 
manager decided to be proactive. His thinking was:  
It is better to do it in a controlled manner rather than having them all sneaking 
in… as if they want to come in we do not have the capacity to stop them. We 
just need to control it as much as possible (I 5).  
When the rains came in 2012, Justin Heath, the conservancy manager, began to 
create grass banks (I 76). Working together with Dickson Kaelo, trials then started 
with the Nkoilale community, experimenting with rotational grazing (ibid). As in 
OMC, Naboisho’s grazing scheme attempts to balance the role that livestock can 
play in rangeland management, community pleas for greater access and concerns 
from the tourism partners regarding the extent to which this will affect their 
‘exclusive’ product (ibid). Naboisho’s scheme allocates areas to each of the five 
bordering communities for rotational grazing (ibid). All the cattle from one village 
graze in a small allocated zone until the grass becomes very short, and then they 
move onto their next zone (ibid). The intention is to provide year-round grazing for 
each village and the zoning takes into account seasonal changes in tourism, with 
grazing concentrated around the camps and central tourism areas during the low 
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season when most camps are closed (ibid). This tries to combat the prior situation 
whereby herders would move further and further into the conservancy during dry 
times, inevitably leading to conflicts as they approach the centre during the camps’ 
high season (I 48). Although this approach minimises the disturbance to tourists, 
some conservationists complain that the location of sensitive animals, such as lion 
cubs, is not sufficiently taken into account through this zoning method, compared to 
the more informal approach adopted by OMC (I 80). This related to Bedelian’s 
(2014: 128) criticism that grazing plans crafted by technical managers have few 
options for input or adaptability. Dickson Kaelo honestly admitted that the 
conservancies are still learning how to balance the trade-offs with conservation:  
There is a general agreement that some degree of grazing should happen but I 
think people want to see it more controlled and I do not think that we are yet 
there… no-one yet has a good plan on how you can fit livestock into a 
conservancy without affecting wildlife (I 48). 
This transition represents a shift from debating whether pastoralism should be 
included, to how it should be done.  
As with OMC, there was still a degree of misunderstanding about the grazing 
regulations among those who were not included in Naboisho’s village grazing 
committees, especially women. For example, some women in Enooronkon (FG 10) 
thought that when conservancy grazing was open, grazing was only allowed at night, 
and for just one week. This has never been the case. There was also a general 
incomprehension as to why cattle are restricted to specific small areas. It was 
difficult for some herders to understand why they had to stay on one side of the road 
where the grass was shorter, when there was tall grass on the other side in the next 
zone (FG 14; I 31). Understanding of the scheme within the communities involved 
improved gradually during the research period, perhaps as a result of the numerous 
community meetings held between the management and grazing committees in each 
village. Nkoilale was the first area to get to grips with the scheme and then other 
committees were taken to talk to them, to see how it was working in practice (I 5).  
One interviewee (I 64) involved in both Naboisho and Motorogi Conservancies 
explained some of the similarities and differences between their grazing schemes: 
The rotational grazing that Naboisho is doing is very good as it brings the 
local people together and it helps them realise the benefits [of conservancies]. 
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If the conservancy can also use grazing to cut the grass it can help them too. 
At Olare Orok and Motorogi the local people think the things aren’t going the 
way they want, for example with the rotational grazing. In terms of 
management there is not a big difference but Naboisho is big so people can 
do the rotational grazing at the same time, all the time.  Sometimes it 
interferes with the tourism partners though. The local people [who border 
OMC] look at what is happening in Naboisho and compare it to OOC and 
they’re not happy. At the moment in OOC they are only allowed in at certain 
times and only into small areas. People need to be educated and sit down and 
find the best way that will not interfere with the TPs [tourism partners] and 
will assist local people. All of the conservancies are trying to do this. 
Nelson Kirrokor pointed out in this quote that one of the key causes for the 
difference in grazing policies between the conservancies was size. Naboisho 
comprises 50,000 acres, whereas OMC has a combined area of 35,000 acres. Further, 
there are large parts of Naboisho Conservancy, estimated at 50%, which are currently 
under 100% unofficial grazing and are not at all managed (I 48). Naboisho’s 
manager blames this on a lack of resources and manpower (I 76). As OMC is smaller 
and has been established longer, management have a more comprehensive control of 
the area, and thus appear stricter with regard to grazing access. Tourism partner 
Gerard Beaton elaborated: 
OOC has a slightly different approach [to Naboisho], a slightly more 
conformed way of grazing in one place, and controlling and knowing where 
everything is. Whereas here [in Naboisho] you have 3, 2 or 4 zones that are 
grazed and it is harder to supervise. And so it is trial and error and if it works 
fine, and if it doesn’t we have to change it until it does work (I 31).  
One similarity between the conservancies’ grazing schemes is that they all impose 
fines on those whose cattle are caught grazing outside of the prescribed times or 
areas. The penalties imposed by the two management bodies vary slightly. In 
Naboisho the fine is 5000 shillings ($57) per herd with 50% going to rangers who 
make the arrest and 50% to a fund in ManCO who chooses how to utilise this (I 76). 
Recently some of this fine money was used to build a more permanent ranger base 
and the next batch will go towards a community project (ibid). In addition to fines, as 
in OMC, the grazing ‘privilege’ can be withdrawn if a community is deemed to be 
acting inappropriately. For example, when a lioness was killed and a community 
bordering Naboisho were thought to be withholding information, they were 
threatened with exclusion from the grazing scheme unless they assisted the 
management.   
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For OMC the fine is also KES 5000 ($57) per herd for the first four occasions within 
12 months, and then it increases to KES 10,000 ($110) (I 81). The fine is increased to 
30,000 ($340) if violence is threatened, and communities can be banned from 
grazing altogether if they do not cooperate (ibid). In order to ensure that fines in 
OMC are paid, 5-10 cows are held until payment is received. For conservancy 
landowners, non-payment within 3 days results in it being deducted from their rental 
income (ibid). Fines in OMC are not shared with the rangers who make the arrests 
because the conservancy manager believes: “it is part of their job and as soon as you 
put a price on what the rangers get, there is a price above which herders can bribe” 
(ibid). Instead they have a monthly performance prize that is won by a team of 
rangers, rather than individuals (ibid). This encourages the rangers to push each other 
as the reward can be up to KES 5000 ($57) per person (ibid). At present, the money 
taken in fines from OMC is used to cover management expenses but the conservancy 
manager would like to see it as an income in a stand-alone initiative that could 
support cattle improvement schemes (ibid).  
I asked the conservancy managers if rangers found it difficult to fine their own 
friends and relatives. They both agreed that it was a problem (I 76, 81). In Naboisho 
they try to ensure that rangers are not based near to their home village and they are 
overseen by wardens who are from other areas of Maasailand (I 76). In OMC they 
try to combat this ‘cattle blindness’ through the incentive to win the team reward (I 
81). An elder in Endoinyo e Rinka mentioned that he does not think that the policing 
of herders is problematic for local people because “it is their [the rangers’] 
employment and so if they have to arrest you it’s your fault because you took your 
cows into the conservancy” (CP 16). 
After the more comprehensive grazing plan had been implemented in Naboisho, I 
asked a community leader why people were still getting fined even though there is 
now always grazing available for the community. His response was: 
The rangers have not been helping people to know where the open area is, 
they would just name it or put out sticks. Recently they have been taking 
people in the car and showing us and so now people know where the areas 
are. Now I don’t think that people will get fined if they know the areas, it will 
be better (I 85). 
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This lack of assistance on the part of the rangers may have been an attempt to 
continue receiving their half of the fine payment.  In addition to this, some owners 
suggested that herders were to blame for accruing fines. Men in FG 22 blamed 
children for the fines, as they are unable to prevent the livestock going into the 
conservancy when cows and shoats are drawn towards the longer grass. To overcome 
this problem, a man in FG 6 explained: 
[The conservancy] is good for grazing during the open grazing period and for 
this time I employ herdsmen to take the cattle. The rest of the time I would 
herd them myself so that I could ensure that they don’t ever go in the 
conservancy illegally so that we don’t have to pay the fines. A herdsman 
doesn’t care about this because he doesn’t have to pay the fines.  
One point of discontent within the communities is that “if you only have a few cows 
you still have to pay the fine of 5000” (FG 25). This favours those who have many 
cattle. At times these big cattle barons just come in and happily pay the fine, 
considering it to be a grazing charge (I 28). The largest complaint by far with regard 
to fines is that if you are caught many times in a month the fines can become greater 
than the rental income paid to conservancy landowners (FG 1, 8, 14, 21, 22; I 85).72  
As such, the cost of the presence of the conservancy is higher than the benefit. This 
was the main justification for those who said that they would prefer that the 
conservancies were not there (FG 1, 8, 14, 21, 22).  
Men in FG 22 did not think that it was stated in their lease agreement that their cows 
could be caught and fined when grazing. They thought that the conservancy 
management were unsympathetic and “have hatred to the local people and their 
cows”. As a result they said that they will give OMC six months to see what happens 
and “will then decide what to do about the conservancy” (ibid). This emphasises the 
critical nature and importance of the grazing scheme in determining community 
perceptions of conservancies. If local communities are not happy with the grazing 
access, even if this is just the result of misunderstandings and incomprehension, this 
could lead to the demise of the conservancies, their conservation efforts and their 
associated businesses.  
                                                
72 In total, fines equate to 1.9% of rental payments in Naboisho and 3% in OMC. This will be 
discussed further in the economic analysis at the end of chapter seven. However, this is not to say that 
individual landowners’ fines may exceed their personal rental income.  
163 
 
As a result of this brewing discontent around OMC, especially regarding grazing 
access, the conservancy manager and assistant manager were fired in August 2014, 
after the research period had finished. Neighbouring pastoralists can push the 
conservancies for access because, if thousands of livestock invade the conservancy 
the management openly admit that they will not be able control this (I 76). Camp 
managers (I 6) who previously worked at Shompole Conservancy near Lake Magadi 
in Southern Kenya have seen this happen before: 
If the conservancy doesn’t work well with the communities they will just take 
their land back when a drought comes… and the tourism partners will only 
take cattle being around the camps for so long before the whole thing 
collapses. 
Johanna and Patrick’s prophecy came true. In 2011 the camp at Shompole was 
forced to close due to a conflict with the neighbouring communities (The Safari and 
Conservation Co., 2011) and in 2014 it was burnt down (The Star, 2014). 
As the restrictions imposed on pastoralists and their livestock are the main source of 
criticisms of conservancies (see Homewood et al., 2009; Bedelian, 2012; Snider, 
2012), the establishment of more comprehensive grazing plans is a very significant 
development. From the community perspective, when I asked each focus group to 
rank the best things about the conservancies, the creation of grass banks that can then 
be accessed for grazing (see figure 6.3) was most frequently named number one.  
This was especially true of the communities that border conservancies. Endoinyo e 
Rinka, which is further away from access to conservancy grass, was the only 
Figure 6.3 "The best thing about the conservancy - my cows grazing inside" 
Photo: Nkaate Koya (CP 6) 
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community to rank projects and rental income higher than grazing. It was also 
observed that communities around Naboisho Conservancy were more positive than 
those neighbouring OMC. Around Naboisho, this positivity increased throughout the 
research period as the more comprehensive grazing scheme was introduced and 
became more widely understood. 
There are several reasons why access to grass banks is valued so highly. Culturally, 
women in Olesere believe “the very good thing about the conservancies is the grass 
that we get because, to us, the cows are the most important thing. They are more 
important than money” (FG 4). For social reasons, women in FG 17, where only two 
out of eleven of their husbands owned land in a conservancy, thought that grazing 
was the best thing about the conservancy because it was inclusive. They explained: 
“for those who don’t have land in the conservancy they also get the benefit in the 
form of grazing – it helps everyone” (ibid). This is a significant point in the face of 
criticisms that conservancies may increase inequalities between members and non-
members (Osano et al., 2013).  
Grazing schemes also have economic benefits for pastoralists, both on a day-to-day 
basis and during droughts (I 79). Conservancies have the potential to increase income 
from livestock because “when cows get this grass they will be fat and will sell at a 
higher price” (FG 22). During the dry season at the end of 2012, Dickson Kaelo (I 
48) observed that the body conditions of the livestock in communities like Olesere 
that border and regularly graze in Naboisho were a lot healthier than those further 
away, for example in Endoinyo e Rinka. This dry season was part of the natural 
bimodal rain pattern in the Mara, but even at this time, the impacts of the 
conservancy grazing schemes were visible. The last severe drought in the Mara was 
in 2009. Although at this time Naboisho was still being developed, OOC was already 
established and so people have experienced the benefits that conservancies can bring 
during these difficult times. OMC assistant manager James Kaigil noted: 
Look at the real drought times like in 2009. If you look at the external 
communities in Olkinyei, Siena et cetera they lost a big majority of their 
cattle because they didn’t have any protection against the drought. But around 
the conservancies we didn’t lose a good number of cattle basically because of 
protected areas like here [the conservancy] where their livestock could graze. 
They make them survive until the rain time comes (I 8). 
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Bedelian (2014: 228) points out that in this 2009 drought, grazing rules in OOC were 
not relaxed as wildlife were dying and so the management remained strict, fining 
herders 220,000 ($2800) in three months. As a result of access for livestock 
becoming more comprehensive since 2012, there is a looming crisis for conservancy 
grazing schemes, namely how to satisfy the cattle all year round while leaving 
sufficient grass as a buffer in case the rains fail. In other words, “a big problem with 
the livestock issue is the unsustainable number that want to come into the 
conservancy and how you overcome that” (I 21). This would be compounded during 
a severe drought because “people will come from far [to graze] and there is no way 
to stop it from happening. From here to Amboseli there are no other grass banks” (I 
76). Having discussed resource access, attention will now turn to wildlife conflicts.  
6.1.2 Human-Wildlife Conflicts 
One of the conservation aims of the conservancies and their affiliated initiatives is to 
maintain, and ideally increase, wildlife numbers. When combined with an increasing 
concentration of homesteads on the borders of the conservancies, partially as a result 
of a desire to access conservancy grazing, it is likely that contact and conflict 
between wildlife and communities will increase. As well as specific conflicts, such 
as livestock predation, there is an ongoing debate between stakeholders regarding the 
effect of conservancies on people’s tolerance of wildlife.  
In some communities, participants indicated that the presence of conservancies has 
made people more tolerant of wildlife. FG 13 said:  
It is the responsibility of the people to look after the animals because we are 
now getting rent money from the conservancy and morally it would be 
wrong. Ever since the creation of the conservancy we do not kill wild 
animals. 
Noosokon Kaleku explained that there was now an understanding that the killing of 
wildlife would be punished: 
Before the conservancy was here, the owners would get mad when the cows 
were attacked and so would retaliate. But ever since the conservancy came 
we can’t do it anymore because we are afraid of getting caught (CP 7).  
Analysis of focus group transcripts suggested that perceptions of wildlife were higher 
in some villages, including Enooronkon, Nkoilale, Olesere and Endoinyo e Rinka, 
than others. There may be rationale behind this. The first three of these communities 
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are located on the border of Naboisho Conservancy and so each has designated 
grazing zones which they can now access year round. The latter three communities 
(Nkoilale, Olesere and Endoinyo e Rinka) have also, to date, received the majority of 
projects from conservancy-affiliated organisations. These four communities have 
also had more students through Koiyaki Guiding School than other villages (I 79). 
These individuals become “positive and influential role models for their own 
communities, especially when it comes to understanding the importance of wildlife” 
(I 80).  
In contrast, some other focus groups expressed very negative perceptions of wildlife. 
For some, tolerances had decreased since the creation of the conservancies. Non-
conservancy members who claimed that they were not getting direct economic 
benefits from the conservancies argued that they did not need to let wildlife onto 
their land, or sit back and endure the conflicts that they brought, whilst others 
received benefits from the presence of wildlife (FG 8, 14, 20, 24). In some areas, 
including Ng’amuriak, men who were too young to be allocated land anywhere have 
reportedly taken their frustration out on the wildlife by chasing ungulates such as 
giraffes on motorbikes and spearing them (I 5; FG 8).  In addition to the non-
conservancy members, there are several communities that are comparatively more 
negative towards wildlife in general, namely: Osilale, Eor Olkimaita, Mbitin, 
Nkirgir, Olkuroto and Mpuaai. The discussion in chapter five was inconclusive as to 
whether conservancy affiliated organisations are not working in these areas because 
they are more ‘difficult’ due to their negativity, or whether they are negative because 
of the lack of engagement. Further analysis of focus group transcripts strongly 
suggests that residents of these communities are more negative about conservancies, 
conservation and wildlife due to a belief that they are not benefiting sufficiently from 
the conservancies either in terms of rent, employment, community projects or 
grazing access. As previously noted, some conservancy landowners who receive rent 
also fall into this category if they believe they are paying more in fines than receiving 
in rent.  
This way of viewing nature as something that they should receive benefits from is a 
direct result of neoliberal conservation approaches (Büscher and Dressler, 2012). By 
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turning nature into a commodity, payments are expected in exchange for its ‘use’. As 
discussed in chapter two, Stem et al. (2003) report that even if benefits cause changes 
in what people do, there may be no change in people’s beliefs or conservation 
perspectives. The ultimate test of this is whether people revert back to previous ways 
if incentives reduce or cease (Pretty and Smith, 2004) or indeed whether 
conservation perspectives would decrease even further. 
Dissatisfaction regarding grazing access expressed by FG 14 resulted in threats being 
made to any wildlife coming onto their land, as well as the continuation of the 
conservancies more generally. They stated:  
We can only allow the conservancy to be there if the livestock are allowed to 
mix with wild animals. The tourists should understand this is how it has 
always been. If our cows cannot graze in the conservancy, we will stop the 
wildlife coming here onto our land.  
Believing that they received minimal benefits from the presence of the 
conservancies, these men were very frustrated by the continued presence of wildlife 
on their land, especially those that created conflicts with their livestock. MNLP’s 
manager (I 80) explained that since the creation of the conservancy, some people 
now believed that all wild animals should stay within the designated protected areas. 
For example, an hour before FG 28 in Eor Olkimaita, lions had attacked a cow whilst 
it was drinking at the nearby river. The women in the group stressed how bad this 
was because “the cow was on the side of the river that is our land, not the 
conservancy land” (FG 28). As they saw it, the lions should have known where the 
invisible conservancy borders were and not breach them. In terms of the neoliberal 
approach discussed above, this behaviour exemplifies community members 
recognising that they should get benefits from conservation, but believe that they are 
not. Inequality is also likely to be playing a role here, as community members see 
some of their neighbours benefiting to differing degrees to themselves, yet they all 
face conflicts with wildlife evenly. To address these low tolerance levels, MNLP’s 
manager believed: “we need the communities to recognise the benefits that they are 
getting from conservancies, especially the non-conservancy members” (I 80).  
Many of the communities that are less tolerant of wildlife openly admitted trying to 
kill any predator that attacked their livestock (FG 14, 15, 21, 24). Retaliation does 
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not always involve spearing. Over the last 10-15 years, pesticides have also been 
used to poison carcasses which predators then come and feed on (I 80). This can 
have far-reaching consequences as it can wipe out several individuals or an entire 
pride of lions (ibid). During the study period there were rumours of one poisoned 
sheep killing five leopards in the Pardamat Hills (anon 2). In addition, the 
carbofluran strain of pesticides is carried through the food chain (I 80). This means 
that any scavenger that feeds on a poisoned predator would also die through 
secondary poisoning, as would anything that then feeds on their carcass, and so on 
(ibid).  
Between June 2012 and June 2013, MNLP was only aware of three lions being killed 
by people around Naboisho Conservancy (MNLP, 2013). In comparison, 16 were 
known to have been killed in the preceding eight months when the project first 
started (ibid). When interviewed in March 2013, MNLP’s manager was hopeful that 
the combination of receiving benefits from the conservancies and MNLP’s 
community work may have reduced retaliatory killings (I 80). On the 4th June 2013 
one of the lionesses affixed with a GPS satellite collar ate a poisoned carcass and 
died, together with her three cubs (MNLP, 2013). This led to the realisation that 
many lions could have been killed, including this lionesses’ entire pride, in secret 
(ibid). It is only because of the collar that this poisoning was uncovered (ibid). 
Instead of conflicts reducing, it now seems as though killings are well hidden, in fear 
of prosecution. This suggests that rather than beliefs and perceptions of conservation 
becoming more positive, they may instead be just disguised under a shield of 
positivity. In line with the preceding discussion on the link between perceptions of 
insufficient conservancy benefits and tolerance of wildlife, the Mbitin/Nkirgir area 
has been the central focus of the majority of retaliatory killings (I 80). 
Pastoralists who admitted to retaliating said that they were taking measures into their 
own hands because they were frustrated that they “go and report it [livestock being 
killed] to the conservancy but they don’t really care. By reporting it, we’re just doing 
it in vain” (FG 16). The men of Mbitin/Nkirgir (FG 14) believed that the 
conservancies should take responsibility for “helping with the wildlife problem 
because they are the ones who approach us and tell us not to attack and kill the wild 
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animals.” The communities would ideally like to see compensation schemes; 
however, the conservancies are resisting this approach.73 Research (including Bulte 
et al., 2005) suggests that compensation can actually increase the number of conflicts 
since people would take fewer measures to prevent attacks (I 80). Although OMC 
and Naboisho Conservancies do not support compensation, the landowners of 
neighbouring Mara North Conservancy have started their own insurance scheme 
whereby they all contribute (through a deduction of lease payments) and if someone 
loses livestock from a ‘secure, well-fenced enclosure’, the fund pays out (I 18). 
Pastoralists around Naboisho and OMC are contemplating replicating this scheme 
(FG 14, 20, 22). In the meantime, steps are being taken by conservancies and their 
affiliated organisations to try to prevent predator attacks. In terms of costs and 
benefits, this approach is centred around reducing costs incurred through 
conservation so that fewer benefits are needed to outweigh these.  
The style and design of livestock enclosures within the study site are changing 
rapidly as families decide to spend money building stronger enclosures, especially 
now that land tenure is secure. This is resulting in a conversion away from the 
traditional circular design with an outer fence lined with houses and the night-time 
livestock enclosure in the middle (figure 6.4).  
 
 
                                                
73 All wildlife in Kenya is owned by Kenya Wildlife Service who are thus theoretically responsible for 
compensation. In the Mara it is very rare for families to receive compensation and it is usually only 
when people are seriously injured or killed. 
Figure 6.4 Circular Maasai Village Design. Photo: C. Courtney 
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Increasingly, instead of dried acacia branches forming livestock enclosures (figure 
6.5), thicker tree trunks from local trees are being used (figure 6.6) and over the last 
five years cedar posts (figure 6.7) have become very popular. At the same time, the 
outer fences enclosing homesteads have become uncommon.  
None of those with cedar post enclosures who were questioned had lost any livestock 
from inside their new enclosures. As Kimanyisho Sikona (CP 3) explained, this was 
because “the new cedar enclosure is strong and it prevents the lions from attacking 
the cows. They can still threaten and scare them but they can’t get in and the cows 
can’t stampede out”.74 Nasha Rakwa (CP 4) did not yet have a strong fenced 
enclosure because her family were not living on their allocated land, so they did not 
want to spend money when they would be moving soon. As a result of their poor 
quality enclosure (location of figure 6.5): “during the rainy season we have a big 
                                                
74 Lions often attack by startling livestock, causing them to stampede out of weak enclosures (I 80). 
Figure 6.7 Cedar post enclosure. Photo: Nooretet Yiale (CP 1) 
Figure 6.5 An acacia branch fence 
Photo: Nasha Rakwa (CP 4) 
Figure 6.6 An enclosure made of local posts 
Photo: Nooretet Yiale (CP 1) 
171 
 
problem with lions attacking the village. In the last year we have lost five cows and 
so many shoats” (ibid). Two months after this discussion, a leopard attacked Nasha’s 
enclosure and killed three more shoats (figure 6.8).  
As the reinforcement of livestock enclosures prevents predator attacks and 
subsequent retaliatory killings, it is being supported by conservancies and their 
affiliated organisations. This is a proactive preventative alternative to compensation 
(I 80). Two initiatives being undertaken within the study site are the construction of 
predator-proof bomas75 in the form of chain-link fenced enclosures76 (figure 6.9) and 
the placement of Turere Lion Lights77 (6.10) which act as a deterrent.  
                                                
75 A boma is the Swahili word for livestock enclosure that is used in English within the study site.  
76 Chained fences (figure 6.9) are favoured over those with adjacent cedar posts (as in figure 6.7) as 
the use of cedar is deforesting the Mau Forest which has environmental implications (Hesslerová and 
Pokorný 2011). In the predator-proof bomas, conservancy-affiliated organisations are now using 
treated gum poles instead of cedar to support the chain fencing (I 80) 
77 This system is named after a 12 year old Maasai boy called Richard Turere whose family live near 
Nairobi National Park. When he noticed that lions did not come and attack the boma when there were 
torches in the vicinity he made an electrical circuit using bulbs and an old car battery to deter lions. 
Figure 6.8 Goat killed by a leopard inside an enclosure.  
Photo: Nasha Rakwa (CP 4) 
Figure 6.9 Chain link fencing in Olkuroto supported by 
OOMT. Photo: C. Courtney 
Figure 6.10 A light bulb in the Turere Lion Lights 
System in Endoinyo e Rinka. Photo: MNLP 
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Olare Orok and Motorogi Trust, in collaboration with the Anne Kent Taylor Fund, 
and MNLP together with BCFK have been subsidising the cost of fenced predator-
proof bomas. In addition, MNLP has affixed a trial Turere Lion Light system in a 
village that was previously frequently attacked by predators (I 80). Initial indications 
suggest that this technique is also effective (ibid). 
Men in Mpuaai (FG 22) were, in the main, very critical of their neighbouring OMC, 
especially regarding its impact upon pastoralism. Despite this, they stated:  
One of the best things about the conservancy is the new [predator-proof] 
bomas that they do. They are really helping us. It is a new development this 
year. There is a conflict between the community and the lions because if the 
lions come to your enclosure, if they want to feed on your cows, you will not 
allow them and you will chase them away. But now we are building an 
enclosure with the wires to stop the lions from entering. If the lion comes 
inside the cow enclosure we would be forced to kill them and so that is why 
the conservancy is helping us to improve the enclosure because then a lot of 
lions will not be killed… The way that it works is that you pay half and then 
they [the conservancy] pay half. It is for both the families who have land in 
the conservancy and those who don’t. 
Another very critical focus group (FG 14) also said: “we have just recently heard 
about the conservancy [Naboisho] building these fenced enclosures… Should there 
be something like that we would really want it, it is a good idea” (FG 14). This 
suggests that conservancies’ supporting the construction of predator-proof bomas in 
these predominantly negative areas is likely to improve their perceptions of 
conservancies, and wildlife more generally. This is another way in which the 
conservancies are perceived, by Maasai men, to be involved in development. 
In summary, the creation of conservancies has had major direct impacts on 
pastoralism, both in terms of accessing resources and wildlife conflicts. There have 
been negative ramifications but the conservancies and their affiliated organisations 
are trying to address these by providing additional benefits in terms of more 
comprehensive resource access and reducing costs by preventing human-wildlife 
conflicts. What has been stressed is that neighbouring Maasai communities will not 
tolerate any threat to pastoralism. In addition to the conservancies having a direct 
impact on pastoralism, it is also influencing the livelihood indirectly by influencing 
livestock holding compositions. 
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6.2 Changes in Livestock Holdings 
The Maasai express their wealth and power through livestock numbers (Spear and 
Waller, 1993). To date, the priority has not been on livestock-keeping in a way that 
many in the West would call economically efficient. Cows were not sold for profit 
when they reached maturity as they were instead kept to increase holdings (I 11). 
Because of this desire to have high numbers, even when droughts came, animals 
were not sold before they died (FG 22); “so long as a cow was alive, it counted 
towards status” (I 11). Daniel Sopia (I 87), a young community leader, explained a 
change that he sees occurring: “people are now thinking of using the cows for 
economic gain. You have some steers that graze then you sell them. In the past cows 
were only used as prestige.”  This suggests that pastoralists today are trying to 
combine both economic and socio-cultural aspects of livestock keeping, whereas in 
the past the latter was prioritised. Changes in pastoralism resulting from both this 
new approach, and indirectly from the creation of the conservancies, will now be 
examined. These include: number of heads, holding composition and breed.  
6.2.1 Number of Livestock 
Alongside attempts to turn livestock keeping into a more profitable business,78 there 
is still the wide-held belief in Koiyaki that a family must keep many livestock. 
Women from the Pesi family in Olesere (FG 7) explained their justification for this:  
We have been allocated 150 acres here and we own 200 sheep, 40 goats and 
100 cows. We know that this is too many but it is better to have a large herd 
like this because when they get sick or there is a drought they die, so at least 
at the end we will be left with a few. 
The women elaborated that they believe that they can continue to keep high livestock 
numbers, or increase their holdings, by buying more land (ibid). Land subdivision, 
and thus the ability to buy and sell land, is a very new concept to the Koiyaki Maasai 
and there is a lack of realisation that land is limited. For example, FG 2 incorrectly 
stated that there are still areas nearby that have not been subdivided where they can 
take livestock to graze when they run out of space in Koiyaki.  
Studies by McCabe (1997), and Homewood, Coast et al. (2006) suggest that as land 
in the Mara becomes privatised there is a reduction in the size of livestock holdings. 
                                                
78 This language of livestock now becoming a ‘business’ was repeatedly used by research participants, 
especially camera participants, when employment and household finances were discussed. 
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Reid (2012: 182) also predicts that, in the context of the conservancies, the Maasai 
will be forced to reduce herd size due to a decrease in grazing land and increased 
competition from wildlife. Ryan Snider’s (2012) thesis examines the impact of land 
tenure and ecotourism on pastoralism around the Mara Conservancies but contradicts 
himself with regard to the effect on livestock numbers. He notes that once land is 
subdivided into private land: “many households realised they needed to reduce their 
herd size due to restricted access to grazing” (ibid: 174-75). However he also states: 
“landowners [of the conservancies] are using their significantly increased income 
generated by leasing out their land to purchase more livestock” (ibid: 135). My 
primary research also found conflicting opinions within the study site regarding the 
impact of land subdivision and the emergence of the conservancies on livestock 
numbers.  
A relatively wealthy and educated man from Mbitin (FG 14) who works at a camp in 
the reserve claimed that because of land subdivision and the creation of the 
conservancies he has been forced to decrease his cattle herd from 500 to 60. He 
complained: “these are not enough for me” (ibid). The location of FG 14 is also 
likely to influence this frustration as the Mbitin/Nkirgir area does not directly border 
a conservancy, which limits access to grazing schemes. In addition to the influence 
of location, it was largely those who owned many livestock prior to land subdivision 
who said that the conservancies had affected their livestock numbers negatively. 
Although, as discussed in chapter two, some elite community members were able to 
benefit disproportionately from land subdivision, poorer families now have land in 
their own name and can manage this land as they see fit. In other words: 
The cattle barons have been making money based on using other people’s 
resources. A revolutionary point is now occurring in Maasai culture. People 
are thinking why should I just give off my land to this man who has so many 
cattle (I 70).  
Although some richer families state that they have had to sell some livestock as a 
result of the changes in land tenure and usage, others have adapted by moving some 
of their livestock to other locations. FG 7 explained: 
There is no-one who doesn’t have a friend, when we have to stay on a small 
area we give our animals away to our friends to look after. Even what we 
have here now is only a part of what we own, the rest are currently staying 
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with our friends. Also, we have already bought another plot of land 
somewhere, and so we would move some of the cattle to there. 
Faith Kereto (CP 9) added:  
Our livestock are kept in different places because we do not have enough 
grass to feed them all here and we have family and land in different places. 
This also stops them all dying from a disease or drought that is in one place.  
The dispersal of herds is especially common during certain times of the year, such as 
when the wildebeest are calving and malignant catarrhal fever79 is prevalent. 
Noombarbali Soit (I 67) praised the conservancy for creating grass banks that the 
communities can access. She estimated that up to one-quarter of her family’s cows 
could have died if she had not been allowed to take them to graze in Naboisho 
Conservancy. Naboisho’s community liaison officer (I 84) expanded:  
It is difficult for the conservancy to manage the livestock because numbers 
are increasing but it is good for the communities because they are getting 
plenty of grass and it is being managed… If there was no conservancy this 
area would support less livestock than now… for example in Endoinyo e 
Rinka [which is quite far from the conservancies] there are fewer cows.”  
The data from the household census supports this statement as there is an average of 
21.5 cows/adult in Endoinyo e Rinka compared to 27.3 cows/adult in Enooronkon 
and Olesere, which border Naboisho Conservancy. Not only are families who live 
near a conservancy able to support more livestock per person, but population 
densities are also high in these areas, partly as a result of people moving to 
conservancy borders to access the grazing schemes. Nasuju Naurori (CP 12) told me 
that they were not allocated land near a conservancy but they bought 50 acres where 
they currently reside “so that we can have our livestock here and they can graze at 
the conservancy.” This is an example of Bedelian’s (2014: 227) finding that 
conservancy land is valued higher, in terms of grazing, than non-conservancy land 
and so people are relocating so that they can access this. In an attempt to curtail this 
practice there was a meeting in Olesere in May 2014 in which residents pledged to 
                                                
79 Malignant catarrhal fever is a deadly viral disease transmissible to cattle during the wildebeest 
calving season. This was previously not too problematic in Koiyaki because the Loita wildebeest 
calved further north in Olkinyei and Maji Moto. Over recent years they have begun calving in 
Koiyaki, perhaps a result of the fencing off of large areas for cultivation further north. 
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try to stop people from outside moving into the area just to access the conservancy 
grass banks.80 
In addition to the grazing schemes, the supplementary income now entering the 
communities through rental income and employment from the conservancies means 
that more livestock could be bought, or fewer need to be sold. This finding was 
introduced in chapter five. John Sengeny (I 87) explained:  
There is a big difference now as before we used to sell livestock for money 
but now with the conservancy if we have enough cash to fund daily life then 
we don’t need to sell our livestock.  
In addition to this, because people are now receiving this income they are able to buy 
medicines to prevent and treat diseases (I 79). Dominic Sakat (ibid) estimates that 
this combination of factors may have enabled livestock numbers to increase by one-
third over the last five to six years since the conservancies were established.  
As testimonies from research participants did not agree about the conservancies’ 
impact upon livestock numbers, quantitative analysis using the household census was 
undertaken. This was compared to earlier studies on livestock numbers in Koiyaki 
which have, to date, formed the baseline for understandings of pastoralism in the 
area. These studies are the Mara Count (Reid et al., 2003), which was an extensive 
land and aerial count carried out by a large team of scientists in 1999 and 2002; and 
research undertaken by Lamprey and Reid, published in 2004. A comparison will 
also be made with Bedelian’s (2014) study from 2009/10. 
Using data from the 1990s, Lamprey and Reid (2004) calculated a figure of 3.13 
livestock units (LU) per reference adult (RA)81 and concluded that the Maasai in 
Koiyaki are poor in terms of livestock holdings. This concurs with the Mara Count 
which estimated that in 1999 and 2002 the area only had 25% and 37% respectively 
of the livestock necessary to support a pastoral livelihood (Reid et al., 2003). The 
household census undertaken for this thesis indicates that at the beginning of 2013, 
                                                
80 This move is not in line with Maasai culture in which livestock move to where grass is available 
and are housed either in a temporary village or with family members or age mates. The decision was 
an attempt to secure grazing for their own livestock because the grass within the conservancy was 
limited and there was an increasing number of livestock wanting to access it. 
81 The Reference Adult value (RA) is calculated as follows: adult male = 1; adult female = 0.86; 




the average number of livestock owned per homestead in the study site was 161 cows 
and 335 shoats. This represents an average of 11.2 LU/RA or 1830.75 livestock 
kg/person. Analysis of livestock numbers is complicated by the use of different units 
in each study. The results are displayed in table 6.1 for comparison. 
Table 6.1 Livestock Holding Calculation Results 
 LU/RA Kg/person 
Data for 1990s from Lamprey and Reid 2004 3.13 - 
Data from Mara Count 1999 - 335 
Data from Mara Count 2002 - 497 
Data from household census 2013 11.2 1831 
Even when these alternative units are taken into account, the most recent data from 
the household census suggest that current livestock per person ratios are three to five 
times higher than previous assessments. For LU/RA, Nestel (1986) stratified the 
Maasai as poor (0-5 LU/RA), intermediate (5-13 LU/RA) and wealthy (>13 LU/RA). 
This would classify the pastoralists within the study site as poor using Lamprey and 
Reid’s data but at the top end of the intermediate strata when the 2013 household 
census data is used. Regarding live-weight of livestock per person (kg/person), it is 
estimated that the Mara Maasai need 1125-1575 kg/person to rely completely on 
livestock for subsistence (Reid et al., 2003). In contrast to the Mara Count’s 
conclusion in 2003, 1831kg/person using the household census data exceeds this 
estimated minimum requirement. As different measures cannot account for the 
significant difference in findings between data collected for this thesis and prior 
studies, other influencing factors need to be considered.  
The former Koiyaki Group Ranch was the data collection area for both the Mara 
Count and Lamprey and Reid’s study. Whilst my study site, within which the 
household census survey was conducted, includes the majority of Koiyaki, the two 
study areas do not match exactly. The study site for this thesis is shaded yellow on 
figure 6.11 and the black dots represent homesteads within the study site that 
participated in the household census. The group ranch border (shown as a black line 
and shaded in yellow) creates a larger area of study for the other two studies. Also, 
homesteads along the Eastern border of Naboisho were included in the household 





Figure 6.11 Comparison of coverage areas for household census (yellow) and the former Koiyaki Group 
Ranch (cream stripes) used by the Mara Count and Lamprey and Reid (2004) 
As a result, population dynamics differ slightly and exact comparisons are not 
possible. Large centres such as Talek and Aitong were not included in the household 
census but were in the other two studies. As there are high populations in these towns 
and the households have much lower livestock numbers, this would have altered the 
figures. In my opinion, urban areas should not be included in analyses of pastoralism 
because the vast majority of people living in these areas rely on other livelihoods and 
thus distort the data.  
Another contributing factor to the differences in findings between the studies is that 
human populations were estimated in the previous studies. In comparison, the 
household census counted individuals directly. In order to calculate the population of 
Koiyaki, the Mara Count tallied the number of huts and then multiplied this by 4.61, 
the average number of people per house found by Lamprey (1984). This data is now 
very outdated. The household census suggests that the average occupancy per house 
in 2013 was 3.19. If this 3.19 people/house figure is used,82 the 2002 Mara Count 
                                                
82 The reduction in this figure is partly the result of the trend for each wife to have one house for 
cooking and another for living and sleeping in. It is appreciated that the Mara Count was undertaken 
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area would have had estimated a population of 6584 rather than 9515. This suggests 
that the Mara Count may have overestimated the population by up to 31%. This of 
course has knock-on implications for their kg/person ratios. Similarly, Lamprey and 
Reid (2004) lacked detailed population age structures on Koiyaki and so they 
assumed that these would be the same as in Ngorogoro, Tanzania in the mid-1990s. 
As a result, instead of calculating this for each societal strata (as suggested by FAO, 
1974 described in footnote 79), they used an estimate of 0.8 to multiply the total 
(estimated) population by to calculate the RA value. The societal stratification found 
in the 2013 household census suggests that 0.66 would have been a more accurate 
multiplier as there is a greater proportion of women and children than the 0.8 figure 
accounts for.83 Again, this would have greatly modified Lamprey and Reid’s values. 
Whilst these inaccurate population estimates close the gap between the previous 
studies and the household census, table 6.2 shows that this does not fully account for 
the disparities. 
Table 6.2 Modified Livestock Holding Calculation Results 




Data for 1990s from Lamprey and Reid 2004 3.13 3.79 -  
Data from Mara Count 1999 - - 335 484 
Data from Mara Count 2002 - - 497 718 
Data from household census 2013 11.2 11.2 1831 1831 
In addition to the calculations used for human population figures, there are also 
significant differences between the studies regarding how livestock were counted. 
The Mara Count and Lamprey and Reid acquired their livestock numbers by 
counting animals that were visible, either from the air or the ground. In comparison, 
the household census asked respondents how many livestock they owned. The key 
difference here is that the census included livestock owned by the family that might 
permanently or temporarily have been located outside of the study site. This may be 
on other plots owned by the household, or land belonging to a family member or 
friend, as previously discussed. It is recognised that asking the respondents how 
many livestock they own means that these figures are not necessarily exact as they 
                                                                                                                                     
more than 10 years ago, and so the occupancy may have been higher than at present, but the use of 
data from 1984 is likely to be highly inaccurate.  
83 Again, it is appreciated that Lamprey and Reid’s data is more than 10 years old, and so the societal 
strata may have been slightly different to that found in 2013. 
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will have been rounded up or down. It is also possible that respondents may have 
intentionally increased their livestock numbers to appear richer, and thus have a 
greater social standing. However, it is deemed just as likely that they may have 
underestimated the figures to appear poorer, and more in need of assistance.  
Although statistics are not directly comparable between studies due to slight 
differences in study areas, the findings of the household census suggest that in 2013 
the pastoralists of Koiyaki were significantly wealthier than was previously 
presumed. Previous studies may have underestimated the livestock per capita ratios 
for Koiyaki by including urban centres predominantly housing non-pastoralists; 
overestimating population and RA figures; and counting livestock numbers 
physically within the site rather than assessing the total number owned. Whilst 
recognising the importance of these factors, it is expected that they may not fully 
account for the discrepancies identified between the studies. Therefore, the latest 
2013 data suggests that there may have been a net increase in livestock numbers over 
the last 10 years.  
An increase in livestock would be supported by Lamprey and Reid’s (2004: 1014) 
conclusion that livestock numbers in Koiyaki vary in accordance with rainfall:  
A further period of good rainfall in 1997/98, associated with ‘El Nino’, led to 
an increase again [in Koiyaki cattle numbers] to 40,000; this was followed by 
a massive 'crash' in the catastrophic ‘La Nina’ drought of 1999/2000. 
In the middle of this ‘crash’, the Mara Count estimated that cattle numbers in 
Koiyaki had fallen to about 16,300 in November 1999 (Reid et al., 2003). As there 
had not been a severe drought preceding the 2013 survey, their hypothesis would 
suggest that livestock numbers should be high. The total number of cattle owned by 
the Koiyaki residents included in this study was 40,430.84  
In order to visualise this reported increase, the total LU/RA (11.2) and cattle LU/RA 
(8.6) calculated from the household survey have been extrapolated onto Lamprey and 
Reid’s graph (figure 6.12). Although not 100% accurate, bearing in mind the 
differences between the studies, this graph shows that, whilst current numbers may 
be higher than noted in studies from the 2000s following the drought of 1999/2000, 
                                                
84 Although it needs to be remembered that not all of these livestock may be present in Koiyaki 
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they are still within the variations seen over the last 35 years. It is likely that numbers 
took a dip as a result of the 2005 and 2009 droughts and to a lesser extent also in 
2011. These dips are not included in the extrapolation as the extent of any decline is 
unknown. 
 
Figure 6.12 Temporal change in livestock holdings in Koiyaki. Graph from Lamprey and Reid (2004: 
1020), extrapolated from 2001-2013 using household census data. 
In summary, unless the sole factor influencing livestock numbers is the natural flux 
as a result of climate variability – which seems unlikely when statements from 
community members contextualise the data – it is suggested that the conservancies 
have had a net positive impact on livestock numbers. Further, access to grass banks 
throughout the year and especially during times of drought may result in the 
ecosystem sustaining higher numbers. The financial ability to buy veterinary 
medicine also reduces the number of livestock dying.  
In numerical terms, the census survey found that households that lease land to a 
conservancy had an average of 112.9 LU per household. Non-conservancy members 
had an average of 102.5. Conservancy owning households have slightly larger 
population, perhaps as a result of family members not being able to live on land 
leased to the conservancy. It is therefore important to work out how many livestock 
units there are per reference adult. This reduces the gap, but conservancy member 
households still have a slightly higher livestock ownership at 10.8 LU/RA as 
opposed to 10.4 LU/RA for households that do not lease land to a conservancy. 
When the conservancies began, conservancy members had fewer livestock per adult 
equivalent than non-conservancy members (Bedelian, 2014). Therefore, although this 
difference is small, it shows that conservancy members have increased their holding 
at a higher rate than non-members. Those who own the most land in a conservancy 
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(over 100 acres) surprisingly had a lower LU/RA at 10.1. Although these individuals 
receive higher rental payments from the conservancies, this may be the result of 
owning insufficient land outside of the conservancy to keep livestock on. The 
wealthiest, in terms of livestock, were those who leased around half a parcel 
(between 50-80 acres) to a conservancy. This category had an average LU/RA of 
11.1. 
As noted, Bedelian’s (2014) found that conservancy member households had 
significantly less livestock than those who do not lease land to any conservancy. 
There are several possible reasons for this. Bedelian (ibid) collected her data in 2010, 
just a few months after the completion of subdivision in block four and the creation 
of Naboisho Conservancy. As noted in chapter two, there was a reported reduction in 
livestock holdings during the land subdivision process as some wealthier households 
sold livestock to buy influence in the land allocation process (Thompson et al., 2009: 
96-7). Also, it is not surprising that any impact of conservancy membership upon 
livestock holdings are not visible in Bedelian’s study as one of the largest 
conservancies in the Mara was only launched during her research period. As a result 
there was a very limited time for conservancies to impact households’ wealth, a point 
that she recognises (ibid: 193). 
In the Mara, the scale of livestock holdings is the single most important predictor of 
income (Homewood et al., 2006: 21). Therefore, the finding that pastoralists in the 
study site own more livestock than previously thought is very significant. It reveals 
that livestock keeping is even more financially important than previously reported. 
The greater wealth held by these communities also suggests that they may be able to 
financially support their own advancement internally to a greater extent than was 
previously believed.  
There are also environmental implications of this finding. As discussed, if 
pastoralists and their livestock are able to move over large areas then environmental 
damage and degradation can be managed. Compression and the inability to continue 
nomadism as a result of sedentisation, combined with an increase in livestock 
numbers, could potentially have detrimental impacts on the ecosystem – as suggested 
in chapter five. This is the same ecosystem that is producing the very benefit that is 
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enabling the increase in livestock numbers exemplifying Lanholz’s (1999) concept 
‘conservation backfires’. This mirrors Kiss’s (2004) finding that high earnings from 
tourism may be put back into activities that threaten biodiversity. When considered 
in conjunction with the report produced by Thompson and Homewood (2002) that 
tourism earnings in the Mara are reinvested in large-scale cultivation, the impact is 
compounded. 
Solutions are needed to cushion the risk brought by high numbers in confined areas 
in order to ensure the sustainability of this livelihood, as well as environmental 
sustainability. Conservancy grazing schemes are one example of this, as Dickson 
Kaelo (I 48) explained: 
If you look at the arguments now in pasture management, it is not always the 
numbers that are the problem; it is how much time the cattle are spending on 
one patch. So I would be more interested to see a grazing system first that 
allows some areas to rest rather than trying to manage numbers. If we can 
design a grazing system, the current numbers of livestock that are in the 
system could still be able to be sustained… And just look at a few months of 
no grazing, how it rebounds back [pointing to the tall grass all around us at 
KGS]. 
In addition to the growth of grass when areas are left to rest, it is claimed that the 
density of the grass in these areas is also increasing within conservancies (I 76). The 
manager of Naboisho Conservancy (ibid) explained that the size of an area that can 
sustain a herd for one month has halved over the last six months as the grass is now 
thicker because it is reseeding itself and the root base is being conserved.  
As the conservancies appear to be not only financially supporting an increase in 
livestock owned by those living within the study site, but also increasing the fodder 
base for these livestock, the findings of this thesis suggest that conservancies may be 
beginning to have a positive impact on pastoralism. At the end of the research period, 
those who were able to make use of the grazing schemes increasingly said: “it is 
easier to be a pastoralist here now than it was before the conservancies came” (FG 
26). It is important to recognise, however, that the impact on families is not 
homogenous. As previously discussed, some households may have been forced to 
reduce their numbers if they were not: sufficiently well-positioned politically to 
receive a large amount of land in the subdivision process; able to redistribute their 
holdings, or; in a position to access the conservancy grazing schemes. As such, there 
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are still many local residents who believe that the conservancies are having a 
negative impact on pastoralism because of resource access restrictions. Poorer 
families may have been the greatest beneficiaries as they are able to increase their 
holdings now that they have secure rights over their own plots of land (I 104). As an 
example of this, Bedelian (2014: 150) reports that although livestock ownership 
remains uneven within Koiyaki’s society with 19% of households owning 50%, this 
has reduced from 20% of households owning 60% of livestock in 2004 (as found by 
Thompson et al., 2009).  
6.2.2 Livestock Holding Composition 
It is not only the quantity of livestock that is changing, the species and breed 
composition of livestock holdings are also currently under flux. Referring back to 
figure 6.12, it can be seen that the gap between the two lines representing total 
LU/RA and the cattle LU/RA has increased. This signifies that the species 
compositions of livestock holdings are changing, with a greater proportion being 
held in shoats. Bedelian (2014: 62) notes that shoats have increased by 210% 
between 1977 and 2011, with the most significant increase occurring since 1995 
(figure 6.13). 
Figure 6.13 Changes in Shoat Numbers in Koiyaki 1977-2011 (Bedelian, 2014: 63) 
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Between 2010 and 2011 shoat numbers increased from approximately 48,000 to 
65,000, a 35.4% increase in one year. Data from the household census undertaken for 
this thesis suggests that in 2013, shoats made up 22.2% of household livestock units, 
more than three times that in the late 1990s (as reported by Lamprey and Reid, 2004: 
1014). This means that pastoralists within the study site now have, on average, more 
than twice as many shoats as cattle. Rather than being a strategy in reaction to 
drought or hardship as thought previously (ibid), two other justifications for this 
change were given by research participants. First, shoats could be sold regularly for a 
smaller income, which would usually cover family expenditure for one week (FG 
22). According to Dominic Sakat: “sheep being seen as a source of money is a 
change in Maasai culture because some years back they were just slaughtered and 
eaten, not sold” (I 79). FG 22 explained that they prefer to sell one shoat every week 
than one cow per month because: “when cattle are sold you get more money but this 
disappears quickly”. This increase in the proportion of livestock holdings being in 
shoats also has environmental implications as they are much harder to graze 
sustainably. OMC’s manager said that whilst they may seem like an easy option to 
the Maasai because they do not really need herding, they can cause big problems for 
the grass (I 81). Shoats stand still and eat the grass in one place until they finish 
everything, often including the roots, whereas cows are more particular and they 
graze and walk simultaneously (I 80). Such concentrated grazing can also lead to 
changes in plant species from those that are palatable to those that are not (Reid, 
2012: 66-67).  
Although the proportion of shoats is increasing, cows are so important to the Maasai 
culturally that it is very unlikely they would ever want to move totally away from 
cattle. The conservancies advocate that they are supporting neighbouring pastoralists 
to continue keeping cattle. In OMC’s manager’s opinion: “there would be hardly any 
cows left here without the conservancies because there would not be sufficient longer 
grass to support them out there [on community land], leaving only goats” (I 81).  
6.2.3 Changing Breeds 
The majority of pastoralists within the study site are in the process of changing from 
the Maasai breeds of sheep, goats and cows to hybrid animals (I 26). Hybrid animals 
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are those that have genetic variation: they are a combination of breeds. In the Mara, 
rather than introducing pure Boran or Sahiwal breeds of cows, these are mixed with 
the Maasai stock to improve the quality, yet keep the hardiness associated with the 
Maasai animals. The hybrid livestock are seen to be better quality and bring with 
them a variety of advantages. They produce a lot more milk (CP 9), grow quicker 
and bigger (CP 7) and achieve a higher price at market (CP 8). Land subdivision and 
the creation of the conservancies are encouraging this change. FG 22 stated that new 
livestock breeds are needed: “because the land for our animals is becoming small and 
so we need few animals which have a higher value.” Nkaate Kuya (CP 6) also 
believes that this will minimise illegal grazing. He stated: “when I have all hybrid 
sheep they will be fewer and they will just be able to graze within my land and so I 
will not get fined” (ibid).85  Yet others (including FG 7) stated that they will not 
reduce the number, even if they have hybrid breeds. Marshall (2014) concurs that 
there no evidence that improving the quality of cattle leads to keeping fewer animals. 
The vast majority of tourism, NGO and conservancy employees purported that 
increasing the quality and decreasing the number of livestock is the way forward for 
pastoralism in Maasailand (I 2, 4, 6, 15, 16, 21, 28, 31, 32, 34, 44, 56, 62, 69, 70, 71, 
72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 96). Whilst many local residents are taking 
steps in this direction, they are doing so cautiously and many remain sceptical. FG 26 
explained:  
It is just recently that we have started doing this [changing to hybrid animals]. 
We started on the sheep and that has worked so now we’re trying to see if the 
cows will survive here. The problem is that in a drought the Sahiwal breed 
may be the first ones to die because they cannot tolerate a small amount of 
grass.  
Dickson Kaelo (I 48), who has extensive experience working with livestock through 
ILRI, supports this cautiousness. Regarding the future of pastoralism in the study 
site, he advocates a greater focus on range management and cautions against thinking 
that changing the breed and upgrading livestock is a ‘silver bullet’. He elaborated: 
If there was an arrangement [for controlled grazing], it might be a more 
sustainable arrangement that trying to say reduce numbers, increase quality 
and then people never do it. And if they do do it then drought comes and they 
all die... I think that it is only now that people are coming to recognise that 
                                                
85 Sheep and goats are not permitted to graze in conservancies. If owners are caught, they are fined. 
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the upgrading is not a ‘silver bullet’ as people would like to imagine… If 
numbers could be regulated I would be very happy, if some bulls could be 
introduced so that a bit of improvement can happen, I think that is what I 
would like to see… In Kajiado in [the drought of] 2009, they lost 80% of the 
cattle because they had changed to the Sahiwal breed and 60% of the sheep 
because they had gone Dopa. In the Mara, there was less than 40% losses 
because they still kept the indigenous breed that is tough and strong. So there 
is this argument to have less cows of a bigger value. It looks very attractive, 
but in practice that big value can go in one year, so what makes the Maasai 
better off? 
In combination with land subdivision and increasing pressures on scarce resources, 
livestock hybridisation is encouraging a resurgence of the Maasai grazing practice of 
olokeri. This is where an area of land is set aside, frequently demarcated or fenced, to 
prevent general grazing so that it can be used for sick animals, those who have just 
given birth, or often hybrid bulls and rams (CP 5 – see figure 6.14).  
Men in Mpuaai (FG 22) explained that olokeri is needed because of high grazing 
pressures and they also recognised: “it is good too for the grass to set some land 
aside, it improves because nothing is feeding inside.” Several community members 
also pointed to the similarities between this traditional practice and the rotational 
grazing schemes undertaken in the conservancies as they leave land to lie fallow for 
periods of the year.  
In summary, both qualitative and more quantitative findings suggest that changes are 
occurring in the livestock quantity, species composition and breed-type of holdings 
within the study site. As has been demonstrated, the conservancies are not the only 
influencing factor, but they are deemed to be a major contributor to these changes.  
Figure 6.14 Simon Taki's hybrid bull grazing inside an olokeri area 
Photo: Simon Taki (CP 5) 
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6.3 Concluding Discussion: Weighing Up Perceptions on 
Pastoralism 
The continued importance of livestock to the Maasai within the study site is 
undeniable. However, whilst staying as Maasai may mean a continuing central 
reliance on livestock, this does not equate to a conservative dependence on pure 
pastoralism (Homewood et al., 2009: 379). Given the underlying importance of 
livestock, it is vital that the conservancies support pastoralism as a livelihood in 
order to maintain and enhance community support for both the conservancies and 
conservation more generally. This support is essential for the sustainability of the 
conservancy businesses. As has been discussed, if consequences of the conservancies 
are perceived to threaten this livelihood, support from the communities will quickly 
dissipate.  
When the Mara embraced privatised land tenure it was expected that the land would 
become fragmented into fenced parcels, creating more hard boundaries (I 69). As 
discussed at the beginning of chapter two, this was of great concern to all who 
profited from wildlife and supported conservation (ibid) as well as those who 
recognised the importance of open rangeland for pastoralism (Behnke et al., 1993; 
Homewood et al., 2009; Notenbaert et al., 2012). Homewood (2012) and Bedelian 
(2012) both argue that the creation of conservancies are detrimental to pastoralism 
because they are in direct competition and prevent nomadic movements. Yet given 
this change in land tenure, nomadism would not be possible notwithstanding the 
presence of the conservancies. This research has found that stakeholders in the Mara 
no longer believe that conservancies are inherently negative for pastoralism.  
Whilst negative consequences are possible, with certain policies and practices in 
place, conservancies also have the ability to support this livelihood. Reid (2012: 174) 
recognises that through conservancies, land privatisation in the Mara has created an 
unexpected window of opportunity, providing new ways to keep the land open and 
improve the flow of benefits to the local people. One example of these benefits is the 
creation of grass banks. Due to the grazing schemes accessing this grass, towards the 
end of the research period some of the research participants (including FG 26; I 76, 
86, 87) began to suggest that the conservancies may in fact support pastoralism and 
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be key for its survival in light of land subdivision. Rationale for this is that in a time 
of individualised land tenure, the conservancies are bringing landowners back 
together, preventing fencing, restricting onward sales and reintroducing communal 
grazing practices. To Dickson Kaelo, the most appealing feature of the conservancies 
is the fact that land is kept open in a way that can work for both wildlife and 
livestock (I 48). Conservancies have the potential to hold land within the community 
rather than its going up for sale and having many other investors come in and start 
flower farms and construct fences (ibid). 
Although you would not rent your house out and then expect to still be allowed to 
come back each day to cook your dinner, providing traditional users access to 
resources on land that they own is essential for the survival of conservancies and 
may even be a human rights issue (Goldman, 2011). Grazing schemes are not a one-
way street. They can be beneficial to the flora and fauna of the conservancies as well 
as the cattle. The chairman of Naboisho’s LandCO (I 86) explained: 
Sometimes people can feel that cattle are a threat to the conservancy but 
they’re not, they support it. Once the cows have grazed the grass is cut down, 
it is easier for the wildlife and they like it. And because of grazing access [in 
the conservancies] we can now have as many [cows] as we want. If there was 
no conservancy, people would be very restricted.  
Grasslands that have been disturbed by certain events, such as grazing, support more 
species than those that remain undisturbed (Grime, 1973). This helps to explain why 
wildlife are often concentrated around pastoral settlements (Reid, 2012). In other 
words, these savannahs decline, or are simplified, if they are not grazed (Oba et al., 
2000). In the Mara this becomes clearer by comparing wildlife densities between the 
centre of the Maasai Mara National Reserve where grass is left to grow, reaching two 
meters high (figure 6.15), and the conservancies where managed livestock grazing 
controls grass height (figure 6.16).86 Grass height greatly affects wildlife biodiversity 
as, with the exception of buffalo, ostriches and elephants, many species do not like to 
eat the tall dry grass which is poor quality and low in nutrients. Instead, they move 
out to areas where the grass has been kept short by livestock (I 80). In addition, prey 
feel unsafe in tall grass because it enables carnivores to creep up on them (ibid).  
                                                
86 The photographs in figures 6.14 and 6.15 were both taken the same week in June 2012. 
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In spite of this potential, “the complementarities between pastoralism and 
biodiversity are not guaranteed. They require special attention and investments and 
policies supporting these overlapping land uses” (Notenbaert et al., 2012: 13). Too 
much disturbance, such as grazing, can also reduce species diversity if unrestricted 
(Connell, 1978; Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008: 404; Reid, 2012). For example, all 
stakeholders concurred that the community lands around the conservancies are 
currently overgrazed which is reducing the productivity of these areas.  
By implementing grazing schemes, the conservancies are countering fortress 
conservation approaches whereby “park managers have tended to regard their 
neighbours as a nuisance and to overlook the rights of the original inhabitants” 
(Berger, 1996: 182). Instead they are moving more towards a community-based 
conservation approach. This is the result of a combination of factors: local 
community members having a voice and a degree of decision-making power; 
recognition of the importance of supporting pastoralism; appreciation of the 
effectiveness of the traditional Maasai grazing practice (combined with Allan 
Savory’s (1988) ideas of high stocking rate and short duration grazing); and, finally, 
understanding the benefits that grazing can bring to the flora and fauna within the 
environment. New approaches to range management usually take a long time to be 
integrated into institutions and bureaucracies, especially if the new ideas have the 
potential to fundamentally shake up the rationale or existence of the organisation 
(Chambers, 1993; Scoones, 1996: 52). The conservancies have a distinct advantage; 
Figure 6.15 Ostriches in tall grass inside the reserve 
Photo: C. Courtney 
Figure 6.16 Multi-species compositions on a grazed area 
in Naboisho Conservancy. Photo: C. Courtney 
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being independent of the government and other large organisations, they can quickly 
change and adapt their policies.  
Mosse (2005) argues that development entities need to make themselves needed. 
Unlike state or development agencies, it is in the interest of the conservancies to 
address the issues associated with pastoralism rather than perpetuate them to justify 
their employment. This is because the sustainability of conservancies, and more 
specifically their businesses, is reliant upon improving the status quo and creating 
satisfaction within communities.  
Analysis of the household census challenges existing studies regarding livestock 
numbers in Koiyaki. This proposes that pastoralists within the study site are 
wealthier in terms of livestock than previously thought. In addition, the empirical 
findings presented in this chapter, both quantitative and qualitative, suggest that since 
the development of conservancies, the numbers of livestock owned by pastoralists 
living within the study site have increased. This growth is attributable to the 
conservancies rather than to land privatisation more generally because it contradicts 
earlier research within the Maasai Mara ecosystem at a time when land had been 
subdivided but no conservancies had yet been established. These studies (McCabe, 
1997; Homewood et al., 2006) found a positive trend between land privatisation and 
reduced livestock holdings.  
Chapter two introduced Langholz’s concept of ‘conservation backfires’. Within the 
subdivided lands of the Mara where there is a high population growth rates and 
livestock concentrations have also reached or exceeded their estimated carrying 
capacities. In this context the use of revenue and other benefits emanating from the 
conservancies to increase livestock numbers would usually easily qualify as a 
conservation backfire – as suggested in chapter five. Prior to conservancies, 
increased holdings would have had a detrimental environmental impact; but, if cattle 
can be supported by grass banks developed within conservancies, this may not be the 
case. In spite of this, in contrast to John Sengeny’s quote earlier, there is a limit to 
the number of cattle that can be supported by the conservancies, especially in times 
of drought. As the conservancy managers indicated, they are constantly walking a 
tight-rope with regard to the amount of access given to cattle. There are many trade-
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offs and hard decisions in this attempt to balance conservation and development 
objectives. 
Land subdivision may have brought greater equality within resource access for 
pastoralists, regardless of wealth or status, in spite of corruption within the land 
allocation process. Those who had larger herds have had to sell some to be able to 
survive on the land that they have been allocated and poorer families who previously 
could not expand their herds due to a lack of grass now have their own land to use. 
At the same time, conservancy grazing schemes provide an opportunity for cattle 
barons to maintain their large herds which would otherwise be unsustainable on their 
private land. Despite this, Maasai women especially praised grazing access as a 
benefit from the conservancies because it is inclusive of all, regardless of land 
ownership or wealth. In addition to changing livestock numbers, holdings are also 
changing in terms of species composition and breed type. 
During the research period, responses from community members regarding the 
impact of conservancies on pastoralism were polarised: some were inherently 
positive whilst others were negative. Analysis of community responses reveals that 
the degree of positivity largely depended on the distance to the nearest conservancy 
and perceptions of the extent of grazing access permitted there. Initially all 
communities that border a conservancy gave relatively even responses: the benefits 
of access during the permitted periods were appreciated but were outweighed by the 
strict limitations and fines imposed for illegal grazing. During the research period, 
improvements in opinions were seen, especially from the communities around 
Naboisho Conservancy. This coincided with the implementation and increased 
understanding of the new more comprehensive grazing scheme.  
For communities that remained more negative about their local grazing scheme, this 
negativity was reflected in their overall opinion of conservancies.87 This correlation 
emphasises the continued importance of cattle to the Koiyaki Maasai and represents 
the shift brought by neoliberal approaches to conservation. It also highlights the link 
between benefits and perceptions of the conservancies and conservation more 
                                                
87 It is important to note that even those who are negative about conservancies for certain reasons still 
identified ways in which they are bringing development. FG 22’s discussion of the predator-proof 
bomas despite their complaints about the grazing schemes is one example of this.  
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generally. Despite livelihood diversification, cattle remain the priority. In order to 
keep the neighbouring communities onside, grazing needs to be given precedence. 
As people come to see the benefits of the grazing schemes, they increasingly 
recognise that instead of threatening or destroying pastoralism, the conservancies 
may be able to maintain and salvage this way of life in a way which brings 
landowners together during a time of physical and social subdivision and separation 
(FG 26; I 76, 79). Dickson Kaelo explained the importance of not dwelling on the 
past: 
I think that the majority of them [local people] who are thinking about the 
future will see it [the conservancies’ effect on pastoralism] as a positive but 
the majority who are thinking about the past will see it as a negative. We 
have people here who think that in the absence of the conservancy they can 
revert back to the way the group ranch existed, which is actually not the case. 
In the absence of the conservancy it would be small subdivided plots so if 
they are looking at what it was in the past and wanting to go there then they 
will be negative about the conservancy, but if they are thinking about what 
may happen into the future, they will be very positive I think (I 48).  
Findings suggest that the positivity of perceptions of the conservancies dictates the 
degree of tolerance expressed towards wildlife. This stresses that links between 
benefits and conservation goals are clearly understood. It means, however, that for 
wildlife to safely move on the community lands that border the ‘conservation 
islands’, pastoralism must be worked with and not against. Costs associated with the 
conservancies need to be minimised, and the benefits – of which grazing was most 
frequently ranked number one – must be widespread, understood and appreciated by 
the local communities. As will be discussed further in chapter eight and the 
conclusion, this is vital because they are the ones who have the power to decide 
whether the conservancies, and the wildlife on which they depend, will survive. 
All these factors suggest that conservancies should expand their grazing schemes and 
open up further to livestock. But extensive grazing access, to the degree that 
Naboisho has reached and beyond, brings its own challenges. In the face of potential 
droughts or further increases in livestock, there will be no grass banks left to cushion 
crises. This will be discussed, alongside other threats to the conservancy concept, in 
chapter nine. It is also important to differentiate between cattle and shoats as while 
the pressure brought by cattle could, theoretically, be cushioned in part by 
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conservancy grazing schemes, this is not true of shoats. Further, the destructive 




7 Economic Implications     
The aim of this thesis is to examine perceptions of the relationship between the 
conservancies and development within the study site. In chapter three, economic 
advancement was identified as one of the three key indicators because of its 
dominance within stakeholders’ perceptions of development. Following on from 
chapters four, five and six, this chapter will continue to address the second research 
question. It will explore how the conservancies are impacting upon economic aspects 
of development, why they are doing this, and whether it affects society evenly. 
Within the literature framework set out in chapter two, this chapter will assess the 
extent and equitability of the various economic benefits emanating from 
conservancies. The power relationships between stakeholders will be examined; who 
the power brokers are and how they attained their power will also be investigated. 
This culminates in an assessment of the degree of participation and control held by 
communities, and sectors of communities, within the conservancy concept.  
Although livestock trading remains the dominant livelihood and income source 
within the study site:  
Other people get money when tourists come to the conservancies. Those are 
people who have their land there and also some people have employment in 
the camps inside the conservancy (FG 22). 
 As will be discussed, this represents a diversification of livelihood strategies. In line 
with the quote from FG 22, concessions in the form of rental income and 
employment were the two economic benefits of conservancies most frequently raised 
by focus group participants. To begin the chapter, these conservancy benefit streams 
will be examined. As noted in chapters three and four, the sale of beadwork was very 
much desired by local women. This will briefly be discussed within the broader 
examination of the role of women in the conservancies, but as OOMT’s beadwork 
project began after the research period, a more detailed analysis of its economic 
impact was not possible. Following this focus on women, perceptions of participation 
and the distribution of power within the conservancies’ structure will be assessed. 
Different land use options will then be compared and how the leasing of land for 
conservancies weighs up financially will be assessed. Concluding thoughts will then 
be brought together.   
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7.1 Conservancy Benefit Streams   
The two conservancy benefit streams to be examined are rental income and 
employment. 
7.1.1 Rental Income 
Those whose allocated land is within a conservancy have the option to rent it in 
exchange for a monthly payment deposited directly into their bank account. 
According to outreach worker Grace Naisenya, this is the main difference between 
the conservancies and the Maasai Mara National Reserve. She said:  
The conservancy has helped a lot bringing the development back to the 
community as opposed to the reserve where the money goes to central 
government so very little comes back to the community (I 62).  
As previously noted, 19% of revenue from the National Reserve is theoretically fed 
back to local communities, although residents widely consider it to be mismanaged. 
The MMNR management plan agrees with these accusations. If 19% of the predicted 
earnings were returned to neighbouring areas, this would exceed $6.5million 
annually (Bedelian, 2014: 66-7). 
Following land subdivision, it was possible for lease payments to be paid in their 
entirety directly to landowning individuals, thus preventing them from being 
amassed by group ranch committees and community leaders. This was a major 
problem in previous community tourism attempts such as the Koiyaki Lemek 
Wildlife Trust (KLWT), as noted in chapter two. One drawback of bank transfers is: 
“we have to go to Narok every month to collect this money which is very expensive” 
(FG 2). Some landowners are aware that it is possible to transfer the money from 
their bank accounts to their phones through M-Pesa,88 which can then be withdrawn 
at centres in the Mara, but many do not know how to do this (FG 2, 26). As the 
research period finished, Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) began building a branch in 
Talek which has an ATM machine. 
Families receiving this rental income describe it as a form of development. Male 
conservancy landowners living further away from the conservancies, who are less 
able to access grazing schemes, ranked it particularly highly as a conservancy 
                                                
88 M-Pesa is an electronic banking system for mobile phones run by the Safaricom network and will 
be discussed further in chapter eight. 
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benefit. Landowners indicated that the payments are used to pay school fees and buy 
food or settle shop debts built up over the month (FG 2, 26). Dominic Koya, 
Naboisho’s liaison officer, estimated: 
50% are using the money in a good way, while 50% have not realised a better 
way of using it. Those who are spending the money well are using the money 
to pay school fees. I normally go to town [Narok] at the three times of a year 
when school fees are due and I see a lot of landowners withdrawing their 
money (I 84).  
Landowners explained “the benefits that we get from this money means that we don’t 
need to sell cattle to get money” (FG 5); “we will stop selling livestock while we still 
have that money” (FG 21). As previously discussed in chapters five and six, this 
implies that although the money from the conservancy may not be used directly to 
buy more livestock, it reduces the amount of livestock that needs to be sold to meet 
the family’s financial needs. Chapter six concluded that this was an example of a 
‘conservation backfire’ unless the conservancies are able to provide for these 
additional livestock – and this is only possible if those livestock are cattle.  
Bedelian (2014: 192) concurs that there is no difference in expenditure per adult 
equivalent between conservancy member households and those of non-members. The 
wife of a conservancy landowner said:  
We have not noticed improvement [in our lives] as the money [rental income] 
already has its uses. No more needs are being satisfied than before. [But] for 
those who didn’t have anything to support themselves with, now they do. 
From the money they get for the rent they’re able to buy food, pay debts and 
pay school fees for themselves (FG 7). 
This quote suggests that landowners who were previously struggling financially may 
be experiencing the greatest benefits from the rental payments as they are now able 
to meet needs that were previously beyond their capability. This would represent a 
decrease in societal inequality. 
MNLP assistant Dominic Sakat believes that conservancy landowners are benefiting 
economically because “their livestock are increasing as they don’t have to sell them 
for the school fees and they can go for a loan and so they never sell their cows” (I 
79). Favourable credit arrangements have been negotiated by conservancies on 
behalf of their landowners, using the rental agreements as collateral (I 81, 87). It is 
hoped that this will drive further livelihood diversification through microfinance and 
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small-scale businesses (I 31). Lars Lindkvist suggested that such measures will be 
especially needed once land is subdivided further over generations (ibid). However, 
one unhappy landowner of MNC in FG 14 accused the conservancies of using loans 
as a way to trap people into the 15-year conservancy lease because “once you get a 
loan you cannot back out”. 
While some people noted that the total amount of money now coming into 
communities each month from the conservancy rents is very large (I 21, 31, 76, 79), 
individual conservancy landowners deem their payments to be relatively small (FG 
1, 6; I 87). One landowner in FG 6 said: “the money from the conservancy helps in a 
small way, but it is your cow that helps the most.” This concurs with Bedelian’s 
(2014) findings that, despite the high earnings from tourism in the Mara, livestock 
remains the primary economic activity. As noted in chapter six, some groups also 
stressed that receiving cash for leasing their land is of no benefit when fines for 
grazing illegally in the conservancies equal or exceed this amount (FG 2, 25).  
My analysis for BCFK’s CMMF baseline survey found that the average monthly 
expenditure per household in 2012 was KES 34,250 ($390). The census survey 
indicated that 76% of households have some land rented to Naboisho, OMC or Mara 
North Conservancies.89 For households who lease land, the average area leased is 
36.2ha. Rent rates vary between these conservancies. This is because they were 
initiated at different times and so the rates for older conservancies are higher as lease 
payments increase each year. The payments per hectare per year for 2012 and 2013 
are in table 7.1 below.  
Table 7.1 Conservancy lease payments 2012-2013 
 OMC Naboisho MNC90 
 $/ha/yr Area Total $/ha/yr Area $/ha/yr $/ha/yr Area Total 
2012 43 12,764 $548,852 32 19,500 $624,000 38 30,000 $1,140,000 
2013 44 12,764 $561,616 35 19,776 $692,160 41 30,000 $1,230,000 
                                                
89 Although Mara North Conservancy (MNC) is not within the study site it is included here as many 
census survey participants within the study site indicated that they earn a rental income from this 
conservancy. 
90 In MNC there are multiple lease payments. Figures in the table are for those who have signed for 
the 15 year lease. For those on the 5 year lease in 2012-3 the payment was KES 3000 ($34) and for 
settled land on the 15 year lease the rate was KES 550 ($6.30) and KES 600 ($6.80) in 2012, 2013 
respectively. For the purposes of the following calculations it is presumed that the MNC landowners 
in the census survey are full landowners on the 15 year lease. 
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In 2013, these three conservancies distributed $2,483,776 to Maasai landowners but 
this rental income is not spread evenly within society. As noted, only 76% of 
homesteads within the census survey owned land within a conservancy. Reported 
size of land owned91 in each conservancy by census survey participants was 
multiplied by its specific lease payment rate. The average annual income for 
conservancy land owning homesteads was KES 110,648 ($1250) in 2012 and KES 
118,030 ($1350) in 2013 - this is 29% of average household expenditure calculated 
in the CMMF survey. This closely conforms with Bedelian’s (2014) estimates 
regarding conservancies’ contribution to household income.  
As noted, conservancy lease payments are increasing, but how long this increase can 
be sustained is uncertain. For OMC there is a KES 50 [$0.57] increase in rental 
payments each year up to 2015, and subsequently an 8% compound increase (I 101). 
One source suggested that OMC tourism partners entered the 15 year agreement with 
the intention of serving out five years and then selling the business on, as once the 
8% compounded increase kicks in, expenses for the tourism partners will 
dramatically increase (anon 3). In Naboisho there is already an 8% increment every 
year and every 3 years an arbitration situation can be called if inflation is more than 
5% above or below this figure (I 21). Given that the inflation rate in Kenya is 
currently 20%, arbitration is expected (I 31). Allan Earnshaw pointed out that there 
are limitations as to how much money can be realistically expected from tourism for 
the land (I 69). He explained: 
Tourism operators are not putting up prices by 20% a year, they are lucky if 
they can put them up 5% a year in the current situation. Even in a rich area 
like the Mara, people need to have realistic expectations (ibid).  
OMC and Naboisho tourism partner Greg Monsen (I 70) agreed that expectations 
need to be managed:  
We can’t afford to pay enough to provide all money needed for life. 
Expectations need to be aligned and we need to think about what people can 
do for more income. What other opportunities are there? 
                                                
91 Conservancy land ownership was requested in acres, as this is the measurement predominantly used 
within the study site. It is suspected that some figures may have been given in hectares. As this was 
not certain, all areas given were presumed to be acres and then converted to hectares. If some figures 
were already given in hectares this would increase the average incomes further. 
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Ole Soit (I 85), a community leader in Olesere, concurred. He noted “the money we 
get from the conservancy is very little and so you can’t rely only on that, we need to 
be able to get money from cows too” (ibid). People continue to place more value on 
the keeping of livestock, seeing tourism as a supplement not a replacement 
(Homewood et al., 2009; Bedelian, 2014: 163). Homewood et al. (2006) found that, 
in the Mara, the greatest income is generated by combining pastoralism and wildlife 
tourism.92 This will be discussed further towards the end of this chapter when 
alternative land use values are compared.  
For the conservancies within the study site, the set monthly remittance is paid by the 
tourism partners regardless of tourist numbers. The relative amount that each tourism 
partner has to pay for the running of the conservancy (which includes land lease 
payments and management expenses) is determined by the number of beds that they 
own within the conservancy. This is not necessarily the number of beds that they 
have in their camp, as some companies pay for more beds than their camp currently 
has, so that they have the ability to expand in the future. The total number of beds 
within a conservancy is fixed by the size of the area; there is a ratio of one tourist bed 
to every 300 acres to ensure low tourist densities. At the beginning of each year the 
amount needed to run the conservancy is calculated and this is divided by the number 
of beds owned; this is then paid monthly by the tourism partners. For example, the 
Naboisho tourism partners paid KES 60,000 ($690) per bed per month in 2012 (I 21) 
and OMC tourism partners paid $637 (FQ Ol Purkel). There are several reasons why 
the bed charge in OMC is lower than Naboisho’s.  
Naboisho is not yet at capacity and there are more than 300 acres/bed. This means 
that the rental payments for the extra land must be covered by increasing the price for 
each bed. Also, OMC undertake their own management rather than contracting it out, 
which is slightly cheaper. The bed rates are based on the premise that expenses can 
be covered if the camps achieve occupancies of around 30%. If the occupancy goes 
above this, any profit is reportedly held by the tourism partners for financial security 
in the case of tourism downturns, such as following the 2007 election, as well as for 
infrastructure and community welfare projects (Bedelian, 2012: 7). If occupancy 
                                                
92 This data was collected in 2004 during the demise of the Koiyaki Lemek Wildlife Trust, which 
preceded conservancies in Koiyaki.  
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goes below this level, the bed fees must still be paid. At certain points in 2012 one 
camp in the study site was only running at a 3% occupancy rate, but payments 
continued regardless. 
Paying per hectare, as opposed to per tourist, is one of the defining characteristics of 
the conservancies in Koiyaki (I 48).93 Following the collapse in tourism following 
the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007-2008, Thompson et al. (2009: 108) 
doubted the ability of tour operators to continue meeting the guaranteed payments. 
Olare Orok Conservancy was the only conservancy within the study site fully 
operational at this time, but its tourism partners remained fully committed to the 
payments despite the financial hardship (I 3, 81). According to Daniel Sopia, the 
community liaison officer for Motorogi Conservancy, another benefit of this system 
is that families can learn to budget as they know the amount that they will be 
receiving each month (I 87). This arrangement of paying set monthly rents is not 
clear to all tourists, as some conservancy camps charge clients a ‘conservancy fee’ of 
$100 per day in addition to accommodation. This mimics ticket fees for the reserve 
and gives the impression that it is this money that is used to pay landowners. 
Despite the benefits associated with set monthly payments, some individuals 
associated with OMC would prefer a ticket-based system whereby rental payments 
would be a share of a set amount paid per client (I 81). These individuals argue that 
they would receive a higher net total, even though it would vary throughout the year 
and drop alongside decreases in tourist numbers (ibid). One person associated with 
OMC (anon 3) criticised the conservancy approach for not having conservation at its 
heart. This person believed that a ticket-based approach would provide more money 
to improve the land, product and wider area (ibid). According to their calculations, 
given there were around 6500 bed nights in OMC in 2013, if tickets were $120 this 
would have totalled $720,000 (ibid). Expenditure by the conservancy in 2013 was 
approximately $600,000 and so with the ticket system there would have been an 
extra $120,000 to use on community/cattle projects (ibid). This individual proposed 
that an agreed amount could be returned per quarter, as schools restart, in the form of 
a dividend (ibid). This could create an incentive for the landowners to improve their 
                                                
93 Within the former Koiyaki Group Ranch all conservancies use this system, but there are two 
conservancies in the Mara (Lemek and Olchorro Oiruwua) that use a ticketing system. 
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product, in order to increase tourist numbers (ibid). The proponent stressed that this 
approach could still work within the current bed-ratio agreements (ibid). As the 
average camp occupancy is around 30%, spare tickets each day could be sold as 
game viewing tickets to those residing outside of the conservancies (ibid). If, through 
this method, the average occupancy of the conservancy increased to around 45%, this 
would bring in an additional $360,000 in revenue (ibid). 
Tourism partners worry that changing to a ticket based system would incentivise 
high tourist numbers, just like the national reserve, whereas the conservancies want 
to focus on low numbers but higher quality (I21, 74). Such a system might also 
create mistrust between stakeholders, as landowners could accuse camps of not 
declaring all bed night numbers (I 21). Tourism partners argue that they face all of 
the financial risk associated with the conservancies, especially in times of instability, 
and cannot afford to increase payments further (I 72). The creation of a bonus fund 
that tourism partners pay into when occupancies at camps exceed 30% may be a 
compromise.  
As detailed in chapter two, there are allegations of political favouritism within the 
land allocation process (anon 1, 3, 9). Residents in Mbitin noted that they would like 
to have been given land in the conservancy “because those with land there are 
benefiting a lot and it is really helping them” (FG 16). They believe that men who 
were allocated land in Mbitin and the Pardamat Hills were not favoured enough to be 
allocated good land in a conservancy or near a centre (ibid). One interviewee 
suggested that there is a correlation between those who were allocated land inside 
Naboisho Conservancy and allies of a prominent community leader who was 
influential in the land allocation committee (anon 2). When asked, Dickson Kaelo (I 
48) recognised that this leader was probably able to influence decisions and has 
many friends amongst the conservancy landowners, but he stressed that there are also 
members in Naboisho who work against him.  
Only those who were allocated land in certain areas are able to lease their land to the 
conservancies and earn this income. This has created a societal divide and has 
widened income inequality between conservancy and non-conservancy members 
(Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014). Although the rental income ranked second to 
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income from livestock, Osano et al. (2013: 249) and Bedelian (2014) both found that 
households enrolled in conservancies in the Mara had significantly higher cash 
incomes, assets and land ownership than non-conservancy households. In FG 25, 
non-conservancy members stated that they get no benefit from the conservancy. By 
this statement they are referring to direct payments but they also did not 
acknowledge their equal access to grazing and community projects until specifically 
asked.  
Potential wealth inequality between conservancy members and non-conservancy 
members prior to the creation of conservancies was not taken into consideration in 
Osano et al.’s (2013) study. They assume that the higher wealth held by conservancy 
landowners is the direct result of conservancy payments. Bedelian (2014) followed 
this up and undertook propensity score matching94 between conservancy members 
and non-members. After this many differences fell away, suggesting that they are not 
a causal effect of participating in the conservancies but instead represent pre-existing 
wealth inequality (ibid: 188). It is noteworthy that the research for these two papers 
was undertaken between 2008-2010. Only OOC was fully functional at this time, and 
the full effects of the conservancies’ impact on wealth will not have been visible. As 
discussed in chapter six, it is now highly indicative that the conservancies have 
increased the wealth of their members in terms of livestock. 
Multiple research participants pointed out that those who were favoured by the land 
allocation committee often received multiple parcels or had land allocated to their 
wives and children who should not have qualified (anon 1, 3, 9). As a result, the most 
politically connected individuals are often conservancy landowners, as well as 
owning land elsewhere (ibid). Other residents did not perceive any correlation and 
suggested that where land was allocated was purely down to luck (FG 6, 11, 22, 28; 
Courtney, 2009: 40). Reflecting on this inequality issue, the MD of Basecamp 
Explorer suggested that although Maasai society might seem to be quite egalitarian, 
levels of inequality had always been higher than expressed by the Maasai image, 
                                                
94 Propensity score matching (PSM) is a technique that attempts to reduce the effects of selection bias 
by seeking to achieve a balanced distribution of observable covariates across treatment and control 




exemplified by uneven livestock ownership (I 56). Because conservancy 
participation requires that land be within designated (often highly desirable) areas, 
this favoured those who benefited the most from land subdivision. Similarly, it 
prevented the poorest from any involvement, especially those who were not allocated 
any land at all. Consequently, although conservancies may be decreasing wealth 
inequality between conservancy landowners as previously suggested, they also have 
the potential to increase wealth inequality between conservancy members and non-
members (Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014: 249). 
As with land ownership and other household incomes, conservancy lease revenue is 
largely held by the men and does not always reach their wives. Women in FG 6 
debated as to whether the money given to buy food at the weekly market differs if 
your husband is a conservancy landowner or not. They concluded that the wives of 
conservancy landowners “are given the same amount, but before [the conservancy] if 
we wanted 5000 shillings [KES $57] we would have had to sell a cow to get this 
same amount of money” (ibid). Sitting under an acacia tree in Olesere village, FG 4 
explained: 
The conservancies are an advantage to the men because they get the rent and 
they are eating the money. Us as women we don’t receive any benefit of the 
conservancy. It is only since the coming of the women’s groups that the 
women in this area get any help.  
This quote shows the general feeling that the conservancies, like land, are a male 
activity as until recently the women have not seen any direct benefits from them. 
Regarding the sharing of rent money with wives, one man in FG 2 admitted:  
Honestly, there are some men who will just take that money, go and drink it 
and the women at home never see it but there are others who use it to care for 
their wives.  
Similarly, the wife of a conservancy landowner had the following response when 
asked what the payments are used for: 
The men just go and spend it on alcohol. But those who don’t drink alcohol 
they bring the money back to help their families. Many of them don’t make it 
back from Narok [with the money] though. When they go to collect the 
money, they drink it all and their friends have to help them home (FG 4). 




Even though my husband doesn’t drink, when he collects the money from 
Narok, he buys alcohol for his friends with the money. Everyone knows when 
the conservancy money arrives and they go and wait [in Narok] for their 
friends collecting this money so that they can get a drink.  
Although this is generating social capital for these men, women in FG 4 said that if 
they do not bring money back, it causes problems within the family. The wives do 
not feel that they can enquire about this or persuade their husbands to bring the 
money to the family because: “when we [wives] ask them [husbands] about this 
money, we are immediately beaten. You’re beaten… and you’ve not got that money 
and [so] you’ve been taken to the ground for nothing” (FG 9).  
This inequality and perceived misuse of rental incomes95 has led to scepticism with 
regard to the extent to which the conservancies economically benefit local 
communities (Bedelian, 2012). Studies in India (including Garikipati, 2008) have 
shown that if money is given to women it is more effective at alleviating poverty 
because they are more likely to spend it on improving nutrition and paying for 
education. Women in Koiyaki concur with this sentiment. FG 7 said: “the 
conservancies need to find ways to help the women because we would take care of 
our families if we were the ones with the money”. Women in FG 5 detailed how they 
would spend income from the conservancies if they could ‘catch’ it: 
There are so many things that the men don’t know. In terms of the household it 
is only the women who know what is needed. If we were getting the money we 
would buy school uniform for the children, food, clothes, and other things for 
the house. 
FG 6 conceded that despite this dream: “we can never be given the money, the men 
wouldn’t agree.” There are also legal barriers. Women did not qualify for the land 
register for land subdivision. Title deeds are in the men’s names. It is therefore not 
possible for the conservancies to give the rental payments to the wives. Only 5% of 
conservancy landowners in Bedelian’s (2014) Koiyaki-wide study were female, and 
these individuals had largely gained land through inheritance. The conservancies 
hope that the microfinance scheme will empower the local women to earn their own 
money (I 31). As examined in chapter five, initial findings suggest that this 
                                                
95 Although it is important to remember that some men are perceived to be using their income 
productively (I 48, 87). 
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microfinance scheme is increasing the average monthly household contribution of 
the women involved by an average of $25, a 55% increase.  
In addition to the inequality of rental payments, which only benefit those who were 
allocated land in certain areas, and that men benefit more than women, some 
conservancy landowners also receive large additional payments. Individuals who 
have a camp located on their plot of land are paid a bed night fee on top of the 
normal rental agreements. Each camp has their own exact agreement, but in OMC 
this ranges from $8-12 per client per night which is divided between one to four 
camp landowners. An additional $2 bed night fee is also charged for the running of 
the landowner committee. This creates additional annual incomes of up to $17,600 
per camp landowner per year. The exception to this is Olare Mara Kempinski Camp 
as they own rather than rent the land that the camp is located on.  
Before land was allocated in Naboisho it was discussed that, instead of bed night fees 
for the owner of camp plots, this money would be dispersed to the community more 
broadly. However, once land was allocated, this changed. As a compromise, having 
learnt from the experiences in OMC, Naboisho Conservancy shares the $11 per client 
per night fee out between more neighbouring plots. 50% goes to the camp 
landowner(s), 20% is divided between neighbouring landowners and 30% goes into 
the landowner community fund (as noted in chapter four). As a result, in Naboisho, 
the maximum additional income from this is $12,000 per camp landowner per year. 
There are two camps in Naboisho that do not follow this structure. Ol Seki Camp has 
its own arrangements with its plot landowners, set prior to joining the conservancy, 
and Basecamp’s Eagle View Camp is located on community land and so pays a set 
annual $50,000 fee to KGS instead. 
These landowners who benefit greatly from having a camp on their land are not 
randomly selected. During the land subdivision process, prime plots were allocated 
to family, friends or political allies of the land subdivision committee as they knew 
which areas were desirable for camps (anon 1, 9). In addition, OOC’s tourism 
partners were sometimes guided to locate their camp on plots belonging to powerful 
members of the land committee (anon 9). There were also cases of land quickly 
changing hands once the locations of camps were decided (ibid). In many instances it 
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is the same elite individuals who have camps on their land who sit on the 
conservancy landowner committees. One source (anon 8) believes that as a 
consequence of this, they do not fight as hard in committee meetings to increase 
benefits for the general landowners because they are too comfortable and do not want 
to risk losing their perks. Similarly, two interviewees accused the tourism partners of 
not wanting these committee members to be replaced because they have existing 
financial arrangements with these individuals to keep them on side, for example 
through the camp landowner payments (anon 3, 19). The new upcoming movement 
to remove these appointed officials discussed in chapter two stands to severely 
disrupt this status quo. 
Despite this inequitable benefit distribution, James Kaigil (I 9) concluded:  
Because of the conservancies many families have recently got a direct link to 
the tourism sector. Even though the politicians and well-connected people 
tried to grab the good looking places for themselves and can earn the most, 
poor families can now also benefit, unlike before. 
FG 14 argued that the conservancies should also pay rent to those with land outside 
of the borders because the wildlife is not confined within the conservancies. Bedelian 
(2014: 248) agrees that payments for conservation should reach all those incurring 
costs as there is a growing dissatisfaction amongst non-conservancy members which 
could lead to conflict or destructive behaviour (as discussed by Songorwa, 1999 in 
relation to Tanzania). There are on-going discussions regarding the possibility of 
paying a lower rent to those owning land near conservancies, who regularly endure 
human-wildlife conflicts in an attempt to appease residents and reduce retaliatory 
killings of wildlife as well as prevent fencing. Whilst rental payments to 
neighbouring landowners may assist in this, it is unlikely to be a comprehensive 
solution. This is because the main strata of society responsible for the killing of 
wildlife are said to be young men (I 79, 80). Men born after 1980 were too young to 
qualify for land allocation. As a result, paying landowners will not directly benefit 
these young men, or give them any incentive to improve their view of wildlife. It is 
also possible that providing payments will just move the problem further back 
geographically as there will still be a border delineating where landowners are paid 
and where they are not. This could incentivise those not being paid to start killing 
more wildlife in an attempt to also receive payments. Also, as noted, tourism partners 
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have limited budgets and find the existing rent a strain in the current economic 
climate (I 72). They are unlikely to be able to provide contributions high enough to 
be regarded as meaningful over large areas. This would mean that any financial 
support would have to come from donors, eliminating the self-sustainable nature of 
the conservancy model in the Mara.  
Considering all the expenses that tourism partners of the conservancies have to pay, 
it is not an easy option for investors to make a quick profit. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) 
elaborated: 
Investing in a conservancy is very expensive because you have to pay for the 
management, you have to pay for the land and there are so many in-built 
things, you have to pay for a community liaison officer, you have to pay for 
board meetings, there are a lot of other things that you pay compared to a 
normal operator, for example operating in the park [MMNR]. 
Tourism partner Jake Grieves-Cook (I 74) concurred that if the priority of the 
investor is only to make money, the easiest option is to get a plot next to the park. To 
invest in the conservancies he noted: 
You have to be a company who is in it for the longer term and you must want 
to be responsible and ethical. You need to pay attention to environmental and 
conservation issues (ibid).  
Grieves-Cook believes that, as a product, the conservancies’ time is now coming 
because tourists are more discerning and want smaller scale products. Dickson Kaelo 
elaborated that the control brought by this product is one of the main motivators for 
the conservancies’ tourism partners: 
You have a product that you can’t have elsewhere and then you also have 
control because in the park [MMNR] someone can just come next to you and 
build a camp and you have no say. So they have control and they have a 
product. That is their motivation (I 48).    
7.1.2 Employment     
In addition to land rental payments, employment injects money from the 
conservancies into local communities. As one woman in FG 9 said: “getting jobs is 
another good thing about the conservancies.” An elder in Olesere noted: “before [the 
conservancies] our sons didn’t have any jobs and just loitered around. It has, at least, 
helped them and reduced unemployment” (FG 4). Women in FG 11 suggested that 




Here in the home we’re seeing the goodness of tourists coming to these 
camps [in the conservancy] because now many young men who are 
[employed] in those camps are now able to bring their salaries home so that 
we don’t have to sell the sheep, it’s helping us a lot. 
One difference between camps in the conservancies and those within and bordering 
the national reserve is their focus on employing local people, especially in higher 
paid positions. This is the result of a combination of the partnership nature of the 
conservancies and the community capacity building centre, Koiyaki Guiding School 
(I 21). This school was established in 2005, in what is now Naboisho Conservancy, 
with the aim of educating young Maasai men and women as safari guides so that they 
are able to compete for employment in the tourism industry (I 3). As well as 100% of 
guides, conservancy camps aim to source 50% of their total employees from local 
communities (I 16). The newest partner in the conservancies studied, Olare Mara 
Kempinski, had the lowest local employment rate at 20% and their guides are not 
Maasai (I 83). In comparison, Basecamp Explorer conducts in-house training and 
85% of their current full time staff are from the local area, including prestigious 
positions such as chefs and junior managers (I 89).  
These findings regarding local employment counter criticisms that local indigenous 
people only hold menial jobs in tourism (Sindiga, 1994). Middleton (1992: 53) 
termed this exploitation by outsiders the ‘final form of colonialism’. Several camp 
managers expressed a desire to employ an even higher percentage of local staff. They 
are dissuaded by low education qualifications and some managers noted that, in their 
experience, many Maasai employees have a poor work ethic. One camp manager 
explained:  
It is much easier to employ people from other areas who have more 
experience and are easier to work with, but because we’re in a conservancy 
we have to employ local staff whenever possible (anon 12).  
In comparison to criticisms of employment in the tourism industry being seasonal 
(Butler, 2001; Riley and Ladkin, 2002), over 80% of jobs in the conservancies are 
permanent. Staff also reported that camps in the conservancies were very good to 
work for and pay comparatively well (CP 2; I 68). In 2012, through formal 
employment in conservancies within the study site (including camps, conservancy 
management companies and affiliated trusts/foundations) ‘local’ staff (as defined by 
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the camp) earned $683,695 plus an additional estimated $224,000 in tips or bonuses. 
This money, along with that from land rental payments, feeds directly into the local 
economy. Additionally, concerns that employment in tourism may restrict rather than 
complement livelihoods (Duffy, 2002: 51) are lessened by the consideration that the 
conservancies represent livelihood diversification rather than replacement. 
KGS teacher Mike Kahiga believes: “a big problem in this area has been an 
overreliance on livestock as the only source of income, but this is now changing” (I 
44). Joseph Mpoe (I 46), who is a safari guide, estimates that today only 30% of 
families in the Mara rely solely on livestock for their livelihood. He explained that he 
would like to see further changes: 
I want my children to have a better life than mine. My parents didn’t live the 
way I live now, and I want it to continue changing for my children. I want 
them to have a better job and not to rely on cows. If they do rely on cows it 
should be a better breed like the Boran (ibid).  
This highlights a common error in the perception of those involved in development, 
that Maasai are culturally conservative and stubbornly persistent in their rejection of 
more modern ways of being (Hodgson, 2001: 6). Such views ignore the realities of 
pastoral adaption, flexibility and straddling (Anderson and Broch-Due, 2000).  
There are often different reasons for livelihood diversification: 
The poorest diversify out of necessity… through a downward spiral of 
progressive loss of access. Better off households by contrast are likely to 
diversify for risk management, and the wealthiest diversify as a means of 
investing wealth for profit maximisation (Homewood et al., 2006: 20).  
In the Mara the diversification seems to be a combination of the latter two reasons: 
profit maximisation and risk management. Through their study of OOC, Osano et al. 
(2013) found that conservancy payments buffered conservancy landowner 
households from declines in livestock income during times of drought and as such 
reduces pastoral vulnerability. Just as a total reliance on pastoralism leaves 
households open to threats from disease and drought, an overreliance on tourism is 
also risky – as was seen following the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya. 
There are also cultural implications of a total shift in livelihood. James Kaigil 
explained: 
To me, if you become biased on just tourism and conservation that is not 
what Maasai life is all about and it is not all what these people need… Even 
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though I am a conservationist, I think that the big majority of local people’s 
lives still rely on their cattle so I think that it is very good to have a balanced 
system to manage cattle, conservation and tourism… [otherwise] there is a 
big risk in the next 10 years to come (I 8).  
Although there is a desire to diversify, none of the Maasai participants indicated that 
they would like to move away totally from livestock keeping, as discussed in chapter 
six. Individuals who are employed still own livestock; even if they work far from 
their rural home they will have livestock that they leave under the care of their wives 
or a herder. This exemplifies the goal of young people in the Mara today, as shown 
by their drawings of their dream future lives. As discussed in the introduction to 
chapter six, young people do not want to move away from pastoralism despite 
desiring permanent employment. Indeed, employment or other income-generating 
activities may enable more livestock to be bought or, as has been discussed, provide 
cash that can be used to meet the household expenditures reducing the number of 
livestock that need to be sold. 
Conservancy managements and camps each have their own policy with regard to 
employment and how ‘local’ is defined. For some, this refers to any Maasai people 
(FQ Kempinski); for others, those who reside within a specified distance from the 
camp (I 16; FQ Kicheche and Asilia). The general manager of Basecamp Explorer 
noted that to her, ‘local employees’ should be Naboisho Conservancy landowners (I 
89). Although not all companies overtly favour conservancy landowners in their 
delineation of who is local, the selection processes used for seeking employees 
frequently prioritise these individuals and their friends or families. For example the 
manager of Naboisho Conservancy explained that when they are looking for new 
employees he tells the conservancy’s land committee and they suggest people to be 
interviewed (I 76). As a result, most people employed as rangers in Naboisho are 
connected to conservancy landowners (ibid).  
As well as the deliberate or incidental favouring of conservancy landowners for 
employment opportunities, there is other evidence of nepotism. The majority of 
conservancy-affiliated managers indicated that they use their conservancy’s 
community liaison officer when seeking new employees or arranging villages for 
their clients to visit (I 4, 72, 88, 89). Over time, some managers have recognised 
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discrepancies. One camp manager explained that they now realise that many of the 
benefits are being directed by the liaison officer towards his friends and family (anon 
12). The manager of OMC believes that such actions are politically motivated – 
especially as the community liaison position is elected by the landowner committee 
(I 81). One young person confided: “it is practically impossible to get a job in the 
conservancy if you’re not on good terms with the liaison officer, regardless of how 
educated you are” (anon 16). Grace Naisenya, the outreach worker focusing on 
schools, concurred. She explained that: “it is problematic if education levels are not 
the determining factor for employment” (I 62). She continued: “if education is not 
appreciated in this way, young people see no incentive to advance themselves and 
continue with their education” (ibid). Camp managers were enthusiastic regarding 
my suggestion of creating a database detailing individuals seeking employment that 
they could access directly, bypassing intermediaries.  
Five focus groups (5, 7, 9, 10 and 17) noted that they would really like more women 
to be employed in the camps as “we can do anything that the men can do” (FG 17). 
Despite this criticism, the conservancies do seem to be further ahead in this regard 
than other camps in the Mara, especially with regard to Maasai women. This is 
largely the result of female graduates of the Koiyaki Guiding School. Once camps 
take on female guides, who prove very popular with guests, the provision of a female 
area in the staff quarters enables camps to also recruit women in other departments (I 
16). 
7.2 Role of Women in Conservancies 
As noted, many conservancy landowners’ wives claim that they never get to see or 
‘eat’ the rental payments and there are calls for more women to be employed. This 
has led to criticisms that the conservancies only financially benefit men (FG 5). 
Women want to be incorporated into the conservancy structure in the same ways as 
the men, breaking the current gender disparity which is discouraging women (FG 7). 
One lady elaborated: 
For Naboisho, it is side-lining the women but instead it should sit down and 
decide, what should we do for these women? I want the conservancies to stay 
but what can they do for the women? We are the pillars of the family, we 
hold the family together (FG 7).  
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FGs 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 19 all stated that 
what they want most from the 
conservancies is to be able to sell their 
beadwork to the camps and tourists. 
Beadwork is closely associated with the 
Maasai image and women often sit by 
their house or under a tree to bead 
whenever they find the time. During 
focus group sessions women often 
beaded whilst we discussed issues. It is a 
skill that is passed down through the 
generations (see figure 7.1) and is an 
activity of great socio-cultural 
importance (I 50). Maasai women explained that they really want to earn money 
from selling beadwork because it is something that can be done from home whilst 
looking after the children, and that they enjoy doing it (I 17, 50; FG 12). Despite 
these desires, “right now we’re not beading for tourists because we have no way to 
sell to them” (FG 15). 
Although a Basecamp Foundation booklet (2011) cited a plan to expand their 
‘Basecamp Maasai Brand’ handicraft initiative to Naboisho Conservancy in 2011, 
this has not yet come to fruition. Independently of this, during the research period 
there was an informal attempt by a Maasai person connected to the conservancies to 
link ladies with tourists to sell their produce, but promises were made and broken 
(FG 4, 13, 15, 16). Women in FG 16 explained their frustrations: 
When [the person] brought the little money, it didn’t equal the amount of 
beadwork that we made. When we came under this tree to meet them we 
covered this area with beads and they only bring back 3000 shillings [KES 
$34]. Do you think that this is for all of our beadwork? What about the things 
that they went with and sold? And then they come to say that the rest are lost, 
where did they get lost to? 
The transpired events created a great deal of disappointment and mistrust between 
these women and conservancies. When I called the women together for focus groups 
in the areas affected, they initially thought that I was connected to the person 
responsible. This led to an angry reception whereby my research assistant and I were 
Figure 7.1 Kijoolu Soit showing two of her 
daughters how to make an enkarewa necklace 
Photo: C. Courtney 
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called liars and cheats. It was only after their concerns were listened to, and my 
neutrality and independence from the individual was assured, that the sessions were 
able to commence. Even after this experience, these women still long for a route 
through which to sell their beadwork: 
If a camp came and offered that we could go and sell our things we would 
really want this and would agree with it, because it is a development that will 
bring change. So if we wanted to buy clothes for our children or something 
we would have something [money] of our own (FG 15). 
Following the research period, the desire for women to sell their beadwork was 
mentioned to camp managers and owners who responded positively. As a result, 
camps in Naboisho Conservancy came together with Lorna Buchanan-Jardine, the 
manager of Mara Plains Camp in OMC (who was informally working on beadwork 
with some women in Endoinyo e Rinka), and OOMT to create a collaborative 
beadwork project between the conservancies. A unified and more formal approach 
such as this will hopefully prevent the reoccurrence of the circumstances described 
above. This venture is in its infancy but early signs suggest that, with formalisation 
and improvement in the quality of the product, beadwork has the potential to be a 
major economic earner for local women. Camps already involved in OOMT’s new 
beadwork project indicated they are each spending approximately KES 60,000 
($680) to 80,000 ($910) per month on the wares that the women are making. If this is 
extrapolated to all nine camps in OMC and Naboisho, an additional $74,000 - 
$99,000 per year could be injected into the local economy, directly into the women’s 
hands. 
In addition to a greater incorporation into the direct benefit streams from the 
conservancies, women in the bordering communities would also like to be included 
in conservancy meetings and decision-making. FG 9 asserted that currently:  
Women are not in the conservancy, we have no say. But we want to be 
involved and have a say on issues concerning the conservancy because they 
also affect us… We also want to be committee members. 
The exclusivity of participation in the conservancies will now be discussed in more 
detail, expanding beyond a gender-basis.  
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7.3 Participation and Power 
Bianchi (2002) argues that it is not only important to understand whether incomes are 
rising due to tourism, but also whether access to power and resources have increased 
or decreased. In other words, central questions are: who wields the power in tourism 
development and can meaningful partnerships result in a sharing of power with the 
destinations? (ibid). Sharpley (2000: 10-11) argues that because of the dominance of 
western businesses in international tourism, the structure is such that there is a lack 
of community control over resource use. He argues a “significant proportion of 
tourism earnings is lost through overseas leakages” which reinforces global 
socioeconomic inequalities and dependency (ibid). Such criticisms have led to 
allegations that tourism is a vanguard of neo-colonialism (Nash, 1989). Similarly, 
governance in neoliberal conservation is characterized by a reduction in the state’s 
control over conservation in favour of hybrid forms of governance in which 
governments, businesses, NGOs and communities all share responsibility for, and 
opportunity to benefit from, conservation (Igoe and Brockington 2007; Bedelian, 
2014: 20). The presence of these powerful actors within the components of the 
conservancy concept means that it is especially important to assess how participation 
and power are distributed between, and also within, these stakeholder categories.  
Tourism partner companies within conservancies are largely owned by British, South 
African or white Kenyan individuals. But because of the participatory partnership 
nature of the conservancy agreements, power and control are shared, to a degree, 
with conservancy landowners. This reduces overseas leakages and increases the 
economic benefit streams back to the local communities. In comparison, tourism 
activities within the national reserve involves very little, if any, local participation 
and control. In response to criticisms over general calls for participation, the vast 
majority of literature on participation in tourism now advocates that for the greatest 
impact, the highest possible degree of local participation is necessary (Briedenhann 
and Wickens, 2004; Wallace and Russell, 2004; Mat Som, 2005; Sebele, 2010). This 
is termed ‘citizen control’ in Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation, and 
‘self-mobilisation’ in Pretty’s (1995) typology. Manyara (2006) is particularly vocal 
in advocating small scale indigenous community-owned enterprises instead of 
foreign investment in Kenya. Norton-Griffiths et al. (2008: 410) point out that in 
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southern Africa, landowners and communities typically own and manage wildlife 
operations themselves, rather than act as simple concessionaires, and accordingly 
capture a large proportion of wildlife rents (ibid). What they fail to highlight, 
however, is that in southern Africa the wildlife ranches are largely owned by one or 
two individuals who are usually wealthy, well-educated, and have the financial and 
human capacity to manage such operations. In the Mara, this is not the case.  
Community-owned and managed ventures in Kenya commonly encounter obstacles 
with securing the necessary financial capital, finding the required social capital 
locally and reaching their potential markets (Kiss, 1990: 14; Leach et al., 1999: 225; 
Mburu, 2002: 2). This has led to the failure of some projects (ibid). Although 100% 
of the money earned in these ventures is fed directly back into the local economy, 
real revenues may be lower and failure rates higher than ventures partnering with 
tourism investors. Further, in partnerships, communities can be sheltered from the 
risks brought by local or industry wide instabilities. Mburu et al. (2003) concur that 
collaborative wildlife management approaches have low transaction costs for the 
communities involved.!
Participation is not a panacea for communities as it will always be a political process 
with tensions and uneven power relations (Jones and Carswell, 2004). Advocates of 
participation rarely consider who should constitute the participants (Southgate, 
2006). Communities are heterogeneous; notions of a single community voice in 
participation are naive and conceal uneven distributions of power and benefits 
(Sharpe, 1998; Naguran, 1999; Gray, 2002; Southgate, 2006). The marginalised in 
society may find it especially difficult to be equal participants (Scheyvens, 2002; 
Cornwall, 2003). More specifically, as noted in chapter two, De Kadt (1990: 30) 
warns that “calls for community participation gloss over the well-known tendency 
for local elites to ‘appropriate’ the organs of participation for their own benefit”.  
Exemplified by the individuals represented on conservancy landowners committees 
and those who benefit from camp landowners’ bed night fees, elite individuals within 
the study site do benefit disproportionately from conservancies. These individuals 
have the power and confidence to deal with outsiders and ensure that development 
opportunities offer particular gains for themselves and their families. Neumann 
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(1998) suggests that such practices are made possible by facilitators of participatory 
conservation projects often being outsiders who are unfamiliar with the local political 
structures. Consequently, they are ready to blindly embrace the participation of any 
local people (ibid). Unless specific measures are taken to encourage meaningful 
participation in community decision-making by all – including traditionally 
disadvantaged groups – Brohman (1996: 60) warns that local participation may 
simply transfer control over development from one elite group to another. In the case 
of the conservancies, inclusive participation should include non-conservancy 
members, youth and women – especially regarding matters whose influence extends 
beyond that of conservancy landowners.  
Dickson Kaelo (I 48) highlighted that although in many conservation projects the 
control rests with an NGO or the tourism investors, the way that the conservancies 
are structured leaves some power with the community (ibid). Security of tenure gives 
power to negotiate with other stakeholders (Ashley and Roe, 2002; Bedelian, 2014: 
117) and conservancy landowners can influence decision-making to a certain extent 
by holding meetings then taking collective thoughts to tourism partners and 
management, for example, with regard to grazing (Bedelian, 2014: 116). In 
conservancies, power resides most heavily with the land committee who are heavily 
dominated by community leaders (Bedelian, 2014: 244). The individuals on this 
committee are theoretically democratically elected but the same officials who have 
traditionally held positions of power maintain their authority and continue to 
manipulate some benefits. Just as the same individuals who captured leadership 
positions during the group ranch period became influential in the choice of officials 
for the wildlife associations (Thompson and Homewood, 2002), the same can be said 
of conservancies. Conservancies are a new forum whereby the same leaders can exert 
their power (Bedelian: 121). As one conservancy employee (anon 1) noted, the 
existing opinion leaders were used to introduce the conservancies to the communities 
and so have become the big leaders in the conservancy committees, despite being 
widely acknowledged as corrupt. As Naboisho Conservancy was created later, this 
informant thinks that more younger people had become informed about the 
conservancies, and so were more willing to stand up to the established leaders (ibid). 
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To him, this has resulted in a younger, more educated and more informed landowner 
committee in Naboisho compared to the other conservancies (ibid).  
Given the appointment of these individuals and the lack of re-elections, there are 
concerns over their downward accountability to conservancy members (ibid: 244). 
Similarly, Mwangi (2005: 62) found in her study of Eselenkei Conservancy in 
Amboseli that “traditional power structures seem to hinder community involvement 
in the decision making process”. On the other hand, the clout of this committee may 
increase influence in conservancy management and put landowners in a stronger 
position – if they have the same interests (ibid: 127). This is the same problem as 
noted by Hughes (2006a) regarding CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe: all participation 
either reinforces or undermines local power relations. One problem faced by the 
conservancies is the extent to which they can or should try to influence existing 
socio-cultural hierarchies and inequalities; for example, who is represented on 
conservancy committees. Tourism partners are largely leaving the landowners to sort 
out their own power imbalances and it is questionable whether they would like to see 
a hand-over of control to other individuals, because of the favourable agreements 
they have in place. 
As noted in chapter two, throughout 2014 there has been increasing awareness and 
dissatisfaction amongst conservancy landowners regarding their representatives. This 
was spurred on by the realisation that large amounts of money have been 
systematically withdrawn from a conservancy landowners’ fund by its officials (anon 
3). Having taken legal advice, the landowners began forming their own association, 
which then began collectively calling for the resignation of the liaison officer and 
other officials (ibid). In one conservancy, 70% of landowners have now joined the 
association and this unrest has now filtered, in differing degrees, into all 
conservancies within the study site (ibid). Considering that in the Mara it is these 
same officials from each conservancy who form the area wide MMWCA, concerns 
regarding their accountability are compounded. The increasing calls for the 
democratisation of the traditional power structures that have, to date, hindered 
community involvement in decision-making through a top-down approach is the 
realisation of Mwangi’s (ibid: 62-63) recommendation in relation to Eselenkei.  
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At present there are also few attempts being made by conservancies to include non-
conservancy members in the discussion of issues that affect them. For example, in 
November 2013 there was a large two-day workshop organised by Basecamp 
Foundation and MMWCA focused on scaling-up conservancy benefits. Women and 
non-conservancy members currently receive the fewest direct benefits from 
conservancies. Having raised this with one of the workshop organisers, I was asked 
to provide a list of people who fall into these categories who could participate in the 
meeting. Despite doing this, only one local woman (a head teacher) was present at 
the meeting, and no non-conservancy members. The result was that their point of 
view was not directly included in discussions.  
In summary, due to the secure nature of the land tenure in Koiyaki, community 
members have a significant degree of power in the venture, despite partnering with 
powerful capitalist businesses. Economic benefits emanating from the conservancies 
are directed to individuals, as opposed to those targeting the community (chapters 
four and five) or livelihoods (chapter six). As a result, inequalities in the distribution 
of conservancy benefits, and therefore the impact of the conservancies on 
development, are most prominent in those of an economic nature. Although receipt 
of the rental payments is determined by land allocation, the varying degrees of power 
(and thus participation) held by individuals also influence the quantity of economic 
benefits received. Elite members of society simultaneously own more land, due to 
influencing the land committee or buying land that comes up for sale, and have the 
greatest degree of participation by sitting on conservancy committees. Compounding 
this, it is these same individuals who are often the ‘lucky’ ones to have a camp on 
their land and thus receive the large additional bed-night fees. This study has 
confirmed that PES can disproportionately benefit the wealthier members of society 
creating or reinforcing power asymmetries amongst those involved (Kosoy and 
Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014). 
The politics of wildlife revenue control in the Mara continues to be intense and 
conflictual (Thompson and Homewood 2002; Thompson et al 2009; Bedelian, 2014: 
127). 
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 Figure 7.2 Differential returns ($/hectare/year) for agricultural, livestock and wildlife 
production concessions in the ASAL districts (Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010: 378). 
These elite conservancy members receive the highest benefits, but unlike under 
previous models, they do not ‘eat’ all of the revenue. Through conservancies, 
ordinary landowners are now assured that they will directly receive their lease 
payments. This finding is the fulfilment of the potential recognised by Osano et al. 
(2013) that by linking landowners directly to the market, and bypassing community 
level institutions, new neoliberal conservation initiatives in the Mara have the 
potential (and promise) to provide better incomes to those participating in 
comparison to the former wildlife associations. In line with Wunder’s (2008) finding, 
this revenue is having the greatest impact on poorer households. At present, non-
conservancy members perceive that there is an increasing inequality between 
themselves and conservancy members. Whilst rental payments are exclusive to 
conservancy landowners and employment within conservancies has bias towards 
landowners, community projects and grazing access are inclusive of all living around 
the conservancies. This is not currently fully recognised. 
7.4 Economic Land Use Analysis 
Analyses of tourism-conservation initiatives in the Mara (including Norton-Griffiths 
et al., 2008; Bedelian, 2012; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014) have focused on 
their impact on livelihoods, weighing up their relative economic benefits as opposed 
to other land use options. In general, Homewood, Chenevix Trench et al. (2009) are 
critical of claims that community-based wildlife initiatives are improving livelihoods 
in Maasai rangelands. However, they recognise that the Mara case shows that, where 
land-owning households are located near top-end conservation areas, there can be 
significant benefits (ibid: 394). These land use comparisons are heavily dependent 
upon rainfall as net returns from agriculture and livestock-keeping, the two main 
alternative land use options, fluctuate with mean average rainfall (Norton-Griffiths et 






The estimations represented in figure 7.2 (calculated from data collected prior to 
2003) suggest that, in areas with high mean annual rainfall, agriculture produces the 
highest net returns. Above an annual rainfall of 900mm, net returns from livestock 
keeping also exceed high concessions from wildlife production ($50/hectare/year).96 
According to these figures, 600mm annual rainfall is the critical point whereby net 
returns from agriculture equal high concessions from wildlife production. At my 
home in Olesere throughout 2013, rainfall totalled 889mm but this was believed to 
be above average for the area. It is estimated that average annual rainfall for the 
study site would be in the 700-800mm range. At this level, this data indicates that 
agriculture is the most economically beneficial land use option. 
Following the creation of the conservancies, economic land use comparisons have 
continued. Osano et al. (2013: 252-3) compare the OOC lease payments against 
returns from alternative land use options. At the time of their study, OOC’s lease 
payments were $41/ha/yr. They compared this to returns from livestock estimated at 
$38/ha/yr at a mean annual rainfall of 800mm or below (see figure 7.2). Using 
Norton-Griffiths’ figures, Osano et al. (2013: 252-3) acknowledge that at this rainfall 
level, agriculture may yield higher returns ($100/ha/yr) than the conservancy 
concessions.  
In a survey prior to land subdivision in the Maasai Mara Ecosystem, 53% of 
respondents indicated that they would like to cultivate crops once they have 
subdivided plots (Seno and Shaw, 2002). The draw of high net returns from 
agriculture are very appealing to new landowners and there is a very rapid 
conversion to agriculture underway in the Mara, especially north of Lemek 
(Thompson, 2002; Reid et al., 2003; Lamprey and Reid, 2004; Norton-Griffiths et 
al., 2008; Homewood et al., 2009; Homewood et al., 2009; Nyariki, 2009; Thompson 
et al., 2009; Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010; Reid, 2012). This is increasingly 
encroaching on MMNR and its wildlife dispersal areas (ibid). Some research 
participants (including individuals in FGs 2, 14, 20) who were unsatisfied with 
revenues from the conservancies indicated that, once the conservancy leases expire, 
they might convert their land to agriculture. 
                                                
96 The $50/ha/yr figure for the highest revenues received in the Mara was calculated during the time of 
wildlife associations, prior to conservancies.  
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Gerard Beaton (I 21), whose family has been heavily involved in farming in Kenya, 
conceded that conservancy rental payments are less than half of what they get for 
wheat in Ngorigori. But in his opinion, very little of the area where the conservancies 
are located would be viable for wheat, owing to the quality of the land and amount of 
rock (ibid). Lamprey and Reid (2004) and Thompson et al. (2009) concur that this 
area is not as agriculturally productive as other parts of the Maasai Mara ecosystem. 
Osano et al. (2013) add that undertaking agriculture this close to the reserve would 
have high costs in terms of wildlife damage to crops. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) also 
pointed out that where land is being fenced and crops grown within this area, it is not 
actually the Maasai who are doing this agricultural work. Other communities come in 
to farm the land (ibid). One of my research assistants, Lorna Serseri is from 
Ololulunga where many Maasai lease their land for agriculture. She confirmed that 
the landowner only receives a little of the profit earned from the crops that are grown 
on their land by Kalenjin farmers (I 68). 
Analyses of the economic impact of the conservancies have, to date, not 
encompassed all revenue streams. The financial contributions of conservancies to 
neighbouring communities extend well beyond the rental payment used by Osano et 
al. (2013) in their land use value comparison. Consequently, this land use option has 
been greatly undervalued. In an attempt to calculate a more comprehensive land use 
value for conservancies, all tourism partners, conservancy managers and 
conservancy-affiliated organisations were asked specific financial questions for 2012 
so that cumulative totals could be calculated. For camps97 this included wages and 
tips to local employees, village visits, donations98 and the bed night fee for the owner 
of the land where the camp is located. Conservancy managements provided details 
regarding payments to local employees and revenue collected in fines. OOMT and 
BCFK detailed the amount of money spent in the area as a result of the 
                                                
97 N.B. For the 2012 period two camps in OMC were not yet fully functional. Olare Kempinski Camp 
provided some data for their local employment during this period but no figures were included for 
Mahali Mzuri Camp in Motorogi as this did not open until August 2013. Therefore, as well as 
increases in payments each year, these figures will be higher now, as two additional camps are now 
fully functional. 
98 This category is donations that are not processed through OOMT or BCFK; for example, donations 
to Kicheche Community Trust or direct donations given to local projects. 
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conservancies’ presence. Money from donors working through these organisations 
who would have donated regardless of the conservancies’ presence was excluded.  
Although the intention is to compare these figures with agriculture and pastoralism, 
more comprehensive calculations to include employment and community projects 
were not made for these two land use options. This is because in agriculture, it is 
generally not local Maasai people who are employed to do the work. In pastoralism 
either family members herd the livestock or Maasai from outside of the Mara are 
employed. Young men in the Mara will not usually work for the small wages offered 
for herding. Also, no projects are known to have resulted from either of these forms 
of land use. Therefore, these two land use options do not provide the same additional 
revenue streams associated with conservancies that, it is argued, need to be 
incorporated into comparative economic land use analysis. The figures for this 
analysis are detailed in table 7.2 below. 
Table 7.2 Comprehensive Annual Conservancy Land Use Values ($) 




Landowner payments including land 
rent, relocation grants and landowner 
community fund 
553,964 43.4 660,680 32 
Conservancy management and camps 
incl. LOCAL employees’ wages plus 
tips, village visits and payments to 
camp landowner 
446,307 (2 camps 
not yet fully 
functioning) 
 623,129  
Donor money due to conservancies 220,154  1,009,800  
Total community income 1,220,425 95.67 2,303,609 118.13 
Grazing fines -16,800  -12,383   
Total with deduction 1,203,625 94.35 2,291,226 117.50 
Local purchases (camps and 
management) 
31,336  95,677  
Total with purchases 1,234,961 96.81 2,386,903 122.4 
Estimation fully functioning 
(without local purchases) 
1,425,259 111.7 2,291,226 117.50 
As table 7.2 outlines, analysis for OMC revealed that $553,964 was paid directly to 
conservancy landowners as rental payments in 2012. In addition, the three 
functioning camps (plus a small amount from the developing Olare Kempinski 
Camp) together with the conservancy management company contributed $446,307 to 
the local economy.99 With the addition of OOMT’s expenditure from sources that 
                                                
99 OOMT’s $5 bed fee payments from camps are not included in this figure as they are part of the 
OOMT expenditure amount and should not be counted twice. 
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would not have donated were it not for the presence of the conservancy, OMC’s total 
for 2012 is $1,220,425. Grazing fines for the year totalled $16,800 which equates to 
3% of land rent payments. When subtracted, this leaves $1,203,625. Dividing this 
total by the 12,756 hectares that made up OMC in 2012 produces a land use value of 
$94.35/ha/yr. If indirect benefits through local purchases in the form of food, paying 
for water from local boreholes, car hire and the purchase of beadwork are included, 
this adds an additional $31,336 and increases the figure to $96.81/ha/yr. The reason 
that these local expenditures are separated is that it cannot be determined what 
proportion of this amount is profit. For example, if a lady sells a necklace to a camp 
for $7 this is not 100% profit as she has to buy the materials to make it. Costs 
associated with predation are also not included. This is because predators were 
killing livestock prior to the creation of the conservancies and there is no evidence as 
to whether this has increased since these predators have received greater protection 
and are thriving inside conservancies, or decreased owing to initiatives aimed at 
reducing and preventing human-wildlife conflicts. In 2010 Bedelian’s (2014: 142) 
survey participants estimated that the mean annual household cost of predation is 
$310 but the Mara Lion Project’s chief project officer (I 105) believes that the 
figures given by households are inflated. 
In Naboisho, although the rental payment rate is lower, the area is larger. The total 
paid to conservancy landowners in 2012 was $660,680. Within this, landowners’ 
contributions to their community initiative (which in 2012 was building classrooms) 
totalled $11,738. The five core camps in Naboisho (excluding Porini in Olkinyei) 
together with the management company contributed $623,129 to the local economy. 
Combining the landowner payments, camp contributions, 60% of the tourism partner 
fund,100 contributions from the management company and money entering the area 
through BCFK (again only that which would not be included if it was not for the 
conservancy’s presence) totals $2,303,609. Grazing fines in 2012 totalled $12,383 
which was 1.9% of rental income. When subtracted from the running total this leaves 
$2,291,226. When this total is divided by the 19,500ha which the conservancy was 
comprised of in 2012, the land use figure is $117.5/ha/yr. Camps and management in 
Naboisho Conservancy indicated that they spent significantly more than OMC on 
                                                
100 The other 40% of this is not included here as it was used to register the land leases. 
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local purchases. This totalled $95,677 and was bolstered by Basecamp’s Maasai 
Brand beadwork project sales, paying for water usage and more food being bought 
locally. Again, the percentage profit within this expenditure cannot be determined, 
but if it is included in the figures the land use value for Naboisho Conservancy 
increases to $122.4/ha/yr. 
These two figures (excluding local purchases), $94.35/ha/yr for OMC and 
$117.5/ha/yr for Naboisho are not dissimilar. As two camps in OMC were not yet 
fully functioning in 2012, the land value for this conservancy will have subsequently 
increased further. If it is presumed that the two new camps in OMC have the same 
average finances as the other three, already functioning camps, this income would 
increase OMC’s land use value to $111.7/ha/yr. These figures are significantly 
higher than the rental payments alone, the figure previously used for land use 
comparisons. For OMC this figure of $111.7/ha/yr is 2.5 times higher, and for 
Naboisho the $117.5/ha/yr figure is 3.6 times higher.  Similarly, Bedelian (2014: 
154) found that conservancy rent revenue only accounts for 47% of conservation 
incomes within Koiyaki.  
It is important to recognise that, rather than being the amount accruing to each 
conservancy landowner per hectare, the figures calculated here represent the money 
going into the local area more broadly for every hectare leased to the conservancy. 
As this chapter has discussed, economic benefits accruing from conservancies are not 
dispersed evenly within society. Although landowners can be encouraged to assess 
land use options by the value that they bring to the wider community rather than at 
the individual level, decisions regarding land use are increasingly taken at the 
household level. OMC manager Rob O’Meara (I 103) warned that if just 5% of 
people whose land is compatible with wheat decide to take that option, everyone else 
would be affected. For example, one of the focus groups which showed an interest in 
changing its land use was made up of men from Olkuroto (FG 20). This village is 
centrally located between three conservancies and so land use change here would 
have far-reaching implications.  
Norton-Griffiths et al. (2008: 409) estimate that wildlife rents of between $100-
150/ha/yr are required for wildlife to survive on significant areas of the Mara. This is 
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the amount required to match the land-rent value of agriculture in areas with mean 
annual rainfall around 800mm in figure 7.2. The new land use value analysis detailed 
above suggests that if a comprehensive view is adopted and all revenue streams are 
taken into account, the conservancies within the study site are entering this range. 
Thus they are competing to be the most economically beneficial land use option. 
This directly contradicts current perceptions amongst landowners within the study 
site that growing wheat is the most lucrative use of land. It will be interesting to see 
how landowners react to this analysis and whether they will recognise the indirect 
revenue streams, such as employment and projects, or whether they will want to 
make land use decisions based purely on the quantity of money entering their 
personal bank accounts.  
There are also other conservancy impacts that are difficult to put a figure on. Dickson 
Kaelo (I 48) believes that the conservancies are largely improving the quality of the 
land, as opposed to degrading it like farming, and so the value of the land will be 
increasing. Also, unlike agriculture, conservancies are compatible with pastoralism. 
Ecotourism works better if it does not threaten or interfere with main sources of 
livelihood (Kiss, 2004). Tourism does not need to out-compete pastoralism because, 
as discussed, conservancies diversify rather than replace pastoralism as a livelihood. 
This is especially important considering the socio-cultural importance of livestock to 
the Maasai. Further, chapter six detailed that the conservancies may even be having a 
positive impact upon livestock keeping within the study site. Any assistance that the 
conservancies can give to livestock keeping – for example through the grazing 
schemes – increases its land use value further. Unfortunately I was unable to quantify 
the value of this within this study. 
7.5 Concluding Thoughts – Economic Implications 
Mihalic (2002: 81-82) Kosoy and Corbera (2010), Koronbery and Hubacek (2013) 
and Bedelian (2014) all question whether host communities in less developed 
countries are able to attain a comparative advantage and profit from the tourism or 
neoliberal conservation initiatives. Due to the secure nature of the land tenure in 
Koiyaki, community members have a significant degree of power in the venture, 
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despite partnering with powerful capitalist businesses. Chapter three confirmed that 
communities see resultant income and employment as a form of development.  
Economic benefits emanating from the conservancies are directed to individuals, as 
opposed to those targeting the community (chapters four and five) or livelihoods 
(chapter six). As a result, inequalities in the distribution of conservancy benefits, and 
therefore inequalities in the impact of the conservancies on development, are most 
prominent in those of an economic nature. Although receipt of the rental payments is 
determined by land allocation, the varying degrees of power (and thus participation) 
held by individuals also influence the quantity of economic benefits received. As 
commonly occurs in tourism fuelled development, elite members of the local 
communities maintain positions of authority and attain more benefits (De Kadt, 
1990: 30), leading to an increased social stratification (Stronza, 2001). Elite members 
of society simultaneously own more land, due to influencing the land committee or 
buying land that comes up for sale, and have the greatest degree of participation by 
sitting on conservancy committees. Compounding this, it is these same individuals 
who are often the ‘lucky’ ones to have a camp on their land and thus receive the large 
additional bed-night fees. The accountability of these individuals to the wider group 
of conservancy members is also questionable. This study has confirmed that PES can 
disproportionately benefit the wealthier members of society creating or reinforcing 
power asymmetries amongst those involved (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg 
and Hubacek, 2013; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014). The politics of wildlife 
revenue control in the Mara continues to be intense and conflictual (Thompson and 
Homewood 2002; Thompson et al 2009; Bedelian, 2014: 127).  
These elite conservancy members receive the highest benefits, but unlike under 
previous models, they do not ‘eat’ all of the revenue. Through conservancies, 
ordinary landowners are now assured of directly receiving their lease payments. This 
finding is the fulfilment of the potential recognised by Osano et al. (2013) that by 
linking landowners directly to the market, and bypassing community level 
institutions, new neoliberal conservation initiatives in the Mara have the potential 
(and promise) to provide better incomes to those participating in comparison to the 
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former wildlife associations. In line with Wunder’s (2008) finding, this revenue is 
having the greatest impact on poorer households.  
Although the money earned through conservancies filters through households and 
surrounding villages to a certain extent, the exclusivity of economic conservancy 
benefits often leaves women and non-conservancy members feeling disenfranchised 
(FG 7, 14). Consequently, these individuals see little motivation to conserve wildlife 
or tolerate it on their non-conservancy land (ibid). In addition, these same 
stakeholders are rarely included in the decision-making process, even when this 
affects the community more generally. At present, non-conservancy members 
perceive that there is an increasing inequality between themselves and conservancy 
members. Whilst rental payments are exclusive to conservancy landowners and 
employment within conservancies has bias towards landowners, community projects 
and grazing access are inclusive of all living around the conservancies. This is not 
currently widely recognised. 
The land use comparison analysis undertaken in this chapter has produced new and 
revealing findings. At present some landowners perceive that the land rental 
payments from conservancies are too low when compared to other options such as 
agriculture, and consequently deliberate changing land use. This analysis has shown 
that when a broader view of money entering the area as a result of the conservancies 
is adopted, as opposed to sole consideration of individual rental payments to the 
landowners, land use values converge. Recognition that not all of the land within the 
study site is suitable for wheat farming would push conservancies ahead of 
agriculture in terms of which land use produces the highest net returns. Further, 
quantification of the extent to which conservancies support pastoralism would 




8 Sustainable Africapitalism  
Having analysed grassroots interpretations of development by a myriad of 
stakeholders in chapter three, three key development indicators were identified. In 
the subsequent chapters I examined perceptions of the impact of the conservancies 
on these indicators within the study site. These were: community development 
initiatives targeting basic needs, pastoralism and economic implications. Although 
multiple problems and issues have been identified and discussed, each of these 
chapters found that the conservancies, which are a form of neoliberal capitalism, are 
perceived to be having a positive impact on local development by the majority of 
research participants. This discovery is significant, coinciding as it does with 
increasing global interest in a private-sector approach to development. The 
conclusion of this thesis is not purely an abstract product of analysis. The fact that 
the conservancies are businesses and yet are still acting as development agents was 
recognised by several stakeholders within the study site. For example, men in 
Enooronkon (FG 8) summarised: 
The conservancy has appeared, and it is good. When drought comes we can 
access grass easier because of the conservation of grass in the conservancy. 
And also now because of the conservancy, people are no longer cutting down 
the trees there and as a result we get more rain… We are also now getting 
facilities in our villages and our sons are being employed… It is also a business 
to make money but it is helping everyone. So those are our opinions about the 
conservancy. 
To assess the broader implications of this research, an analysis of the role of business 
in development is necessary. Neoliberal approaches can have negative consequences 
on development (such as those discussed by Chomsky, 1999; Boas and Gans-Morse, 
2009). However, this thesis has demonstrated that when capitalism is conscious of its 
impact upon its surroundings, the role of business in development can be significant. 
This chapter will assess how this case study relates to current literature on conscious 
capitalism. This will include discussions on the concepts “inclusive capitalism”, 
“creating shared value”, and “Africapitalism”. Following this, literature pertaining to 
the expansion of the role of neoliberalism within the conservation field, and 
specifically public-private partnerships such as ecotourism ventures, will be 
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analysed. This section expands upon the introduction to neoliberal conservation in 
chapter two and will highlight how the very essence of the conservancy concept has 
evolved within a capitalist mind-set. I will then reflect on the implications of the 
findings resulting from this chapter. Specifically, I will consider lessons that can be 
learnt from this case study regarding the broader implications of using business as a 
development tool, highlighting the relative pros and cons of this approach. This 
chapter will address the third research question: assessing the bigger implications of 
this research. In terms of the literature framework in chapter two, this chapter will 
reflect upon criticisms of caplitalism in light of the findings from this study and 
explore what lessons can be learnt for both inclusive capitalism and Africapitalism.  
8.1 Private Sector Development 
While shifting definitions of responsibility give the impression that corporate 
responsibility is a fad, the idea of companies having an obligation towards society 
has a long history (Blowfield, 2008). Despite this, in media and through campaigns, 
business went through a period of being portrayed as exploitative of poverty (ibid). 
Porter and Kramer (2011) believe that this problem has been exacerbated by policy 
choices in which the presumed trade-offs between economic efficiency and social 
progress have been institutionalised in an attempt to address social weaknesses at the 
expense of business.  
Now, increasing attention is being paid to the idea of business as a solution 
(Blowfield, 2008). Organisations including NGOs, and international organisations 
such as the World Bank, World Trade Organisation (WTO), and United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) are all promoting business strategies for 
development. The Millennium Development Goals also refer to a “global partnership 
for development” (MDG 8) in which there is a role for companies. This is being 
explicitly targeted by the UN Commission on the Private Sector and Development 
that UNDP launched in 2003 (UN News Centre, 2003). ‘Unleashing 
Entrepreneurship: Making Business work for the Poor’ in 2004, ‘Growing Inclusive 
Markets’ in 2006 and ‘Business Call to Action’ in 2008 have all been UNDP 
initiatives focusing upon realising the potential power of business for development 
(UNDP, 2012).  
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There are a multitude of ways in which this potential power could be realised 
through alternative approaches to capitalism, but as with community-based 
conservation and community-based ecotourism, despite this optimism, doubts and 
criticisms remain (Kolk and van Tulder, 2006; Karnani, 2009: 38). The following 
section will examine some of the alternative approaches put forward and will 
examine the arguments presented by both advocates and critics. Where appropriate, 
the conservancies’ case study will be brought in to support or counter the literature. 
Porter and Kramer (2011: 75) state: “Not all profit is equal. Profits involving a social 
purpose represent a higher form of capitalism, one that creates a positive cycle of 
company and community prosperity”. This statement proposes that there are multiple 
forms of capitalism, with some ‘higher’ than others but does not address why such 
alternative capitalisms may be required. Advocates of free markets having a 
singularly important role make the case that business cannot cause poverty if it acts 
rationally because the market is the most effective way of determining price and 
allocating resources (Blowfield, 2008: 7). Even if this is accepted, power 
asymmetries that favour certain business actors mean that there are wide disparities 
in how trade proceeds are distributed (Raynolds et al. 2004). Similarly, the power 
that some brand-owners hold as gatekeepers to lucrative consumer markets results in 
manufacturers having limited bargaining power over price or specification 
(Blowfield, 2008: 7). Consequently, labour becomes one of the few areas where 
management can influence profitability, with the result that long hours and abusive 
labour practices become common (ibid). In other words, whilst capitalism is 
theoretically a rational and efficient entity, power imbalances can result in 
inequitable benefit distribution, often with the poorest receiving the smallest share 
and the environment being damaged. More broadly, Harvey (2007) criticises 
neoliberalism for being a project to restore class dominance, channelling wealth from 
subordinate classes to dominant ones. It is this inequality that alternative capitalisms 
aim to address through a business-poverty agenda.  
In many instances, perhaps the majority, poverty is still not a consideration in 
investment decisions and business actions, with corporations positioning themselves 
as bystanders (Blowfield, 2008: 6). Yet some companies are increasingly becoming 
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aware of the potential benefits. The business-poverty relationship is multi-faceted 
and there are several different approaches that have been suggested as to how 
capitalist businesses can influence development. These include minimising costs and 
bringing the poor into the market as consumers or producers, as well as more 
fundamental changes such as bringing a development focus into core business 
structures (ibid).  
Over time, requirements for companies to mitigate damage and comply with human 
rights and environmental standards have strengthened and become part of normal 
operations (Ashley, 2009). This focus has been to ‘do no harm’ and ‘clean up 
damage’ rather than create new value (ibid). Corporate responsibility programs 
reacting to external pressures have largely emerged to improve firms’ reputations and 
are treated as a necessary expense. Anything more is seen as an irresponsible use of 
shareholders’ money (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Kramer and Kania (2006) describe 
the distinction between these two approaches as ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ 
corporate responsibility. Defensive strategies are intended to address problems of the 
business’ own making, for example by protecting its reputation and reducing its legal 
liabilities (ibid). In contrast, offensive strategies involve companies investing their 
resources and competencies either alone or in partnership with others in initiatives 
(ibid). Examples of offensive strategies are funding the construction of a local school 
or promoting the use of local entrepreneurs as suppliers. 
Blowfield (2008: 2) makes another distinction within the business-development 
nexus and divides business’ influence into being a development tool, or a 
development agent. When business acts as a development tool (ibid), which can also 
be termed business-in-development (Amaeshi, 2014), positive outcomes such as job 
and wealth creation and the satisfaction of basic needs such as goods and services 
can be achieved. Business acting as a tool does not hold itself accountable for 
causing, preventing or alleviating poverty (Blowfield, 2008: 2). In contrast, business 
acting as a development agent (ibid), or business-for-development (Amaeshi, 2014), 
takes conscious intentional actions because of poverty. Expanding on this, Blowfield 
(2008: 14) notes: 
This is not simply a restatement of the centrality of business to the capitalist 
economy as a source of employment, goods and services, and wealth. Rather it 
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is the belief that business can consciously invest in ways that are 
simultaneously commercially viable and beneficial to the poor. 
Blowfield (ibid: 15) argues that it is important to distinguish between companies that 
serve the poor (development tools) and ones that factor poverty alleviation outcomes 
into their decisions and strategies (development agents). This is because he advocates 
that financial performance ultimately should be a less important indicator than social 
outcomes (ibid). This is not to say that companies should approach poverty as a 
social enterprise where profits are unimportant (ibid). To be profitable can require 
unconventional business models in such terms as understanding the market; 
designing products; and the collaborations that are required (ibid). There are various 
instances whereby companies collaborate with NGOs to identify needs and deliver 
products (ibid), as will be discussed in more detail shortly. Actions undertaken by the 
conservancies fall into the category of business acting as a development agent, 
therefore this aspect is of most interest within this thesis. 
The intention of inclusive business is that through purposeful action, the business 
model can be adapted, not just to avoid damage, but to unleash greater development 
impacts while still being driven by commerce (Ashley, 2009: 7). The aim is to have a 
greater developmental impact than conventional corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) (ibid). Although the term CSR is sometimes used to encompass more 
comprehensive approaches, Ashley (ibid: 5) and Porter and Kramer (2011) argue that 
altering core business practice differs from CSR. Their rationale of this is that the 
latter is widely considered an optional add-on – a reaction to external pressure – 
which is not fundamental to the business and can be divorced entirely from day-to-
day activities (ibid). Although the annual report of almost every large company 
claims its mission is to serve some larger social purpose besides making profits 
(Karnani, 2009: 41), Crook’s article on CSR in The Economist concluded that for 
most large public companies, “CSR is little more than a cosmetic treatment” (2005: 
5).  
8.1.1 Creating Shared Value 
Creating Shared Value (CSV) is a concept created by Porter and Kramer (2011) 
which has similarities with CSR, but also significant differences. Simply put, it can 
be seen to be a more strategic approach to CSR in which initiatives are profit 
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maximising as well as socially beneficial (ibid). The logic behind the commitment to 
communities incorporated in CSV is recognition that societal needs, not just 
conventional economic needs, define markets (ibid). In spite of this self-interest 
approach, Porter and Kramer advocate for CSV over CSR as they purport: 
“companies acting as businesses, not charitable donors, are the most powerful force 
for addressing the pressing issues [societies] face” (ibid: 2). As such, whilst CSR is 
widely viewed as an optional add-on to businesses, CSV represents a more inclusive 
business approach in search of the evasive win-win scenario. Again, this approach of 
undertaking philanthropy to directly support business interests is not new and can be 
dated back to the great industrial philanthropists of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (Sawaya, 2008). 
General motivators for companies to adopt inclusive business approaches include: 
improving reputations and gaining competitive advantage, market growth, and/or 
strong localised supply chains (Ashley, 2009: 6). This is undertaken so long as the 
costs, which are mainly short-term, can be outweighed by the benefits, which are 
largely long-term (ibid). Looking specifically at whether businesses will take on a 
development agent role, Blowfield (2008) presents three basic conditions that dictate 
the likelihood of action. First, business is more likely to act when poverty is 
associated with an identifiable risk to the company or industry, including risks to 
reputations, production, or the availability of commodities. An example of this is 
Cadbury’s Cocoa Partnership aimed at preventing long-term shortages in the 
commodity. This initiative involved a total investment of £45 million ($76 million) 
over 10 years to secure the social and environmental sustainability of around one 
million cocoa farmers and their communities in Ghana, Indonesia and the Caribbean 
(ibid: 12-13). The second condition is that business is more likely to act when 
poverty offers a favourable return on investment (ibid). For example Safaricom101 
recognised the need of migrant workers to remit money home and so launched the 
                                                
101 Formed in 1997, Safaricom is the leading mobile phone network provider in Kenya. It is a 
subsidiary of Telkom Kenya and the UK’s Vodafone Group Plc who own 40% and have the 
management responsibility for the company.  
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M-Pesa mobile phone money transfer scheme102 in Kenya as a way of providing a 
service to an under-served market (ibid: 16). The third condition notes that business 
is more likely to act when poverty is associated with inefficiency, exemplified by 
education programmes of companies such as Anglo American and Cisco Systems 
(ibid: 19).  
Blowfield suggests that development lying outside the scope of these three 
conditions is unlikely to be addressed by business overtly (ibid: 19-20). This 
highlights one of the key disadvantages to using business for development, a 
complexity which advocates often overlook: it is only realistic under certain 
conditions. Businesses will only become a development agent and enter the world of 
inclusive capitalism if they are to benefit by doing so. Further, within each industry 
sector there are additional factors limiting the potential reach of this development 
approach. For example, there are only certain locations viable as successful tourist 
destinations. This restricts the locations able to capture any resultant benefits from 
this industry. Yet such limitations do not prevent positive outcomes accruing when 
these criteria are met. 
The conservancies meet all three of the development agent conditions stated by 
Blowfield, to a greater or lesser extent. For example, low development levels around 
the conservancies restrict camps from employing locally (which is desired by 
community members, especially landowners). Therefore, it is the interest of the 
camps to support initiatives such as Koiyaki Guiding School which enhances local 
social capital. It could also be argued that the lease agreement with the conservancy 
landowners, for which they receive the monthly payments, represents a favourable 
return on investment. Blowfield’s first condition is the most significant in this case 
study; a lack of development is a major risk for the tourism partners. Chapters four 
and five highlighted the fact that there is an expectation for conservancies to hold a 
degree of responsibility for developing the area. This is through three main routes: 
community initiatives, grazing schemes and economic advancement. Discontentment 
                                                
102 M-Pesa is the result of DFID funded research that highlighted the need for a system whereby 
money can be transferred by mobile phones in Africa. The idea was then introduced to Vodafone who 
had been discussing similar microfinance projects.  
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within local communities has the potential to remove the commodities – land and 
wildlife – upon which the conservancies depend.  
8.1.2 Africapitalism 
Another possible motivating factor for businesses to give greater consideration to the 
environment and societies in which they function, is patriotism and a resurgence of 
the importance of place in this globalised world. At a conference in Nairobi in 
December 2011 the Nigerian economist Tony Elumelu introduced the term 
‘Africapitalism’ (All Africa, 2011). In the United Kingdom, this concept has been 
popularised by two articles in The Guardian by Afua Hirsch (2013) and Kenneth 
Amaeshi (2013). Elumelu insists that Africapitalism is not capitalism with an African 
twist, but rather “an economic philosophy that embodies the private sector’s 
commitment to the economic transformation of Africa through investments that 
generate both economic prosperity and social wealth” (cited by Amaeshi, 2013). 
Africapitalism does not ask businesses to be philanthropists. As with other inclusive 
capitalism approaches, although the long-term investments should be beneficial for 
the locale by creating social wealth, they also stimulate profit for the investors.  
Capitalism encounters different circumstances around the world, and business 
practices in Africa differ from those in other locations (Elumelu, 2013: 12). In China 
there is limited private equity ownership, while family-run multi-national 
conglomerates dominate the business landscape in India and Korea (ibid). In Africa 
there are new challenges or opportunities such as increasing populations, labour 
pools, spending power and accelerating reforms which create various demands (ibid). 
Partly as a result of striving to meet these challenges, Africa has been the location of 
some of the most advanced concepts guiding the development of global business 
today such as the ‘double bottom line’103 and Porter and Kramer’s CSV (ibid).  
Amaeshi (2013) proposes that the emotive power of Africapitalism is not necessarily 
a new phenomenon, as economic patriotism and nationalism played significant roles 
in the rebuilding of Western Europe following World War II, as well as in 
contemporary China. He asserts that as economic development is both a rational and 
                                                
103 While all businesses have a conventional bottom line to measure their fiscal performance, 




an emotional project it is not surprising that there is a resurgence of sentiments in 
economics and finance in the wake of the recent global financial crisis (ibid). 
Elumelu (2012) stresses that the term ‘African private sector’ does not necessarily 
mean African indigenousness, and he urges all entrepreneurs and investors who do 
business in Africa to come together and show greater commitment to the economic 
transformation of the continent. Despite this, all case studies of Africapitalism 
documented to date (see Elumelu, 2013; Linnay, 2013) are undertaken by nationals 
of the country where the business is undertaken.  
The case study of the Mara Conservancies augments discussions on Africapitalism 
by showing African and non-African investors working together with a shared 
commitment to undertake business responsibly. This multi-national approach to 
Africapitalism conforms to Elumelu’s ideals in a way that other case studies to date 
do not. Instead of making distinctions along nationality lines, it is affinity with the 
locale that appears to be the influencing factor amongst tourism partners, with regard 
to how they perceive the developmental responsibility of their businesses. Tourism 
partners who have grown up in the Mara or who have either been visiting the area for 
a long time or spent a long time there over a shorter period,104 appear to be the most 
committed to ensuring that the conservancies are integrated within surrounding 
communities and have a positive impact. To a large extent this may be because they 
recognise the potential threat brought by unsatisfied community members. In 
contrast, instead of explaining how involvement in development is an integral part of 
the conservancy approach, those affiliated with new tourism partners (including I 83) 
who do not have a close affinity to the area used terms such as CSR when discussing 
their interaction with communities. 
Amaeshi (2013) anticipates that Africapitalism embodying an Africa-consciousness, 
a form of reimagined Afrocentricism which places the interests of Africa and 
Africans at the epicentre of business decisions, will guide Africa's renaissance. The 
inclusion of Africonsciousness within capitalism, represented by Africapitalism, 
helps to neutralise the onslaught of globalisation (ibid). The key distinction between 
Africapitalism and more general forms of conscious capitalism is the importance of 
                                                
104 It is important to note that growing up in the area or visiting it frequently does not indicate that 
these individuals are Kenyan, or even African citizens.  
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place. Approaches and actions are specifically adapted to the locale and the aim is to 
meet the genuine development needs of African people within that specific context, 
regardless of the nationality of the business decision-maker.  
Returning to the broad remit of alternative approaches to capitalism, there is a body 
of thinking that equates the opportunity to engage in free market activity with ethical 
outcomes (see Easterly, 2006; Sachs, 2006). From this have flowed various attempts 
to encourage businesses to help the poor by showing there is a positive business case 
to be had from operating at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’105 (BoP) (McFalls, 2007; 
Blowfield and Dolan, 2010: 144). Prahalad’s book The Fortune at the Bottom of the 
Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits urges the poor to be recognised as 
“resilient and creative entrepreneurs and value-conscious consumers” (Prahalad, 
2009: 25).  
8.1.3 Bottom of the Pyramid 
Bottom of the Pyramid approaches tend to blur the distinction made by Blowfied 
(2008) between business as a development tool and as a development agent. 
Businesses tapping into the purchasing power at the bottom of the pyramid would 
seem to equate to the development tool notion, as it implies that the poor represent a 
rational, if overlooked, business opportunity (ibid: 14). However, BoP advocates 
argue that these approaches are an example of business as a development agent, 
because “by meeting the needs of the poor, business can increase their productivity 
and incomes, and be an engine of empowerment, not least by allowing them to enter 
into the formal economy” (ibid). In other words, they argue that by selling to the 
poor, companies can help eradicate poverty. This proposition is not universally 
accepted. Karnani (2009: 40) argues that poor people do not necessarily do or want 
what is truly in their best interests, for example, spending available cash on impulse 
purchases (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010) or 
alleviating short-term suffering or stress through alcohol and tobacco at the expense 
of economic prosperity in the long-term (Karnani, 2009: 41). Karnani (ibid: 43) also 
believes that the ability of the poor to be entrepreneurs, which is the other aspect of 
the BoP approach, has been romanticised; most people do not have the skills, vision, 
                                                




creativity and persistence to be an entrepreneur (ibid). Instead of bringing the poor 
into the market as consumers, he advocates focusing on them being producers 
(Karnani, 2007; Karnani, 2009). He expands: 
This is not to deny that free markets can help reduce poverty. In fact, the 
private sector must play a critical role… The best way to alleviate poverty is 
to raise the real income of the poor by creating opportunities for steady 
employment and reasonable wages. Firms can do this by creating more 
employment opportunities in labour-intensive industries and investing in 
upgrading the skills and productivity of poor people, thus increasing their 
income potential (2009: 43). 
Ansari et al. (2012) conclude that poverty alleviation is not fundamentally 
irreconcilable with enterprise-based solutions, but assert that it needs to be more 
community-centric and concentrate on building capacities within BoP communities. 
Simanis, Hart et al. (2008) acted upon this collaborative approach, focusing on the 
poor as business partners and innovators, rather than potential consumers or 
producers, and developed the ‘Base of the Pyramid Protocol’. This is an 
entrepreneurial process that guides companies in development business partnerships 
with income-poor communities in order to co-create businesses and markets that 
mutually benefit both the companies and the communities (ibid).  
Within the case study, the conservancies are not selling a product to poor consumers. 
It could be argued that the Maasai communities are producers, in that many are 
employed by or lease their land to conservancies which in turn produce the tourism 
commodity. However, it is this final BoP collaborative approach which has the most 
similarities with the conservancy concept under investigation.  
These three different recommended approaches for poverty alleviation within the 
broader BoP concept are the result of differing interpretations of what poverty is, and 
thus how it can be addressed through development. The BoP approach proposed by 
Prahalad advocates the inclusion of the poor within the market system as consumers 
and entrepreneurs. This differs from that offered by Karnani. He instead pushes for 
the need to focus on the poor as producers, to enable the creation of income through 
employment and income-earning opportunities. The first approach is an attempt to 
undertake development through consumerism and the resultant price reductions, 
whereas the latter focuses upon increasing incomes and education levels. Ansari et 
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al. (2012: 834) push for a partnership style. This is in recognition that Sen’s freedom 
and capability approach to development is currently lacking from the BoP approach. 
Consequently, there is a continued reliance on traditional economic remedies for 
poverty alleviation and community wellbeing (ibid).  
This multiplicity of approaches extends beyond the BoP concept. Chapter three 
detailed that any work within the ‘development’ field involves the necessity of 
defining this socially constructed, value-laden term. In recognition of this, Blowfield 
(2008: 5) notes that the role of business looks different if the rights-based, 
empowerment, or neoliberal elements of development are emphasised. This 
distinction that varying business responses are dependent on differing ideas of 
development is often blurred in business-poverty discussions (ibid). Failure to 
recognise that development is a socially constructed concept that differs between 
individuals and organisations as well as over time can lead to unwarranted criticism 
or praise of the private sector’s role, depending on how it relates to the individual’s 
own interpretation of development (Bond, 2006). For example, if corporations make 
decisions about how to address development without including the local 
communities, the actions undertaken may meet their own definition of development 
but not that of community members.  
It is for this reason that stakeholders’ development conceptualisations were explored 
as part of this research project. Despite the heterogeneity of these interpretations, it 
was possible to identify and assess three key indicators against the conservancies’ 
actions. Although those who interpret development differently may disagree with 
some of the conclusions, my intention (as outlined in chapter two and made explicit 
in the research questions) is to assess the extent to which the conservancies are an 
agent for development, from the perspective of the stakeholders within the study site, 
especially the local communities.  
8.1.4 Partnership Approach 
As noted, in recent years there has been a push for business to adopt a collaborative 
partnership approach rather than to think of the poor as purely consumers or 
producers. These new forms of engagement are unleashing synergies between profit-
driven and social-driven institutions resulting in NGOs and governments entering 
241 
 
into an array of new partnerships with corporates (Ashley, 2009: 7). For this, the 
philanthropist Bill Gates (2008 cited by Ashley 2009: 7) favours the term ‘creative 
capitalism’: 
The challenge is to design a system where market incentives, including 
profits and recognition, drive the change. I like to call this new systems 
creative capitalism – an approach where governments, businesses and non-
profits work together to stretch the reach of market forces so that more people 
can make a profit, or gain recognition, doing work that eases the world’s 
inequities. 
Given that companies are rarely sufficiently equipped or specialised to undertake 
development work, collaborations with NGOs can increase effectiveness and 
contribute the on-the-ground implementation capacity (ibid, Prieto‐Carrón et al., 
2006: 984). Governments can create incentives for inclusive businesses (Ashley, 
2009: 7). In recognition of the value that they can bring each other, mutual suspicion 
is beginning to be replaced by relationships between governments, businesses and 
NGOs (ibid). This three-way partnership approach mirrors that of neoliberal 
conservation (as discussed in chapter two) but, instead of partnering with individuals 
such as landowners, businesses and NGOs work together with the state. 
In The Poverty of Capitalism (2013), Hilary condemns NGOs for choosing to cosy 
up to corporations and governments as it reduces their ability to be critics, 
consciences and routes for social feedback. Further, he argues that corporations have 
been able to point to their partnerships with respectable NGOs as a means of 
dismissing criticisms (ibid). Yet Blowfield (2008: 23-4) points out that this informal 
regulation by NGOs can be important because although there are pressures, 
companies are under no formal compulsion to consciously manage their relationship 
with society and the environment. Also, without any systems of accountability in 
place, corporations may be able to pick and choose what constitutes societal good, as 
well as appropriating development approaches for their own interests such as 
commercial competitiveness (ibid). Prieto-Carrón et al. (2006: 985-986) calls for 
more formal regulation106 of such collaborations, otherwise:  
The emphasis on multi-stakeholder dialogues and public-private partnerships 
may result in institutional capture or co-option of governments, NGOs or 
                                                




indeed the United Nations, all of which may then consciously or 
unconsciously come to represent the private company interests instead of 
broader public interests. 
Hilary (2013) charts how numerous attempts to regulate and hold transnational 
corporations to account have given way to voluntary initiatives and CSR projects 
instead. He argues that rather than constraining capital and ensuring good working 
conditions for workers, CSR actually legitimises current practices of exploitation 
(ibid: 79). Bieler (2013) retorts that Hilary is being too optimistic regarding potential 
moves beyond capitalism, and questions whether it is actually being challenged. 
Those, such as Hilary, who fundamentally disagree with capitalism, are unlikely to 
ever support alternative approaches within the notion. However, as Bieler (2013) 
implies, at present a total move beyond capitalism is unrealistic. This relates back to 
chapter three where neoliberal approaches to development, and more specifically 
sustainable development, were considered and critiqued. It is easy to make the 
criticism that the neoliberal approaches to development do no more than tinker at the 
margin of the economic system which caused the problem, and the same can be said 
of inclusive forms of capitalism. Yet to realists, something viable is better than 
unrealistic theoretical dreams. Blowfield (2004: 67) notes that the starting point for 
any debate on how business relates to the wider society is to consider whether we 
accept the social, moral and economic dimension of global capitalism. For those who 
do accept this, attempts can be made to modify and improve the nature of capitalism 
and, more specifically, the relationship between businesses and the poor. To Harrison 
(2001: 40): 
the argument is no longer about the relative merits of capitalism or socialism, 
but about what kind of capitalism is most appropriate for ‘development’ and 
how much political control is required to expedite the process.  
Business’ engagement in development does not require a radical shift (Blowfield, 
2008: 24). As the business-poverty framework shows, it can lead companies to 
rethink their relationships without undermining them (ibid). It may be harder to argue 
that business might co-opt development than make the case that business as a 




Reflecting on the criticisms presented by Hilary regarding the relationships between 
businesses and NGOs, the independence of the conservancy-affiliated organisations 
comes into question. For example, to what extent are they a function of the 
marketing departments of the tourism partners’ companies? Within this case study 
there are varying degrees of affiliation. For example, Kicheche Community Trust is 
managed by the wife of a co-owner of Kicheche Camps, and Basecamp Foundation 
is the sister organisation to its commercial entity Basecamp Explorer, with the former 
owning shares in the latter. Olare Orok and Motorogi Trust is more independent as it 
has its own board which has minimal representation and control by tourism partners, 
despite their financial support.  
One way in which the camps fundraise for their partner trust or foundation is through 
market-based philanthropy approaches such as cause-related marketing or other 
forms of consumptive philanthropy (approaches discussed by Holmes, 2012). This is 
where the consumption of certain goods is linked to a philanthropic donation in 
recognition of the market as a powerful means to solve the world’s problems (ibid). 
The $5 donation made on behalf of each OMC client is an example of this, as the 
consumption of staying at a camp in OMC is linked to a philanthropic donation to 
OOMT. Žižek (2009: 35) sees such actions as a component of ‘cultural capitalism’ 
whereby capitalism produces goods whose consumption is claimed to bring deeper 
purpose and meaning to life. In other words, to do good and make capitalism 
responsible, with the effect of reducing discontent with capitalism and allowing its 
continuation (ibid).  
It is important to question whether this relationship with commercial entities is 
necessarily negative. Critics may argue that the independence of development 
organisations is vital to ensure that the greatest needs are targeted as opposed to 
initiatives that are the most strategic commercially by being cheap, simple to 
undertake and most effective in communication and marketing. However, as 
discussed in the conclusion of chapter five, with more inclusive participation 
ensuring that the voices of civil society are heard, communities’ needs could be 
prioritised above those of the funders. Although this is dependent upon the 
communities having the power to demand this, whether via a concrete partnership 
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agreement or a bargaining chip such as secure land tenure. Ansari et al. concur that: 
“BoP empowerment can only occur when businesses and governments include 
communities as equal partners within a collaborative process of co-evolution” (2012: 
833).  
It could also be argued that ‘meeting the greatest needs’ and solving development is 
not the responsibility of business. As discussed in chapter four, the majority of 
stakeholders stated that development should be undertaken by the state. But as this is 
not seen to be happening by residents, these expectations are then transferred onto 
other actors present and active in the area. Within partnerships, these communities 
can push their partners for more and more. From the business perspective, regardless 
of the commitment to responsible inclusive capitalist approaches, there will be limits 
as to how far a business can go and the resources that it can put towards 
development. Expectations of NGOs and communities may exceed beyond these 
limited resources within companies. Similarly, there are limits to the degree to which 
livestock can be incorporated into the conservancies before they have too large an 
impact on the product for the tourism partners to accept. Further, corporations may 
have unrealistic expectations regarding the potential benefits of inclusive business 
approaches (McFalls, 2007).  
With businesses entering the development push, how far should they go? And who 
decides this? As concluded in chapter five, the failure to bring these expectations in 
line with each other can lead to misunderstandings and negative perceptions of 
efforts by businesses if they fail to meet the anticipated outcomes. However, it is 
important to note that the criticisms of community projects in chapter five were not 
based on insufficient resource allocation but rather inefficient allocation and limited 
comprehensive community involvement, matters that are much more easily 
addressed. 
This issue of who, within the heterogeneous entity of ‘community’, is participating 
and benefiting has been largely ignored within inclusive business discussions. This 
research, concurring with other tourism studies (including Brohman, 1996; Goodwin, 
1998; Walpole and Goodwin, 2001; Thompson and Homewood, 2002), found that 
community representation and participation in meetings is almost exclusively by 
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male community leaders. Also, there is evidence of their benefiting 
disproportionately by utilising the power given by conservancies for their own 
benefit, and financially, through camp bed night fees. As their voices are the only 
ones regularly heard by the NGOs and businesses within the partnerships, only their 
opinions and perceived needs are heard. This problem is not exclusive to inclusive 
capitalism approaches, as aid and development in general can be elite-captured, 
particularly those initiatives that are community-based (Platteau, 2004).  
8.1.5 Transparency and Accountability 
Although some companies are mindful of poverty, at present the conditions under 
which business engages in poverty alleviation are rooted in self-interest. There is a 
narrow perspective on what they are to be accountable for and to whom; incentives 
to be more rigorous are lacking (Blowfield, 2008: 27). There are two key ways in 
which accountability can occur. The first is the creation and enforcement of binding 
international regulations and national legislations which hold companies to account 
for their practices overseas (Blowfield, 2004: 66). The second is a variety of 
pressures contributing to voluntary standards which emerge as a ‘sector conditioned 
morality’ (Kolk and van Tulder, 2006). Linking back to the previous discussion on 
balancing expectations, this notion reflects a minimum level of expectation from 
civil society on the one hand, and a ceiling level acceptable to an industry on the 
other (ibid). Blowfield (2008: 27-8) emphasises the importance of accountability as 
without it: 
there will always be a randomness and unpredictability to business’ 
interpretation of its responsibilities, leaving open the possibility that for all of 
the justification for business to be a development agent, it will remain a 
development maverick.  
Blowfield (2004: 67) and Responsible BoP (2012) suggest that critics, such as 
Christian Aid, are not against capitalist involvement in development per se, but are 
concerned to see increased regulation, transparency and accountability. For example, 
although Karnani (2009: 40) criticises a focus on the poor as consumers, he does 
advocate the use of the free market system for development. His condition for this is 
that states should impose some limits on markets to prevent the exploitation of the 
poor and provide basic services such as infrastructure, public health and education. 
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Again this emphasises that business cannot be expected to solve development issues 
alone. 
As a result of minimal independent impact assessments of inclusive business 
practices: “to date success has been measured in terms of the instrumental benefit for 
companies, not the developmental benefit for communities” (Blowfield, 2008: 25). 
Countering this, in recent years there has been a proliferation of accreditation 
schemes. These include the Global Reporting Initiative, AccountAbility, Accounting 
for Sustainability, The B Team, B Corp and the Global Impact Investing Rating 
System (GIIRS). These organisations aim to redefine success in business (B Corps, 
2014) and facilitate responsible investing (GIIRS, 2012). Tourism partners within the 
conservancies are beginning to gain certification from these organisations. Asilia 
Africa, for example, is in receipt of a high rating from both the GIIRS and B Corp 
(World Travel and Tourism Council, 2014). 
On a smaller scale, whilst Blowfield (2008: 25) believes that the poor may 
participate but do not have the power to hold others to account for the outcomes, this 
case study suggests that given the correct context, ‘the poor’ can hold a significant 
amount of power. The case study of the conservancies presented in this thesis has 
shown that landowners and surrounding communities do have some power in holding 
the conservancies and their affiliates to account. Conservancy landowners are an 
indispensable partner within the conservancy concept, and more broadly, 
contentment within neighbouring communities is essential. Further, the Maasai Mara 
is such an iconic product,107 especially when it comes to marketing, that tourism 
partners are less able to shift to another area where the communities may have fewer 
demands. In light of this, landowners have been able to negotiate lease agreements 
and the communities continually request assistance with development initiatives and 
grazing access. Although power imbalances between the community representatives 
and the tourism partners undoubtedly remain, a certain degree of accountability is 
being achieved. If this can be maintained and enhanced, communities having 
                                                
107 The Maasai Mara is termed a product here because the name of the location is packaged as a 
commodity to sell to the tourists. This product includes the landscape, wildlife and the Maasai people 




sufficient power to hold the corporations accountable for their actions can go a long 
way to address the regulatory problems that are the most frequently cited criticism of 
inclusive capitalism.  
Furthermore, businesses can push their competitors to advance the inclusivity of their 
business approach. If socially orientated entrepreneurs find a viable way to 
demonstrate social returns, they may influence other competing companies that limit 
their accountability to internal rationalisation (Blowfield, 2008: 27). This can be seen 
within the case study as the way in which, if one tourism partner decides to start an 
additional initiative, for example by taking school children on game drives, others 
quickly follow suit. 
The aim of adopting an inclusive capitalism approach is to reduce the negative and 
increase the positive impacts emanating from a business. The influx of responsible 
businesses within the Mara has increased the amount of money entering development 
work locally, both directly and also through the creation of new NGOs that funnel 
both internal and external donations. Yet business actions are not primarily an 
approach to development, and it is unsurprising if it has shortcomings in this regard 
(Blowfield, 2008). Perhaps the involvement of the private sector should be seen as an 
addition to the development agenda, rather than a replacement.  
As evidenced in this chapter, there has been a proliferation of terminology referring 
to private sector involvement in businesses, and there is a wide variety of ways in 
which it is being approached. The conservancies within the study site are an example 
of inclusive capitalism, and they are acting as development agents. The conformation 
of this case study to these notions is even stronger given their lack of recognition of 
issues such as elite capture or the evenness of benefit distribution. Whilst companies 
could argue that their responsibility is to deliver benefits and should not concern 
themselves with its distribution, if a long and fruitful partnership with the 
beneficiaries is desired these issues must be given careful consideration. 
Newell and Frynas (2007) point out that by understanding any shortcomings we can 
ask how they can be overcome and thus in turn begin to answer questions about what 
kind of development agent business could be. By recognising the problems brought 
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by a lack of rigorous accountability, which enables companies to make claim without 
any independent verification, solutions are beginning to emerge in the form of global 
accreditation schemes. Ecotourism has faced similar criticisms: a lack of agreement 
regarding its definition and a lack of accreditation resulted in green-washing, making 
the concept tokenistic (Honey, 2002). Here also, sector specific certification schemes 
now enable consumers to make informed decisions. It has also been shown that in 
certain contexts, the poor themselves can hold businesses to their responsibilities – if 
these can be agreed upon and if the poor have sufficient power. There are still 
uncertainties. For example, it is unknown how the movement towards inclusive 
business will be influenced by the influx of foreign direct investment from countries 
such as China and India and the different types of relationships that may emerge as a 
result (Blowfield, 2008: 27; Kolk et al., 2013). 
8.2 Neoliberal Conservation      
Development is not the only notion integrated within the conservancy concept that is 
being influenced by capitalist ideals and approaches. As outlined in chapter two, the 
conservancies are a public-private partnership, developed as part of the 
neoliberalisation of nature, with conservation at its heart. This section will build 
upon the introduction to neoliberal conservation from the beginning of the thesis, 
examine how it relates to conscious capitalist approaches for development, and 
assess how the findings within this thesis relate to the concept. 
Within the study site, businesses are attempting to bring development to the local 
communities as well as financing conservation. To those who include environmental 
aspects within their definition of development,108 these two components may be 
inseparable. To others they are contradictory. Just as recognising the potential in the 
bottom of the pyramid exemplifies capitalist expansion by providing new areas for 
money making, conservation is also providing new areas within which money can be 
made (Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Holmes, 2012).  
The introduction of new actors in environmental governance through neoliberal 
approaches to conservation reduces the responsibility of the state and increases that 
                                                
108 As discussed in chapter three, the notion of sustainable development was particularly popular 
amongst tourism partners, others in the tourism industry and NGOs.  
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of private individuals and civil society (Holmes, 2012: 192). This “private indirect 
government” (Mbembe, 2001) results in “the privatisation of sovereignty” (Ferguson, 
2006) within which sovereignty becomes highly decentralised and fragmented (Igoe 
and Brockington, 2007: 439). As discussed in chapter four, whilst Ferguson (1994) 
concludes that state involvement in development intervention in Lesotho increases its 
bureaucratic state power, the minimal role of the state in development within the 
study site potentially represents a reduction in state power, sovereignty and 
legitimacy. Considering that the conservancies and their affiliated organisations are 
widely perceived to be the main development actors, this power, sovereignty and 
legitimacy is partially transferring to these organisations. As control over both 
conservation and development interventions are transferred from the state to private 
entities through the conservancies, this privatisation of sovereignty is compounded.  
By emphasising the financial value of land and carefully calculating the putative 
losses from not harming the environment, easements represent a clearly neoliberal 
conservation strategy of developing new ways of financially valuing nature and using 
market mechanisms to conserve it (Morris, 2008). If calculated accurately, leasing 
land can be a rational business decision, considering the compensation received as 
well as the likely increase in land value (Holmes, 2012: 192). If money can be earned 
by those leasing the land through conservation-friendly practices, such as 
conservancies, the payment of easements to landowners can also be a rational 
business decision.  
In a diversion from rational business decisions and market principles, I have stressed 
throughout this thesis that in spite of compensation in the form of direct payments 
and social community projects, the traditional livelihood of pastoralism remains 
critically important to communities within the study site. In several instances it was 
implied by community members that no amount of money would compensate for the 
loss of this livelihood. Igoe and Croucher (2007) documented a similar case in 
Tanzania where local people were being targeted for conservation easements in 
exchange for leaving their land open for wildlife, but the easements could not 
adequately compensate people who depended on access to that land for their 
livelihood. This exemplifies McAfee’s (2012) argument that theoretical claims 
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underpinning ideas such as ‘opportunity costs’ are only possible through the faulty 
assumption that the values of ecosystem services can be reduced to fungible 
quantities by means of market or quasi-market pricing. As has been seen in this 
thesis, particularly in chapters six and seven, in some instances the value of 
ecosystem services is difficult, if not impossible, to calculate. The sustained 
importance of some cultural aspects, such as pastoralism, to the Maasai extends 
beyond economic logic. In such instances, the power dynamics within the partnership 
become critical so that the importance of non-economic dimensions, such as local 
livelihoods, can be incorporated into the structure. An example of this is the 
development of grazing schemes within the study site. In other words:  
Market-driven approaches to conservation could work if local people hold 
exclusive rights to their land and the capacity to negotiate directly and 
effectively with potential investors. Of course in such cases, they would also 
be free to withhold their land from business ventures as well as choosing not 
to make it available for biodiversity conservation (Igoe and Brockington, 
2007: 446). 
Many of the criticisms faced by neoliberal conservation directly mirror those 
previously discussed in relation to business’ involvement in development, and many 
reflect criticisms of capitalist approaches more generally. Just as Hilary (2013) 
criticised the partnering of NGOs and corporations, Holmes (2012: 193) is concerned 
about the involvement of business people on the boards of environmental NGOs. He 
fears that this may allow them to define conservation in ways which are not just 
friendly to capitalism generally, but also to their companies in particular (ibid). 
Similarly, Edwards (2008) and Holmes (2012: 189) suggest that the positive sheen 
gained by capitalist actors involving themselves with good causes may also distract 
from the negative consequences of capitalism, or make them seem justifiable. In 
addition, as philanthropists will choose causes, approaches and locations that reflect 
their own personal interests and ideologies rather than consider wider visions of 
societal need, creating “private visions of public good” (Raddon, 2008: 38).  
Neoliberal conservation, like neoliberalism, is fundamentally an uneven project and 
applied with differential rigour across space (Brockington and Duffy, 2010: 479). 
Due to the logics of neoliberalism and capitalism, certain places are more desirable 
than others. In the context of conservation, those with structures which encourage 
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conservation enterprise (such as clear property rights or a rolled-back state) and those 
containing nature which is more amenable to being transformed into a commodity, 
are particularly desirable (Holmes, 2012: 201). Ecosystems like savannahs with 
tourist-popular endangered animals are favoured over environmentally important, but 
less commercially appealing, areas such as mangroves. Despite this recognition of 
the differential impact that neoliberal conservation can have upon place, there is not 
yet any consideration of the effect of place on neoliberalism. Given the globalised 
nature of the world this may seem unimportant, but with the introduction of 
Africapitalism bringing geographical and patriotic elements into business-
development discussions, this gap within neoliberal conservation literature is 
noteworthy. 
In conclusion, whilst Brockington and Duffy (2010: 481) see chasms opening up 
between the positive rhetoric of neoliberal conservation and its actually existing 
consequences, this thesis has presented a case study in which market solutions to 
conservation are being carried out. It is not suggested that the Mara Conservancies 
are working perfectly, and chapter nine will examine many threats to their 
sustainability, but at present they do exemplify a working case study whereby 
conservation is self-supporting as the result of a neoliberal approach. As discussed, 
even within the context of neoliberal conservation, it is not always possible to rely 
solely on economic assessments of environmental services, especially when 
culturally emotive livelihoods such as pastoralism are involved. It is only with the 
participation of the local communities and the inclusion of non-monetary factors that 
fruitful partnerships can be worked towards. 
The bottom line is that neither protectionist conservation nor neoliberal economic 
development needs to benefit the rural poor in order to thrive (Brockington 2003: 
emphasis in original). This is where environmentally and socially responsible 
businesses can step in and expand capitalism into new areas where there is money to 
be made. Simultaneously, conservationists are adopting capitalist strategies, motives 
and structures as the best way to get things done in a capitalist world (Holmes, 2012: 
200). Neoliberal conservation aims to move beyond the world of win-win solutions 
to a world of win-win-win-win-win-win-win solutions that benefit: corporate 
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investors, national economies, biodiversity, local people, western consumers, 
development agencies, and the conservation organisations that receive funding from 
those agencies to undertake large interventions (Grandia, 2007). Despite this aim, as 
with development, business cannot be expected to be solely responsible for 
conservation. As has been shown, any impact of business on conservation will be 
uneven geographically and may not necessarily target the greatest environmental 
crises. But this is not to say that neoliberalism cannot be beneficial for conservation 
in certain contexts, as the conservancies demonstrate.  
8.3 Relative Benefits of Business’ Involvement in Development  
This chapter introduced inclusive capitalism and its related concepts and then 
highlighted similarities with neoliberal conservation approaches. The relative costs 
and benefits of using capitalism to meet development goals, as opposed to more 
conventional means, will now be considered. This will begin with an overview of the 
rationale behind favouring private sector involvement on an international and 
national scale, before focusing down to the study site. 
A change occurred in the 1980s in which thinking moved away from the central role 
of the state in development (Schulpen and Gibbon, 2002: 1). NGOs filled this void 
but the involvement of the private sector has increasingly come to be seen as more 
efficient, productive and conducive to economic dynamism (ibid). Critics of foreign 
aid programmes have long argued that the continuation of poverty reflects 
government failure (Boone, 1996), advocating the need for alternative approaches. 
Harrison (2001: 41) suggests this governmental failure may be due to governments in 
many developing countries lacking the competency to carry out some policies, 
however well thought out they may be. This may be the result of poorly developed 
markets or infrastructures, a lack of highly skilled human resources, or corruption 
within state functionaries (ibid). For example, in testing predictions for aid 
effectiveness, Boone (1996) finds that international aid given directly to states does 
not significantly increase investment, nor benefit the poor (as measured by 
improvements in human development indicators); it does, however, increase the size 
of the government.  
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This declining confidence in the state as a development agent has coincided with a 
growth in private investment. Deregulation, the central role of business in economic 
growth, and private sector delivery of development functions (including utilities, 
health and education), have all served to broaden the array of expectations society 
has of business (Blowfield, 2008: 3). According to Schulpen and Gibbon (2002: 1), 
the general consensus in development thinking follows a relatively simple logic: 
(a) poverty reduction is the main objective of development;  
(b) central to development is economic growth;  
(c) economic growth is best achieved through the private sector; and  
(d) government has a role to play in making the private sector flourish and 
ensuring that growth contributes to poverty reduction. 
As point (d) emphasises, despite neoliberal approaches promoting the private sector 
as an integral part of development strategies, the government still has a central role to 
play in the process (Harrison, 2001: 40; Briedenhann and Wickens, 2004: 78; Arthur, 
2006). It is charged with creating a more enabling environment for private businesses 
but also providing businesses with support and protection (ibid).  
Kenyan policies have not been particularly supportive of initiatives like 
conservancies that are proliferating across the country. Conservancies are now 
acknowledged as a land use and form of conservation by the 2013 Wildlife 
Conservation and Management Act, but the government continue to charge stamp 
duty,109 high fees for the registration of land within conservancies (I 47, 104), and tax 
conservancy payments (I 81). At the same time as these charges are being imposed 
on conservancies, competing land uses such as agriculture are given incentives such 
as subsidies and loans (I 104). Dickson Kaelo (ibid), the CEO of KWCA, believes 
that policies are not yet overtly supporting conservancies, despite positive sounds 
coming from the current administration, for two reasons. First, the Wildlife Act is 
still new and has therefore not yet been fully implemented (ibid). Secondly, he thinks 
that the government is currently concentrating on poaching and do not recognise the 
role that conservancies can play in addressing this problem (ibid). Making a simple 
procedure for creating and running conservancies is not yet their priority (ibid). 
Duncan Green, senior strategic advisor for Oxfam, notes:  
                                                
109 When registering conservancy land leases the government demands stamp duty cumulative for the 
15 year length of the lease, paid up front (I 104).  
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the idea that private-sector investment is good and aid is bad, as some 
advocates of this theory have said, is completely ahistorical… if you look at 
any other country that is developed, it’s involved a relationship between the 
private sector and the state (cited by Hirsch, 2013).  
Supporting this, Schilpen and Gibbon (2002: 1) suggest that following a period of 
major disillusionment regarding the role of the state in development in the 1980s, 
both public and private sectors began to be considered to have distinctive but 
complementary roles to play. However, as has been discussed, even within 
partnerships, entities must continue to hold each other to account – especially civil 
society. 
One criticism of donors supporting private sector in development is the promotion of 
exports or investments in which the donor has a vested interest (Schulpen and 
Gibbon, 2002: 10). For example, DANIDA110 supported the Danish company 
Grundfos in their attempt to launch private water points in Kenya (World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, 2011). Similarly, the concept of microfinance 
emerged from initiatives by Accion International and the Grameen Bank, which 
wanted to provide economic opportunities to poor people looking to start small 
businesses (Blowfield, 2013: 175). Although such strategic approaches can lend to 
criticism, it is logical and a more effective use of resources to support initiatives that 
are familiar and to which specialised knowledge and assistance can be given. In other 
words, conservancy-affiliated organisations would be more able to facilitate a 
wildlife conservation education programme than, say, a dental clinic.  
As previously noted, Blowfield (2008: 14) states that the idea of business as a 
solution centres around the belief that “business can consciously invest in ways that 
are simultaneously commercially viable and beneficial to the poor”. In the same 
context, philanthrocapitalism argues that incorporating capitalist strategies such as 
markets and profit motive into approaches to address the problems of the world will 
make for a more successful outcome (Holmes, 2012). This is because including a 
profit motive leads to more investment, efficiency and innovation; the potential to 
make money from doing good will attract interest from the private sector and thus 
more money for development (Bishop and Green, 2010). More specifically, 
                                                
110 Danish International Development Agency 
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philanthrocapitalism argues that successful capitalist individuals and organisations 
are ideal philanthropists and are better at ‘doing good’ than government or NGO 
officials (Edwards, 2008; Bishop and Green, 2010; Scott et al., 2011).  
From a development practitioner perspective, Ashley (2009: 6) suggests that the 
motivations for embracing private sector involvement include: assistance in 
delivering development impacts at scale; creating a more sustainable impact for the 
poor, and; making better use of the complementary skills (or comparative advantage) 
of business and civil society. This builds upon recognition of weaknesses to date and 
the realisation that government-driven poverty reduction strategies are insufficient 
(ibid). At the most basic level, the private sector is simply too large and closely 
integrated within most developing economies to ignore (ibid). Development benefits 
accruing from business involvement have been contextualised using the 
conservancies’ case study throughout this thesis.  
In his interview for this research, Dr Lindkvist (I 31) discussed the relative benefits 
of the conservancies’ involvement in development. Being from a non-for-profit 
background he admitted that he was initially sceptical of the concept but he has seen: 
When it [business] works, it is very powerful. It is raw in its way of just 
generating and if you can harness that in proper agreements and judicial 
systems, governance structures, I do believe that it is the way forwards (ibid). 
Comparing the conservancies with his knowledge and experience of working in 
NGOs, Lindkvist (ibid) highlighted that these latter actors use a small time 
perspective as budgets and strategies work in 2-4 year slots after which they enter a 
new strategy process and the perspective changes. This is in line with a point made 
by Mosse (2005) that within development agencies, dominant policy models and 
priorities are frequently changing which in turn influences the perceived success of 
initiatives. As a consequence of this time framing, Lindkvist noted: “we have seen 
quite a few NGOs come and go over the years, very few actually stay” (I 31). In 
contrast, he argued that BCFK was able to build up trust by being present over a long 
period of time because of its commitment to the area through the relationship with its 
corporate sister, Basecamp Explorer (ibid).  
The conservancy managers also had opinions regarding development emanating from 
business. OMC manager Rob O’Meara suggested that if development is to be self-
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supporting, it is vital that it has a capitalist element (I 81). Naboisho Conservancy 
manager Justin Heath agreed that the private sector can accomplish a lot, both in 
terms of conservation and development and because of this he believed that the 
government was beginning to pay attention to this approach (I 76). He noted that 
prior to seeing what impact business approaches like Safaricom’s M-Pesa could have 
in Kenya, the government felt threatened by the private sector but this was no longer 
the case111 (ibid). Justin also argued that an advantage of businesses, such as those 
involved in the conservancies, participating in development was: 
We are on the ground, we have a deeper understanding of what is needed 
here… I see a lot of NGO cars in Narok, but what are they doing there? They 
are not out here (ibid). 
Negative aspects of utilising business for development and conservation have been 
presented in the form of criticisms throughout this chapter. In summary these 
include: the requirement for self-benefit to initiate action; corporations determining 
what constitutes societal good (which may differ to that of the society); unrealistic 
expectations; and, most commonly, a lack of regulation, transparency and 
accountability. Another consequence of the business approach to development is that 
business goes down as well as up (Ashley, 2009: 7). Further, collaborative 
partnerships between actors also have their own consequences. Without 
accountability, private companies may be able to co-opt their partner organisations, 
turning governments or NGOs consciously or unconsciously into their 
representatives (as discussed by Prieto‐Carrón et al., 2006: 985-986). This can in turn 
reduce accountability further by silencing those who would previously have been the 
critics, consciences and routes of social feedback for these corporations. More 
broadly, those who fundamentally disagree with capitalism continue to critique the 
foundations of these attempts, regardless of how “conscious”, “inclusive” or 
“sustainable” capitalism may become. 
8.4 Concluding Discussion 
This chapter has presented arguments pertaining to a move towards more conscious 
and inclusive forms of capitalism. It has highlighted ways in which this is able to 
                                                
111 Although, as previously noted, DFID was involved in the development of the M-Pesa scheme, it is 
now widely seen as a business. 
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influence poverty alleviation and development as well as conservation. Where 
appropriate, links have been made to the findings presented in the preceding chapters 
relating to the conservancies case study.  
At present it is difficult to draw broad conclusions about the effectiveness of 
inclusive capitalism as a development agent. As Ashley (2009: 7) points out, work on 
assessing whether inclusive business is delivering a sustainable impact is only just 
beginning. This thesis will start filling in this broad literature gap, and takes it a stage 
further by recognising that community heterogeneity and gender dimensions have 
been largely ignored within this alternative capitalism literature. To inclusive 
capitalism, the focus has been on benefiting “the poor” and it has not broken down 
who, within this abstract category, the beneficiaries are. In addition, to date there has 
been a focus on multi-national corporations and trans-national corporations (see 
London and Hart, 2004; McFalls, 2007). Although the role of small-medium 
enterprises in economic growth is well documented, their role as development agents 
is only gradually being discovered (Blowfield, 2008: 16). As discussed, in all 
instances, there are specific criteria and contexts influencing the likelihood of 
businesses taking on the role of a development agent.  
Although there are many ways in which the development outcomes emanating from 
the conservancies could be improved, given the discussions within this chapter it is 
deemed that this case study does exemplify inclusive capitalism as the tourism 
partners are acting as development agents. Given the commitment by the actors 
involved to ensure that development takes into account the importance of place and 
the greatest need of the residents, such as the importance of Maasai culture and their 
dominant livelihood – pastoralism, the term Africapitalism is deemed most 
appropriate. This term goes beyond broad conscious capitalism approaches by 
including an Africonsciousness within capitalism, bringing back the importance of 
place into capitalism so that it prioritises Africa and Africans.  
Neoliberalism is inherently uneven; therefore, any benefits resulting from this 
approach will also be unevenly distributed. The implication of this is that a business 
approach, no matter how inclusive, can never become the sole answer to the 
development problem. But as stressed, development has not suddenly become the 
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responsibility of business (Ashley, 2009: 7). This is not to say that businesses cannot 
assist and have a positive impact in certain contexts. Importantly, this research 
contributes to the literature on private sector in development by documenting that, 
from a local perspective, small and medium enterprises can have a positive causal 
relationship with development. Also, the private sector has the potential to improve 
the sustainability and efficiency of development in Africa as well as its quantity and 
dispersal. Moreover, this is done in a way that promotes entrepreneurship and self-
sustainability rather than reliance on external actors. 
There are criticisms of the motivations behind private sector in development 
approaches, but no development actions are without their own agenda. Religious 
organisations often have evangelical goals, NGOs must appease their funders and bi-
lateral institutions inherently support their own country’s interests - as highlighted 
through the DANIDA example. Business does not act in a vacuum and cannot be 
expected to solve all of societies’ problems. What has been under investigation in 
this chapter is the extent to which it can contribute and why the choice is made to do 
so. 
The main outstanding question regarding this case study is the sustainability of the 
conservancies and the businesses upon which they depend. As expectations between 
the different stakeholders have not been clearly outlined or understood, pressure is 
building from all sides, and the future is uncertain. The literature framework created 
in chapter two has formed the backbone to this research and how empirical findings 
relate to this literature has been referred back to throughout the thesis. One key 









9 The Sustainability of the Conservancies  
The research findings presented in this thesis represent a snapshot in time of the 
impact that OMC and Naboisho Conservancies are perceived to have upon 
development within the 2011-2014 period. Chapter two touched upon how historical 
events have shaped and influenced the present, and chapters three to eight assessed 
and analysed the present day. This section will now look to the future and discuss the 
extent to which the conservancies are sustainable. Unsustainability of ventures was 
one of the six key threats preventing community-based tourism from having a 
positive development impact introduced in chapter two. This is largely the result of 
the competitiveness of the tourism industry, high costs involved, weak local 
capacities and inadequate support by donors and NGOs (Lapeyre, 2010). In Kenya, 
political insecurity and increasing competition from Tanzania are additional factors.  
It is important to consider the sustainability at the end of this thesis. Even though a 
positive relationship between the conservancies and development has been suggested 
at present, this is of limited importance if the conservancies themselves are not 
feasible in the long-term. This analysis will be comprised of discussions based on ten 
key threats currently facing the conservancies. These are: 
1. Reductions in tourist numbers 
2. Increasing land values 
3. Land use change around the conservancies 
4. Decreasing tolerance of wildlife 
5. Unsatisfied community members and increasing demands 
6. Increasing livestock numbers 
7. Unsupportive policies 
8. Lack of financial transparency  
9. Political hijacking 
10. Population growth 
9.1.1 Reduction in Tourist Numbers 
The first threat to the conservancies to be considered is a reduction in tourist 
numbers. Tourism is closely linked to political stability in that if instability occurs – 
as with the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007-8 – tourist numbers drop rapidly. 
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Tourists have been discouraged by recent terrorist attacks, especially those that affect 
tourists including the 2013 attacks on Westgate and a tourist vehicle in Mombasa. 
Gerard Beaton (I 102) predicted that tourist numbers in 2014 will be 20% down on 
2013 because of the Westgate attack. This estimation was prior to the increased 
warnings in May 2014 in British and American travel advisories regarding terrorist 
threats on the Kenyan coast, and so it is likely that the annual figures will reduce 
further. Simultaneously, the tourism sectors in other African countries are rapidly 
developing, increasing Kenya’s competition in attracting tourists. Without sufficient 
tourist numbers, tourism partners will struggle to continue paying the fixed rents, and 
this could result in the collapse of the initiative. For example, up to September 2014, 
Eagle View Camp failed to pay its annual $50,000 fee to Koiyaki Guiding School for 
the preceding 18 months (anon 11, 20). 
9.1.2 Increasing Land Values 
Within the Mara land prices are increasing very rapidly. Immediately following 
subdivision, one acre could be purchased for KES 2-4,000 ($23-46) (I 85), but in 
2013 one acre near a main road would demand a price of at least KES 60,000 ($690). 
Given continuing demand from outside investors, as well as internal population 
growth, this rapid increase is expected to continue. For the conservancies to endure 
in the long-term, their rental payments should match the rate of growth of land 
values. However, as discussed above, tourism numbers are not increasing at this 
same rate and at present are decreasing. If the tourism partners are not able to keep 
pace with the increases in land values, it will be very hard to convince landowners to 
re-commit once the current 15-year leases expire around 2024-2025. This is vital for 
neoliberal conservation as they must be able to realise the present and projected 
market value of the nature in which they live (Child, 2000).  
Even before the leases come up for renewal, there are fears that the tourism partners 
will not be able to maintain the pre-agreed increases in lease payments. As noted in 
chapter seven, an 8% compound increase per year is very high. One informed source 
(anon 3) suggested that, given the combination of current rate increases and tourist 
number predictions, the tourism partners may not be able to meet their commitments 
within the next couple of years – unless business picks up substantially. In 
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recognition of this, several large conservation NGOs, including WWF, AWF and 
TNC, are currently in dialogue with stakeholders in the Mara. Tourism partners hope 
that they may be able to relieve some pressure off them (anon 11), but this would 
remove the self-sustainability aspect of the conservancies. 
9.1.3 Land Use Change Around Conservancies 
As has been touched upon in chapters two, six and seven, there are increasing land 
use changes around the conservancies. Wheat farming is rapidly encroaching and 
now borders Lemek Conservancy, just 12km from the study site. In addition, there is 
increasing urbanisation in the communities on conservancy borders, exemplified by 
the creation of a substantial centre in Olesere over just 18 months. The construction 
of fences is another major problem for the sustainability of conservancies, as they 
restrict the free-movement of wildlife on community land. This is widely considered 
essential for the biodiversity of the conservancies (Homewood et al., 2009; Reid, 
2012). Ironically, conservancies encouraging pastoralists to keep fewer high-quality 
livestock is exacerbating the construction of fences. Due to their expense, owners 
want to ensure that these livestock have high-quality grass to themselves in the form 
of olokeri. It is expected that the land use value analysis undertaken in chapter seven 
will now be able to inform decisions regarding land use. 
9.1.4 Decreasing Tolerance of Wildlife 
Chapter six discussed the perception held by some conservationists that the 
communities bordering the conservancies are increasingly intolerant of wildlife. This 
is problematic for the sustainability of the conservancies; if communities kill lions 
that cross onto the community land, the number of lions seen by tourists within the 
conservancies will quickly decrease. This would in turn reduce the desirability of the 
tourism product. At present, Naboisho Conservancy and its camps advertise that they 
have “one of the highest lion densities in Africa” (Kicheche Camps, 2012; Mara 
Naboisho Conservancy, 2012; Asilia Africa, 2014; Basecamp Explorer, 2014; 
Encounter Mara Safari Camp, 2014; Hemingways Expeditions, 2014). Yet, as the 
conservancies are not fenced and wildlife is free roaming, this is dependent upon 
community tolerance. This research suggests that any decrease in tolerance may be 
the result of inequal benefit distribution. When no one benefited from wildlife 
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(before the neoliberalisation of nature), there was no issue; the problem has arisen as 
some people are benefiting from wildlife whilst others think that they are not (anon 
20). Neoliberal approaches are inherently uneven in this regard. However, even 
conservancy landowners who receive rental incomes sometimes kill wildlife (I 80), 
suggesting that benefit levels may not yet be perceived to be sufficiently high to 
compensate for the costs of living with wildlife. In addition, population growth and 
an increasing density of settlements on conservancy borders are increasing human-
wildlife conflict (ibid). 
9.1.5 Unsatisfied Community Members and Increasing Demands 
As has been discussed at length in this thesis, the conservancies and their affiliated 
organisations are beginning to recognise the importance of dispersing benefits widely 
in order to satisfy both landowners and neighbouring communities more generally. 
Although some individuals are already inherently against the conservancies, it is 
expected that the popularity of conservancies may decline in the coming years if they 
do not see adequate increases in benefits. As just noted in threat two, it is likely that 
there will be a point in the near future when land lease payments will not be 
favourable in relation to land values. Already some conservancy landowners 
complain that the payments are too low to be significant. With regard to conservancy 
benefits in the form of community development projects, the chairman of OOMT (I 
75) explained: 
Unless the tourism operators recognise that they have displaced a large 
number of people and show them that they are sensitive to their needs and 
pay for development, there will always be a huge conflict and the 
conservancy will disappear because there will be more and more Maasai 
living on the edge looking in and saying why are we doing this, we get no 
benefit from this. I think the community development programs are the only 
way to mitigate this risk. You will never eliminate it but you can allow the 
communities to appreciate the values of the conservancy otherwise they will 
want their land back (ibid). 
For the tourism partners, spending on community initiatives can be recouped to a 
certain extent through the creation of responsible reputations, access to impact 
investing options, accreditation awards and subsequently an increase in business, 
with the correct marketing (see chapters four and eight). However, if the 
communities keep demanding more and more benefits, there is going to be a 
breaking point whereby it is not strategic for the businesses to do more. In other 
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words, the businesses would not get any additional benefit by spending on 
community initiatives. If this critical point is reached it could lead to a stalemate and 
resultantly bring down the partnership. This is especially problematic as, the more 
that the conservancies and their affiliates become involved in development 
initiatives, the more that is expected of them (see chapter four). Communities stated 
that development is the responsibility of the conservancies because that is who they 
see acting; as a consequence, communities now take their demands to conservancy 
organisations. Another contributing factor to this problem is the lack of agreement 
regarding the extent of the responsibilities of the camps, conservancies and their 
affiliated organisations. There is no consensus regarding their geographic scope or 
the type of initiatives that they should be involved in.  
9.1.6 Increasing Livestock Numbers 
In a similar sense, as livestock numbers are increasing due to support from 
conservancies, the number of livestock permitted to have access to the grass banks 
will have to be restricted in the near future. Because of the livestock numbers using 
the grazing scheme, and high herbivore wildlife densities,112 in 2013-2014 it proved 
extremely difficult for the conservancy management – especially in Naboisho – to 
put aside grass banks for the dry seasons. This was despite higher than average 
rainfall. Consequently, if a drought were to hit the Mara in the coming seasons, there 
would be no emergency grass bank. The Maasai in Koiyaki are known to have 
followed a boom-and-bust pattern over the years with livestock numbers depending 
upon rainfall and disease (Lamprey and Reid, 2004). However, a drought occurring 
would now also have a devastating impact upon the conservancy concept, 
specifically the relationship between the parties involved. Although it is recognised 
that livestock numbers using the grazing schemes need to be limited, now that 
neighbouring communities have become accustomed to extensive grazing access, 
trying to refuse these demands and limit grazing access is likely to result in mass dis-
satisfaction. In turn, this could also threaten the conservancies. 
                                                
112 For example as a result of the fencing and encroachment of agriculture, the Loita wildebeest 




Compounding the problem of livestock numbers and availability of grass banks 
within the conservancies is access to the national reserve. The MMNR has always 
been an important grazing resource during times of drought, during which a blind 
eye is turned. Over the last few years, households have begun to rely on using the 
reserve to feed their cattle at all times, regardless of seasonality (Butt, 2011). 
Bedelian (2014: 237) found that 66% of households in Koiyaki have used the reserve 
within the last year. Towards the end of 2014, rumours began to spread of the 
MMNR becoming much stricter regarding grazing within its borders. The governor 
of Narok County, is Ole Tunai. One of his main political opponents is Francis 
Nkoitoi, who also ran for governor. Within the conservancies in Koiyaki, all of the 
committee members are supporters of Nkoitoi, and the conservancies form his power 
base. The rumours say that Ole Tunai has realised that he can put enormous pressure 
on the conservancies, and thus his political opponent, by closing grazing within the 
reserve.  
9.1.7 Unsupportive Policies 
As noted in chapter eight, the Government of Kenya has, to date, not been overtly 
supportive of conservancies. The new Wildlife Act recognises the conservation of 
private land as a land use, and community members as wildlife managers. Dickson 
Kaelo notes that, whilst things are now improving with this act, it does not 
operationalise everything (I 104). The CEO of the Kenya Wildlife Conservancies 
Association (ibid) also notes that the government is not giving any incentives for 
landowners to choose conservation over other land use options and does not provide 
an enabling environment for those wanting to create or be part of a conservancy. At 
the same time, they are subsidising competing land use options such as agriculture 
(ibid). 
9.1.8 Lack of Financial Transparency  
As the conservancies and tourism partners do not provide access to their finances, 
many people see the high prices charged to guests and, being unaware of all of the 
costs involved, assume that the tourism partners are making a large profit from the 
arrangement. One male informant in Olesere (FG1) said:  
To me, I don’t see what the conservancies have brought to us because they 
are just businessmen who are out to fill their pockets because to us what we 
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are eating is small. If a tourist goes to a camp they pay a lot of money and the 
money that we get from that is only small. And so I do not see the role of the 
conservancies in development. 
Councillor Ketuyo (I 30) concurred saying: “they [the conservancies] are only for 
their profit, that is the problem… They are giving them [the landowners] peanuts. It 
is very very little yet they are earning a lot.” This problem is not restricted to the 
Mara. In his newspaper article in The East African, Mbaria (2007) criticises Porini 
for paying a minimal amount to the communities in Eselenkei. His accusations were 
based on looking up the price that tourists pay to stay at the camp, without any 
consideration of the costs involved in operating camps or running a conservancy. If 
all tourism partners were able to provide access to some of their finances, for 
example the amounts received, spent on employment, lease payments, marketing etc. 
– perhaps on a website – then criticisms of this secrecy could be dispelled.  
9.1.9 Political Hijacking 
Another threat facing the conservancies is political hijacking. As has been discussed, 
the community members who are given the largest voice and degree of control over 
the running of the conservancies are largely the political and societal elite. History 
shows the political dimension of conservation in the Mara to be strong; it was the 
main cause of the breakdown of the previous associations (Thompson et al 2009). 
Using the same leaders and them having the greatest power therefore inevitably 
makes conservancies political (Bedelian, 2014: 244). Within conservancies, financial 
payments are now direct transfers to the landowners, preventing interference – with 
the exception of landowner community funds. However, it is common for these 
committee members and community liaison officers to try to utilise their positions 
within the conservancies for political advantage. Examples of this include 
influencing grazing access and the distribution of community projects. This is 
particularly problematic for Olare Orok and Motorogi Conservancies. This relates 
closely to Mwangi’s (2005: 62-63) finding in Eselenkei. He purports that “traditional 
power structures seem to hinder community involvement in the decision-making 
process.” In response, he recommends the democratisation of these traditional 
structures to prevent a top-down approach (ibid). 
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9.1.10 Population Growth 
The exponential population growth in the Mara is, in my opinion, the biggest long-
term threat to the conservancies, and yet one that is receiving minimal attention. One 
of the dangers resulting from this population increase is the proliferation of 
conservancy landowners, increasing the complexity and reducing the viability of the 
model. If one landowner has 10 sons, when he dies, the plot is fragmented through 
being divided into 10 parts. The result of this is that the rental income will also be 
divided by 10. If a landowner now considers his KES 18,000 ($200) monthly rental 
income insignificant, what are his 10 sons going to think of KES 1,800 ($20)? In 
addition to this causing widespread dissatisfaction of benefits (threat five), 
population growth is also a contributing factor to threats two (land values), three 
(land use change), four (decreasing tolerance of wildlife) and six (increasing 
livestock numbers). Despite this, population growth and contraception are hot topics 
in the area and ones that NGOs avoid. The only work on family planning that I came 
across during the research period was the outreach work in women’s groups. 
However, during a follow-up with one of the camera project participants (CP 13) 
from this group, she explained that, even though the women see the value in reducing 
family sizes, it is the men who make that decision. She explained: “Maa men still 
want us to have as many children as possible” (ibid). I did not come across any work 
on family planning being undertaken with men. Conservancy manager Justin Heath 
(I 76) noted that he has informally tried to talk about contraception with his rangers, 
as the treatment of STIs is a continual problem, but they just laughed at him. 
9.2 Concluding Discussion       
With regard to threats preventing conservancies from contributing to development 
discussed throughout this thesis, chapter nine has shown that the conservancies in the 
Mara are facing multiple threats to their sustainability. Unless the conservancies, 
their affiliated organisations and other influential actors – such as the state – can 
address these threats, the lifespan of the conservancies are under threat. This is a 
critical factor because in turn it threatens any development impact that they are 
perceived to be having. Unless the sustainability of the conservancies can be secured, 
all of the development outcomes discussed throughout this thesis become equally 




10 Conclusion         
This conclusion to the thesis will summarise the key findings by returning to the 
three research questions and their sub-points as well as the literature framework. It 
will then assess how this thesis has contributed to knowledge, before concluding. 
10.1 Key Findings         
The three research questions, and sub-questions, that this thesis has aimed to answer 
are: 
1. How do stakeholders within the study site understand the term 
“development’?  
2. What is the perceived relationship between the conservancies and 
development? 
a. (How) are the conservancies impacting upon development?  
b. Why are they doing this?  
c. Does this affect society evenly 
3. How does this research relate to literature on sustainable forms of capitalism, 
including Africapitalism? 
Throughout the thesis, responses to these three research questions have highlighted 
linkages with the literature framework developed in chapter two. As a reminder, the 
key features of this are noted in table 10.1, along with the chapter in which each 











Table 10.1 Key Features within the Literature Framework 
 
In order to summarise the key findings, concise answers to the research questions 
will now be assembled from the body of the thesis. How these relate to the literature 
framework will also be discussed. 
10.1.1 Research Question One 
One of the threats that could potentially prevent the conservancies in the Mara from 
having a positive impact upon development is how the term development is 
interpreted. Definitions of development can be very restrictive, with economic 
benefits often receiving the most attention (Telfer, 2002: 339). Kontogeorgopoulos et 
Key Features within the Literature Framework  Chapter 
Considered 
Inconsistent definition of development 3 
Little attention paid to the subjectivity and non-Western perspectives of 
impacts 
3 
Who are the actors who want to get involved in this area? Are traditional 
development actors as heavily involved in areas linked to conservation? 
4,5 
Motivation - is conservation or development prioritised? What are the 
motivations of the different actors involved? 
4,5 
Are there clear links between benefits and conservation goals? In actions, 
beliefs or perceptions? 
4,5,6,7,8 
What are the implications of nature becoming a commodity from which 
benefits are expected? Does this change how ‘nature’ is treated? 
4,5,6,7,8 
Quantity and distribution of benefits 5,6,7 
What are the trade-offs and hard decisions needed between conservation 
and development? 
5,6,7 
What are revenues from conservancies being used for? Have livestock 
numbers changed since the creation of the conservancies? Are there any 
‘conservation backfires’? 
5,6,7 
How do access restrictions affect traditional resource users? 6 
How can pastoralism survive on subdivided land with a rapidly increasing 
population? 
6 
Have conservancies heeded calls for greater incorporation of livestock and 
changed their approach to pastoralism? How are their policies regarding 
grazing perceived by conservancy stakeholders? 
6 
Do conservancies have a differential impact on the elite/non-elite, 
members/non-members and different genders? 
7 
Degree of participation or control by communities 7 
What are the power relations between stakeholders? Who are the power 
brokers and how did they attain these positions? Do they benefit 
disproportionately? Are societal inequalities increasing? 
7 
How do general criticisms of capitalism reflect upon this case study? 8 
Does this case study exemplify conscious capitalism and Africapitalism? If 
so, what can be learnt from this case study for these fields? 
8 
How sustainable are the conservancies in the Mara? 8 
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al. (2013: 2) caution that the measurement of success is subjective, controversial and 
‘depends largely on one’s perspective and expectations’. Current models are “overly 
reliant on Western ‘experts’ and development agencies and that far too little attention 
has been paid to local and non-Western perspectives and knowledge” (Le et al., 
2012: 362). Addressing these concerns, the subjectivity of what development is, and 
how ‘success’ is interpreted from the perspectives of people on the ground, directly 
affected by the conservancies, have been at the heart of this thesis. The first research 
question was designed to address this issue. 
Chapter three analysed the multiplicity of interpretations of development from 
stakeholders within the study site. Although categories were not homogenous in their 
understandings, it was clear that different stakeholder groups have differing 
interpretations of development. From this analysis, three key components from the 
multiple definitions were identified by their frequent inclusion across stakeholder 
categories. These became the development indicators. These were: meeting basic 
needs through community projects; livelihoods, specifically pastoralism; and 
economic implications.  
Although these three components were selected as indicators because the majority of 
different stakeholders highlighted their importance, there were differences in 
prioritisation between stakeholder groupings. Those affiliated with the tourism 
industry emphasised the economic aspects, environmental conservation and meeting 
basic needs. It is perhaps unsurprising to note that these three features broadly cover 
the most direct ways in which the camps and the conservancies influence 
development. In other words, within the interpretation of development put forward 
by the tourism industry is the inherent suggestion that the conservancies are having a 
positive impact upon development. Within communities, women and youth strongly 
emphasised the need to address education, health and water problems, as well as 
stressing the importance of capacity building. Both men and women prioritised the 
security of ensuring the continuation of their livelihoods as well as the need for direct 
economic benefits. 
The findings of chapter three strongly suggest that the distribution of conservancy 
benefits needs to expand well beyond those of an economic nature as within the 
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study site, development is perceived to be more than economic advancement. 
Although financial capital is often perceived to be paramount within a Western 
understanding of development, many participants in this research, especially 
community members, valued other aspects as much, or even more so. Exemplifying 
this, they often noted that non-economic benefits of the conservancies, such as 
grazing, are more important than financial payments. This concurs with Snider’s 
(2012) findings from the Mara.  
The main implication of definitions differing between stakeholders is that actions 
undertaken by one actor with the intention of being development may not be seen as 
such by other stakeholders. If development actors desire positive responses to their 
efforts, they must be aware of the different ways in which development is understood 
and the nature of the development paths that are desired by heterogeneous 
communities. 
10.1.2 Research Question Two 
In order to address the second research question, which focuses on perceptions of the 
relationship between conservancies and development, chapters four to seven 
analysed the impact of conservancies on the three key development indicators 
identified in chapter three. This research question examined the distribution of 
benefits to community members, the equality of this, and the motivations behind 
these actions. Each of the three sub-points of research question two will now be 
discussed. 
10.1.2.1 (How) are the conservancies impacting upon development?  
Chapter four assessed which actors are involved in development within the study site 
and whether traditional development actors are as involved in conservation areas. 
Having found that conservation and tourism based entities are at the forefront of 
development work within the study site, chapter five focused on their impact upon 
meeting basic needs through community development projects, chapter six 
pastoralism and chapter seven examined economic implications. These chapters 
broadly found that the conservancies are trying to positively impact development by: 
• Assisting with coordinating and funding community development projects; 
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• Securing and supporting the dominant livelihood through grazing schemes, 
and; 
• Increasing household income through rental payments, employment, and 
other revenue generating activities. 
Despite this general positive finding with regard to how the relationship between 
conservancies and development are perceived, research participants highlighted 
many criticisms of conservancy practices. This thesis has identified multiple ways in 
which the conservancies’ development impact could be improved and enhanced. The 
main complaints given were that benefits are insufficient and access to essential 
resources is restricted. Regarding benefits, landowners complained that payments 
were too low to compensate them for the loss of being able to use their land, and 
those with land outside of the conservancies complained that they did not receive 
payments despite having wildlife disperse onto their land. Employment is perceived 
to be riddled with favouritism and nepotism, and many people either did not 
acknowledge indirect benefits or claimed that they were not aware who was 
responsible for these (as detailed in chapter four regarding community projects).  
Regarding community projects, chapters four and five highlighted that greater unity 
and collaboration is needed between development actors, especially those affiliated 
with conservancies. Greater coordination with members of the local communities 
from all demographics and an area-wide planning approach would also improve the 
efficiency and outcome of such initiatives. To avoid jealousy between communities, 
it is important to ensure that projects are not concentrated in a few villages and that 
greatest needs are considered. On an even more basic level, just ensuring that 
community members are aware of the link between projects – such as boreholes and 
clinics – and the conservancies would improve people’s perception. This mirrors 
Mwangi’s (2005: 61) finding from Eselenkei that a general lack of awareness and 
information was a key factor hindering community support for conservancies.  
Participants suggested that, in their opinions, not all conservancy landowners, 
employees and other income earners are utilising their incomes in ways that directly 
benefit their families. Cited beneficial expenditures were paying school fees, 
covering medical bills or building a more permanent homestead. As chapters five and 
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six detailed, for many households, the increase in cash income is predominantly used 
to decrease the number of livestock that need to be sold each month to meet the same 
expenditures. Whilst over time this has the effect of increasing the family’s herd, and 
thus wealth base, it also has potential negative environmental implications.  
Conservationists, conservancy management and tourism stakeholders believe that the 
high livestock densities, now constrained following land subdivision, represent a 
risky investment which simultaneously threatens the very resource that provided the 
money to buy the livestock. In other words, conservancies financially benefiting 
individuals are endangering their own sustainability by increasing livestock densities 
on their borders. Whether this is a ‘conservation backfire’ (Langholz, 1999: 52) or 
not depends upon whether the conservancy grazing schemes can absorb and provide 
for this increase in cattle. Any increase in shoat numbers, however, would certainly 
have negative environmental implications, as the conservancies cannot cushion these 
animals.  
It is uncertain whether it is the conservancies’ responsibility to influence spending 
habits of their beneficiaries. However, given the impacts that spending habits are 
having, it is in the long-term interest of both conservancies and landowners to ensure 
that the source of this income is not threatened. It is vital that for the full benefits of 
conservancy-affiliated initiatives to be appreciated, and thus of use in increasing the 
positivity of conservancy perceptions, positive outputs need to be translated into 
positive outcomes. The discoveries discussed in chapter 5 reveal that a more detailed 
analysis of perceived development successes resulting from community-based 
tourism initiatives are essential. What may seem like success from the surface may 
not be as beneficial as expected in terms of outcomes. This emphasises the 
importance of the participatory ethnographic approach taken, as it is vital to examine 
how outputs are perceived by community members who live with them, as opposed 
to how they appear to an outsider passing through.  
The vast majority of research participants acknowledged that conservancies have 
been increasing the extent to which they incorporate livestock and attempts have 
been made to increase the participation of pastoralists in decision-making regarding 
grazing access. As a result of these changes, criticisms of grazing access in 
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conservancies made by Butt (2011), Osano et al. (2013) and Bedelian (2014) are no 
longer as valid as when they were made. Despite these changes, the most common 
complaint made by community members was still that the conservancies threaten the 
dominant livelihood – pastoralism – by restricting access to grazing by traditional 
resource users (see chapter six). Although conservancies are supporting pastoralism 
to a certain extent through the creation of grass banks, as acknowledged by some 
pastoralists, many community members maintain that the conservancies restrict 
grazing and consequently are not wanted. One of the key issues here is that the 
conservancies emerged concurrently with land subdivision. As a result, many 
pastoralists, especially elderly individuals who have not seen other individualised 
areas, do not recognise that grazing and movement over other peoples land would 
have become restricted regardless of the presence of conservancies. Those who 
believe that the conservancies are supporting pastoralism point out that, in a sense, 
the conservancies are actually moving back towards more communal land tenure and 
communal grazing. As such, they believe, they are creating a survival tactic for the 
livelihood that would otherwise struggle on the subdivided land of today.  
The land use comparison analysis undertaken in chapter seven produced new and 
revealing findings regarding the economic benefit of conservancies. At present some 
landowners perceive that the land rental payments from conservancies are too low 
when compared to other options such as agriculture, and consequently deliberate 
changing land use. This analysis revealed that when a broader appreciation of money 
entering the area as a result of the conservancies is adopted, as opposed to sole 
consideration of individual rental payments to the landowners, land use values 
converge. Recognition that not all of the land within the study site is suitable for 
wheat farming would push conservancies ahead of agriculture in terms of which land 
use produces the highest net returns. Further, quantification of the extent to which 
conservancies support pastoralism would increase this land use value further.  
As is to be expected from a heterogeneous society, perceptions of the role that the 
conservancies are having upon development varied greatly. These perceptions are 
also not static and change over time. Temporal changes are largely in line with the 
quantity of perceived benefits that are being received, and how these weigh-up 
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against perceived costs. For example community opinions about the conservancies, 
conservation and wildlife were dependent upon perceptions of the benefits received 
in return. This concurs with Whelan’s (1991) conclusion that for a successful project, 
benefits for the host communities must outweigh costs. This finding also reflects 
Büscher and Dressler’s (2012: 368) conclusion that through neoliberal conservation 
the ‘emphasis is shifting from local constructions of nature by communities to what 
nature should mean for communities in terms of commodity resources and capitalist 
markets’. This commodification is changing how nature is seen by communities 
resulting in increasing demands for payment for its use, through PES. Although it is 
important to note that these payments are not just those of an economic nature. As 
previously discussed, access to grass banks for grazing was considered one of the 
most important benefits of conservancies. If land owners and surrounding 
community members are not satisfied with the quantity or distribution of the benefits 
offered in exchange for the use of their nature, they will take this out on the 
environment, wildlife or other components of the conservancy concept. This 
expectation of payment (in whatever form) is a dramatic change from more 
traditional Maasai conceptualisations of nature.  
Changes in perceptions of the conservancies in response to an increase in grazing 
access, as well as recognising the role of conservancy-affiliated organisations in 
community projects, are two examples of the fluid nature of opinions. It was 
especially interesting to find that many individuals who were critical of some aspects 
of the conservancies still identified ways in which they are having a positive impact 
upon development. A looming question emanating from the evident fluidity of 
perceptions about conservancies, and conservation more generally, is what impact 
any reduction in benefits will have. Pretty and Smith (2004) suggest that even if 
actions change at the time of benefit receipt, if people’s beliefs or conservation 
perspectives are not altered then they are likely to revert back to previous ways if 
benefits reduce or cease. It is even possible that perceptions and actions may worsen 
following the cessation of benefits as communities and individuals will have become 
accustomed to receiving compensation for the use of their nature. For example once 
people are aware of the value of their land and its flora and fauna, if these payments 
or other benefits cease, they could hold the nature ransom by threatening to destroy it 
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or its wildlife unless payments return or are increased. This is a cost of the 
commodification of nature; once it is given a value, what happens if that value is not 
or cannot be met? 
10.1.2.2 Why are they doing this?  
Chapter four broke down the motivations behind the levels of involvement of 
different development actors within the study site. The development actor matrix 
within the study site is perceived to differ from those involved elsewhere in 
Maasailand and Kenya. Despite the majority of communities stating that the main 
responsibility of development should lie with the government and elected political 
leaders, they are not perceived to be living up to this. Religious organisations are also 
seen to be comparatively absent, and communities are taking a relatively passive role 
in development. This apparent ‘absence’ of traditional development actors is 
extremely noteworthy. Within this context, alternative actors are currently involving 
themselves in developing Koiyaki, especially those affiliated with the conservancies. 
There is no simple explanation for the present development actor matrix in the Mara. 
Many factors, including those of a geographical, historical, political and cultural 
nature, are likely to be influential. The motivations behind development actor’s 
actions are also of critical importance to understand. Finally, it is suggested that the 
neoliberal model upon which the conservancies are based may be altering the 
dynamic of those who are involving themselves in development, as well as the power 
dynamics between these actors.  
Although it is an area that is often neglected in studies of tourism’s developmental 
impact (Wiebe, 2011), philanthropic tourists are increasingly becoming major actors 
within the study site. As discussed in chapter two, conservancies and their affiliated 
organisations have duel objectives in that they seek win-win outcomes for both 
conservation and development (Muradian et al., 2010; Bedelian, 2014). This results 
in multiple complexities as projects have to make hard decisions and trade-offs 
between these two objectives (McShane et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014: 16). Further, 
the neoliberal component of conservancies means that business sustainability is an 
additional objective. This triple conservation-development-business motivation will 
result in different trade-offs and different approaches adopted in comparison to those 
276 
 
with alternative motivations, for example seeking political support or evangelical 
reasons. The key difference between this case study of the Mara conservancies and 
conservation or tourism initiatives that are not perceived to benefit development 
(including those discussed in chapter two), is this third motivational objective; 
business sustainability. Given the importance of place in the conscious capitalist 
approach adopted by the conservancies, chapter eight determined that Elumelu’s 
term Africapitalism was most appropriate. Due to the privatised nature of land tenure 
and the subsequent structure of the conservancy concept, there is an inherent need for 
conservancies to win and maintain community support so as to ensure the 
sustainability of their businesses. As Dickson Kaelo stressed: “there is a business 
interest in doing this development, and so where people own the land, tourism can 
become a development actor” (I 48). In spite of the multiple prevailing threats to 
sustainability discussed in chapter nine, the nature of the conservancies also 
encourages the stakeholders in the conservancies to do everything they can to ensure 
their sustainability, given the investment that each has made.  
It is not only conservancy members who need appeasing. Non-conservancy members 
neighbouring the conservancies are also able to discreetly demand benefits. Murphy 
(2013: 153) details the rationale behind this: 
Tourism, like no other industry, relies on the goodwill and cooperation of 
local people because they are part of its product. Where development and 
planning do not fit in with local aspirations and capacities, resistance and 
hostility can raise the cost of business or destroy the industry’s potential 
altogether.  
The tourism partners are acutely aware of this threat. At any time, if the 
neighbouring communities become dissatisfied with the initiative, they could invade 
the conservancies with their livestock at a level that management could not control, 
block roads crossing private land, kill wildlife or destroy the camps. If the 
conservancy product is to survive, both the landowners and the local communities 
more generally need appeasing. Consequently, the tourism partners are beginning to 
recognise the importance of ensuring that benefits are dispersed beyond just the 
conservancy landowners. This is the predominant aim of the grazing schemes and 
community projects.  
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The neoliberal nature of the conservancies inevitably means that new actors will be 
introduced. This results in less responsibility for the state and more for private 
individuals and civil society (Holmes, 2012: 192). This ‘private indirect government’ 
(Mbembe, 2001) refers to the decentralisation and fragmentation of sovereignty (Igoe 
and Brockington, 2007: 439). Ferguson (1994) found that state involvement in 
development intervention in Lesotho expanded the extent and reach of “bureaucratic 
state power”. In contrast, the relatively minimal role of the state in both conservation 
and development initiatives in the study site represents a reduction in state power, 
sovereignty and legitimacy. Prior to the creation of the conservancies, communities 
were reliant on the state for assistance; to attain this, people felt they had to beg 
politicians (I 87). As a result, some political leaders now see conservancies as 
competition because “they can’t win people’s minds like they used to” (ibid). As 
conservancy-affiliated organisations are now largely perceived to be the main 
development actors, the power brought by this involvement in development 
interventions – discussed by Ferguson – is ultimately being handed to private 
entities.  
10.1.2.3 Does this affect society evenly? 
Economic benefits emanating from conservancies are the most socially unequal as 
they benefit individuals rather than communities. As a result, inequalities in the 
distribution of conservancy benefits, and therefore inequalities in the impact of the 
conservancies on development, are most prominent in those of an economic nature. 
Although receipt of the rental payments is determined by land allocation, the varying 
degrees of power (and thus participation) held by individuals also influence the 
quantity of economic benefits received. As commonly occurs in tourism fuelled 
development, elite members of the local communities maintain positions of authority 
and attain more benefits (De Kadt, 1990: 30), leading to an increased social 
stratification (Stronza, 2001). Elite members of society simultaneously own more 
land, due to influencing the land committee or buying land that comes up for sale, 
and have the greatest degree of participation by sitting on conservancy committees. 
Compounding this, it is these same individuals who are often the ‘lucky’ ones to 
have a camp on their land and thus receive the large additional bed-night fees. 
Without regular elections the accountability of these appointed individuals to the 
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landowners whom they are supposed to represent is questionable. Also, given the 
homogenous nature of these voices, they cannot claim to represent society more 
broadly.  
The existing favourable agreements between these individuals and the tourism 
partners mean that neither party want to accept the widening calls from landowners 
for their representatives to be changed. Likewise, corruption by these individuals – 
such as controlling and acquiring money from community landowner funds – is 
swept under the carpet. This is especially true when large donors show interest in 
supporting the area as the Maasai community leaders’ presence is deemed important 
for showing the conservancies’ community-based approach. In such instances, 
indiscretions are quickly forgotten.  
Non-conservancy members and women need to be given a voice within 
conservancies. Although they do not own land in the conservancies, decisions made 
also affect these demographics. This finding concurs with Bedelian (2014: 253) who 
concluded: “more attention needs to be paid to the socio-political processes of who 
gets to participate in such initiatives and who gets left out.” In response to my 
Masters research highlighting the extent to which women and youth were excluded 
from the conservancies, OOMT and BCFK began an outreach project targeting these 
strata of society. Whilst this has made the first steps towards filling this gap, more 
can still be done. Suggestions made to camp managers and NGO workers at the end 
of the Ph.D. research period have led to the initiation of a beadwork project for 
women, providing a market for their produce within the conservancy camps and 
beyond. Early signs indicate that this has the potential to be a significant source of 
income for the women, without the requirement of owning land. Young men, 
however, still feel disconnected from the conservancies. Other than through 
employment, many youths feel that they are unable to capture benefits because of 
their lack of land ownership. Given that it is this demographic who are most 
commonly responsible for the killing of wildlife and burglaries in camps, benefit 
distribution within this sector requires further consideration. 
This study has confirmed that PES can disproportionately benefit the wealthier 
members of society creating or reinforcing power asymmetries amongst those 
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involved (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013; Osano et al., 
2013; Bedelian, 2014). The politics of wildlife revenue control in the Mara continues 
to be intense and conflictual (Thompson and Homewood 2002; Thompson et al 
2009; Bedelian, 2014: 127). These elite conservancy members receive the highest 
benefits, but unlike under previous models, they do not ‘eat’ all of the revenue. 
Although it was not allocated fairly, the privatised nature of land tenure results in 
significant benefits being shared with community members in a more equitable way 
than previous attempts in the Mara, including access to resources (as predicted by 
Osano et al., 2013). Although not perfect, through conservancies, the distribution of 
benefits has improved. Now ordinary landowners are assured of directly receiving 
their lease payments, grazing access is open to all and the creation of specific audited 
organisations to oversee community projects has blocked corruption channels. 
10.1.3 Research Question Three 
Research question three assessed how this research relates to literature on sustainable 
forms of capitalism, including Africapitalism. Chapter nine also assessed the 
sustainability of the conservancy concept within the context of this case study.  
Neoliberalism is inherently uneven; therefore, any benefits resulting from this 
approach will also be unevenly distributed. As a result, a business approach can 
never become the sole answer to the development problem, regardless of how 
inclusive, sustainable or conscious it is. This is not to say, however, that businesses 
cannot assist and have a positive impact upon development in certain contexts. 
Business does not act in a vacuum and cannot be expected to solve all of societies’ 
problems. This research contributes to the literature on private sector in development 
by documenting that, from a local perspective, small and medium enterprises can 
positively contribute towards development. Men in Enooronkon (FG 8) summarised: 
The conservancy has appeared, and it is good. When drought comes we can 
access grass easier because of the conservation of grass in the conservancy. 
And also now because of the conservancy, people are no longer cutting down 
the trees there and as a result we get more rain… We are also now getting 
facilities in our villages and our sons are being employed… It is also a business 




There are criticisms of the motivations behind private sector in development 
approaches, but as noted, no development actions are without their own agenda.  
Given the commitment by the actors involved in the conservancies to ensure that 
development takes into account the importance of place and the greatest need of the 
residents, such as the importance of Maasai culture and their dominant livelihood – 
pastoralism, the term Africapitalism is most appropriate to this case study. This term 
goes beyond broad conscious capitalism approaches by including an 
Africonsciousness within capitalism, bringing back the importance of place into 
capitalism so that it prioritises Africa and Africans. This will be elaborated upon 
below when discussing the contribution of this thesis to knowledge within the 
business world. 
With regard to the potential of unsustainability preventing community-based tourism 
from contributing to development (as discussed by Lapeyre, 2010), chapter nine 
discussed the multiple ways in which the sustainability of the conservancies under 
investigation is under threat. Six of the ten threats identified in chapter nine are the 
result of population growth. It is deemed that this is the singular greatest threat to the 
sustainability of the conservancies, and their resultant development impact.  
10.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
There are three different audiences that this thesis has targeted: academia, the 
business world and stakeholders within the study site. Each of these will now be 
discussed in turn. 
10.2.1 Academia 
Snider (2012: 210) concluded his thesis by appealing for new innovative measures of 
non-economic benefits emanating from tourism, as defined by the host community. 
Instead of adopting a Western definition focusing on economic aspects, this research 
was guided by how the stakeholders themselves define development. This is 
especially important because stakeholder groupings and individuals understand the 
concept of development, and how the conservancies are interacting with this, very 
differently. If development indicators from international development institutions 
had been used, the findings would not have been as relevant to the study site and 
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would not represent how those within this specific context understand development. 
This case study is especially timely and valuable given the newness of the 
conservancy concept in this ecosystem, uncertainty regarding its development impact 
(Thompson et al., 2009: 108) and the evocativeness of the Mara-Serengeti 
ecosystem. 
Another contribution that this research has made to academia is an expansion of the 
use of visual ethnography. This research has shown that using children’s drawings 
and photographs to visualise how individuals perceive development can be very 
successful and effective. Not only did this eliminate educational barriers to 
participation and draw in shy contributors, it proved to be an extremely useful tool 
for initiating discussions. In particular, female camera participants and shy 
schoolchildren became more confident by participating in these participatory 
projects.  
10.2.2 Business 
Chapter eight examined the bigger implications of this thesis’ findings beyond the 
realms of conservations and tourism to the business world more generally. Despite 
all of the excitement surrounding the potential contribution that business could make 
as a development agent, there is little information about what has been achieved 
(Blowfield, 2007; Hamann, 2007; Blowfield, 2008). More specifically, the 
information that is available tells us little about the real outcomes for the poor 
(Blowfield, 2008: 20). The challenges associated with delivering benefits, such as 
uneven distribution and elite capture, are rarely discussed or included in inclusive 
business strategy literature (ibid: 22). Using the case study of OMC and Naboisho 
Conservancies, this research has contributed to addressing this research gap.  
This thesis also highlighted the relevance of the new concept ‘Africapitalism’. This 
was initiated by Tony Elumelu in the banking sector of Nigeria, but comprises very 
few examples to date. This research has developed the notion by expanding its scope 
beyond that of the banking sector and has exemplified that Africapitalism is not 
dependent upon country nationals, or even African citizens. Within this case study, 
the tourism partners that are most passionate about ensuring that the conservancies 
have a positive development outcome are those who have personal connections to the 
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area, but this is not necessarily represented by their nationality. Inclusive capitalism 
literature (including Ashley, 2009: 7) states that, as yet, there is insufficient data to 
draw conclusions about its effectiveness as a development agent. This thesis is an 
attempt to start filling in this broad literature gap and takes it a stage further by 
recognising that community heterogeneity and gender dimensions have been largely 
ignored. In addition to the academic merits of this, there are useful practical business 
applications of these findings. Chapter eight brought together different fields of 
study, furthered concepts, and provided a new insightful case study, both in terms of 
industry and locale.  
In several places this thesis has questioned the extent of the responsibility that the 
conservancies have for development, how far should this go, and who decides. No 
answers to these questions have been found, but they are not exclusive to this 
example, or even this industry. They can be extrapolated to all businesses. When a 
business engages in the development sphere, what is the extent of their responsibility 
and how far does this go temporally and geographically? This would be an 
interesting area of potential future research given the current gap in both tourism and 
conservation literature, as well as that of inclusive business strategies more generally.
10.2.3 Study Site 
It is anticipated that one of the main beneficiaries of this research will be the 
stakeholders within the study site. This has been in my mind throughout this whole 
process. In addition to producing a strong academic thesis, my intention and hope has 
been that these findings will be useful to the conservancies and their stakeholders.  
As noted in the introduction, the strengths of this research are rooted in the emphasis 
on interpretive paradigm and qualitative methodology, in which voice is given to 
local people as well as other stakeholders. This study has aimed to provide a broader 
view of stakeholders’ understandings and perceptions of the conservancies’ role in 
development, as opposed to earlier works in the Mara. A key strength is enhancing 
the focus beyond the loudest voices to include those who are often excluded. This 
research engaged with a multitude of stakeholders and each of these can use this 
thesis to learn about the perceptions and opinions of their counterparts.  
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More specifically, it is anticipated that chapter three will raise awareness of the 
contrasting definitions of development, and will thus inform the development actors 
of the need to match desires and actions more closely. The surprising findings in 
chapter six regarding estimated livestock per capita ratios will also be of great 
interest to those involved in the grazing schemes and livestock management in 
Koiyaki. Further, I expect that the comprehensive approach taken in the economic 
analysis of the conservancies’ land use value will inform future land use 
deliberations. Finally, for those who have decision-making power within the 
conservancies, it is hoped that this thesis will unveil some of the weaknesses within 
the concept in a practical and constructive way, allowing them to be considered, 
addressed, and improved upon. 
10.3 Concluding Thoughts    
With regard to the aim of this thesis – to examine the relationship between the 
Koiyaki Conservancies and development – it is concluded that perceptions are fickle 
and change easily over time. This is based upon how perceived benefits are thought 
to weigh-up against perceived costs. The thesis has gone to great lengths to include 
the voices of those who may not traditionally be the first to be heard, and as a result a 
wide variety of opinions are represented – as is expected from heterogeneous 
communities – this opinion is far from universal. For those who believe that the 
conservancies are having a positive impact upon development this is based upon 
conservancies assisting with community development projects, supporting 
pastoralism through grazing schemes and increasing household income. It is 
unknown whether such positive perceptions of conservancies, that are accompanied 
with a more positive view of conservation and wildlife more generally, would remain 
if benefit streams were to reduce or cease (as discussed by Pretty and Smith, 2004). It 
is suggested, however, that perceptions could even worsen in comparison to the 
baseline prior to conservancies if the benefits dry up.  
A multifaceted approach to development that does not purely focus on economic 
aspects is essential. Within the study site, development is perceived to be holistic. 
This thesis has highlighted that there are many ways in which the development 
impact of each of these three benefit streams examined – basic needs, livelihoods and 
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economic implications – could be improved. As previously stressed, belief that the 
conservancies are positively impacting upon development should not be interpreted 
as equal satisfaction with the conservancies more generally. Even those who 
expressed that they did not like the conservancies and wished that they were not 
there still noted some ways in which they were benefiting upon development. Yet for 
these people, the benefits did not outweigh the costs.  
Many community members, like the elder in Mpuaai (FG 22) responsible for the 
quote at the very beginning of the thesis, are still waiting to see what benefits the 
conservancies will bring before making up their minds about the initiative. There are 
other stakeholders, including politicians, who believe that the conservancies do 
nothing for development and are just another way for white people to exploit the 
riches of the Maasai. These individuals would like to see the conservancies fold. 
Discontent is not the only threat currently facing the conservancies, as discussed in 
chapter nine, and they remain very fragile. Simultaneously, this thesis has shown that 
there is great potential for the conservancies to stimulate and facilitate development 
in the local area, so long as their sustainability can be assured.  
This case study exemplifies that, given the right conditions, conservancies and other 
business sectors can ‘do good’ whilst making money, as purported by Porter and 
Kramer (2011). The implications of this are broad and wide-reaching. They push 
those working in development to rethink the potential role of the businesses. Given 
its nature, the private sector has the capability to increase the efficiency of 
development, as well as its magnitude and dispersal. It is essential, however, that 
measures are put in place to ensure that businesses are not exploitative of those that 
they state they are assisting. In this instance, it is secure land tenure and a partnership 
agreement between the landowners and the tourism partners that ensures that power 
and control are shared, and thus a positive developmental impact can be established. 
What this case study shows is that the concept of Africapitalism expands beyond 
Nigeria and beyond the banking sector. If non-Africans conducting businesses in 
conservancies in Kenya can contribute towards development, what is stopping other 
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Appendix 1. Focus Groups (FG) 
Ref Village Men/women Participants Date Facilitator 
1 Olesere Men 6 25/3/12 Resian Letoluo 
2 Olesere Men 9 7/4/12 Resian Letoluo 
3 Olesere Women 15 24/3/12 Resian Letoluo 
4 Olesere Women 13 29/3/12 Resian Letoluo 
5 Olesere Women 16 30/3/12 Resian Letoluo 
6 Olesere Women 11 9/4/12 Resian Letoluo 
7 Olesere Women 3 2/4/12 Resian Letoluo 
8 Enooronkon Men 7 21/4/12 Resian Letoluo 
9 Ng’amuriak Women 12 17/4/12 Resian Letoluo 
10 Enooronkon Women 14 18/4/12 Resian Letoluo 
11 Enooronkon Women 5 19/4/12 Resian Letoluo 
12 Ng’amuriak Women 8 20/4/12 Resian Letoluo 
13 Enooronkon Women 3 2/5/12 Resian Letoluo 
14 Mbitin/Nkirgir Men 8 25/5/12 Resian Letoluo 
15 Mbitin Women 8 18/5/12 Resian Letoluo 
16 Mbitin Women 19 21/5/12 Resian Letoluo 
17 Nkirgir Women 12 23/5/12 Resian Letoluo 
18 Endoinyo e Rinka Men 7 13/10/12 
Lorna Serseri & 
Dominic Sakat 
19 Endoinyo e Rinka Women 40 14/10/12 Lorna Serseri 
20 Olkuroto Men 23 27/10/12 Lorna Serseri 
21 Olkuroto Women 7 28/10/12 Lorna Serseri 
22 Mpuaai Men 9 25/11/12 Lorna Serseri 
23 Mpuaai Men 6 2/12/12 Lorna Serseri 
24 Osilale Men 5 2/2/13 Lorna Serseri 
25 Osilale Women 8 1/2/13 Lorna Serseri 
26 Nkoilale Men 3 7/2/13 Lorna Serseri 
27 Nkoilale Women 5 8/2/13 Lorna Serseri 
28 Eor Olkimaita Women 6 12/2/13 Lorna Serseri 




Appendix 2. Interviewees (I) 
 Participant Details Interview / Discussion Details 
Name Position Style Recorded
? 
Date Place Language 
1 Anna Banyard Dig Deep programme manager SSI113 N 4.12.11 KGS English 
2 Anna Banyard Dig Deep programme manager SSI N 17.1.12 Olesere English 
3 Ron Beaton OOMT & KGS founder SSI N 30.1.12 OMC English 
4 Eche, Nina and 
Zarek Cocker 
Encounter Mara Camp managers and operations manager SSI N 6.2.12 Naboisho English 
5 Justin Heath Naboisho Conservancy manager ID114 N 8.2.12 Naboisho English 
6 Patrick and Johanna 
Strömvall 
Kicheche Valley Camp, Naboisho, managers SSI Y 8.2.12 Naboisho English 
7 Kokoo Soit Elderly grandmother ID N 20.3.12 Olesere Maa (translated by 
Resian Letoluo) 
8 James Kaigil Assistant manager, OMC SSI Y 21.3.12 OMC HQ English 
9 Paul Murero Teacher at the Oltopesi Cultural Centre, representative of 
the Catholic Church and Lemek resident 
SSI Y 13.9.12 Naboisho English 
10 Dominic Sakat Trained guide and assistant for the Mara Naboisho Lion 
Project 
ID N 22.9.12 Olesere English 
11 Dominic Sakat Trained guide and assistant for the Mara Naboisho Lion 
Project 
ID N 3.10.12 Olesere English 
12 Robert Oigo Head teacher of Olesere Primary School SSI Y 11.10.12 Olesere English 
13 Teriano Soit Local University Student SSI Y 12.10.12 Olesere English 
14 Lorna Seseri Research assistant ID N 16.10.12 Aitong English 
15 Garry Cullen Managing Director of Hemingways Ol Seki Camp, 
Naboisho 
SSI Y 16.10.12 Naboisho English 
16 Helen Schutte Co-manager of Asilia Naboisho Camp SSI Y 17.10.12 Naboisho  English 
                                                
113 Semi structured interview 
114 Informal discussion 
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17 Nashiploni Pesi Lady in Endoinyo e Rinka who invited us for tea ID N 18.10.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 




Community Leader ID N 18.10.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
Maa (translated by 
Lorna Serseri) 
19 Wilson Ntirra Deputy Head Teacher Endoinyo e Rinka SSI Y 18.10.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
English 
20 Michael Rakwa Safari guide and resident in a village visited by clients from 
Ol Seki 
SSI Y 19.10.12 Olesere English 
21 Gerard Beaton Country manager for Asilia Africa  SSI Y 21.10.12 Naboisho English 
22 Naisuyasui 
Lolkumum 
Solar mama who went to India to train as a solar technician SSI Y 21.10.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
Maa (translated by 
Lorna Serseri) 
23 Juma Sampuerrap Nurse practitioner CMF SSI Y 21.10.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
English 
24 Gert Bomhof Former tourist who set up Stichting Nkoilale  SSI Y 21.10.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
English 
25 Erik Ranja Co-founder Better World Canada SSI Y 21.10.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
English 
26 John Sankok Director of CMF Health Ministries SSI Y 21.10.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
English 
27 Øyvind Aadland and 
Priscilla Serukka 
Secretary General and Regional Director of Stromme 
Foundation 
ID Y 23.10.12 Olesere English 
28 Ron Beaton OMT & KGS Founder ID N 26.10.12 OOC English 
29 Penina Taki Community Based Facilitator for Basecamp Foundation’s 
microfinance project 
SSI Y 28.10.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
English 
30 Councillor Ole 
Ketuyo 
Councillor  SSI Y 28.10.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
English 
31 Lars Lindkvist Executive chairman of Basecamp Foundation SSI Y 1.11.12 Naboisho English 
32 Nathaniel Robinson Manager of Olare and Motorogi Trust ID N 2.11.12 Talek English 
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33 Lars Lindkvist Executive chairman of Basecamp Foundation Pres.
115 
N 2.11.12 Talek English 
34 Roelof Schutte Co-manager Naboisho Camp ID N 7.11.12 Naboisho English 
35 Dickson Kaelo Co-founder of KGS, community leader, PhD student, 
previously Basecamp Foundation’s project manager 
ID N 11.11.12 Narok English 
36 Nathaniel Robinson Manager of Olare and Motorogi Trust SSI Y 13.11.12 OOMT HQ English 
37 Debra Kaigil Community Based Facilitator for Basecamp Foundation’s 
microfinance project 
SSI Y 25.11.12 Mpuaai English & Swahili 
38 David Kerempe Head teacher of Talek Primary School SSI N 27.11.12 Talek English  
39 Lincoln Njiru African Impact Project Manager SSI Y 29.11.12 KGS English 
40 Peter Koya Community Health Officer, CMF SSI Y 31.11.12 Olesere 
Clinic 
English & Swahili 
41 Willy Loigero Endoinyo e Rinka Head Teacher SSI Y 3.12.12 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
English 
42 James Maina Assistant manager of Ol Seki Camp, Naboisho SSI Y 6.12.12 Naboisho English 
43 Francis Sakat Maternal Child Health Officer at the CMF Clinic in Talek SSI Y 7.12.12 Talek English 
44 Mike Kahiga Instructor at KGS SSI Y 11.12.12 KGS English 
45 Simon Nkoitoi Administrator at KGS SSI Y 11.12.12 KGS English 
46 Joseph Mpoe Project Co-ordinator SSI Y 11.12.12 KGS English 
47 Allan Earnshaw Chairman of Kenya Wildlife Trust ID N 18.1.13 Nairobi English 
48 Dickson Kaelo Co-founder of KGS, community leader, PhD student, 
previously Basecamp Foundation’s project manager 
SSI Y 22.1.13 KGS English 
49 Sarah Liaram Outreach Worker for Basecamp Foundation focusing on 
women’s microfinance groups 
SSI Y 23.1.13 KGS English 
50 Kijoolu Soit Neighbour in Olesere ID N 26.1.13 Olesere Maa (translated by 
Lorna Serseri) 
51 Irene Yiele Head teacher at Loigero Primary School SSI N 28.1.13 Mpuaai English  
52 Daniel Tasere Head teacher at Naserian Primary School SSI N 28.1.13 Osilale English & Swahili 
53 David Lang’at Head teacher at Mara Hills Academy SSI N 30.1.13 Mpuaai English 




54 Fred Mpooya Head teacher at Olkuroto Primary School SSI N 30.1.13 Olkuroto English & Swahili 
55 Rubin Njapit Community Health Worker at Koiyaki Community Clinic SSI Y 30.1.13 Talek English 




Y 2.2.13 Naboisho English 
57 Nathaniel Robinson Manager of Olare Motorogi Trust ID N 3.2.13 OOMT HQ English 
58 Ben Skelton Director of Dig Deep SSI Y 3.2.13 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
English 
59 Vincent Simpiri Nurse SSI Y 4.2.13 Endoinyo e 
Rinka 
English 
60 John Omae Head Teacher at Mbitin Primary School SSI N 4.2.13 Mbitin English & Swahili 
61 Moses Parayio Deputy Head Teacher at Nkoilale Primary School SSI Y 6.2.13 Nkoilale English 
62 Grace Naisenya OMT’s outreach worker focusing on conservation 
education in schools 
SSI Y 6.2.13 KGS English 
63 Lorna Serseri Research Assistant ID N 8.2.13 Olesere English 
64 Nelson Kirrokor Manager of Nkoilale Community Development 
Organisation, trained guide and OOC land committee 
member 
SSI Y 8.2.13 Nkoilale English 
65 Koya Family Host homestead for clients from Naboisho Camp SSI N 9.2.13 Enooronkon English 
66 Ali Mohammed Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Environment and 
Mineral Resources 




67 Noombarbali Soit Community Based Facilitator for Basecamp Foundation’s 
microfinance project 
SSI Y 10.2.13 Olesere  English 
68 Lorna Serseri Research Assistant ID N 12.2.13 Olesere English 
69 Allan Earnshaw Chairman of Kenya Wildlife Trust SSI Y 19.2.13 Nairobi  English 
70 Greg Monsen Kicheche Co-owner SSI Y 20.2.13 Nairobi English 
71 Nathalie Leen Kicheche Community Trust SSI Y 20.2.13 Nairobi English 
72 Sean Anderson African Encounter East Africa General Manager SSI Y 21.2.13 Nairobi  English 
73 Adrian Maarschalk African Encounter East Africa Operations Manager SSI Y 21.2.13 Nairobi  English 
74 Jake Grieves-Cook  Owner of Porini SSI Y 22.2.13 Nairobi  English 
75 Terry Davidson Chairman of OMT Board SSI Y 22.2.13 Nairobi English 
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76 Justin Heath Manager of Naboisho Conservancy SSI Y 1.3.13 Naboisho English 
77 Emma and Darren 
Geary 
Managers of Kicheche Bush Camp, OOC SSI Y 2.3.13 OOC English 
78 Cath Heath Consultant for Basecamp Foundation SSI Y 3.3.13 Naboisho English 
79 Dominic Sakat Trained guide and assistant for the Mara Naboisho Lion 
Project 
SSI Y 15.3.13 Olesere English 
80 Niels Mogensen Manager of Mara Naboisho Lion Project SSI Y 16.3.13 Olesere English 
81 Rob O’Meara Manager of Olare Motorogi Conservancy SSI Y 18.3.13 OMC HQ English  
82 Lorna Buchanan-
Jardine & Richard 
Pye 
Managers of Mara Plains Camp, OOC SSI Y 22.3.13 OOC English 
83 Geoffrey Mulwa Manager of Kempinski Olare Camp, OOC SSI Y 23.3.13 OOC English 
84 Dominic Koya Naboisho Conservancy Community Liaison Officer SSI Y 25.3.13 Enooronkon English 
85 Rusei ole Soit Community Leader in Olesere SSI Y 25.3.13 Olesere Maa (translated by 
Dominic Sakat) 
86 John Sengeny Chairman of Naboisho Conservancy’s Land Committee 
and Headteacher of Aitong Primary School 
SSI Y 26.3.13 OOMT HQ English 
87 Daniel Sopia Mara Representative  for the National Conservancies 
Forum, new OMT Community Facilitator and Morotogi 
Landowner 
SSI Y 26.3.13 OOMT HQ English 
88 Harry Maina Temporary Manager of Porini Lion Camp and Gold Safari 
Guide 
SSI Y 27.3.13 OOC English 
89 Annette Bulman General Manager Basecamp Explorer SSI Y 29.3.13 Naboisho  English 
90 Garry Cullen Managing Director of Hemingways Ol Seki Camp, 
Naboisho 
ID N 3.9.13 Naboisho English 
91 Gay Cullen Operations Director of Wells Fargo and PRI-Kenya 
secretary 
ID N 3.9.13 Naboisho English 
92 Afitap Shams 
Kartaloglu 
Hawksford 
Repeat volunteer at African Impact Volunteer Project ID N 7.9.13 Naboisho English 
93 Kasmira Cockerill Secretary for MMWCA and research coordinator ID N 7.9.13 Motorogi English 
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94 Rusei Ole Soit Community Leader in Olesere ID Y 8.9.13 Olesere Maa (translated by 
Dominic Sakat) 
95 Resian Letoluo Former research assistant, now OOMT outreach worker ID N 9.9.13 OOMT HQ English 
96 George Vaulkhard Administrator of OOMT ID N 9.9.13 OOMT HQ English 
97 Lorna Buchanan-
Jardine 
Manager Mara Plains Camp ID N 11.9.13 OOMT HQ English 
98 Justin Heath Manager of Naboisho Conservancy ID N 11.9.13 Naboisho English 
99 Allan Earnshaw Chairman of Kenya Wildlife Trust ID N 12.9.13  Predator Hub English 
100 George Vaulkhard 
and Lorna 
Buchanan-Jardine 
Administrator of OOMT and manager of Mara Plains 
Camp 
ID N 12.9.13 OOMT HQ English 
101 Rob O’Meara Manager of Olare Motorogi Conservancy ID N 15.9.13 OOC HQ English 
102 Gerard Beaton Country manager for Asilia Africa ID N 19.2.14 Naboisho English 
104 James Kaigil Assistant Manager of Olare Motorogi Conservancy ID N 28.2.14 OMC HQ English 
103 Rob O’Meara Manager of Olare Motorogi Conservancy ID N 10.3.14 OMC HQ English 
104 Dickson Kaelo CEO of KWCA SSI N 6.9.14 Nairobi English 




Appendix 3. Camera Participants (CP) 
 Name M/F Area 
1 Nooretet Yiale F Olesere 
2 Nkoeki Mwatata M Olesere 
3 Kimanyisho Sikona F Olesere 
4 Nasha Rakwa F Olesere 
5 Simon Taki M Olesere 
6 Nkaate Kuya M Enooronkon 
7 Noosokon Kaleku F Enooronkon 
8 Nesiamo Kuya F Enooronkon 
9 Faith Kereto F Enooronkon 
10 Dennis Lepore M Enooronkon 
11 Nairurari Karkar F Mbitin 
12 Nasuju Naurori F Mbitin 
13 Noormiseyieki Mpooya F Nkirgir 
14 Mary Solol F Mbitin 
15 Milton Karkar M Mbitin 
16 Mechanica Lolkumum M Endoinyo e Rinka 
17 Nashiloni Pesi F Endoinyo e Rinka 
18 School children M&F Endoinyo e Rinka 
19 Anna Matany F Olkuroto 
20 John Miyion M Olkuroto 
21 Entajiri Sananka F Mpuaai 
 
 
 
